Fall 1942. What if Tiger I placed into large scale production? (1 Viewer)

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Heer and U.S. Army evaluation of T-34 both agree on that point. Probably Russia also as they replaced Christie suspension with torsion bars.
 
Look at the link you posted and observe Skoda's consistancy...they were churning out a steady line of the 38(t) chassied panzers

Skoda didn't just sit around knocking out 50 tanks of a single type each month between 1939 and 1945 and call it good, they were a major source of vehicles, AFV and panzers.

Below is a list (far from complete) to give an idea of thier production numbers. Bear in mind that the dates will be overlapping as the production reflected Wehrmacht's criteria.

PzKfw 35(t) - 424 units, 1935-1938 (with 219 units confiscated March 1939)

PzKfw 38(t):
. 150 units (Ausf A) May-November 1939
. 325 units (Ausf B, C, D) January-November 1940
. 525 units (Ausf E, F) November 1940-October 1941
. 90 units (Ausf S) May-December 1941
. 321 units (Ausf G) October 1941-June 1942
PzKfw 38(t) total: 1,411 1939-1942

PzKfw 38(t) purpose built (SP) carriers:
Marder III w/7.62cm PaK36(r) (Sdkfz 139) 344 units, April-October 1942 (plus 19 conversions)
Marder III w/7.5cm PaK40/3 Ausf H (Sdkfz 138) 242 units, November 1942-April 1943 (plus 175 conversions)
Marder III w/7.5cm PaK40/3 Ausf M (Sdkfz 138) 975 units, April 1943-May 1944
Grille (Cricket) 15cm Ausf H (Sdkfz 138/1) 90 units, February-April 1943
Grille (Cricket) 15cm Ausf K (Sdkfz 138/1) 282 units, April-June 1943 October 1943-September 1944
Flakpanzer Ausf L (Sdkfz 140) 140 units, November 1943-Februray 1944 (plus 1 conversion)
Hetzer 15cm Infantariegeschutes 33/2 (Sf) 24 units, December 1944 onwards (plus 6 conversions)
SP carrier total: 2,097 1942-1944

Additionally,
Munitionspanzer Ausf K (Sdkfz 138) 102 units, January-May 1944
Armored Recon w/2cm KwK38 or 7.5cm KwK38 L/24 (Aufklarer auf Fgst) 52 units, February-March 1944
Hetzer w/7.5cm PaK39 2,584 units, April 1944-May 1945 (includes 20 flammpanzer conversions)
Hetzer Bergepanzer (recovery vehicle) 106 units, October 1944-May 1945
Additional units total: 2,844

So our grand total for the 38(t) all types built would be 6,571 between 1939 and 1945

This figure doesn't include the repair works and the upfitting/modifications that was going on at the same time as noted earlier. Add to this the wheeled and tracked vehicles (10 different types) that they were producing for transport and construction, as well as specialty vehicles like airfield support equipment.
 
First of all, Christie suspension was not suitable for a heavy tank. Diesel or gasoline engine, its more upto how good/reliable the engine was.

Juha

Heer and U.S. Army evaluation of T-34 both agree on that point. Probably Russia also as they replaced Christie suspension with torsion bars.

How about the same system as the KV's that seem to have worked ok, or?

Would changing the engines in the panzers, from petrol to diesel, made them more, or less, reliable?
Wouldn't that have made them less prone to freeze in cold weather, less chance to catch fire etc.?
But then again, were they of a sound design in the first place?
 
The LT-38 was neither a Skoda design nor did they build LT-38s - all they produced from summer 44 was the Jagdpanzer 38. The LT-38 was a CKD/BMM design and they built the majority of them. They even build 25-33% of the LT-35 if I remember right.

