Dive bombers to Ceylon 1942 (1 Viewer)

[Steamed_Banana]

Perhaps. Or perhaps the maneuver might be noticed and the Battles torn up. I agree that a doctrinal objection to tactical air-support was not the RAF's shining moment here, though they did come around by 1944.

I'd say they clearly came around in 1942, or they wouldn't have won 2nd Alamein

Do we have any instance of Battles launching such an attack profile, against any target be it land or sea, successfully against such a CAP?

I'm no fighter pilot, but I'd imagine that if flying off from carriers, I'd be more focused on the threat from torpedo-bombers and DBs rather than level bombers, and that if my hunch is true, the Blenheims slipped through precisely because the Japanese CAP were focused on what they thought of as the ship-killers. That's only a guess, but let's be fair, it has every bit as much evidence as your own idea.

seems plausible, but random luck also plays a role, I suspect. There wasn't that much CAP up either.

USN made bigger blunders a few times with a lot more CAP flying

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'd say they clearly came around in 1942, or they wouldn't have won 2nd Alamein

A fair correction, though my understanding is that this mindset was pretty local to North Africa and took time to percolate through RAF hierarchy, with the result culminating in 2TAF over NW ETO where it was perfected.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

A fair correction, though my understanding is that this mindset was pretty local to North Africa and took time to percolate through RAF hierarchy, with the result culminating in 2TAF over NW ETO where it was perfected.

I am not sure of the details of that, though it seems like some of these lessons were also applied in Burma, both by the British and the Americans.

I'm sure there was a degree of institutional lag though.

 

[Admiral Beez]

That is still 44% attrition, an entirely unsustainable rate. USN and IJN both had to spend time recuperating a month or so after each battle to overcome those sorts of losses. Fighting off a raid, okay, but remember, it wasn't clear that this was only a raid at that time.

An 100% loss rate on a one way mission that cripples even one IJN carrier is worth the loss of all the Blenheims, Skuas and Chesapeakes and their crews we can muster. Nagumo is going to hightail it out of the area and never again venture into the Indian Ocean. He's got bigger fish to fry at Coral Sea and Midway, and now he's a carrier short.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I am not sure of the details of that, though it seems like some of these lessons were also applied in Burma, both by the British and the Americans.

I'm sure there was a degree of institutional lag though.

I don't know much about RAF ops in Italy and that may be where the local started becoming institutional?

I know that American air power started working at ground support in earnest by the end of 1942/early 1943, and that DAF tactics were an influence; and that in the PTO Americans were trying to apply CAS to the battlefield as well though without so much experience shared from the RAF as in MTO.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

An 100% loss rate on a one way mission that cripples even one IJN carrier is worth the loss of all the Blenheims, Skuas and Chesapeakes and their crews we can muster. Nagumo is going to hightail it out of the area and never again venture into the Indian Ocean. He's got bigger fish to fry at Coral Sea and Midway, and now he's a carrier short.

Perhaps, but remember, after losing four carriers at Midway, Nagumo led forces of three carriers not once but twice into battle in the Solomons. The idea that one crippled carrier will scare the Japanese off is not really borne out. That only happened at Coral Sea because the other carrier had lost so many airframes ... and the Shoho had been sunk.

And further to the point, Nagumo had nothing to do with Coral Sea except for donating CarDiv5 to Adm Inouye. Strategery is above his pay-grade. The clusterfuck at Midway belongs to Yamamoto and his staff, in great proportion.

 

[RCAFson]

Perhaps. Or perhaps the maneuver might be noticed and the Battles torn up. I agree that a doctrinal objection to tactical air-support was not the RAF's shining moment here, though they did come around by 1944. Do we have any instance of Battles launching such an attack profile, against any target be it land or sea, successfully against such a CAP?

I'm no fighter pilot, but I'd imagine that if flying off from carriers, I'd be more focused on the threat from torpedo-bombers and DBs rather than level bombers, and that if my hunch is true, the Blenheims slipped through precisely because the Japanese CAP were focused on what they thought of as the ship-killers. That's only a guess, but let's be fair, it has every bit as much evidence as your own idea.

