Dogfight: Me 262 vs. Meteor

[kool kitty89]

... Such a jet could be built with the Jumo 004A engine utilizing the 9-10,000 tons of Krupp cemented armor used by the KM on massive artillery emplacements of the Atlantic Wall which were of little real value anyway. Instead this combination could be used to produce thousands of Jumo-004A with the high nickel chrome alloys needed for turbine blades.

Just to be clear each ton of Krupp cemented armor used 3.4% Nickel and 2.4% Chrome, so each ton of installed KC steel amounted to 34kg of nickel and 24kg of Chrome. Failing that each ton of Krupp Non Cemented armor had 2.3% Chrome and ~ 1% Nickel. So if each Jumo OO4A engine does in fact need 88kg of Nickel - then each Engine would need these alloying agents from 3 tons of KC armor or 10 tons of NC. General Warship construction is done with STS 52 steel which needs no Chrome or Nickel alloy agents. So each ton of armored steel lost can still be used as 1 ton of general warship construction. STS is the main steel used in U boat construction.

Neat info there, but not so relevant to the 004A. Those didn't make use of just standard Krupp stainless steel alloys but specialized high temperature alloys containing significant amounts of even more scarce metals like cobalt and molybdenum. (the latter is exceptionally good at increasing creep strength)

So Jumo 004Bs might have been able to be built without resorting to mild steel, but they'd likely still have had problems with turbine vibrations (due to differing harmonics in the alloys used) as well as air cooling of the turbine blades. (vibration issues were more serious in terms of preventing mass production, otherwise the early 004B variants using solid cromadur -krupp stainless steel- blades with air cooling jets/channels at the hub alone could have been in production much earlier)

More significant may have been Heinkel's engines, which never relied on proprietary alloys, but did use large amounts of stainless steel for the hot section and (in the case of all Ohain's engines up through the HeS 8) used proportionally large/heavy radial turbines. (which fared better uncooled than similar axial turbines, and theoretically could have made good use of hub-root cooling slots/channels rather than hollow blades, but used much more material than axial turbines) The HeS 3 and HeS 6 in particular are interesting as they were flight-worthy pre-war and probably could have been refined for mass production rather early in the war, before major shortages of krupp alloys (and constituent metals) and likewise could have proved useful enough to divert those alloys away from other projects. (the HeS 8 was unfortunately problematic compared to those earlier two, in spite of being intended as a stop-gap compromise for the very advanced reaction compression bladed axial HeS 30 and abandoning the less ideal -larger diameter but still slim compared to Whittle's engines- HeS 3 and 6 was a rather bad move -as was failure to simply continue scaling up the basic, proven configuration used on the HeS 3/6, as something in the size/thrust range of the Halford H.1/Goblin was likely possible, probably somewhat slimmer but heavier)

I think it is possible at least that Hausenberg dragged his feet, but the failure of the Nazi nuclear program has far more to do with mismanagement at levels above him. it is significant I think that direct funding was withdrawn from November 1941, following his meeting in Copenhagen with Bohr, thereafter placed under the direction of Goring no less.

mismanagement and a lack of resources was the reason for the german failure more than anything else

Diebner ran the programmes but he was no Oppenheimer. Like any major scientific undertaking there was a team of scientists and technicians involved, minute in Germany compared to the USA.
The failure of the German project, specifically the design of a bomb, was to a very large extent a result of a fundamental mistake made by Heisenberg.
If he had made that mistake, working in the Manhattan project, it would certainly have been discovered by his peers. In the limited German project peer review, a fundamental principle of any scientific endeavour, wasn't exactly a strong point. Heisenberg and the others didn't drag their feet, they just didn't get it right.
Cheers
Steve

Not to mention the German project seemed to have fundamentally different project goals than the US (or especially very U235-enriched-weapons-focused Japanese) ones. A lot of work seemed to go towards power plant reactor development/experiments and stockpiling materialize for said yet-to-be-built powerplants (namely heavy water production).

I could understand difficulties in amassing enough natural Uranium to construct an open-air experimental reactor similar to Chicago Pile 1, but the apparent total failure to investigate/invest in U-235 enrichment was exceptionally odd, even for a chiefly power-generation focused project. (particularly so if/when they'd established the minimum low-enriched state for practical power generation) Those hydroelectric plants used to generate Heavy Water would have similarly made ideal sites for energy-intensive Uranium enrichment (particularly the simple, relatively foolproof, but power-inefficient thermal diffusion method that Japan resorted to utilizing Northern Korea's extensive surplus power resources for)

It should be noted that the efforts involved in U-235 enrichment are not particularly physics-centric (let alone advanced nuclear physics) but mostly chemistry (namely selecting the preferred gas/vapor form Uranium compound) and applied chemical, mechanical, and materials engineering. The biggest part of physics involved would be thermodynamics. (fluid dynamics would be a component as well, and would be the chief aspects of membrane diffusion -which the US used during the war- and gas centrifuges -which, of course is the standard method used from post war up to this day)