AFAIR Diesel engines had more vibrations and easier to hear from distance. Also Diesel flocks-out at cold temperatures without additives or a small amount of petrol mixed inside. The KV suspension was torsion bar as well and used (in modified form) for the IS series
 
changing the engines in the panzers, from petrol to diesel, made them more, or less, reliable?
How many reliable diesel powered tanks were built during WWII? Certainly not anything produced in Soviet Union and that goes double for notoriously unreliable T-34/76.

Not that I have anything against diesel engines per se. I think Heer missed the boat by not using 400hp diesel which Daimler-Benz designed and tested successfully for Panzer III and Panzer IV. However German gasoline engines got the job done in a reliable and inexpensive manner.
 
1942 U.S. Army Ordnance evaluation of T-34.
Evaluation of The T-34 and KV Tanks By Engineers of the Aberdeen Proving Grounds - ENGLISH.BATTLEFIELD.RU - ENGLISH.BATTLEFIELD.RU
T-34 medium tank after driving 343 km, became completely disabled and that could not be fixed.

permeability to water of the lower hull during a water crossings, as well as the upper hull during a rain. In a heavy rain lots of water flows through chinks/cracks, which leads to the disabling of the electrical equipment and even the ammunition.

electrical mechanism for rotating the turret is very bad.

deficiencies in our tracks from their viewpoint results from the lightness of their construction. They can easily be damaged by small-calibre and mortar rounds. The pins are extremely poorly tempered and made of a poor steel. As a result, they quickly wear and the track often breaks

deficiency of our diesels is the criminally poor air cleaners on the T-34. The Americans consider that only a saboteur could have constructed such a device :lol: Soviet quality is an oxymoron.

On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.

Side friction clutches Out of a doubt, very poor

technology for tempering the armor plating should be changed

Replace the existing transmission of outdated design
 
I always thought that the T-34 was reliable, with its diesel engine... :shock:

And you would be right. Davebender, as usual is misquoting and misusing the US report from Aberdeen.

The Soviets had their man at Abedeen, and in response they produced their own 650 page report on why the Aberdeen report was totally bogus. The following is a summary from Archive Awareness

"In 1943, a T-34 and a KV-1 (the #11302 mentioned earlier) were sent to the Aberdeen proving grounds in the United States to undergo testing, and see what technical solutions from these tanks can be of use to the Americans, and what can be done to improve their designs. While the report from these tests is not widely available, another document is: a translation of the summary of the tests obtained by a GRU agent at Aberdeen. This text, especially when taken out of context, provides a very scathing, and generally incorrect view of T-34 and KV tanks. Here are a collection of documents elaborating on this information".

"Comments on the evaluation of T-34 and KV tanks by workers of the Aberdeen proving grounds in the USA, representatives of companies, officers, and commission members.

I. Tank condition

According to information received from the Americans, the T-34, after traveling 343 km, was disabled by the breakdown of the V-2 diesel engine. The Americans are of the opinion that this was caused by a poor air filter on the diesel engine.

The T-34 sent to America had an air filter of the "Pomon" type. This filter was installed on T-34 and BT tanks. If properly cleaned and supplied with oil (in exceptionally dusty environments, this must be done once every 2-3 hours), the Pomon filter guarantees normal engine operation with 79.6% air purity at air dustiness of 1 gram per cubic meter. The filter at Aberdeen was not cleaned [Note: the filter was also not oiled. The Americans wonder why the filter is called "oily" by the Soviets in their impressions], which led to uncharacteristic engine wear.

Starting with 1942, all T-34 tanks have an improved Cyclone filter, which provides 99.4% air purity at air dustiness of 1 gram per cubic meter. This filter also needs cleaning and oiling every 3-4 hours.

IS tanks in development will have an improved air filter, providing 100% air purity at air dustiness of 3 grams per cubic meter, and can operate without cleaning for 8 hours. This filter is designated "Multicyclone".

II. Armour

The Americans insist that the T-34 and KV tanks' plates are hardened shallowly, and most of the armour is soft steel. They suggest that we change the hardening technology, which will increase the armour's resistance to impacts. This opinion has no basis in reality, and was likely caused by poor analysis of the armour.