The Battles were used in France and, to lesser extent in Africa for tactical strike/glide bombing missions. Anyways we have lots of examples of IJN CAP entirely failing to intercept SDBs prior to them beginning their attack dives.

On 10 12 May 1940, 5 Battles attacked the Vroenhoeven bridge which measured 370 x 30ft, and they succeeded in knocking it down with 250lb bomb hits, although all 5 Battles were shot down by a combination of dense flak and Luftwaffe fighters.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Battles were used in France and, to lesser extent in Africa for tactical strike/glide bombing missions. Anyways we have lots of examples of IJN CAP entirely failing to intercept SDBs prior to them beginning their attack dives.

I don't agree with "lots of examples" of IJN CAP "entirely failing". At Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz, SBDs suffered losses, sometimes in their dives, because IJN fighter pilots in that era were well-trained, very experienced, and just as dedicated to mission.

We all know Battles were used to attack land targets in ETO, but you didn't mention anything about their mission effectiveness. Care to lay out loss-rates versus results? Do we have an example where Battles attacked a defended target, got the job done, and skedaddled without getting shot to Hell and gone?

On 10 May 1940, 5 Battles attacked the Vroenhoeven bridge which measured 370 x 30ft, and they succeeded in knocking it down with 250lb bomb hits, although all 5 Battles were shot down by a combination of dense flak and Luftwaffe fighters.

Okay, there's one example, albeit that all five were lost in the effort. How much CAP did that bridge have, and what's the breakdown on losses by cause?

Mind you, dear reader, I'm not belittling the valiance or skill of those crews. But I doubt that the Fairey is a good answer in 1942 against any opponent fielding decent fighters or flak crewed by trained personnel.

As an aside, I'd point out that any bridge that can be put down by 250-lb bombs can't be that strong. To be sure, even 250-lb bombs could damage the Japanese carriers in Op C, but first you've got to get those bombs on target, and second you'd better hope they hit something flammable or explosive.

 

[RCAFson]

I don't agree with "lots of examples" of IJN CAP "entirely failing". At Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz, SBDs suffered losses, sometimes in their dives, because IJN fighter pilots in that era were well-trained, very experienced, and just as dedicated to mission.

We all know Battles were used to attack land targets in ETO, but you didn't mention anything about their mission effectiveness. Care to lay out loss-rates versus results? Do we have an example where Battles attacked a defended target, got the job done, and skedaddled without getting shot to Hell and gone?



Okay, there's one example, albeit that all five were lost in the effort. How much CAP did that bridge have, and what's the breakdown on losses by cause?

Mind you, dear reader, I'm not belittling the valiance or skill of those crews. But I doubt that the Fairey is a good answer in 1942 against any opponent fielding decent fighters or flak crewed by trained personnel.

As an aside, I'd point out that any bridge that can be put down by 250-lb bombs can't be that strong. To be sure, even 250-lb bombs could damage the Japanese carriers in Op C, but first you've got to get those bombs on target, and second you'd better hope they hit something flammable or explosive.

The attrition rates are irrelevant because the Luftwaffe and German Army knew that the bridges would be targets and they reacted accordingly, especially as the Battles were sent in several days after the bridges had been captured. Any other available aircraft type making tactical strikes against those bridges would have suffered severely. The key point is that this bridge was 1/6 of the area of an IJN fleet carrier and 5 Battles took it out. The Battle doesn't have to be state of the art in 1942, it just has to be in the right place at the right time.

At Coral Sea the first 3 SBDs attacked Shoho with no CAP opposition.

From Lundstrom:

The Japanese air officers had to coordinate their combat air patrol without the incalculable advantage of early warning by means of radar. Standard procedure was to retain most of the fighters on deck until the enemy had been spotted, then scramble the remaining Zeros for a close interception. Thus the Japanese CAP system required high visibility to operate at best efficiency....