Failure to target a nuclear weapons program might not seem quite so odd given the level of chemical and biological weapons (botulinum toxin comes to mind) the Germans had at their disposal but also refused to use or even plan to use in any particularly developed manner (at least in part due to Hitler's own aversion to chemical weapons in warfare, plus fears of retaliation of British Nerve Gas, among other things). The Japanese obviously had fewer qualms about fielding such weapons, but thankfully had relatively primitive chemical weapons on-hand. (and also seemed to lack the same level of of fear of horror-weapon retaliation that most other countries involved in WWII shared)

Honestly, given the German fuel/energy crisis throughout the war, success in nuclear power generation could have been a huge boon for them and a far more potent game changer than working early-generation fission bombs. (that likely would have just led to even more unrestricted total-war retaliation against Germany, opening the floodgates for whatever horrific weapons technology could grind Germany's ability to function the fastest -use of chemical weapons, shift of American bombing to blanket civilian and military targets alike, focus on maximum destructive force -likely heavier use of incendiary weapons- and employment of American Nuclear weapons as well -though, like Incendiaries, the effects on European cities wouldn't be as dramatic as Japanese ones, wood vs brick and stone makes a big difference)




And now back to the original topic (and some older posts that don't seem to have been directly addressed).

 

[kool kitty89]

And yes, the Me262 did not have airbrakes and due to the slow spool-up time of the Jumo engines, would have been more of a liability than an asset had they been installed.

The slow spool-up would be one of the biggest reasons in FAVOR of air breaks as they'd allow a means to slow the aircraft down (without relying on hard maneuvering) while keeping the throttle high. (useful in combat and during landing operations -no spool up when forced to go around for another pass or, worse, if enemy aircraft make a strike on the field -and get through the fighter screen and AA defenses)

Ideally, you'd never go much below maximum continuous power ratings, varying between mid-high and max throttle settings (the latter of course with limited duration and more heat concerns, aside from extreme altitudes with much lower mass flow and typically lower operating temperatures). Jet engines become vastly less efficient at lower RPM anyway, so best range would be attained through max continuous power at as high an altitude as you could afford. (fuel consumption -and thrust- drop as altitude rises due to lower air density, while drag drops doe the same reason and low air temps also typically favor hot jet exhaust thrust efficiency, though the 004B wasn't as altitude optimized as the 003 or 004D or more so the 004E that was to follow the D -the latter in mass production at the war's end, but not yet fitted to production Me 262s, while the 004E was about to enter production as well)

The Jumo004B was much improved over the 004A and had a life of 12 to 15 hours under proper use and during ambient weather conditions. The BMW003 used in the He176 was a bit more reliable.

As partially addressed already, the 004B (of several variants) was the war-time engine, the 004A was pre-production using specialized non-mass-production alloys. (I believe the B-3 or B-4 was the best with over 20 hours between overhaul in service, while the 004D in production at the war's end increased that to the realm of 60 hours -and improved thrust, improved throttle management, and fuel consumption, but never made it to any operational Me 262s)

The numbers of Me262s that were in use after operation Bodenplatt diminished not because of reliability, but because of logistics. The Luftwaffe was running out of fuel, tires, spare engines and most importantly: skilled pilots. The fuel situation was so bad, that the Me262s were towed out to the flightline and assembled with Kettingrads or tractors, then started and took off.

More so breakdown of transportation. What limited resources remained were often unable to actually make it to the front lines. (in the case of engines and especially fuel -diesel supplies were still substantial- this was especially true, with reserves stuck at depots unable to reach airfields)

And I agree Greg, about the He280. While it was only 45 miles an hour slower than the Me262, it was extremely agile and armed with 3 MG151/20 cannon in the nose, making it a potent adversary. It has always been my contention that the He280 would have made the perfect top cover for the Me262 during bomber interception, the He280 engaging and drawing away the escorts while the Me262 picked the bomber stream apart.

Ignoring the engine production issues, the He 280's armament was mostly due to being configured earlier than the Me 262 (the MK 108 didn't exist yet, and the MG 151/20 hadn't yet been fielded when the He 280 first flew for that matter). The He 280 almost certainly could have been adapted for 2, perhaps 3 MK 108s had it reached production. (it was also light enough to accept the rather mediocre but finally approaching arguable production level performance and reliability Hes 8 of 1942 -the HeS 30 had much more potential growth but wasn't as ready for production while the HeS 8 seemed mostly stalled in further improvement without major redesign; the Me 262 was well suited to the HeS 30 but apparently ill suited for the lower power HeS 8 ... even though the empty weight figures I've seen for the 262 and He 280 don't seem too far off, perhaps they're not totally accurate?)

