Fixing the Italian Military, 1933~1945

[TM06]

Back to the Italian army and going over a lot of stuff from earlier, except in one place

1. Ditch the Breda 30 and build a licensed ZB 26.
2. Ditch the Brixia 46mm mortar and replace with a licensed Brandt 60mm mortar.
3. License the Brandt 120mm mortar.
4. Build a lot more of the Cannone da 75/32 modello 37 (like 500-1000 during 1938-39-40) giving the division artillery an extra 2000 meters (or bit more) range.
Not a lot of punch but better than being both out ranged and using smaller shells.
5. Instead of the M11/39 tank build a M-12/13 with the 37mm gun in a two man turret, even if they loose the bow machine gun.
6. Replace as soon as possible with a M-14/15 tank with a high velocity 47mm gun (like the 47/40 L40) except in 1940/41 instead of Jan 1943. Try to use a 3 man turret even if losing the bow machine guns. Two 15 ton tanks may equal a single 28-30 ton tank with a MV 75mm gun.
7. Replace the 47mm Bohler gun with the 47/40 L40 as soon as possible for towed AT gun work. The extra 200m/s in velocity would be worth a lot in 1941-42.

Don't forget the immediate post-WW1 introduction of the Spitzer bullet for the 6.5 Carcano and preventing the existence of 7.35 Carcano entirely.
I still remain steadfast in my support for the widespread adoption of the Breda PG, perhaps by cutting into MAB 38 production?

 

[yulzari]

Don't forget the immediate post-WW1 introduction of the Spitzer bullet for the 6.5 Carcano and preventing the existence of 7.35 Carcano entirely.
I still remain steadfast in my support for the widespread adoption of the Breda PG, perhaps by cutting into MAB 38 production?

The 7.35mm round for the Carcano was a perfectly logical follow up from the conclusions the Italian army drew from WW1 on the role of the infantry rifle.What proved an issue was not doing it fast enough to make it the wartime standard.

The poor performance of the 6.5mm Breda M30 light machine gun but adequate Breda M38 8mm heavy machine gun left an opportunity for a light machine gun in 8mm Breda with a box feed, thus keeping the army on a two type ammunition standard and peer adequate performance. Of course one has to note that it could do with an earlier introduction of these to service and achieving all this by 1940 and not the planned 1943.

The Breda PG would be a nice replacement for the Carcano but the Carcano 38TS was a cheap upgrade and adequate for the task in hand.

 

[Shortround6]

The rifle was not a big killer on the battlefield. Artillery was generally rated as causing about 1/2 of the causalities. Not sure if that includes mortars.
Which leaves about 50% to be divided between machine guns of all types, hand grenades, rifles and submachine guns, pistols and bayonets.
10-20% of the riflemen never even fired their rifles most of the time.
The bipod mounted MG was the real killer in the rifle squad/platoon. It was often overseen by the squad leader (or 2nd in command) and being mounted on a bipod it gave better long range (lets say 200yds and up) accuracy in addition to the rate of fire (equal to 6-10 riflemen).

The Italian 8 x 59 cartridge was bit of beast. It was the 3rd (?) most powerful machine gun round of the war (not counting the 12.7mm and larger) which meant it was rather uncomfortable to fire from standard bolt action rifles or carbines. Germans had number of different loads for the 8 x 57 and the hottest loads may have been more powerful than the Italian 8 x 59. The Italian round used a fatter diameter body which means it held a bit more powder than is suggested by the 2mm difference in length.
Compared to the US 30-06 the Italian 8mm cartridge fired bullets that were about 30-40% heavier than the US rifle ammo (US machine gun ammo used bullets that were about 15% lighter).
The champ of the 7.5-8mm ammo was the Swedish 8 X 63 which actually had some rifles chambered for it. Pretty much only issued to crewmen that were dealing with the 8 x 63 chambered machineguns. This rifles are known for their 'stout' recoil.