...After a flight of only an hour and fifteen minutes, Burch was rewarded with the sight of MO Striking Force. At 1032, The Yorktown SBDs spotted what they thought were two carriers, a battleship, three heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers or destroyers crossing an open area on course 190 degrees, speed 20 knots. The Yorktown pilots had been aided by the enemy's mad dash at 30 knots and a brisk tailwind. Burch carefully led his twenty-four SBDs closer to the ships, using cloud cover to conceal his approach. Skirting the edge of a cloud mass, Burch moved to take position upwind of the Japanese force. By 1049, he had attained excellent position just southeast of the enemy carriers, where he waited impatiently for Torpedo Five to arrive so the two elements could coordinate their attacks for maximum shock value and mutual protection. As the lumbering Devastators were still some distance away, the SBDs had to wait, circling at the edge of the clouds. From their perch at 17,000 feet the crews could see to the north and below a number of Zeros circling lazily at perhaps 12,000 feet over the nearest flattop. MO Striking Force continued steaming southward at high speed, and the Zuikaku and her escorts began to disappear into the black squall line marking the southern terminus of the open area. Soon both Japanese carriers, the only targets worth attacking, would be lost to view inside rainstorms. Over the radio Burch fretted, pleading with Taylor to "Bear a hand because time's a wastin!"6​ He could do nothing until Taylor replied that he had spotted the target.

While enemy dive bombers milled about nearly overhead, the Japanese were oblivious to their presence. The Shōkaku completed air operations by 1030 and warily waited for something to happen. The Zeros spotted by Burch over the Shōkaku were Okabe and wingman PO3c Tanaka Yoshizō; Iwamoto flew at much greater height over the Zuikaku. At lower level near the Shōkaku were the five Zeros led by PO1c Minami and PO1c Miyazawa. Ready to take off was Ensign (Special Service) Abe and PO1c Kawanishi Jinichirō. Likewise poised on board the Zuikaku for instant launch was the Zuikaku's fighter leader, Lieut. Okajima, with four Zeros of his large 11th Shōtai.

Midway:

When Massey swung north to chase the Hiryū, the flagship Akagi at 1020 gave the signal to launch planes. Ten minutes or so later the four flight decks would be cleared of strike planes. Almost simultaneously with her message, her lookouts spotted American dive bombers poised over the Kaga! The CAP was totally unprepared for a dive bombing attack. In contrast to the two previous torpedo attacks (VT-8 and VT-6), there were now no fighters held in reserve. All had swarmed eagerly after Torpedo Three or Thach's Wildcats.

McClusky at 1022 pushed over on the Kaga, the westernmost of the four carriers. The flattop heeled into a sharp evasive turn, but she could not evade the onslaught of twenty-five SBDs. Gallaher's Scouting Six followed McClusky down, and, by mistake, most of Bombing Six piled on as well. The Akagi commenced launching Zeros, holding course into the wind to launch aircraft. Best went after her with five SBDs from Bombing Six. Meanwhile, the first of four bombs slammed into the Kaga, preventing the launch of her strike group of three Zeros and twenty-seven carrier attack planes. Flaming aircraft and explosions soon turned the Kaga's flight deck into an inferno and doomed the vessel. The Akagi's time had also come. At 1025, the first Zero started down her flight deck, but Best's five SBDs already hurtled toward her. His pilots secured two 1,000-lb. bomb hits, one detonating in the midst of the eighteen carrier attack planes spotted aft on deck for launch. Like the Kaga, the fleet flagship had taken mortal damage.

Eastern Solomons:

At 1550 Kirn's squadron pushed over from 14,000 feet against the Ryūjō. No Zeros intervened...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The attrition rates are irrelevant because the Luftwaffe and German Army knew that the bridges would be targets and they reacted accordingly, especially as the Battles were sent in several days after the bridges had been captured.

In the context of this conversation, attrition rates matter greatly, because, as I've already pointed out, the British did not know this Japanese incursion was a temporary raid in force. If you want to put light bombers like the Battle into this, you'll need to consider survivability.

In any air battle -- indeed, in any battle at all -- attrition rate matters -- unless and until you are yourself willing to quit the field ... and even then, your decision is going to be driven in part by (wait for it) attrition.

Get those five Battles up over KdB and let us know how it goes.

Any other available aircraft type making tactical strikes against those bridges would have suffered severely. The key point is that this bridge was 1/6 of the area of an IJN fleet carrier and 5 Battles took it out. The Battle doesn't have to be state of the art in 1942, it just has to be in the right place at the right time.