The 280 probably needed a tail redesign (there are vaguely described problems with the existing tail) and increased fuel capacity to be really useful, though. (a redesigned wing with added fuel cells would have been enough, though adding wing-tip fuel tanks or drop tanks might have been faster)

I should point out there are reasons for the 262 superb handling, one is the introduction of the multi gear control stick, one gives greater leverage and id is very sensitive, another are the superb double hinge servo tabs, these were so effective that other german aircraft started using them like the ta 152 h, double hinge supposedly gives smooth action, I should point out that some people believe that the servo tabs were fixed for some reason, though were not designed to work like that, im not sure, info is scarce on this, I can state with some degree of certainty that some prototypes and early production 262s did have functioning servo tabs, plus I find it weird because these things came with a price due to drag, dang, part of the modernizing of the 262 was a redesign of the servo tabs so they would be eternal. During development, a huge amount of time and effort WAS devoted to making the controls lighter and more responsive, especially the ailerons, I had a book that described day by day development of the 262 it was great, you wouldn't believe how, writing was on the ailerons and there effectiveness, of course wing design contributes a lot in this regard along with aileron design. One last thing I can add to this point is that one of the last features to introduced to production air craft(I don't know if this actually became standard or not and that was a junction box for the control rods and such, this thing was filled with several types of lubricant along with some type of anti freeze agent for high altitude flight, I have the names of this stuff written down somewhere. well that's it for this part of your introduction to what I know about the me 262.

The Me 262 (as explained already) only used ground-adjustable servo tabs, the push-tube aileron actuation was the main reason for the relatively light controls (on top of aileron aerodynamic shape), something in common with most American fighters. (even the F2A buffalo is noted for exceptional aileron response in part thanks to its use of push-tubes rather than cables)

On the other hand, F4U DID use servo tabs for very light and effective ailerons. The P-38 appears to have attempted to use servo tabs to boost the elevator to aid in dive recovery (but this was abandoned due to overstressing and disintegrating the tail assembly) but was oddly not employed on the P-38's notoriously heavy ailerons, instead later introducing hydraulic boost part way though the J series production. (odd given servo tabs are a very nice, elegant, simple solution)

Do note the Meteor's airfoil was also rather thin for the time, but was constant (or closer to constant) throughout the span (so much thicker at the wingtips than the Me 262 but only modestly thicker at the root) but simply had a massive wing with very long chord and thus physically thick appearance even if the airfoil was rather thin. (12.5 % at the root vs 11% on the Me 262, compare that to 13% on the P-80 and 12% on the F-84 or 14% on the P-58 and Vampire -though the short-chord Meteor, P-59, and Vampire were all more mach limited by bulky pod/nacelle design than airfoil used ... the Vampire being the only one to be more mach limited and less massive-drag+mach limited in its early forms -those awful nacelles on the P-59 and early Meteor ruined their aerodynamics cutting speed and causing most of that snaking behavior while the Vampire was able to fairly consistently push up against its .76 mach limit in its underpowered 2700 lbf thrust Mk.I iteration when flying above 25,000 ft -at least in the cold European atmosphere, on the Pacific coast or California desert -like the Muroc site where the P-59 and P-80 were tested, it might have stuck below .76 up to its ceiling)

Vampire Performance Trials

Due to drag qualities of the short-chord Meteor III (and heavy ailerons), the Vampire Mk.I would have been a much better candidate against the Me 262 in spite of the lower mach limit. (of course it was lower priority and not being pressed into active service even for posterity like the Meteor III was) This was entirely due to the Goblin and Vampire both being low priority projects and likely could have been useful war-time aircraft had they had even the level of support/funding from the ministry that Whittle and Gloster did. (the Goblin also may have been a better engine to have GE copy than the W.1, simpler and more powerful though poorer thrust to weight -likewise for the later Ghost, larger and much heavier than the similarly powerful J33 or Nene, though mechanically simpler ... the Soviets probably would've had an easier time copying one of those than they did the Nene)

A Metrovick F.2/3 might have actually turned the Meteor 3 into something more formidable though, the slim axial nacelles avoiding the problems the short chord Derwent/Welland nacelles (let alone the Goblin powered prototype -or proposed Mk.II) and had an impressive 2700 lbf rating. They were the first Metrovick engines to be reasonably reliable and given the 1943 test dates, probably could have arrived in time to be mated to the war-time Meteor III had the RAF put production on high priority. (the more advanced F.2/4 would not have been ready for war-time service, and the earlier F.2/2 or even earlier F.2/1 actually tested on the Meteor had critical overheating problems with their annular combustion chambers -the flame cans adopted on the F.2/3 solved that)

Just to finish up on this aspect of the 262, one of the p47 pilots who became one of whatsons whizzers, went into some detail about this, I forget which one, I don't think it was Strobell, he said, the me 262 had the most responsive handling of any air craft he had flown up to that time, including the p47 of course as well as the p40, he mentions the p40, because from the little I know about this fighter, it had superb handling role rate, he said that time from which input was made through control column to the 262 reacting was instant , no delay or mush.

The P-47 was actually known for its exceptional aileron control and roll rate as well, even better than the contemporary P-40, and both could exploit this to out-maneuver Spitfires at both low and high speeds (rapid turn-reversal until the Spitfire was so far behind they could loop around and get a bead on it). This was particularly dramatic for the P-47 given its relatively massive size.

