Dive vs Torpedo Bomber

[Admiral Beez]

I'm not sure that using a Swordfish in the TB role was safer than using it as a DB

With limited CAG sizes I can see the benefit of having the dual option with one aircraft type.

 

[RCAFson]

With limited CAG sizes I can see the benefit of having the dual option with one aircraft type.

It doesn't really matter how big your CAG is, having a single type that can do both roles is always preferable.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It doesn't really matter how big your CAG is, having a single type that can do both roles is always preferable.

IDK. Had the Nakajima B5N been only torpedo-capable they might not have been caught wrong-footed on deck between torp 2 bomb swaps at Midway.

Though I think the Kate was a level bomber only, and I suppose all carrier torpedo bombers are level bomb capable.

 

[kitplane01]

The Avenger wasn't stressed for divebombing and stressing the airframe for divebombing and adding divebrakes would have added considerable weight. OTOH, the SB2C was stressed for divebombing, and when the SC2C-4/5 appeared, along with rapid torpedo carrying conversion kits, then there were calls to ditch the TBF/TBM and use the SB2C-4/5 in both roles.

Wrong example on my part. Rephrasing.

Why not put shackels that can also hold a torpedo on a Dauntless, and use that as both a dive/torpedo bomber? The carrier air wing eliminates one aircraft type, which must help the parts supply. The Navy can have one fewer type to train pilots and mechanics. The carrier air wing can do a max effort dive bomb, or a max effort torpedo bomb, or mix it up.

I'm asking is there any advantage to having two types, because having one type does have advantages?

You wrote they were considering it late in the war. Was there a reason not to consider the same issue earlier in the war, or before the war?

My best guess, this was just a mistake (but that happens, especially in decisions made with limited information).

 

[stona]

I didn't say they weren't DB capable, but that the Brits didn't use dedicated dive bombers like the USN or IJN. Swordfish and Albacore were torpedo-DB, same as the Barracuda I listed above as an example of the type, but I suppose for clarity I should have listed them all. Mind, you don't get much speed or element of surprise diving a Stringbag. If I'm sending a dozen Swordfish against an armoured warship, I want torpedoes not bombs.

The job of sinking enemy ships was not solely the Royal Navy's, it was a job eagerly embraced by the newly independent Royal Air Force. The large AP and SAP bombs specifically to sink ships were designed and built and almost all bomber specifications of the inter-war years included the ability to lift such ordnance. Interestingly RAF medium bombers were initially supposed to also carry aerial torpedoes, as in Specification P.13/36 which eventually and in a convoluted way resulted in the Lancaster's huge and unobstructed bomb bay. The British wanted a multi-role aircraft (we are always short of money) and the new medium bomber to that specification was intended to form the backbone of the RAF's 'Striking Force', meeting requirements for General Reconnaissance, General Purpose AND Torpedo Bomber classes.
Enemy fleets were not operating in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean in British pre-war planning. The Western Air Plans all included some version of attacks on German warships and their harbours and these were indeed some of the first targets attempted by the RAF when war broke out.

As far as the RAF was concerned there was an inbuilt doctrinal opposition for anything that looked like close air support for the Army and dive bombing definitely fell under this umbrella. This was best summed up by Liddell-Hart in 1940 when he wrote in his diary that the RAF had "no suitable machines for low flying attack, and the Air Staff object to the idea of air counter-attack against troops moving up".

That left dive-bombing to the Royal Navy. The problem here is that the RN had long considered the best use of naval aviation was to carry torpedoes. What attracted the attention of torpedo advocates was the possibility of the aeroplane's use from the decks of ships. If torpedo aircraft could be carried in this way then attacks on the enemy's capital ships could be carried out with a combination of Fleet attack and air action. The most prominent apostle of this concept was one of the most influential men in the RN, Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir David Beatty. Indeed, in August 1917 he, together with Captain (later Admiral Sir) Herbert Richmond developed a plan for exactly such a mass attack on the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven, involving no less than 120 torpedo carrying aircraft, each flight of 40 protected by 5 Sopwith fighters. The plan was nixed by Jellicoe and the Naval Staff, but it was decades ahead of its time, it was the Italians who would suffer a version of it at Taranto in 1940. The torpedo lobby was strong, in October 1918 the RN received its first purpose built torpedo aircraft (the Sopwith Cuckoo) and the first flush-decked aircraft carrier, HMS Argus, entered service in the same month.

This does not mean that the RNAS simply gave up on bombing. Between March and November 1915 No. 3 Wing RNAS in the Dardanelles made more than 70 bombing attacks on enemy warships. The results were not outstanding, though at least one vessel was sunk. There were other successes, in 1917 an RNAS bomber distinguished itself by being the first to launch a successful attack on the German warships Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean, both were damaged. Damaged is the key word. There was a general perception in the RN that in the case of larger vessels, torpedoes sank them, bombs damaged them, and the RN wanted to sink them.