A big point you're eliding is that bridges don't actually sail at 27 kts while doing evasive maneuvers. This makes your comparison, to use the British lexicon, chalk and cheese. We're talking about sending them out against carriers in the Indian Ocean with organic air defense sailing on unpredictable routes.

At Coral Sea the first 3 SBDs attacked Shoho with no CAP opposition.

From Lundstrom:








Eastern Solomons:

I never wrote that no SBDs ever got a clear shot. Go back and reread what I wrote, for context and content rather than argumentation. Thanks in advance.

 

[ThomasP]

FWIW

The main failings of the Swordfish (as a design) relative to operations in the open ocean, were its speed and the lack of significant protection (no SSFT and little or no armour).

As is (as was?), the early-war Swordfish (no SSFT) only had about 25-50 miles less ROA with a torpedo or bombs than the early-war SBD (with SSFT) - albeit at a much slower cruise speed (about 55 mph less than the SBD). The problem with the non-SSFT arrangement is that fitting SSFT would have reduced the amount of fuel carried (minus 25%?) to such a degree that the range would no longer be acceptable. As mentioned up-thread, the FAA/RN figured the Swordfish (with a 1000-1500 lb load) had a 225-250 mile ROA. The USN figured the SBD (with a 1000 lb bomb) was good for about 250-300 miles ROA. The ranges I mention here are from the RN/FAA and USN planning charts.

Additionally, the potential effects of the all-weather operating capabilities of the Swordfish should not be underestimated - either in the ETO/MTO or the PTO - especially if you throw in ASV, although the time period of this thread might be too early for ASV. Dive bombing usually required daytime operations, but glide-bombing and torpedo attacks did not (at least not for the FAA).

The Albacore had SSFT and some armour protection, along with a ROA equal to the SBD - again at a much lower cruise speed (20-30 mph less) than the SBD.

 

[EwenS]

Hi

This is just to point out the RAF was not picking off isolated ships that had poor defensive capabilities, it was a very dangerous occupation. It would have been nice to have a Beaufighter equipped Strike Wing plus lots more fighters out in Ceylon, but it was too early in the war to be able to do that and would still have been costly unless there were enough allied aircraft to overwhelm the Japanese carrier force air element, that would need a lot of aircraft not a few obsolete types.

Mike

And if it didn't go well the losses could be heavy. "Black Friday" 9th Feb 1945. 31/32 Beaus dispatched with an escort of 10/12 Mustang III (P-51B/C).

7 Beaus shot down by flak, plus 2 and a Mustang to Fw 190, another pair crash landed back at Dallachy and many more damaged. Mustangs claimed 4/5 of the 12 Fw 190 involved.

Black Friday (1945) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The first torpedo carrying Beaufighters went to 254 squadron in Sept 1942. It teamed up with 236 squadron to form the first CC strike wing at North Coates in Lincolnshire in November 1942. Their first operation as a wing that month did not go well (3 aircraft lost for a tug of 449 tons). The result was that the wing was withdrawn from the front line until new tactics could be worked out and intensive training undertaken to ensure attacks could be well co-ordinated. Their successes began in April 1943 after they returned to the fray with an extra squadron added to the wing.

The message was clear. You can't simply take a couple of squadrons, call them a wing and expect to achieve great results.

 

[yulzari]

Thoughts so far.

We seem to have shifted the discussion from the OP to what would be the best aeroplanes to hit the Japanese fleet and away from what could have been put into place in time to actually be in Ceylon without magically making superior aeroplanes available and in service and instantly teleported from the UK to Ceylon.

Strategically I see this action as being similar to the War of 1812. In both cases the British simply want to make the naughty enemy go away and stop it. In the western Indian Ocean, as in North America, the naughty people went away and never came back. That was for a whole raft of reasons but essentially the Pacific and China Seas became a higher priority to the Japanese who saw no benefit in seriously contesting the Bay of Bengal, and indeed the Indian Ocean. A factor in this was that the Japanese fleet that attacked Ceylon was itself assaulted. Not with significant results but it was engaged. That it was engaged with obsolete aeroplanes only emphasised the expectation that those would be replaced by superior bombers and torpedo bombers and escorted by modern fighters. Ceylon remained a major naval base and the Royal Navy did not withdraw to East Africa or the Arabian Sea. Sensibly the Royal Navy had made plans to do so if necessary should the need arrive and invading the French in Operation Ironclad (with Stream, Line and Jane) supported the viability of that contingency.