That said, most american fighters had very good roll and aileron handling in general (the Mustang might not have been quite as snappy as the P-40 or P-47, but in the ballpark -I forget how they compared exactly and might be underselling the Mustang a bit). The Fw 190 was closer to American fighters, but still had heavy aileron issues at lower speeds than American counterparts. (the Bf 109 was about as bad as the Spitfire, I believe, though the nasty heavy/stiff elevator at high speeds was a big problem as well)

The only early-war (or pre war) British fighters noted to have good aileron handling as such were Gloster's, I believe. The F.5/34 monoplane definitely (remarks appear similar to RAF P-36/Hawk tests) while the F.9/37 twin engine fighter has more vague commentary that implies similar advantages but isn't explicit enough to really confirm. (this aspect of the F.5/34 is one of the reasons I think it was a missed opportunity, particularly converted to Merlin power and/or imported R-1830 power -the Mercury was a dead end, Hercules too big/heavy to avoid a major redesign, and Taurus just not a very good engine, so like the Beaufort better with R-1830s ... plus it would have fit in well as a Canadian and/or Austrailian/commonwealth licensed/outsourced design ... better than the Hurricane or Boomerang certainly)

That said, the Me 262 in spite of the huge engine mass, probably could out maneuver a Spitfire at high speed (ie 400+ MPH TAS, probably ~350 mph too) due to the more effective controls. Additionally, turn-reversals don't bleed off nearly as much energy as a proper turn and burn WWI style dogfight and fit much better with the more modern energy tactics Me 262 pilots should have known to use. (dive, zoom, and minimal turning -rapid turn reversal of a slow-rolling opponent followed by a banked zoom-climb and split-s dive would be textbook ideal there)

A shame Heinkel was ordered to abandon the HeS 30 (in favor of the Hes 011), that would have been an amazing fit for the Me 262, cutting nearly a ton off the empty weight for little (or no) loss in thrust, lower frontal area, lower specific fuel consumption (multiplied by the lower weight and drag area). Plus the smaller, lighter compressor would make for shorter spool-up times.

British Jet aircraft development does seem to have been very slack. Gloster with its admittedly small team spent 4 years and came up with the Meteor III that snaked, had gun troubles and after several versions still needed a new tail and engine nacselles. DeHavilland seem to have developed the Spider Crab/Vampire almost as an after work hobby project at one point just 2 men were working on it in the drawing office.

I wonder what other companies could have come up with if given plenty of resources to design and build a fighter. My favourite would be Miles aviation though as they were known for some pretty wacky designs its possible they would have turned out a Bat wing Canard or have the Pilot sat underneath the engines.

Yep, I do wonder if they'd have been better off just investing in De Havilland's project and leaving Whittle and Gloster to focus on the G.40 testbed.

Providing funds to accelerate Goblin development would have probably led to production sooner than the Welland, let alone encouraging collaborative development with Rolls Royce ... or Whittle/Power Jets, or all of the above. Whittle's configuration showed obvious long-term advantages but greater complexity than Halford's, even without the Rover fiasco, plus the W.1 and W.2 were too small to be useful in the Vampire but certainly could have led into further scaled up designs able to best the Goblin in thrust and weight/size, just as the Nene and Derwent V and 8 eventually did -the Nene or Tay probably would have been a better fit for the Comet and Venom than the Ghost as well ... while the Nene was overkill for the Vampire -the Australian Nene Vampire probably would have been better off as a Derwent V vampire, better thrust than a Goblin 3, lower weight, no intake problems, better matched to the small/light airframe, and consequently better range. (I believe the Derwent 8 could exceed the Goblin 4's 3750 lb thrust though was limited to 3600 lbf in the Meteor F.8 for operational safety reasons, plus the radial air inlets with wire mesh filters reduced risk of foreign object ingestion that the Goblin/Ghost risked -and destroyed the protype Goblin in the XP-80 when its intake ducts collapsed)


On a side note, relieving Gloster of the Meteor project would have freed up resources to pursue their promising twin-engine fighter design proposals (the single-seat so-called 'Reaper' development of the pre-war F.9/37) and had something close to a wartime Hornet in operation. (not to mention a potent, potentially longer range fighter-bomber that didn't rely on the Saber ... and had fighter class performance -ie not a Beaufighter)

 

[GrauGeist]

The slow spool-up would be one of the biggest reasons in FAVOR of air breaks as they'd allow a means to slow the aircraft down (without relying on hard maneuvering) while keeping the throttle high. (useful in combat and during landing operations -no spool up when forced to go around for another pass or, worse, if enemy aircraft make a strike on the field -and get through the fighter screen and AA defenses)

Ideally, you'd never go much below maximum continuous power ratings, varying between mid-high and max throttle settings (the latter of course with limited duration and more heat concerns, aside from extreme altitudes with much lower mass flow and typically lower operating temperatures). Jet engines become vastly less efficient at lower RPM anyway, so best range would be attained through max continuous power at as high an altitude as you could afford. (fuel consumption -and thrust- drop as altitude rises due to lower air density, while drag drops doe the same reason and low air temps also typically favor hot jet exhaust thrust efficiency, though the 004B wasn't as altitude optimized as the 003 or 004D or more so the 004E that was to follow the D -the latter in mass production at the war's end, but not yet fitted to production Me 262s, while the 004E was about to enter production as well)

Dive-brakes are not the magic solution for attacking much slower targets and adapting to the high rate of closure is. The Me262 pilots adapted to this situation quite well.