The armour of the sent T-34 tank consisted of 8S steel. All T-34s are armoured this way. This steel is hardened to high hardness (2.8-3.15 mm on the Brinell scale). The KV tank's armour was medium hardness (3.35-3.6 mm on the Brinell scale).

The Americans take the same approach as us, hardening armour of medium thickness to high hardness and armour over 40 mm thick to medium hardness. Our armour provides greater resistance to impact compared to American armour.

German heavy tanks have armour of medium hardness.

Currently, we are in the process of producing high hardness armour for IS tanks.

Perhaps, when commenting on the tanks' armour, the Americans meant that heavy tanks should have armour of high hardness.

III. Hull.

The Americans found that the tank takes on water when crossing rivers, and the hatches leak during rain. The hulls of our tanks are sufficiently watertight to cross rivers. However, the top hatches are insufficiently watertight.

IV. Turret.

The Americans consider the crampedness of our turrets a weakness. The T-34 we sent had a welded turret. New cast turrets are roomier than old welded turrets. New IS and T-43 tanks have larger turrets, due to the enlarged turret ring. The electric turret rotation mechanisms are indeed insufficiently reliable. A hydraulic turret rotation mechanism is currently in development, similar to American ones. This mechanism is very reliable and comfortable to use.

V. Armament.

It is necessary to admit that the muzzle velocity of our medium tank gun F-34 is insufficient, and is lower than that of the American 3" gun. However, the muzzle velocity of the American 75 mm gun on the M3 Medium and M4A2 tanks is also insufficient.

VI. Tracks.

During testing at Aberdeen, tracks of the T-34 tore. The track pins, instead of being guided by the guide, get caught on it and bend. This could potentially be caused by an insufficiently wide guide, or defects of the track metal. On currently produced T-34s, tracks are of much higher quality, the guide has been lengthened, and there are additional guides on the sides of the hull.

VII. Suspension.

The Americans do not like our spring suspension, based on their work with Christie tanks. [Note: the impressions of the suspension are from Christie tanks only, since the T-34 only traveled a very limited distance under the Americans' supervision. The suspension of the T-34 was different from the suspension of Christie or BT tanks]. We consider the reliability of the T-34's suspension adequate, but the T-43 is being developed with a torsion bar suspension.

VIII. Engine.

The T-34 tank has a 15 hp ST-700 electric starter. The KV has two 6 hp starters, 12 hp in total. Currently, both the KV and T-34 are built with a ST-700 starter.
A high power tank starter was first developed here. The Americans have much weaker starters. For some reason, they evaluate our starters as weak.
The ST-700 starter has a series of defects, making its reliability unsatisfactory to us. The IS tank is being developed with an electro-inertial starter of higher reliability.

IX. Transmission.

The KV and T-34 transmissions were a result of continued development of the Christie transmission. This transmission is currently obsolete.

The Americans have a poor opinion of the KV and T-34 gearboxes. They assumed that we copied their A-23 gearbox that was built 15-20 years ago by an American company. This same company built gearboxes for Christie tanks in 1929-1930.

The T-34 and KV gearboxes use a cross-bar and a bevel gear and pinion, transmitting the rotation from the motor. Perhaps the blueprints for our gearbox are similar to the A-23 ones.

Currently, a superior gearbox is used on the KV with 8 speeds (the one sent to the Americans had 5). T-34s built by the Kirov and #174 factories use a new 5-speed gearbox (the one sent to the Americans had 4). Quality of the gears in the gearbox is significantly increased.

X. Friction clutch

The Americans consider friction clutches obsolete. Apparently, even American tank companies no longer use them. They suggest that we replace them with double differentials, like they have on their tanks.

We also consider friction clutches obsolete. IS tanks are being developed with a planet gear, which makes the tank more maneuverable and reliable. All further transmission related work is aimed at transmissions of the planet gear type. This transmission is superior to the American one, which consists of a gearbox of the tractor-automobile type and a double differential.