On the basis that he who holds the field of battle at the end has won then the winner was the Commonwealth which could freely use the Bay of Bengal whilst the Japanese could not.

The OP specifically asks for how might dive bombers get to have been used against the Indian Ocean Raid. This involves taking into account what dive bombers there were available, the logistics timeline to have them in place with all the parrots and monkeys and to explore what AH decisions might be necessary to achieve this on time to locate and engage the Japanese.

The Middle East is hotly engaging the Axis in North Africa and has just been invading Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon having cleared out Italian East Africa and a costly unsuccessful campaign to defend Greece. The Royal Navy is flat out fighting the Battle of the Atlantic and disputing control of the Mediterranean. The Middle East is screaming for more and more modern aeroplanes for the continuing fight. As a measure, when the Middle East was pressed to send on aeroplanes to Malaya pre 1942, all they could offer was a couple of squadrons worth of Gladiators and some Hart variants as surplus to their needs. Even from the Middle East we are looking at a 12,000km sea journey between Egypt and Ceylon lengthened by convoy speeds and zig-zagging to put off submarine attacks. Not that much different to the steaming distance from the UK to Ceylon.

Actually available in any numbers dive bombers at the end of 1941 are limited to Skuas, Rocs, Battles, Swordfish, Albacores and Chesapeakes. All of these either have dive brakes or have dive speeds limited by inherent design. These would have to be in place, in service, from all weather airfields, with all support and aircrew by the end of March 1942. To do that we need PoD changes to bring the decision in sufficient time to gather everything together and ship it 12,000km away to the other side of the world in contested waters where merchant shipping is regularly being lost. For example it took three attempts to get a vital piece of machinery to the UK until the third made it ashore and the Twin Wasp engines for the Beaufort MkII ended up at the bottom of the Atlantic.

Yes these are all vulnerable to fighter attacks but the alternative is to not to engage the Japanese. War is cruel but if you add all the potential aircrew together you have barely the numbers of just one infantry company. The task is to bomb the Japanese raiders. Coming back and trying again is a welcome bonus. Very harsh but true. Much as I would like to send them out in Korean War Fairey Fireflies escorted by Hawker Sea Furies what we had in December 1941 is what there is.

The Japanese were not invading Ceylon but carrying out a reconnaissance in force to see what response the defenders could make, and do any incidental damage. They were deterred from again doing the same in such force. Had Ceylon received contemporary dive bombers from existing stocks then more damage would have been done in identical to OTL circumstances but the overall strategic result would be much the same but with more Japanese losses and less Royal Navy ones. Escorting fighters would be nice but the fighter priority in India was combat over the land defence of India 3,000km away and we are talking of range limited Hurricanes and Mohawks. Even if they had such fighters in quantity their role would be close defence of the naval facilities ie combat over Ceylon itself.

Given that we have to attack the Japanese fleet with unescorted aeroplanes and that they would be slow, 'dive bomber' precision would increase the damage caused without making air losses worse than the OTL level bombing. Our task is to examine what could actually be put in place and what and when decisions need to be made to make it so.

I would suggest as a PoD that plans to defend Malaya etc. sensibly include provision for having to withdraw to India and that include a priority for ASV equipped Wellington torpedo bombers based in Ceylon for night radar guided torpedo attacks. That to be triggered by an invasion of Malaya. Just about-ish possible by the plan requiring it as soon as war with Japan begins so skipping some of the decision making lags. ASV Wellington production is already spoken for and there would be screams of rage from Coastal Command and the Middle East if their Wellingtons were taken away from them to go to Ceylon. I would not like to be the officer presenting the concept to their Airships in the heat of 1941 struggles.

As an aside I wonder if any Malayan airfields were all weather capable of hosting torpedo Wellingtons?