As has been mentioned before, slowing the Me262 down to have a longer target window is not only defeating it's purpose, it also leaves it open to defensive fire, which the Me262 was ill-suited to absorbe. Also, the Me262 rarely had the luxury of bombers without escort, so again, speed was it's salvation.

Keep in mind that the Jumo's thrust was nothing like modern jet engines and you simply could not deploy dive-brakes and then hope to retract and zoom away. This is also a contributing factor to the Me262's long takeoff run. Add to that, the Me262's high stall speed, which also meant a high-speed approach and long roll-out after touchdown. Deploying dive brakes to facilitate a short landing approach is a recipe for disaster, as the 262 did not have prop-wash to help generate nessecary lift, only airflow, even with it's slats extended.

The suggestion that the 262 maintain max. continous power rating is not helpful, as it was to be avoided for any extended length of time. I don't have the settings table in front of me at the moment, but memory says it was in the range of 80-85% unless the pilot needed to get extra speed to evade an enemy.

I am fairly sure that the idea of dive-brakes may have been brought up to Willy, as many Luftwaffe aircraft were equipped with them, so this technology was not unknown to them. But for the reasons I mentioned above, the idea of installing dive-brakes on the Me262 was not going to work in it's favor.

 

[kool kitty89]

The most useful situations for the Me 262 to have air brakes would be non-combat (particularly landing run) with use in combat more sparingly significant. (in both cases used to avoid dropping engine RPM, though use to avoid exceeding critical mach would be notable as well -and aside from preventing critical mach, adding drag to slow down more quickly during recovery from a terminal dive would also be very significant, reducing airspeed more quickly and thus both altitude loss and G-forces during pullout -even if aerodynamic forces were too high for full deployment at high speed, they would come into play more during recovery and still save a lot of time, altitude loss, and airframe stress/risk of pilot blackout)

Positioning them to ALSO correct nose-down pitch (mach tuck) akin to the P-38 and P-47's dive recovery flaps (and possibly P-80 air break -not 100% sure that counters pitch-down) would be ideal. (still useful as general purpose subsonic airbrakes, but all the more useful in critical dive recovery situations)

Not to mention good dive breaks would have allowed more competent use of fighter-bomber variants for shallow dive bombing. (aside from the high fuel consumption at low altitude, the Me 262 -and jets in general- DID have some real, practical potential in that role; doing so to the exclusion of fighter/interceptor/destroyer roles was obviously not useful) OTOH, the fuel consumption issue might have also been partially addressed with good dive breaks, allowing cruise at higher altitude and rapid drop down low when reaching the target area. (using breaks to stay below terminal dive conditions, in controlled, high-speed descent) Good practice/training with shallow dive bombing at high speed would have been critical for making the most of those aircraft though. (dropping to conventional dive bombing speeds would be totally pointless) Heavy air-to-ground rockets (or the A2G variants of the R4M, had they been made operational) would likely have been more useful than gravity bombing. (large caliber cannon mounted in a ventral pod might have been more useful for the ground-attack role as well, particularly positioned to act as ballast for the rear fuel tank)


And even if you loose zoom-climb energy, retaining at least enough to stay at/above ideal climb speed is critical as well. (the Me 262 having an impressive rate of climb, but -like all jets, and unlike propeller driven aircraft- achieved such at a fairly high airspeed) This would also be notable in the fighter-bomber and ground attack roles given keeping that speed up would allow rapid climb back to (reasonably) economical cruising altitude while out-running and out-climbing any intercepting aircraft and being a generally tough target for AA.

 

[GrauGeist]

I can honestly see airbrakes being useful to shorten the rollout on landing but I think that using the Me262 as a bomber was a waste of it's potential.

The Luftwaffe had the Ar234 that was far better suited to the bombing mission.

 

[Milosh]

How many Ar234 bombers did the Lufwaffe have? I thought most were recon airplanes.

Me262 bombers could have wrecked havoc on Allied supply lines using Sd bombs.

 

[GrauGeist]

How many Ar234 bombers did the Lufwaffe have? I thought most were recon airplanes.

Me262 bombers could have wrecked havoc on Allied supply lines using Sd bombs.

There were over 200 units produced, and many were used in the recon role, but they performed bombing missions as well.

It was the Ar234 bombing mission on the RAF's 616 Sqd base that provided the closest jet-on-jet action of the entire war.

The Me262's bombing missions were less than stellar in thier accuracy or effectiveness.

 

[stona]

Me262 bombers could have wrecked havoc on Allied supply lines using Sd bombs.