Again, to cut a long story short, after 1918 the employment of torpedo aircraft was left entirely in the carrier fleet and it was in relation to fleet requirements that the torpedo operations subsequently developed. It was no longer seen as a truly offensive weapon (as in the Dardanelles or Beatty's ambitious plan) but as a means of assisting the main fleet. Any offensive operations would be undertaken by the main bomber force and that meant the RAF, not the RN. It was the RAF who would bomb the enemy's dockyards and heavy industry which supplied and sustained the German Navy. This was the essence of the RAF's offensive doctrine. There was no place in the RAF for torpedo aircraft, and little place in the RN for bombers.

Finally, there was the issue of who controlled the development and supply of aircraft. While the Air Ministry did concede that there was a place for torpedo aircraft within Fleet action, it had no interest in their development. As the RAF was responsible for providing aircraft to the Navy fleet requirements were never fully satisfied. The tensions between the two services are beyond the scope of this reply. Lessons learnt by the RNAS were forgotten by the RAF and only re-learned at considerable cost by the FAA and Coastal Command. As if this were not bad enough, the parlous state of British maritime aviation when WW2 started was a reflection of its neglect.

 

[RCAFson]

Wrong example on my part. Rephrasing.

Why not put shackels that can also hold a torpedo on a Dauntless, and use that as both a dive/torpedo bomber? The carrier air wing eliminates one aircraft type, which must help the parts supply. The Navy can have one fewer type to train pilots and mechanics. The carrier air wing can do a max effort dive bomb, or a max effort torpedo bomb, or mix it up.

I'm asking is there any advantage to having two types, because having one type does have advantages?

You wrote they were considering it late in the war. Was there a reason not to consider the same issue earlier in the war, or before the war?

My best guess, this was just a mistake (but that happens, especially in decisions made with limited information).

The SBD-3 was limited to 1000lb bomb load when operating from a carrier. Anything heavier and they had to remove fuel, but the USN torpedo weighed over 2000lb, and was well beyond the SBD's capability.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The job of sinking enemy ships was not solely the Royal Navy's, it was a job eagerly embraced by the newly independent Royal Air Force. The large AP and SAP bombs specifically to sink ships were designed and built and almost all bomber specifications of the inter-war years included the ability to lift such ordnance. Interestingly RAF medium bombers were initially supposed to also carry aerial torpedoes, as in Specification P.13/36 which eventually and in a convoluted way resulted in the Lancaster's huge and unobstructed bomb bay. The British wanted a multi-role aircraft (we are always short of money) and the new medium bomber to that specification was intended to form the backbone of the RAF's 'Striking Force', meeting requirements for General Reconnaissance, General Purpose AND Torpedo Bomber classes.
Enemy fleets were not operating in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean in British pre-war planning. The Western Air Plans all included some version of attacks on German warships and their harbours and these were indeed some of the first targets attempted by the RAF when war broke out.

As far as the RAF was concerned there was an inbuilt doctrinal opposition for anything that looked like close air support for the Army and dive bombing definitely fell under this umbrella. This was best summed up by Liddell-Hart in 1940 when he wrote in his diary that the RAF had "no suitable machines for low flying attack, and the Air Staff object to the idea of air counter-attack against troops moving up".

That left dive-bombing to the Royal Navy. The problem here is that the RN had long considered the best use of naval aviation was to carry torpedoes. What attracted the attention of torpedo advocates was the possibility of the aeroplane's use from the decks of ships. If torpedo aircraft could be carried in this way then attacks on the enemy's capital ships could be carried out with a combination of Fleet attack and air action. The most prominent apostle of this concept was one of the most influential men in the RN, Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir David Beatty. Indeed, in August 1917 he, together with Captain (later Admiral Sir) Herbert Richmond developed a plan for exactly such a mass attack on the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven, involving no less than 120 torpedo carrying aircraft, each flight of 40 protected by 5 Sopwith fighters. The plan was nixed by Jellicoe and the Naval Staff, but it was decades ahead of its time, it was the Italians who would suffer a version of it at Taranto in 1940. The torpedo lobby was strong, in October 1918 the RN received its first purpose built torpedo aircraft (the Sopwith Cuckoo) and the first flush-decked aircraft carrier, HMS Argus, entered service in the same month.

This does not mean that the RNAS simply gave up on bombing. Between March and November 1915 No. 3 Wing RNAS in the Dardanelles made more than 70 bombing attacks on enemy warships. The results were not outstanding, though at least one vessel was sunk. There were other successes, in 1917 an RNAS bomber distinguished itself by being the first to launch a successful attack on the German warships Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean, both were damaged. Damaged is the key word. There was a general perception in the RN that in the case of larger vessels, torpedoes sank them, bombs damaged them, and the RN wanted to sink them.