As another aside what if the RAF Chief of Air Staff offer in mid 1941 of 21 Gloster Gladiators to Malaya were instead sent to Ceylon to protect the naval and air bases there. Would they usefully engage the Japanese bombers over Ceylon?

 

[Admiral Beez]

Perhaps, but remember, after losing four carriers at Midway, Nagumo led forces of three carriers not once but twice into battle in the Solomons. The idea that one crippled carrier will scare the Japanese off is not really borne out. That only happened at Coral Sea because the other carrier had lost so many airframes ... and the Shoho had been sunk.

And further to the point, Nagumo had nothing to do with Coral Sea except for donating CarDiv5 to Adm Inouye. Strategery is above his pay-grade. The clusterfuck at Midway belongs to Yamamoto and his staff, in great proportion.

I didn't suggest that Nagumo would run scared after losing a carrier at Ceylon, only that he'd not return due to commitments elsewhere. It would be interesting to see what key learnings about fleet air defence and reconnaissance Nagumo and his air bosses take away from their Indian Ocean experience as they head into the Coral Sea and Midway campaigns.

 

[EwenS]

I didn't suggest that Nagumo would run scared after losing a carrier at Ceylon, only that he'd not return due to commitments elsewhere. It would be interesting to see what key learnings about fleet air defence and reconnaissance Nagumo and his air bosses take away from their Indian Ocean experience as they head into the Coral Sea and Midway campaigns.

The KB had little opportunity to consider anything before Midway due to their operational tempo and were destined to repeat the mistakes from early operations at Midway.

On 19th April, while on their way back to Japan, Cardiv 5 (Shokaku & Zuikaku) was detached to participate in Operation MO against Port Moresby. Arrived Truk on 25th & sailed on 1st May to participate in Battle of Coral Sea. Shokaku reached Japan on 17th May for a month of repairs. Zuikaku reached Japan on 21st.

On 18th April the Doolittle raiders hit Tokyo.

Japanese reaction to this included redirecting AkagI, Hiryu & Soryu from a position just north of the Philippines on a wild goose chase to try to intercept the US task group. As a result they didn't arrive back in Japan until 22nd April. They left again on 27th May to participate in Operation MI, Midway. There was an awful lot of work needed done in that month to prepare for the next operation as the ships had been at sea for a long time. Air Groups required bringing up to strength and training to work together as a team with the replacements.

And then there was all the planning to be done / absorbed for MI. A series of war game exercises were held on board Yamato 1-5 May in which all the senior officers participated. Reading "Shattered Sword" about those it seems to have been more of a rubber stamping exercise than anything else, with the aviators being particularly cocky. Nagumo was simply referring any aviation matters to his senior officer Genda. To make matters worse Coral Sea was still being seen as a victory for Japan when Shokaku pulled into port.

Kaga was under repair until 4th May and then involved in training her air group and preparing for Midway.

For me there are three mistakes apparent in Operation C that were repeated at Midway with disastrous consequences.

1. Poor reconnaissance plans
2. Indecision about the strength of strikes and then chopping and changing of intentions for the part held back with the need to change weapon loads.
3. Widely spread carriers which, while good for operating aircraft, made TG defence harder.

I'm not sure if anything changed after Midway or not. But 1943 saw both USN & IJN carry out major overhauls of their carrier tactics.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I didn't suggest that Nagumo would run scared after losing a carrier at Ceylon, only that he'd not return due to commitments elsewhere.

That's pretty much what actually happened historically, without any damaging strike.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

In the context of this conversation, attrition rates matter greatly, because, as I've already pointed out, the British did not know this Japanese incursion was a temporary raid in force. If you want to put light bombers like the Battle into this, you'll need to consider survivability.

In any air battle -- indeed, in any battle at all -- attrition rate matters -- unless and until you are yourself willing to quit the field ... and even then, your decision is going to be driven in part by (wait for it) attrition.

Get those five Battles up over KdB and let us know how it goes.



A big point you're eliding is that bridges don't actually sail at 27 kts while doing evasive maneuvers. This makes your comparison, to use the British lexicon, chalk and cheese. We're talking about sending them out against carriers in the Indian Ocean with organic air defense sailing on unpredictable routes.