They couldn't because just like the fighter bombers of the RAF and US air forces they weren't accurate enough to do so. They did still retain cannon armament which, in the RAF example, proved a devastating and accurate weapon against soft skinned vehicles.
The trade off is the vulnerability of the Me 262 to anti aircraft fire, even the small calibre varieties which it would encounter in heavy concentrations on such missions. This would inevitably have become even heavier as the allies reacted to the attacks.
The reality is that by the time the allied tail was vulnerable to air attack the Luftwaffe didn't have enough of anything (aircraft, fuel, pilots) to mount such attacks in any case.
Cheers
Steve

 

[kool kitty89]

The Me 262 was probably better off using weapons other than bombs (be it rockets or cannon pods -or alternate nose armaments) for ground attack. High speed still makes targeting more difficult, but rockets or (especially) cannons are a lot easier to use in the anti-material, anti-vehicle, and anti-armor roles than bombs. (the HEAT variant of the R4M would have been extremely useful had development started earlier ... it was simple enough to be developed early-war, but needed the initiative to get started and supported earlier and refine it to something operationally useful) Gondola mounted heavy cannon similar to what the Hs 129 used might have worked well, though the MK 103 should have fit in the nose. (perhaps 2 MK 103s in place of the 108s)

The Me 262 and Fw 190 were both high performance, top of the line fighter aircraft, so adapting both to a similar array of roles made some sense. (particularly since the Me 262, like the 190 -but unlike the 109- was large enough to carry pretty hefty external loads) The main problem with all jets is the high fuel consumption and resulting short endurance at low altitude (unless engines were throttled back to improve loiter time ... but doing that more than a very modest degree would totally loose the speed advantage and make them easy prey to enemy fighters -loitering at higher altitude and higher speed would be a much better tactic, fuel use wise)

Of course, use as fighters/interceptors should have been primary, as with the 190.


The Ar 234 was really underpowered with just a pair of 004s ... it really needed 4 engines to make a good bomber, preferable 003s. (or Heinkel engines had the RLM not cancelled their class 1 designs, or crippled the 011 by favoring the impractical diagonal compressor design ... and also crippling it by discontinuing HeS 30 development -the compressor, turbine, and combustion chamber designs all could have fed into a more successful ~3000 lb thrust class engine has the smaller design been allowed to mature first, alternatively a single stage centrifugal compressor could have been added to minimize weight/cost/length while not increasing maximum diameter -experience with the HeS 8 did provide useful information on using a small diameter diffusor, and mating the HeS 8 to the HeS 30 compressor+combustion chambers+turbine might have led to a very nice combination of characteristics -unlike the HeS 011 which combined virtually the worst aspects of both, including treading into many untested engineering areas rather than re-using what already worked)

It is slightly odd that there wasn't much general effort in jet powered light/medium bomber projects earlier on given how well they fit RLM demands (dive bombing aside, of course). Targeting the 1000-1000-1000 bomber goal should have been rather obvious. (something Heinkel could have leveraged to get more support as well ... even potentially adapting the 1300 lbf HeS 6 of 1939 to a 4-engine configuration similar to the later Ar 234C, with 4 HeS 30s and refined aerodynamics, the 1000-1000-1000 target was probably a realistic war-time goal ... 700-700-700 was more realistic for an early-war jet bomber implementing production derivatives of the HeS 6)

 

[stona]

Free fall bombs were very innaccurate, statistically less accurate even than rockets according to British analysis of results for Typhoons of the 2nd TAF.
An ORS report showed that 89% of 3" rockets landed within 150 yards of a target compared with just 45% of bombs.

The distance of the mean point of impact from the target for rockets was 62.5 yards (43 yards with a gyro gunsight) meaning that a Typhoon firing all eight rockets had a roughly 4% chance of hitting a tank in trials with no defensive fire and a clearly visible target. Operationally this chance was expected to be significantly lower. To have a 50% chance of hitting a tank 140 rockets, equivalent to 18 Typhoon sorties were required.

The air launched Panzerblitz (Pb 1) was more accurate according to German trial results. At Tarnewitz a hit rate of 1 in 6 was claimed on a 10m x 10m target. Operationally against tanks and locomotives this fell initially to 1 in 36 before improving to 1 in 24, according to Generalmajor Hubertus Hitschhold, in charge of the Schlachtflieger, in his post war interrogation

By February 1945 there were 115 Fw 190 F-8s equipped with the system. 43,580 Pb1 missiles were produced by SS controlled factories in Czechoslovakia. The monthly production rate was to be 16,000. In April 1945 at least 12 Staffeln were using the system. III./SG 4 flew 115 sorties in January/February 1945 with the Pb1 system and claimed 23 tanks destroyed and 11 damaged. Given the RAF and USAAF's propensity to massively over claim for armour, I would take those figures with a large pinch of salt. The allied pilots had their claims checked by men on the ground as the advance continued. There were no such checks for Luftwaffe air to ground claims.
Typhoons of No. 121 Wing of No.83 Group flew 99 sorties against German armour around the village of la Baleine, comparable to the German figure above. The Typhoons claimed 17 tanks destroyed and 27 damaged, again broadly comparable figures. An investigation by the ORS 2nd TAF revealed that just 2 tanks had been destroyed by rockets (a Panther and a MkIV) and none damaged. Of a total of 40 vehicles of all types destroyed just 7 showed evidence of aerial attack.