Again, to cut a long story short, after 1918 the employment of torpedo aircraft was left entirely in the carrier fleet and it was in relation to fleet requirements that the torpedo operations subsequently developed. It was no longer seen as a truly offensive weapon (as in the Dardanelles or Beatty's ambitious plan) but as a means of assisting the main fleet. Any offensive operations would be undertaken by the main bomber force and that meant the RAF, not the RN. It was the RAF who would bomb the enemy's dockyards and heavy industry which supplied and sustained the German Navy. This was the essence of the RAF's offensive doctrine. There was no place in the RAF for torpedo aircraft, and little place in the RN for bombers.

Finally, there was the issue of who controlled the development and supply of aircraft. While the Air Ministry did concede that there was a place for torpedo aircraft within Fleet action, it had no interest in their development. As the RAF was responsible for providing aircraft to the Navy fleet requirements were never fully satisfied. The tensions between the two services are beyond the scope of this reply. Lessons learnt by the RNAS were forgotten by the RAF and only re-learned at considerable cost by the FAA and Coastal Command. As if this were not bad enough, the parlous state of British maritime aviation when WW2 started was a reflection of its neglect.

The RAF did not ignore torpedo bombers. The Beaufort (and Botha) were procured for that role.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The RAF did not ignore torpedo bombers. The Beaufort (and Botha) were procured for that role.

Hampden too.

 

[davparlr]

How about throwing skip bombing into this discussion. High speed delivery, highly accurate, effective.

Also, it seems all of these techniques disappeared with jet aircraft.

Also, I would think defending against dive bombing would not be too difficult since there is no angular displacement. Just make a box of continuous AAA explosion at 5k and let the aircraft fly through it.

 

[swampyankee]

How about throwing skip bombing into this discussion. High speed delivery, highly accurate, effective.

Also, it seems all of these techniques disappeared with jet aircraft.

Also, I would think defending against dive bombing would not be too difficult since there is no angular displacement. Just make a box of continuous AAA explosion at 5k and let the aircraft fly through it.

Any bombing or strafing run on a ship will have little or no angular displacement. I'm going to speculate a bit here, but I would surmise that heavy AA guns couldn't sustain a sufficient rate of fire at high elevations and light AA guns were contact-fuzed. It probably didn't help the firing solution that the ship was also performing violent maneuvers to throw off the dive bomber's aim.

 

[Dinger]

[

Would either Taranto or Pearl Harbor count as "confined harbors?"

No - I would not class either Taranto or Pearl Harbour as confined - They are both bloomin' huge!!! I'm talking about a harbour like Kaafyord where the Tirpitz was moored. Hence the Operation Goodwood attacks by Barracuda having to be done by dive-bombing rather than Torpedo attack.

 

[Admiral Beez]

How about throwing skip bombing into this discussion. High speed delivery, highly accurate, effective.

Hmm... this got me thinking of Dambusters with torpedoes. How many torpedoes could a Lancaster carry? I bet you could fit four fish in that long bomb bay.

Here are RCAF coastal patrol Lancs. No torps though, depth charges.

 

[stona]

The RAF did not ignore torpedo bombers. The Beaufort (and Botha) were procured for that role.

Neither of those aircraft were in service with Coastal Command at the beginning of the war. When the war started Coastal Command had precisely two torpedo squadrons and they were equipped with Vildebeests aircraft which the Commands own AOC-in-C (Bowhill) characterised as

'of such limited range and poor performance as to make them of very little value... for the purpose for which they were designed.'

He would also write,

'I have no striking force whatever. It is one continual promise from the production side that never materialises, and to think that this Command started this war (and is still in the same position) with Vildebeests as a striking force is extraordinary.'

Bowhill wanted some Blenheim IVs, but Sholto-Douglas (the Assistant Chief of Air Staff) would not allow it, insisting that the Command take Bothas and Beauforts. By early 1940 (the first Bothas arrived at Coastal Command in December 1939) it was obvious that both types were unsuitable for the sort of operations envisaged for them. Coastal Command did get Blenheims a little later.

This was part of the story, the tug-o-war between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry over maritime aviation, particularly for control of land based assets (meaning principally Coastal Command) which was outside the scope of that reply.

Between 1919 and 1929 the RAF was not interested in supporting the RN. When, for example, the Admiralty tried to clarify how the RAF intended to protect ports (which might well contain naval assets) from enemy surface raiders it was told that.

"The Air Staff have been consistently opposed to the principle of immobilising aircraft, either for the defence of ports or for any other purpose...The conception [sic] of earmarking units of the Air Force as a primary arm in the defence of ports has been definitely abandoned."