Some a fair bit faster than that!

I never wrote that no SBDs ever got a clear shot. Go back and reread what I wrote, for context and content rather than argumentation. Thanks in advance.

SBDs got in a few successful attacks flying as scouts, often coming out of a cloud by surprise, dropping bombs and then running. These were with very highly trained USN crews (you don't see the USMC let alone the Army pilots pulling this kind of thing off with essentially the same plane) and hinges on the ability to fly long search missions while carrying bombs.

 

[EwenS]

In the aftermath of Operation C a number of planning papers were drawn up in late April which took account of all the intelligence then to hand. Those on the scene then, and contrary to what we know now, considered it entirely credible that Japan would return to the IO in an attempt to invade Ceylon. Pleas were made to the US for help in the IO for the next 2-3 months. But the USN was stretched and was unable to help.

The vital thing from a British perspective was to hold on to the ME to help maintain its links to India/Australia/ New Zealand and the oil from the Persian Gulf. That meant controlling the western part of the IO. To that end the main base of THE EASTERN FLEET WAS WITHDRAWN TO KILINDINI IN KENYA and it remained so for the rest of 1942 and into 1943. From the Admiralty War Diary of the Fleet 23rd April.

" 33. At subsequent meetings the general organisation and administration of the Eastern Fleet and East Indies Station were discussed and it was agreed that so long as the Indian Ocean remained the main theatre of operations for the Eastern Fleet, it would be appropriate and convenient to make the following changes.

(a). Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet to become Deputy Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, headquarters at Kilindini

(b). Commander in Chief, East Indies to be replaced by a Flag Officer at Ceylon

(c). The Title of Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy to be changed to Flag Officer India with a second Flag Officer as Deputy and in charge of operations.

(d). Control of trade on the Indian coast and defence of the Persian Gulf to be taken over by the Flag Officer India.

Proposals to this effect were made in my 1443 and 1728 of 28th April.

34. Other meetings were also held between my staff and that of Commander in Chief, East Indies, to decide a number of administration problems which had arisen consequent on Colombo being no longer suitable as a main base for the Eastern Fleet. Time did not permit of all these matters being so fully considered as I could have wished. No doubt Their Lordships will fully appreciate the difficulties which have arisen as the result of the new situation created in the Indian Ocean where we are forced to temporarily abandon Ceylon as a fleet base and rely on undefended ports in East Africa and in the islands in the West Indian Ocean, none of which have proper administrative staffs. A considerable amount of administration now undertaken by Commander in Chief, East Indies will of necessity, have to be transferred to Kilindini and the building up of a new organisation will be a lengthy process and result in inevitable delays."

That doesn't mean that it didn't use Colombo or Trincomalee as the need arose. And it doesn't mean that Somerville sat at Kilindini and did nothing. At the same time a number of airfields were being constructed around Nairobi to support the FAA on the Easter Fleet carriers. A study of the various ship histories will show how much time they were spending at Kilindini v ports in Ceylon.

As the months passed tensions eased as the Japanese began to be weakened by defeats at Coral Sea and Midway. Whenever possible Somerville patrolled towards the eastern IO mostly with the faster ships (Force A) built around the carriers while the older and slower ships remained at Kilindini. So for example there was Operation Stab in July/Aug as a diversion, at US request, for Operation Watchtower at Guadalcanal.

Operation Stab - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And he operated in the central IO as cover during the later Madagascar operations in Sept in case of IJN intervention.

Somerville was also hampered by the gradual withdrawal of his more modern ships. Ships from other fleets "borrowed" for Ironclad were returned to where they came from. Indomitable left in July to participate in Operation Pedestal. Formidable left at the end of Aug to refit at Home and then go to the Med. The Dutch ships (AA cruiser & 2 N class destroyers) left for SWPA at Fremantle in Oct 1942. Illustrious left in early January 1943 to refit at Home and become the Home Fleet carrier in place of Victorious (on loan to the USN in the Pacific at their request). Valiant left for home at the end of Jan 1943. Warspite left for home in April.

