Fairey Swordfish

[blobs]

more reading material if you can get hold of it.
Fairey Swordfish warpaint series No 12 by W.A.Harrison
Flypast editions February 1995 article Sub Patrol compelation flight log J.D.Young
May 1995 article fly past collection RNAS Yeovelton
April 1997 article Swordfish Night Fighters Hugh Garlick
August 1997 artical
December 1998 article Bring back my Stringbag John Godley

 

[davebender]

Channel Dash was one of the few German moves in the west, after the failure of the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over GB in 1940, where German planning, execution and objectives were all in sync and came off brilliantly.

August 1942. German defense of Dieppe vs British invasion.
Aug 1943. German withdrawal from Sicily to Italy across Messina Straits.
Sep 1943. Operation Achse (i.e. German response to Italy switching sides)
Fall 1943. German defense of Aegean vs British invasion.
Dec 1943. Bari
Jan 1944. Anzio defense vs U.S. invasion.
Apr 1944. Exercise Tiger
Summer 1944. Defense of Caen vs several British offensives.
Sep 1944. Operation Market-Garden.
Fall 1944. Metz defense.
Fall 1944. Hürtgen Forest defense.
Fall 1944. Defense of Scheldt for two months after British Army captured port of Antwerp.
Numerous Afrika Korps operations.

There are plenty more examples if you want to examine WWII time lines.

 

[pbfoot]

August 1942. German defense of Dieppe vs British invasion.
Aug 1943. German withdrawal from Sicily to Italy across Messina Straits.
Sep 1943. Operation Achse (i.e. German response to Italy switching sides)
Fall 1943. German defense of Aegean vs British invasion.
Dec 1943. Bari
Jan 1944. Anzio defense vs U.S. invasion.
Apr 1944. Exercise Tiger
Summer 1944. Defense of Caen vs several British offensives.
Sep 1944. Operation Market-Garden.
Fall 1944. Metz defense.
Fall 1944. Hürtgen Forest defense.
Fall 1944. Defense of Scheldt for two months after British Army captured port of Antwerp.
Numerous Afrika Korps operations.

There are plenty more examples if you want to examine WWII time lines.

the Scheldt was no walk in the park can you imagine having to do canal crossings onto flooded polders , there was zero cover for most of the assualts , I suggest you read about it

 

[nuuumannn]

The Channel Dash was a mixed blessing for the Germans; psychologically it was a master stroke, but there the brilliance ended. Basing the German battleships in German ports brought about their demise more hastily than if they were stationed at Brest - effectively, the damage done by RAF bombing that necessitated the ships' move back to Germany brought about the ships' end.

Gneisenau was hit by a mine, then further RAF bombing raids forced a move further east to Gotenhafen - the ship never sailed again under its own power. Scharnhorst was sunk on what was described as a suicide mission to attack a convoy, being intercepted by a strong British task force under the command of Adm Sir Bruce Fraser aboard the battleship Duke of York, to whose guns the Scharnhorst met its end on Boxing Day 1943.

Interestingly, whilst at Gotenhafen conversion to a 15 in gun armed battleship was begun on Gneisenau(the Germans always classified these two ships as such); this involved rebuilding the foc'sle among other structural changes, but importantly the ship's three triple 11 in gun turrets were removed and in their place were to be fitted three twin 15 in turrets of the same type as fitted to the Bismarck and Tirpitz. This never happened, but Gneisenau's 11 in guns were sent to Norway for coastal defence purposes, where they survive to this day. I haven't seen them, but there are pics somewhere on the internet of them.

Dave, Anzio and Market Garden were more a British failure than a German success; they can not really be described as being failures because of brilliant German planning. In many of the examples you cite, the Germans took advantage of Allied bungling, rather than German forethought bringing about a negative result for the Allies.

 

[davebender]

I'd take that a step further. The Channel Dash ended Admiral Raeder's plans to operate battleships and heavy cruisers in the Atlantic. A strategic defeat for the WWII German navy as most of their pre-war naval construction effort was rendered useless.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... A strategic defeat for the WWII German navy as most of their pre-war naval construction effort was rendered useless."

