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You got a good point about the notion that scouts need radios to really work well, but even without a radio I would not go so far as to say 'useless'.
A6Ms routinely navigated over long distances in Pacific, from the Aleutians to Australia.
And you are sure they never had a long range radio in an A6M?
It was impossible to fit aft fuel tanks in the Merlin and early Griffon engined variants. Most of the naval modifications were to the aft fuselage. Catapult spools, arrester hook, fuselage strengthening etc. To maintain the aircraft within CG limits the Merlin versions had to add lead weights (c28lbs in the Mk.III) to the engine bearers.I wonder how a Seafire would handle with aft fuel tanks. The added endurance would be welcome.
ASB was the early search radar set in USN Carrier aircraft. This was similar to the British ASV.II.The strike aircraft (Avengers and dive bombers) often had radar using the Yagi aerials. Since they had somebody besides the pilot as a radar operator they were probably a better bet for "scout duty" than using single seat night fighters were were not common.
Actually that is not bad considering the work that needed done.Fairey got an order for 127 Fulmars in mid 1938. It took until Jan 1940 for the first one to fly.
The following website provides an excellent history of USN night fighter development with respect to radarI don't believe it was a shortage of night fighter and strike aircraft. From 1944 the USN CV Air groups all had a night fighter flight attached for defensive purposes especially around dawn and dusk.
But from Aug 1944 they started to deploy entire night air groups. First on the CVL Independence, then Enterprise, Saratoga and finally the Bon Homme Richard. Those groups fulfilled both offensive and defensive roles with F6F-5(N) and TBM Radar equipped aircraft of various models. A CVEG(N) was also being readied for service as the war ended.
Edit:- USMC squadrons also flew night fighter F6F from various Pacific shore bases. As the war was ending the first F7F night fighters were just arriving on Okinawa.
Report on operations by CVG(N)-90 on the Enterprise along with histories of her rwo squadrons, between Dec 1944 & May 1945The following website provides an excellent history of USN night fighter development with respect to radar
Note the tiny size of the cockpit display.
As a practical matter single seat aircraft were not suitable for search missions. Fighters were under the direction of a shipboard controller with the onboard radar used at relatively short distances. Radar equipped TBMs and SB2Cs were used for long range search missions. Two or more crew members results in a much more efficient operation
My understanding is that the engine itself generated static to the extent that the radio on the Zero, while not absolutely useless, was so poor that it could not reliably transmit for the four hundred or so miles of a mission round-trip back to base. It's not that they didn't have long-range radio, it's that the generator(?) in the engine gave electrical interference.
Without reliable radio, using Zeroes for scouting not only diminished a carrier's CAP, it also was not reliable enough to provide early warning. If you've got to trap on the deck before delivering intel, that could obviously be too late in many instances.
Would a Zero in the place of Tone's late scout have made a difference if its message was garbled by these known radio issues? The delayed Tone scout-plane reported by radio "one carrier" at 0740. But if it had been a Zero with the crummy radio, would Nagumo have done the order-counterorder-disorder thing because he'd have no intel until the plane landed? Or would he have blithely launched a second strike at Midway with many of his fighters flying bomber-escort instead of CAP?
The world wonders.
Even with static, you could still deliver a simple morse message. I'd say send a zero out in parallel along all search axis, all they need to send back is "Who I am" "On course" "Found something"
If you have any type of shielding issue on the aircraft, the radio signal isn't going far, be it voice or Morse Code.Even with static, you could still deliver a simple morse message.
Only if they worked - and from that same article it seems like they didn't most of the time. It's been well documented that maintenance and logistics were a major issue for the Japanese through out the war. Interchangeability on many components was almost non-existent.And some other parts of the article, it sounds like the radios weren't that bad, problems were somewhat intermittent but the biggest issue was actually training. Apparently A6Ms did carry morse radio sets and could and did communicate with aircraft carriers, at a distance of 250 miles. I think this definitely puts them over the line from "useless" and well into "useful".
