Dive bombers to Ceylon 1942 (3 Viewers)

[Steamed_Banana]

In the case of Ceylon, Swordfish were involved in the battle. Right? That is something to go by.

 

[RCAFson]

As I already noted, the Swordfish was clearly superior to the TBD, which was almost as old. I would note, however, that is a very low bar.

Luckily for the US, they had the far more successful TBF / TBM available, which the British made heavy use of for some odd reason. Almost incomprehensible given the Sterling capabilities of the Swordfish and the Ablacore, not to mention the extraordinary Barracuda!

As for the "Merlin engined fighters" requested here... devil's in the details I guess?

I wonder why they didn't call for Seafires? Isn't that the best naval fighter of the war? Or was it the Sea Hurricane? Sea Gladiator? Fulmars!

How much more quickly would the Pacific War have been won if they had re-equipped the entire US fleet with Fulmars and Swordfish?

The TBF wasn't available until June 1942 and it was not a success as a TB until it was equipped with reliable torpedoes in mid 1944.

The F4F-4 was considerably outperformed by the Hurricane II and even the IB had a far superior climb rate and better performance at low altitude where most of the fighting occurred. I don't think the Seafire was a thing in June 1942.

Why would the USN want to re-equip with aircraft that the FAA itself considered to be obsolete in mid 1942?

 

[RCAFson]

In the case of Ceylon, Swordfish were involved in the battle. Right? That is something to go by.

They were caught by surprise whilst flying between bases.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

The TBF wasn't available until June 1942 and it was not a success as a TB until it was equipped with reliable torpedoes in mid 1944.

I would suggest that the US and indeed, the Fleet Air Arm combat histories contradict this view

However, I never suggested the TBF be applicable to this exact scenario. I can't imagine why you seem to suggest here that I did. I pointed out that it was available to the US Navy. For that matter, TBD were not available to the British for Ceylon either.

The F4F-4 was considerably outperformed by the Hurricane II and even the IB had a far superior climb rate and better performance at low altitude where most of the fighting occurred. I don't think the Seafire was a thing in June 1942.

Again, one wonders why the US didn't use the Hurricane, as magnificent as it was, or why the FAA itself, at the suggestion of it's own pilots, seemed to clearly prefer the F4F / FM1 / FM2?

I wonder why F4F had so much better of a combat record against the A6M and Ki-43 than the Hurricane II did, given the superority of the Hurricane?

Why would the USN want to re-equip with aircraft that the FAA itself considered to be obsolete in mid 1942?

I would ask the same about the Hurricane, but I must be crazy

 

[Steamed_Banana]

They were caught by surprise whilst flying between bases.

If not for that, surely they would have prevailed and wiped out the KB!

 

[EwenS]

Seafire Ib & IIc only started to arrive on the front line squadrons in June 1942. Their first operation was Torch in Nov.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I personally wouldn't advocate for the use of Seafires in this scenario.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I actually think the Wellington night attack is the best bet. If you can get a couple of squadrons with radar there in time.

 

[SaparotRob]

As I already noted in this thread, (which you somehow missed?) the Swordfish was clearly superior to the TBD, an obsolete aircraft almost as old. I would note, however, that is a very low bar.

Luckily for the US, they had the far more successful TBF / TBM available, which the British made heavy use of for some odd reason. Almost incomprehensible given the Sterling capabilities of the Swordfish and the Ablacore, not to mention the extraordinary Barracuda!

As for the "Merlin engined fighters" requested here... devil's in the details I guess? How unfortunate all they could find were a few P-40Fs and those new F4Us.

I wonder why they didn't call for Seafires? Isn't that the best naval fighter of the war? Or was it the Sea Hurricane? Sea Gladiator? Fulmars!

How much more quickly would the Pacific War have been won if they had re-equipped the entire US fleet with Fulmars and Swordfish?

The USN was in the process of reequipping torpedo squadrons with TBFs. There were 4 TBFs at Midway that were part of Torpedo 8 but had missed the boat. There's a second sole survivor of Torpedo 8 from this group (Thanks, Dave!) The Japanese had, rudely, not informed the US of their upcoming secret attack on PH. Had the JCS been properly informed, the change-over might have been sped up somewhat.

 

[SaparotRob]

Again, one wonders why the US didn't use the Hurricane, as magnificent as it was, or why the FAA itself, at the suggestion of it's own pilots, seemed to clearly prefer the F4F / FM1 / FM2?

They wouldn't have been available even if someone came up with that "interesting" idea.
What was that hooked Airacobra called again? The P-39 hasn't popped up in a while.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes, but after they dropped their bombs over the targets. Their mission was complete.