He was also short of destroyers. Oct 1942 saw a U-boat pack operating around southern Africa until Dec. Due to a shortage of AS escorts in the region, he was forced to give up as many destroyers as he could to ASW operations. The result was that the Eastern Fleet had to spend much of its time in harbour at Kilindini.

Things only started to improve for the Eastern Fleet after the Italian surrender. Somerville had been able to return his HQ to Colombo on 4th Sept 1943. The 4th Sub Flotilla and it's depot ship Adamant was able to return to Ceylon at the end of the month. The old battleships and cruisers went home at the end of 1943 / early 1944. Things really began to change with the arrival at Trincomalee in Jan 1944 of Illustrious, Renown, Valiant & Queen Elizabeth.

 

[EwenS]

Some a fair bit faster than that!

View attachment 854799

And contrary to popular opinion carriers don't go haring about the oceans at anything like their maximum speeds. Usual operating speeds are 15 to 25 knots +/- a knot or two.

Burns up far too much fuel, especially for the escorts that have to keep up. If needed they can put a spurt on to operate aircraft but then they will return to that lower TG speed.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

FWIW

The main failings of the Swordfish (as a design) relative to operations in the open ocean, were its speed and the lack of significant protection (no SSFT and little or no armour).

As is (as was?), the early-war Swordfish (so SSFT) only had about 25-50 miles less ROA with a torpedo or bombs than the early-war SBD (with SSFT) - albeit at a much slower cruise speed (about 55 mph less than the SBD). The problem with the non-SSFT arrangement is that fitting SSFT would have reduced the amount of fuel carried (minus 25%?) to such a degree that the range would no longer be acceptable. As mentioned up-thread, the FAA/RN figured the Swordfish (with a 1000-1500 lb load) had a 225-250 mile ROA. The USN figured the SBD (with a 1000 lb bomb) was good for about 250-300 miles ROA. The ranges I mention here are from the RN/FAA and USN planning charts.

That's true, but the numbers are bit deceptive.

First, when it comes to radius, the ranges get compressed.
Second, thesee are conservative figures for carrier ops, though I think you are being generous to both aircraft.
Third, regardless, 50-75 miles is a fairly big difference in combat.
Fourth, these figures vary based on the specific type. Total range for the Swordfish was 546 muiles with a torpedo. SBD range is listed as anywhere from 733 miles (with a heavy load of bombs) to 1325 miles. 1,115 is usually the median.

Strike radius for SBD was effectively 175 miles with a 1,650 lb or 1,000 lb bomb on the centerline and up to 650 lbs more bombs in the wings, and 250 miles with a 500 lb and two smaller bombs on the wings. But that could be and was pushed. How far varied depending on weather, time of day, planned position of friendly carriers, and whether they were flying from a land base vs a carrier.

The SBD could range to 325 miles with one 500 lb bomb, on the 'Scout bombing' missions. At the Battle of the Phillipine Sea in 1944, the IJN fleet was 275 miles away. They sent out 95 Hellcat fighters, 51 Helldivers, 54 Avengers (carrying bombs) and 26 SBDs. 80 US aircraft had to ditch or crashed during landings while short on fuel, but none of the SBDs apparently ditched.

Additionally, the potential effects of the all-weather operating capabilities of the Swordfish should not be underestimated - either in the ETO/MTO or the PTO - especially if you throw in ASV, although the time period of this thread might be too early for ASV. Dive bombing usually required daytime operations, but glide-bombing and torpedo attacks did not (at least not for the FAA).

I think a night time torpedo attack is a viable strategy, if the KB comes into range. Do you have any thoughts on using a Wellington in this role?

The Albacore had SSFT and some armour protection, along with a ROA equal to the SBD - again at a much lower cruise speed (20-30 mph less) than the SBD.

I don't think the range was actually equal. History of War puts it at 710 miles with a torpedo, to 930 miles without.

SBDs also could and did survive fights with A6Ms, I do not rate the chances of the Ablacore as much more than nil in that scenario, at least in daylight. Their only hope would be hiding in a big thunderstorm or fog bank, or the A6Ms running out of ammunition. And I think the A6M doesn't need it's cannons to score a kill on an Albacore.