They were often matched up with one or 2 multi seat aircraft to provide communications/navigation support.To be useless as scouts they almost had to be useless as long range fighters, but clearly they were not.
Yes and no - the Brits had some issues, the US not so many and if anything interchangeability was quite good.Well yeah, that - especially the lack of interchangeability, was definitely a huge problem. I think that was also an issue with some Allied aircraft in the early years of the war.
They did, but look what most units did with their radios.But "they had a lot of reliability problems and many pilots were not trained to use radios" is not quite the same as "they had no radios / radios didn't work at all, therefore they were useless as scouts" since clearly they did have radio communication for Pearl Harbor, 250 miles away from their carriers, and in many other long range fighter sweeps and strike escorts they routinely conducted after Dec 1941.
Scouting and conducting a specific military operation are two different animals. On a scouting mission you're gathering intelligence and looking for targets of opportunity. A strike will have a plan, briefings, etc. With all that said, if I was running a fighter unit, be it JAAF or IJN, I would not want to waste a fully functional fighter on a scouting mission, I'd send something specifically designed for that task.To be useless as scouts they almost had to be useless as long range fighters, but clearly they were not. It's also clear that they did have a lot of problems with radios as well as their newer engines and all kinds of other machinery,
They did but by early/ mid 1943, the writing was on the wall for both IJN and JAAF unitsthough they managed to get enough of it working to still pose a substantial threat through 1943 at least.
They were often matched up with one or 2 multi seat aircraft to provide communications/navigation support.
This was not unique to the Japanese. Many of the fighter ferry flights to Malta had one or two multi seat aircraft providing the same support to the single seat fighters.
It might have been done by US fighter units on occasion.
If you are sending out planes on scout/ recon/ search missions you want a high likelihood that EACH plane will be able to succeed in it's function.
the passage is a also a bit selective.
. Power of the transmitter was 8 to 10 watts in voice mode and 30 watts in telegraph mode, called CW for 'continuous wave'. In 'At Dawn We Slept' Gordon Prange relates that one of the problems encountered in the IJN's preparation for Pearl Harbor was that they had never operated fighters farther than 90 miles from their carriers. 50 miles was the practical limit of utility of the voice radios under optimum conditions. Since the fighters would be venturing around 250 miles outbound on the mission
rule of thumb was telegraph mode was worth 3 times what voice mode was.
50 miles was the practical limit. Not average limit, or sure limit but not max limit either. It would allow for some repeated attempts. It was also not the limit in either optimum conditions or worsts conditions. But the Japanese were going to try for 5 times the range, not 3 times.
I think they did use radios for navigation / direction finding without a doubt. But it's also pretty clear they were communicating as well. And frankly, sending a short morse message isn't as challenging on a technical level as coordinating voice communication among maneuvering fighters, IMO.Are the fighters supposed to report back to the carrier or did the multi seat aircraft relay the messages?
Was the greater range capacity (which is not spelled out in the passage) to help inure that aircraft that had been separated in combat had a larger margin of error to contact the carriers on the return flight?
Please note that the passage does say they operated, at least once, about 40 miles beyond radio range. They may not have been planning for full radio coverage. Just a larger are of the flight to be in contact to provide guidance for off course aircraft.
yes that's what I meant. The Soviets had problems with this too.Yes and no - the Brits had some issues, the US not so many and if anything interchangeability was quite good.
They did, but look what most units did with their radios.
Scouting and conducting a specific military operation are two different animals. On a scouting mission you're gathering intelligence and looking for targets of opportunity. A strike will have a plan, briefings, etc. With all that said, if I was running a fighter unit, be it JAAF or IJN, I would not want to waste a fully functional fighter on a scouting mission, I'd send something specifically designed for that task.
They did but by early/ mid 1943, the writing was on the wall for both IJN and JAAF units