Additionally, American tractors still use friction clutches. For example, these can be found on American Alice-Chalmers, Caterpillar, and International tanks currently being supplied to the USSR.

As for friction clutches on the KV and T-34, they work reliably, provided they are taken care of.

XI. Overall impressions.

The Americans remark that the tank is produced crudely, absent-mindedly, and with undeveloped technology of certain parts and devices. Significant progress has been made in upgrading the quality of produced tanks. However, mechanisms of American tanks are superior to domestic ones in cosmetic finish and performance.

Overall, Americans comment that their tanks are superior in maneuverability, firepower, speed, ease of use and maintenance, and reliability of construction. While American tanks are simpler to use, but ours have superior combat performance. The combination of armour, armament, and maneuverability is significantly more optimal than the Americans', which is proven by combat application."
 
Part II

CAMD RF 38-11355-1712

Since the above commentary makes it seem like the Americans hated everything about the T-34 and KV, here are the good parts they found:

"The shape of the tanks is loved by all, without exception. The T-34 is especially favoured. Consensus is that the T-34's shape is the best of all vehicles known in America.
...
Ammunition rack placement is very well liked.
...
The F-34 gun is very good. It is simple, reliable, and easy to service.
...
Consensus: the gun sights are the best in the world. Incomparable to any currently known worldwide or currently developed in America.
...
The Americans love the idea of steel tracks.
...
The suspension on the KV is excellent.
...
The diesel engine is light and excellent. The idea of using diesel engines has previously come up, but the Navy uses all diesel motors produced in the USA, and therefore the Army lacks the ability to use diesel tanks.
...
Both of our tanks can deal with sloping terrain better than any American tank.
...
Small size of radio stations and their placement inside the tank is good.
...
...overall tank construction is well though out...
"

Additionally, from the "Minutes of the meeting on the question of the evaluation of T-34 and KV tanks by Americans", CAMD RF 38-11355-360

"Major-General Ogurtsov speaks:
"The Americans provide incorrect data for muzzle velocity of the guns...they claim that their gun has Vo of 5700 ft/sec, or 1730 m/sec, which seems very unlikely, even given all of its advantages.""

You may notice that the T-43 is mentioned a number of times in this report. Development of the T-43 was cancelled, but many solutions from the project were used on other tanks, such as the T-34-85 and T-44.

By the way, if you ever do come across a full report, give me a shout. I'm very interested in reading it. You'll know it when you see it, it's 650 pages.
 
"Consensus: the gun sights are the best in the world. Incomparable to any currently known worldwide or currently developed in America." ?????

"Small size of radio stations and their placement inside the tank is good." ??? (outside of command tanks, what radios?)

Medium hard armor (assuming they mean homogeneous here) actually is better for well-sloped surfaces, like the T-34. It deflects shots better than high hardness (again, assuming they mean face hardened), which is designed to damage or break a shell and is used on more vertical surfaces (like, say, a Tiger I).

Small turrets? yes, for 2-man turrets. For three-man (T-34/85, T-43, IS) you'd naturally need a bigger turret.

It seems like a lot of the Soviet responses are on the order of "newer production is better" or "newer tanks in development are better," which - to me - begs the question: why, then, did the Soviets send older tanks? I think its reasonable to expect that these older tanks would not be as good as the newer. Blanket statements about newer production and models mean nothing if they cannot be evaluated; all the US had to work with was what the Soviets provided. I can't tell you what an Aston Martin drives like because I've never (<sigh>) been behind the wheel of one.

Interesting report. I'd love to read the original as well - when I have time, which should happen in 3-4 years.
 
The air filter construction seems strange with the need for that much cleaning/oiling. Did the other nations use a similar system or were they more advanced?
 
"Consensus: the gun sights are the best in the world. Incomparable to any currently known worldwide or currently developed in America." ?????