Perhaps - in terms of the original purpose for which that fleet was built. But after 1944 the German army must have been damn glad to have floating artillery in the Baltic as they retreated west.

MM

 

[Siegfried]

Michael,

The Channel Dash Association

Britain is a past master of getting caught with her trousers down but, somehow managing to save the day. Suicide or bravery? You decide...

John

I don't think that Britain has ever been caught with its trousers down: its expenditure on its military as a proportion of GDP has always been very high. Remember the Anglo-German Naval treaty kept the German Navy at around 35% of the British. Certainly the British have a talent for 'muddling their way through'. They've always been 'prepared'.

 

[Readie]

I don't think that Britain has ever been caught with its trousers down: its expenditure on its military as a proportion of GDP has always been very high. Remember the Anglo-German Naval treaty kept the German Navy at around 35% of the British. Certainly the British have a talent for 'muddling their way through'. They've always been 'prepared'.

I agree about the perfected art of muddling through. Its honed after being caught in unexpected situations ( which is my meaning). languid arrogance? perhaps....
John

 

[davebender]

A Wespe 10.5cm light SP howitzer cost about 50,000 RM.
A Hummel 15cm heavy SP howitzer cost about 100,000 RM.
KM Admiral Hipper cost 85.8 million RM.
Even the dumbest soldier would prefer 1,000 SP howitzers over a single Hipper class heavy cruiser. In fact he would probably prefer 10 SP howitzers over any naval vessel.

Those very expensive German surface warships justified the construction cost only as long as they interdicted enemy shipping in the Atlantic. When Britain expelled them from the Atlantic a half billion RM of German military spending was rendered almost useless.

I doubt German 6th Army which surrendered at Stalingrad cost half billion RM to raise, equip and train. Perhaps that will provide some perspective on the magnitude of the British accomplishment.

 

[Siegfried]

Dave, Anzio and Market Garden were more a British failure than a German success; they can not really be described as being failures because of brilliant German planning. In many of the examples you cite, the Germans took advantage of Allied bungling, rather than German forethought bringing about a negative result for the Allies.

The German military was prepared to exploit these opportunities and to fight agressively in the face of supply and logistics issues where many would have been illprepared.

The German navy was restricted by the Anglo-German naval treaty to a fraction of the British size. Furthermore the Kriegsmarines first new Battleships Scharnhorst and Gniesau had only 11 inch guns instead of the 13 or 12 inch units determined as optimal due to Hitlers need to appease British sensitivity to naval gun size; nor could the German fleets be ready till 1948.

God favours the big battalions in naval terms this is refered to as a "Lanchestrian Scenario"; big fleets have more guns, more likely to get hits first, more likely to degrade their opponents.

Had the German Navy guaranteed its cypher security its raiding stratagey might have worked: it came tantalizingly closed to this. Four rotor enigma succeded for nearly 1 year and UKWD could have guaranteed security for another 2 years had it been implimented in mass when it became available in late 1943.

Bad luck also plays a part: had Scharnhorst known of DoY prescence in the area (there was a poorly interpreted reconaisance report) Bey would have turned his radar on and detected Burnetts cruisers and not had its radar damaged.

 

[davebender]

Cypher security won't protect against aerial recon, which Britain had in abundance even before the war started. Germany had good aerial recon too plus an excellent EW capability. So it was impossible for large naval vessels to hide in the North Atlantic. If you cannot hide you have no choice except to defeat the enemy.

 

[nuuumannn]

Just to put this thread back on track. Today, the 12th Of February is the 70th Anniversary of the Channel Dash and the loss of Esmonde et al...

Lest we forget

 

[stug3]

A Fairey Swordfish Mk.I from the Torpedo Training Unit at Gosport drops a practice torpedo during training.

Fitting the torpedoes on to the Fairey Swordfish aircraft during training for pilots for naval aircraft at HMS JACKDAW, Royal Naval Air Station, Crail, Fife.

Swordfish crews decorated for the part they played in the sinking of the BISMARCK. Left to right: Lieutenant P D Gick, RN, awarded DSC; Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde, RN, awarded DSO; Sub Lieutenant V K Norfolk, RN, awarded DSC; A/PO Air L D Sayer awarded DSM; A/Ldg Air A L Johnson, awarded DSM.