Rockets, any unguided air launched WW2 rockets, were not an effective weapon against vehicles or anything else.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

Rockets, any unguided air launched WW2 rockets, were not an effective weapon against vehicles or anything else.

I think the German Army and Navy would heartily disagree.

 

[stona]

I think the German Army and Navy would heartily disagree.

I doubt that very much. Rockets didn't hit much on land, I've posted a lot of data both here and in other threads to show this.

Coastal Command got relatively good at hitting ships (a much larger target than a tank or gun emplacement) with their solid warheads. Coastal Command discovered, after initial completely unsuccessful attacks using rockets with the standard 60lb explosive warhead, that the bulbous head created so much resistance that the propellant charge was insufficient to carry the rocket with any accuracy beyond 1,000 yards, attacks were normally made from beyond that range. The adoption of the much slimmer 25lb solid head and the reduction of standard attack range to 1000-1200 yards increased accuracy to a large degree. Between June and December 1943 as many as 5 of the 9 vessels claimed sunk by Nos. 16 and 18 Groups of Coastal Command were attributed to the new version of the 3" rocket projectile.

The effect of Coastal Command's direct attacks on shipping, with bombs torpedoes and rockets accounted for 366 vessels for an outlay of 37,837 sorties. 857 aircraft were lost.
The RAF's mine laying campaign accounted for 638 vessels for an outlay of 19,917 sorties. 450 aircraft were lost.
I'll do the maths for any German ready to heartily disagree. It took 104 anti shipping sorties to sink a ship. It took 31 mine laying sorties to sink a ship.
For the British each ship lost to mines cost 0.55 aircraft, to anti shipping strikes 5.28 aircraft (from the BBSU). Most of those aircraft didn't even carry rockets.

What about efficiency?
Torpedo strike cost 3,000 man months to sink a vessel.
Low level bombing cost 2,600 man hours to sink a vessel
Rocket strike cost 2,230 man hours to sink a vessel.
The loss of an average 3,000 ton vessel was estimated to cost the Germans 6,000 man months, plus another 400 man months for lost cargo.

The combined effects of all attacks on German controlled shipping was devastating for the Germans. As well as the hundreds of vessels sunk, between 14% and 17% of the entire merchant fleet was in need of repairs at any given time. As much steel plate was used in building and repairing smaller merchant vessels (up to 2,000 tons) as was used in U-Boat construction.
The role of air launched unguided rockets in this was minimal at best.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

Your statement wasn't that rockets weren't the most effective form of attack, it was that rockets weren't an effective weapon against anything.

I suppose if you want to quantify that as the number instances which a rocket physically struck a German tank, then I guess that would be the case.

But if you want to quantify the efficacy of RP in terms of its contribution in winning the war - I can't see how you can describe it as being ineffective against anything.

A lone Panzer is a different story than concentrations of Opels, horses or troops - and morale is a tough one to graph on a spreadsheet ...

 

[stona]

By far the most effective weapons that the fighter bombers of 2nd TAF and US 9th AF had were their cannons and machine guns. Rockets landing, on average, 60 yards away have minimal effect on experienced troops and absolutely none on even semi-armoured vehicles. Bombs landing 150 yards are similar. In fact another uncomfortable fact discovered by the 2nd TAF's ORS was that a near miss with a bomb on a tank did not damage or disable it, only a direct hit was sure to do that. It was even harder to hit a bomb with a bomb than a rocket. The US 9th AF hardly used rockets, preferring bombs and later napalm.

The average pilot could actually hit an average sized vehicle, gun emplacement or bunker with his cannon/machine gun. A concentration of 'Opels, horses or troops' was a good target for 4 x 20mm cannon or 6 x .50 calibre machine guns. They could hit it and cause devastating damage and carnage. With rockets? not so likely.
Rockets were supposed to destroy the targets that the cannon could not (as well as those they could). They could, but unfortunately only if they hit them and that was the problem.
Rockets just couldn't hit point targets. Another ORS report showed that of 216 rockets fired from 27 attacking Typhoons at 4 heavy and 6 medium gun emplacements just 2 hits were scored (a hit rate of 0.9%).
The 9th and 14th Tactical Air Forces and the RAF's 2nd TAF claimed 324 tanks in the Ardennes salient. These were engaged with bombs, rockets, napalm, machine guns and cannon by various formations. In the area later examined by ORS they claimed 66 tanks. The reality? 1 (that's ONE) Tiger II was deemed destroyed by a bomb and 3 Panthers listed as 'possible' victims of air attack. If we allow the 'possibles' that is over claiming at 17:1.

Rockets couldn't hit what they were aimed at. They did manage to sink a few vessels at sea, but as you make a bigger target the percentage of hits will rise. I can't find statistics for Coastal Command, I bet it never made double figures.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Milosh]

Myth of the tank busters, Ground Attack Aircraft: Myth of the Tank-Busters | For the Record

I can't find it now online but there is a report of damage done during the Falaise battle by a/c. It is an eye opener.