"Small size of radio stations and their placement inside the tank is good." ??? (outside of command tanks, what radios?)

Medium hard armor (assuming they mean homogeneous here) actually is better for well-sloped surfaces, like the T-34. It deflects shots better than high hardness (again, assuming they mean face hardened), which is designed to damage or break a shell and is used on more vertical surfaces (like, say, a Tiger I).

Small turrets? yes, for 2-man turrets. For three-man (T-34/85, T-43, IS) you'd naturally need a bigger turret.

It seems like a lot of the Soviet responses are on the order of "newer production is better" or "newer tanks in development are better," which - to me - begs the question: why, then, did the Soviets send older tanks? I think its reasonable to expect that these older tanks would not be as good as the newer. Blanket statements about newer production and models mean nothing if they cannot be evaluated; all the US had to work with was what the Soviets provided. I can't tell you what an Aston Martin drives like because I've never (<sigh>) been behind the wheel of one.

Interesting report. I'd love to read the original as well - when I have time, which should happen in 3-4 years.


The comments about the gun sights and the radio communications are those that were made in the Aberdeen test report. it just shows what a total crock the US report actually was.

There were huge QA issues with the earlier T-34s. those made in 1941 went into battle with a mallet as standard issue, to hit the side of the gearbox plate to help get the gearbox into reverse. The transmissions were particulalry poor.

by 1943, these problems were largely solved, and the reliability of the T34s were such as to be able to run up up to 1000 kms on the one set of tracks. This was several orders of magnitude better than any of the german tanks they faced (but not so better than a Sherman, admittedly). During the advance in 1941 the average life expectancy of the light German tanks was about 250 kms. Conditions in the Soviet Union were very tough, for all combatants.

To me it makes perfect sense that the Soviets would not send their very latest and best. The Soviets viewed Allied motives with the deepest suspicion, why would they waste sending a perfectly up to date model for testing with an "ally" viewed as less than useless to them (the Soviets). In 1943 the Soviets were still fighting for survival,, and whilst british committment was commendable and noted by the Soviets, the US was yet to make any significant contribution to the war (when viewed through Soviet eyes). the Americans had nearly lost the war in the Atlantic, had not committed any substantive air forces in the ETO, had committed about 3 divs to the landings inm North Africa, had reneged on the second cross channel front, all at a time when the Soviets were fighting to stay alive. More than half of lend lease for the Soviets at that stage was coming from the British and Commonwealth nations. Big things were on the move in the US, but it was yet to translate to anything meaningful.....How might you think they (the Soviets) would react to American request for a brand new T-34????
 
In a nutshell, if the T-34 was such a pile of crap, why did the Germans react to it with such urgency with new-threat upgrades to thier own Panzer program?

The hallmark of a weapon system can be judged by how much effort an opponent will go to counter it...
 
The comments about the gun sights and the radio communications are those that were made in the Aberdeen test report. it just shows what a total crock the US report actually was.

There were huge QA issues with the earlier T-34s. those made in 1941 went into battle with a mallet as standard issue, to hit the side of the gearbox plate to help get the gearbox into reverse. The transmissions were particulalry poor.

by 1943, these problems were largely solved, and the reliability of the T34s were such as to be able to run up up to 1000 kms on the one set of tracks. This was several orders of magnitude better than any of the german tanks they faced (but not so better than a Sherman, admittedly). During the advance in 1941 the average life expectancy of the light German tanks was about 250 kms. Conditions in the Soviet Union were very tough, for all combatants.