 

[Maxrobot1]

In the book "Electronics and Sea Power" by Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet (RN) -published 1975, he mentions that in the Bismarck affair the Ark Royal did not have any shipboard radar but some of the Swordfish it and the Victorious carried had ASV Mark II radar.
On May 24 a strike force of Fulmars and Swordfish was sent out from the Victorious and a Swordfish with the ASV Mark II radar located the Bismarck. One torpedo hit resulted. the flight then used the radar to find they way back.
On May 26 a Catalina with ASV Mark II located the Bismarck and shorty afterwards it was visually located by a plane from the Ark Royal. At 1450 fourteen swordfish were sent off with one carrying the radar. From above the clouds they obtained contact and dived through the clouds to attack the HMS Sheffield which had been detached from the fleet to shadow the Bismarck because it was one of the very few ships with radar that could track the Bismarck.(Elderly type 79 radar)
A second strike was sent out three hours later with orders to first; locate the Sheffield, and then let the Sheffield direct them to the Bismarck! This resulted in the rudder hit which crippled the Bismarck.
It is interesting too that despite the U.S. having adopted widespread use of voice radio, the British allowed voice radio to be used in single seat aircraft only. Early on in the use of radio the British found that it was difficult to understand all the accents in the British Empire! (I can fully appreciate that!)
Aircraft like the Swordfish communicated by Morse, not voice radio.

 

[redcoat]

This resulted in the rudder hit which crippled the Bismarck..

The torpedo didn't hit the rudder, it hit the stern above the rudder. This caused the partial failure of the stern, which collapsed onto both rudders, jamming them.
http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p2.htm

It should be noted that the same thing happened to the German heavy warships Lutzow and Prinz Eugen when they suffered torpedo hits on their sterns, though in both these cases, due to the presence of escorting warships, the result wasn't so deadly for their crews.
In 1942-3 the remaining German heavy warships underwent modifications to rectify this fault

 

[stug3]

A German U-boat in rough seas being fired on by a Fairey Swordfish with rocket projectiles.

Swordfish from the escort carrier HMS Archer were responsible for successful U-boat attacks when defending convoy HX 239.

 

[fastmongrel]

I was watching the Royal Navy Swordfish taking off and landing at RAF Woodvale Friday evening, it was there for the Battle of the Atlantic celebrations this weekend in Liverpool. Its only when you get close that you realise how big an aircraft it is, also when coming into land that Peggy radial makes a lovely clattering noise. With a strong nor westerly blowing and full flaps the old girl was almost doing a VTOL my mate said it looks like the Observer could jump out and jog alongside

 

[parsifal]

The Swordfish was obsolete, in the sense of its performance. But there are two issues for strike aircraft to consider.....survivability, and mission effectiveness. In terms of perforamce, the Swordfish was very lacking, unquestionably, but in terms of mission effectiveness,, plane for plane, it was the most effective carrier borne aircraft of the war, at least on the allied side.

The Swordfish compensated for its low performance by adapting early to operate at night. Its sturdy construction, and low perforamce alsomade it more capable than most at operating in rough weather and heavy seas.

The combination of its obsolescence, intelligent adapations and other characteristics, made it a very successful weapon of war. What irks people is that it shouldnt have. But then the RN tended to do this a lot....win despite its equipment failures. It tended to lose or fail less badly than that of its opponents.

 

[VBF-13]

A Fairey Swordfish Mk.I from the Torpedo Training Unit at Gosport drops a practice torpedo during training.

Any torpedo bomber is going to be effective when you can get it in looking like that.

 

[parsifal]

Not necessarily, though I do get your point. successful launch is partof the issue, but if your strike aircraft is going too fast, or is too high, or the angle of attack is wrong, or the launch point too far away from the target, the attack is likley to fail.

The Swordfish had the runs on the board. It could get low and slow, and this made it a hard target for flak, and allowed it to get in close, real close. being slow meant risk of damage due to launch was minimised, and slow speed also allowed greater time for course corrections for the aircraft.

The Swordfish was no wonder weapon, but it had enough right about it to make it a danagerous weapon. It was stable, docile even, as evidenced by its use as a primary ASW weapon in its later years.