That is still 44% attrition, an entirely unsustainable rate. USN and IJN both had to spend time recuperating a month or so after each battle to overcome those sorts of losses. Fighting off a raid, okay, but remember, it wasn't clear that this was only a raid at that time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Aug 7 strike flew from Rabaul and ditched near Shortland Island.

Right, not a round-trip.

The only one it surpasses is the miserable Douglas Devastator, which was of similar vintage.

Even that beast could manage 175 miles with a torpedo ... which didn't often work.

 

[EwenS]

View attachment 854695

Ah, but let me help you a bit, this is for the geographically challenged, whether they be from your country, my country, or one of the many others represented in this forum. Most of whom already grasp this, like I assume the British planners in 1933 actually knew this fairly well, but from the context of the discussion it is not clear whether you are aware.

1 - The South China Sea
2- The Pacific Ocean, that vast body of water of which the South China Sea is a subset, technically a 'marginal sea of the Western pacific Ocean', according to Wikipedia.
3- The Aleutian islands, Alaska, US, for scale
4 - The Indian Ocean

The goal of an aircraft carrier is in fact to move around the seas and oceans. If one's goal is to sink enemy ships in range of land air bases, as was often possible in the Med and may in some cases be possible in the South China Sea, then you can use land based aircraft (most of which have vastly longer range than a Swordfish). But in naval combat, one presumes that the airbase, i.e. the aircraft carrier, is moving. That being key.

And in a combat between moving warships, even within the confines of the South China Sea (which covers 3,500,000 square kilometers) one will still need to outrange enemy aircraft, or at least come close to their range, otherwise your strike aircraft is dangerously obsolete really by definition, and your fleet sailing into treacherous waters in mortal peril. Like just a teensy bit further out into the vast Pacific or Indian Oceans which are contiguous bodies of water, the latter of which borders arguably the most important colonial holdings of the British Empire.

So once again, yes, a Swordfish was indeed probably adequate for 1933. Seven years later it's looking a little old. Nine years later it's looking positively creaky.



I did myself emphasize the ability to use the Swordish, in fact I think I introduced the concept to this very thread.

The ability to use radar on board aircraft, even painfully obsolete aircraft like the Swordfish, was a major achievement by the British, for which they should be (and by all appearances are) extremely proud.

However, the idea that one could rely on the enemy being unable to approach within range of their daylight bombers when they out-range your strike aircraft by hundreds of miles, and when their ships are even a fair bit faster over the water, is shall we say, an extremely optimistic way of looking at things.

No matter how much you want it to be the case, this

View attachment 854684

was not in the same league as this

View attachment 854689



Those Americans were clearly fools not to re-equip all of their navy squadrons with Swordfish and Sea-Hurricanes! I suspect this may have been only the latest by that time in a long series of dreadful mistakes they kept making, and might have been talked out of had they only been willing to listen.

Whether or not the SCS is or is not part of the Pacific, it is certainly not a vast area of open water like the main part of the Pacific east of the Philippines.

Free movement is heavily restricted by large areas of shoal water ready to catch out the unwary. Large areas are still oob for large vessels. Those are the bits China is attempting to claim today.

Try asking the crews of vessels like the sub USS Darter or the frigate HMS Aire.

 

[RCAFson]

I would suggest that the US and indeed, the Fleet Air Arm combat histories contradict this view

However, I never suggested the TBF be applicable to this exact scenario. I can't imagine why you seem to suggest here that I did. I pointed out that it was available to the US Navy. For that matter, TBD were not available to the British for Ceylon either.



Again, one wonders why the US didn't use the Hurricane, as magnificent as it was, or why the FAA itself, at the suggestion of it's own pilots, seemed to clearly prefer the F4F / FM1 / FM2?

I wonder why F4F had so much better of a combat record against the A6M and Ki-43 than the Hurricane II did, given the superority of the Hurricane?



I would ask the same about the Hurricane, but I must be crazy

You brought up the TBF...

You'll have to argue with Nimitz... The FAA's experience with the F4F variants was mixed. It had better range and endurance but it's climb rate was abysmal for a single seat fighter, which is the main complaint against it in the USN, and as I stated it was outperformed by the SHIB at low altitude. It's biggest advantage was that it had folding wings which was a big deal for the FAA as four of their fleet carriers in mid 1941 had lifts that were too small for a fixed wing aircraft.

In any event this is getting OT from the topic at hand.

I think most people here are respectful of others, so please stop with the emojis.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

There's quite a difference in the tactical situation for Zero's flying carrier CAP and land based fighters.