The Air Ministry argued that the location of its bombers at various locations around Britain would be sufficient deterrent to any enemy naval force attempting an attack on coastal installations.

The Air Ministry further abdicated all responsibility for the development and testing of air dropped torpedoes to the Navy. It just was not interested. Coastal Command, and the two land based torpedo squadrons in the Far East were compelled to employ tactical instructions worked out by the FAA for its carrier borne aircraft (as instructed by the Director of Staff Studies in April 1939) which was far from ideal. Even after the start of the war the torpedo squadrons were never regarded as anything other than a sort of back up. They never had been. In 1937 an unknown officer at the Air Ministry wrote in reply to a letter from the Committee of Imperial Defence .

"On occasions, shore based torpedo carrying aircraft may be required to attack warships reported to be in range. The Air Staff have, however, always regarded this method of attacking warships as unsuitable employment by aircraft."

The RAF's attitude cannot be any clearer than that!

 

[Dinger]

Dive-bombers can be used at night, if the target has natural illumination (moon) or is artificially illuminated via flares. The USMC, tried, unsuccessfully (couldn't locate the targets) to attack the IJN via night dive-bomber attack from Midway. The RN developed torpedoes that could be dropped in shallow waters, specifically to attack ships in harbour. IIRC, the IJN developed a similar mod after gaining details of the Taranto attack.

Hmmm... I didn't say just harbours, I didn't say shallow harbours, I said confined harbours - As in small, enclosed, where a torpedo bomber would not be able to get into position to release its payload. As far as dive-bombing at night - of course you could do it if there was a bright moon (the FAA planned a moonlight attack by Skuas on the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at Brest,) - But you can hardly depend on having a bright moon in an encounter fleet action. Incidentally, there was a dive-bombing attack in the middle of the night -The Skua attack on the Scharnhorst at Trondheim was done at 2 am in the morning - but being June that far North it was still bright daylight.

 

[pinehilljoe]

In his Biography Carrier Admiral, ADM Joseph Jocko Clark said he favored Torpedo Bombers, paraphrasing, "if you want to sink a ship you need to put a hole in it"

Book is co authored by Clark Reynolds, a very good book on the Pacific Carrier War.

 

[pinehilljoe]

[

No - I would not class either Taranto or Pearl Harbour as confined - They are both bloomin' huge!!! I'm talking about a harbour like Kaafyord where the Tirpitz was moored. Hence the Operation Goodwood attacks by Barracuda having to be done by dive-bombing rather than Torpedo attack.

Ive been lucky to visit Hawaii several times, everytime the plane approaches Honolulu I'm amazed at how small Pearl looks from the air.

 

[Dinger]

Ive been lucky to visit Hawaii several times, everytime the plane approaches Honolulu I'm amazed at how small Pearl looks from the air.

I've been there as well. For a 1940s era aircraft it would have presented few problems - Especially with the big, flat, Ford Island in the middle of it. - Likewise been to Taranto - You wouldn't even class that as a harbour in the geographic sense at all, at least not where the Italian fleet was anchored - Just a big bay open to the Med. Gotta wonder in both cases why more extensive anti-torpedo nets were not in place. The Germans had only had possession of Trondheim for a few months but they still managed to put anti-torpedo nets in place to protect Scharnhorst and Hipper by June 1940. Also been to the Tirpitz museum at Kaafjord - Now that's a confined anchorage.

 

[stona]

How many torpedoes could a Lancaster carry? I bet you could fit four fish in that long bomb bay.

I bet you couldn't.
The Manchester was supposed to be capable of carrying two 18" torpedoes (which were 18' long), but on 3rd May 1937 the Deputy Chief of Air Staff was informed by the Operational Requirement branch that there was new information on torpedoes and that the 'Avro bomber' (Manchester) could only carry one. It also transpired that there were no torpedoes that could be dropped at 150 mph and from 200 feet, which the Air Ministry/RAF in their ignorance of torpedo bombing, in which they had no real interest, had considered reasonable. It wasn't long before the torpedo requirement for P.13/36 was quietly dropped.

 

[pinsog]

An old veteran once told me that he carried a knife/bayonet, a pistol and a rifle when he was in Korea because each had a specific job though their jobs did overlap, none of them could replace the other 2, they were complimentary. I tend to look at carrier based dive and torpedo bombers in the same way.

 

[kitplane01]

An old veteran once told me that he carried a knife/bayonet, a pistol and a rifle when he was in Korea because each had a specific job though their jobs did overlap, none of them could replace the other 2, they were complimentary. I tend to look at carrier based dive and torpedo bombers in the same way.

My great grandfather once told me he carried two screwdrivers. One was clean, bright and useful. The other was ugly and had a chipped blade, but he was attached to it anyway.