To me it makes perfect sense that the Soviets would not send their very latest and best. The Soviets viewed Allied motives with the deepest suspicion, why would they waste sending a perfectly up to date model for testing with an "ally" viewed as less than useless to them (the Soviets). In 1943 the Soviets were still fighting for survival,, and whilst british committment was commendable and noted by the Soviets, the US was yet to make any significant contribution to the war (when viewed through Soviet eyes). the Americans had nearly lost the war in the Atlantic, had not committed any substantive air forces in the ETO, had committed about 3 divs to the landings inm North Africa, had reneged on the second cross channel front, all at a time when the Soviets were fighting to stay alive. More than half of lend lease for the Soviets at that stage was coming from the British and Commonwealth nations. Big things were on the move in the US, but it was yet to translate to anything meaningful.....How might you think they (the Soviets) would react to American request for a brand new T-34????

Totally agree about Soviet suspicions; kinda figured that's was why they didn't provide the latest models. Still, the pragmatist in me feels that some of these latest examples had fallen into German hands as a matter of course, so it seems strange that while your enemy has samples of your best you refuse them to your ally. But, then, a paranoid state sees the world in a ... different way.

I also wonder how much of a role US doctrine - you know, the one that told the Army that tanks didn't fight tanks but TDs did instead - played a part, rather than evaluating the T-34 on its own merits?

As far as the gunsights, the US was describing the Soviet gunsights as the best in the world? Makes me wonder what they were smoking - and puts the US optics in a very bad light. (Ever try telling a US BB fan that American optics were anything less than wonderful? Unless you're looking to be on the receiving end of a vicious diatribe, don't!!)

Anyway, GrauGeist said it perfectly.
 
if the T-34 was such a pile of crap, why did the Germans react to it with such urgency
What urgency would you be referring to?

7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.

Panzer III remained armed with 5cm main gun rather then lengthening chassis so it could be armed with 7.5cm high velocity cannon.

Panzer IV production was not significantly increased until 1943. Until then production did not exceed 1,000 vehicles per year (i.e. less then 100 per month average).

Henschel Vk3001(H) and Vk3601(H) chassis were more or less ready to go during 1941. Heer was in no hurry to add vehicle hull and turret then rush the new medium tank into production. In fact neither vehicle ever had a complete prototype (chassis + hull + turret).

Tiger tank was never placed into large scale production.

Ju-87D was an effective tank killer using cluster munitions or under wing cannon. Ju-87 production did not drastically increase and the first cannon armed variants didn't appear until 1943.

Hs.129 was an effective tank killer and development was completed during 1941. However only 221 produced during 1942.
 
What urgency would you be referring to?

7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.

Panzer III remained armed with 5cm main gun rather then lengthening chassis so it could be armed with 7.5cm high velocity cannon.

Panzer IV production was not significantly increased until 1943. Until then production did not exceed 1,000 vehicles per year (i.e. less then 100 per month average).

Henschel Vk3001(H) and Vk3601(H) chassis were more or less ready to go during 1941. Heer was in no hurry to add vehicle hull and turret then rush the new medium tank into production. In fact neither vehicle ever had a complete prototype (chassis + hull + turret).

Tiger tank was never placed into large scale production.

Ju-87D was an effective tank killer using cluster munitions or under wing cannon. Ju-87 production did not drastically increase and the first cannon armed variants didn't appear until 1943.

Hs.129 was an effective tank killer and development was completed during 1941. However only 221 produced during 1942.

That sounds like a list of some of the reasons why the 3rd Reich lost the war on the eastern front.
 
What urgency would you be referring to?

7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.

Marders were conversions, you cannot convert more than you have chassises to convert

Panzer III remained armed with 5cm main gun rather then lengthening chassis so it could be armed with 7.5cm high velocity cannon.

After stop-gap uparmoured long-barrel 50mm versions the production was run down to allow more StuG IIIs, which surprise-surprise were up-gunned with long-barrel 75mm, to be produced and last version was armed with short-barrel 7.5cm L/24 gun for fire-support work, I wonder why, was that because the old 7.5cm L/24 tank, Pz IV, was for some reason, what that might have been, upgunned with a long 7.5cm gun

Panzer IV production was not significantly increased until 1943. Until then production did not exceed 1,000 vehicles per year (i.e. less then 100 per month average).