 

[Shortround6]

Actually the guns weren't that accurate either

But firing 40 (Typhoon) to 100 (P-47)rounds per second and having firing runs of 2-3 seconds means an awful lot of projectiles in the target area and even a low single digit hit percentage means multiple hits and destroyed unarmored vehicles or horse teams.

The rockets sure look impressive both firing and impacting though

 

[stona]

It's all relative. In trials 32 of 120 20mm cannon rounds fired hit a 10 foot square target normal to the line of flight. With the rockets salvoes of eight generally all missed.
About 1 in 25 rockets hit the target as opposed to nearly 1 in 4 cannon shells.
The other salient point is that each Typhoon could only deliver eight rockets, whereas it could deliver 600 cannon shells.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Greyman]

One type of job that the rocket seems to excel at is close support of infantry in the attack. It seems to be very rare for a Typhoon squadron to be asked to come in and pick off individual tanks at a particular location. Most often targets are more like 'enemy position in large copse of trees' or 'southernmost row of buildings in village'.

For work like this spraying an area with 20-mm probably wouldn't be very effective and lobbing bombs would be a bad idea with friendly troops nearby.

One can't help but trip over mountains of material on the effect of allied air power on the German forces but it takes a bit more poking around to find RP-specific stuff. The following might be from one of those same reports stona was referencing:


Chapter 4 - Fighter and Fighter-Bomber Attacks on Forward Troops

Morale Effects on the Enemy

14. About a hundred prisoners of war have been questioned about rocket attacks; approximately half of them had been in positions which were so attacked and all had at some time witnessed such attacks from distances of 1000 metres or more. They varied in morale and physique, from the lowest "Total Mobilisation" types to ex-aircrew personnel serving in a Parachute regiment.

15. Except for a few AA gunners, all who had been attacked by rockets expressed their dread of the weapon. The reasons generally given were as follows:

(a) RP is an unknown quantity, except to AA gunners. (Exaggerated tales of its terrors have circulated among German troops and Typhoons seem to rank with artillery in their disturbing effects).
(b) The noise of the plane as it dives is a danger signal and is, in itself, terrifying.
(c) The noise of the approaching rockets is frightening. In addition, one PW captured at Wimile near Boulogne insisted that the most terrifying moment was when the rockets left the plane; he considered it was extremely shattering to watch.​

16. With the exception of the GAF AA gunners, PWs stated that they always took cover immediately when the Typhoons started to attack and remained there for times varying from one to ten minutes afterwards; they expected the planes to circle round and strafe their positions with cannon fire. ...


Morale Effect on our Own Troops

19. When asked what they think of rocket-firing Typhoons, infantry officers have without exception been very enthusiastic. They say that the effect on our own troops of a flight of Typhoons diving at the German FDLs is most marked; it seems to raise their morale even more than it lowers the enemy's. Our troops are impressed by the accuracy with which rockets are fired at targets only a short distance in front of them. So much reliance is placed on the effectiveness of these attacks that when, for reasons not always obvious to front line troops, a request for close support Typhoons has to be turned down, a feeling of dissatisfaction is apt to arise.

20. The following incident, which occurred near Overloon (E 7632) on 13th October, illustrates the morale effects of rockets.

A battalion in 3 Br Inf Div was lying along the south side of a wood approximately 300 yards from the enemy who were holding the northern edge of the next wood. During the morning the battalion tried to advance but were driven back across the intervening open ground. Air Support was requested and a squadron of Typhoons was ordered to attack the wood at 1400 hrs with RP. This attack took place as planned and the battalion advanced across the open ground immediately afterwards without opposition. The CO of the battalion said that not only had the RP successfully unnerved the enemy but they had also put new vigour into his own men who were somewhat disconsolate after the casualties and reverses of the morning.

 

[GrauGeist]

Although in another theater, the USN used HVARs against Japanese positions (occasionally against shipping) with good effect

 

[stona]

The morale effect is well documented in many P/W interrogations, it is just difficult to quantify. Ian Gooderson explains this better than I can.

"With regard to fighter bomber attacks, accounts from British and US troops and ORS investigations all affirm that it was this temporary morale effect of air attack, rather than any destruction and casualties caused, that was decisive. There was also the very important practical consideration that fighter bomber strikes could permit assault troops to approach closer to their objective than possible with supporting artillery fire, enabling them to take maximum advantage of the morale effect. For mobile and airborne operations close air support was the only means of supplementing the limited firepower of Allied units, and its success was crucial. But here too air support proved highly effective in the temporary neutralisation targets, rather than in their destruction."

That's what fighter bombers were good at, whether they used bombs, rockets, napalm or cannon and machine guns. They were not good at taking out pin point targets, though the effect of cannon and machine gun on logistic tails could be devastating. They also limited the ability of the enemy to operate in daylight or to concentrate in any way. In the break out from Normandy this was probably their greatest contribution.

Cheers

Steve