Not really. 1) the airfield or docks they're protecting aren't moving, meaning that the fighters to provide CAP must stay in place unless 2) they're willing to risk a second incoming strike while the CAP is off chasing the first.

With five opposing carriers mounting at least 250 operational aircraft, the RAF fighters had to be aware of the possibility of multiple strike waves and stay close to CAP coverage.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

You brought up the TBF...

yes, in a specific context, though this apparently was lost on you - we were at that point talking about the US navy. I brought up the Swordfish too in this thread.

You'll have to argue with Nimitz... The FAA's experience with the F4F variants was mixed. It had better range and endurance but it's climb rate was abysmal for a single seat fighter, which is the main complaint against it in the USN, and as I stated it was outperformed by the SHIB at low altitude. It's biggest advantage was that it had folding wings which was a big deal for the FAA as four of their fleet carriers in mid 1941 had lifts that were too small for a fixed wing aircraft.

Another possible advantage is that it had a roughly even (true) combat record against Ki-43 and A6M, which is not something that you can say for the Hurricane, for all of it's alleged superiority.

In any event this is getting OT from the topic at hand.

You ain't lyin there!

I think most people here are respectful of others, so please stop with the emojis.

I react the way the post makes me feel. Some of them are funny, whether intended that way or otherwise.

 

[RCAFson]

That is still 44% attrition, an entirely unsustainable rate. USN and IJN both had to spend time recuperating a month or so after each battle to overcome those sorts of losses. Fighting off a raid, okay, but remember, it wasn't clear that this was only a raid at that time.

Yes, but if they had hit and damaged or sunk Akagi, which navy/AF would consider the attrition rate too high? The real tragedy here, IMHO, was the RAF's opposition to tactical strike missions and the needed tactics and the reliance on level bombing. If we replace those 9 Blenheim with 9 Battles, each carrying 4 x 250lb bombs and attacking in a steep glide, I suspect that they would have had a fair chance of success.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Whether or not the SCS is or is not part of the Pacific, it is certainly not a vast area of open water like the main part of the Pacific east of the Philippines.

Free movement is heavily restricted by large areas of shoal water ready to catch out the unwary. Large areas are still oob for large vessels. Those are the bits China is attempting to claim today.
View attachment 854719



Try asking the crews of vessels like the sub USS Darter or the frigate HMS Aire.

The issue is whether it's a safe assumption in a naval war that a conflict would somehow be contained within this specific area, and never take place, for example, in the Indian Ocean or a bit further on the other side of Malaya, or a bit south of Java etc.

I don't really find that a credible suggestion. It may somehow be possible that the FAA thought this was credible, but that to me would be a reflection of yet another really bad decision made by the FAA. Which is more or less how they ended up with a biplane as their main torpedo bombing aircraft in the beginning of the war. And then replaced it with another one.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Yes, but if they had hit and damaged or sunk Akagi, which navy/AF would consider the attrition rate too high? The real tragedy here, IMHO, was the RAF's opposition to tactical strike missions and the needed tactics and the reliance on level bombing. If we replace those 9 Blenheim with 9 Battle, each carrying 4 x 250lb bombs and attacking in a steep glide, I suspect that they would have had a fair chance of success.

Perhaps. Or perhaps the maneuver might be noticed and the Battles torn up. I agree that a doctrinal objection to tactical air-support was not the RAF's shining moment here, though they did come around by 1944. Do we have any instance of Battles launching such an attack profile, against any target be it land or sea, successfully against such a CAP?

I'm no fighter pilot, but I'd imagine that if flying off from carriers, I'd be more focused on the threat from torpedo-bombers and DBs rather than level bombers, and that if my hunch is true, the Blenheims slipped through precisely because the Japanese CAP were focused on what they thought of as the ship-killers. That's only a guess, but let's be fair, it has every bit as much evidence as your own idea.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The issue is whether it's a safe assumption in a naval war that a conflict would somehow be contained within this specific area, and never take place, for example, in the Indian Ocean or a bit further on the other side of Malaya, or a bit south of Java etc.

I don't really find that a credible suggestion. It may somehow be possible that the FAA thought this was credible, but that to me would be a reflection of yet another really bad decision made by the FAA. Which is more or less how they ended up with a biplane as their main torpedo bombing aircraft in the beginning of the war. And then replaced it with another one.

The other thing is this: even as restricted as the South China Sea may be to heavy shipping, the fact is those ships can, did, and do operate there, and only a fool plans for what you think the enemy might do. Planning should accommodate enemy capabilities, not predilections. Doing otherwise leads to crap like Pearl Harbor or Darwin, or Operation C.