But surprisingly Pz IV was hurriedly upgunned with a long 7.5cm cannon.

...Tiger tank was never placed into large scale production...

Again, Germany could not began large-scale mass production of Tigers because of lack of suitable machine tools.
 
Oh here we go...

So in your world, Dave, the Wehrmacht could care less about the T-34 and didn't even acknowledge it existed.

The reality was that the Ju87D(field mod)/G and Hs129 operated at risk as the Luftwaffe lost air supremacy in spite of thier anti-armor effectiveness.

In 1941, the Wehrmacht was shocked when they encountered the T-34. Up to that point, they had been enjoying great success over the BT series Soviet tanks. At that time, there wasn't sufficeint numbers of Wehrmacht armor that were equipped with the PaK38, which was the only real effective weapon they had to stop the T-34, and that was only at dangerously close ranges.
The bulk of German armor was the PzKfw II, III, IV and 38(t) at that time and all were vulnerable to the T-34.

The PzKfw V (Panther) was a response to the T-34, being designed based on that threat and being put into production and reaching the battlefield by 1943, getting it's baptism of fire at Kursk.

In the case of the King Tiger, the idea of a heavy tank had been considered for some time (since late 30's) but with the advent of the T-34, it became aparent one was needed. The King Tiger was designed with the T-34 in mind, as a battlefield supremacy objective and also reached the battlefield in 1943.

I won't go into deep details regarding those, as it's been exhaustively discussed already and I don't want to hijack the thread...but there it is...the T-34 forced a new-threat upgrade with German armor.
 
What urgency would you be referring to?

7.5cm Pak40 AT gun was already in pipeline. Production of SP variant (i.e. Marder) remained small.

Panzer III remained armed with 5cm main gun rather then lengthening chassis so it could be armed with 7.5cm high velocity cannon.

Panzer IV production was not significantly increased until 1943. Until then production did not exceed 1,000 vehicles per year (i.e. less then 100 per month average).

Henschel Vk3001(H) and Vk3601(H) chassis were more or less ready to go during 1941. Heer was in no hurry to add vehicle hull and turret then rush the new medium tank into production. In fact neither vehicle ever had a complete prototype (chassis + hull + turret).

Tiger tank was never placed into large scale production.

Ju-87D was an effective tank killer using cluster munitions or under wing cannon. Ju-87 production did not drastically increase and the first cannon armed variants didn't appear until 1943.

Hs.129 was an effective tank killer and development was completed during 1941. However only 221 produced during 1942.

The T-34 and KV-1 were the reasons the 3601 morphed into the 4501 which after the start of Barbarossa morphed to accommodate even heavier armor and the 88 - the only gun at the time of Barbarossa the German had which could reliably take out a KV-1, and also the reason the 3601 never went into production. Thus a 30-ton pre-war design morphed into a 45-ton wartime design (May '41) and then finally ended up a 56-ton wartime production model.

The Panther was designed as a direct counter to the T-34 encountered first in June '41. The designs were completed by April '42, with a prototype being built by Sept. Production started in Nov/Dec '42, slowly at first because of a lack of machine tools. It was also rushed into production, with well-cataloged results. Less than 18 mo from start-of-design to production is very fast for a tank; the 3601 design work started in '37.

PzIV production was not significantly increased but it was significantly up-gunned with first the 75L43 and then the 75L48.

The Stuka G didn't hit the front line until mid '43, and was a direct result of troubles with the development of the Hs 129B-3 - which the RLM wanted to replace - and the desire to get another tank-killer in the field ASAP.

The entire Marder series was slapped together to also help counter the T-34 and KV-1.

The "urgency" reaction was in the up-gunning, up-armoring, and the new tank design, not in raw numbers. Note that after encountering somewhat superior French and British tanks in France and NA, the Wehrmacht did little to improve their kit; it took the T-34 to bring about significant and rapid improvement in the capabilities of German armor.
 

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