Problem for the Italians is that while rifles are not expensive per rifle, you need a lot of them. Italian army was about 2.5 million men but a lot of them had other duties/jobs and can be given pistols/submachine guns and carbines for 'self defense'. Buying over 1 million rifles just for the first line troops gets expensive. Once you have a good light machine gun you can worry about the rifle/s.
Only country that didn't go that way was the US.
Switching the 6.5mm Carcano to a spitzer bullet makes a lot of sense from a ballistic point of view. But it requires a new or modified sight. As mentioned in earlier posts the existing rifling may or may not be compatible with the the type/style of spitzer bullet. Especially if a shorter barrel is wanted for weight or ease of carry.
I would note that the model 38 Carcano is almost 1 kg lighter than the American 1903 Springfield and even lighter compared to the M-1 semi automatic rifle.
Also of note is the amount of ammo the US was planning on going into battle with even in 1940/41. The M-1 rifleman was supposed to carry 40 rounds while on the march with 96 rounds in two 48 round bandoliers issued prior to combat with another 96 rounds (in bandoliers) in the ammunition train as a reserve.
In regiment the M-1 rifles had a total of 328 round per rifle while the M1903 or M1917 bolt action rifles had 220 rounds per rifle.
The US was planning on 1620-1748 rounds per BAR and 6000 rounds for each 1919 air cooled Browning. The Water cooled 1917 Brownings had 8,250 rounds.
These are ammunition totals including small unit transport and regimental ammo train. I don't know what was in the brigade or division ammo train.

Semi auto rifles are nice, but they need more ammo and better training.

 

[tomo pauk]

Italians have had a bit a late start with the heavy 8mm round, barely earlier than with the 7.35mm.
For my money: forget both of these, introduce the spitzer bullet for the 6.5mm, and introduce the air-force's existing 7.7mm to the Army (mainly for vehicle-mounted positions). Once France is defeated, make the deal with the Germans to ship the French guns and ammo in 7.7mm to Italy.

 

[z42]

Italians have had a bit a late start with the heavy 8mm round, barely earlier than with the 7.35mm.
For my money: forget both of these, introduce the spitzer bullet for the 6.5mm, and introduce the air-force's existing 7.7mm to the Army (mainly for vehicle-mounted positions). Once France is defeated, make the deal with the Germans to ship the French guns and ammo in 7.7mm to Italy.

As mentioned above, a 6.5 Spitzer bullet may or may not have been compatible with the rifling in the existing guns. But yeah, if it's possible to make it work, seems like an obvious choice.

As for the 7.7mm (.303), there are some additional challenges in making rimmed cartridges feed reliably. Which is why they have largely been replaced by rimless ones. So maybe at least don't expand usage of that cartridge?

If they wanted a new full power rifle caliber cartridge, instead of reinventing the wheel they could have adopted the 7.92 Mauser, which was already used by several European militaries in addition to Germany.

 

[z42]

This sounds good on first glance, but it is about 300 miles from Cagliari on Sardinia to Naples so you need a lot of freighters to move the coal and once the British figure out what is going on the the route becomes a prime hunting ground for British subs.

Sure, there are risks. But at least those have a higher chance of going through than continuing to buy British coal after war was declared.

I am having trouble finding the history of the Carbosulcis mine but the the nearby Serbariu Coal Mine only opened in 1939 and was the largest coal mine in Italy until the 1950s, closed in 1964?
The Carbosulcis mine deposits are around 350-550 meters deep. The Serbariu mines (they acquired some of their neighbors) only reached a depth of 179 meters from the surface but that was 103 meters below sea level.

I think the basic problem is that in the interwar years Italy had neither money nor serious interest in energy autarchy. Buying British coal was cheaper than developing a domestic industry, so that's what they did.

In Germany there was a lot of opposition to the synthetic fuels program by the industrialists, they saw it would never be commercially competitive. But Hitler had the political clout to push it through regardless.

 

[tomo pauk]

As mentioned above, a 6.5 Spitzer bullet may or may not have been compatible with the rifling in the existing guns. But yeah, if it's possible to make it work, seems like an obvious choice.

Other people made the switch to the spitzer bullet in the late 19th/early 20th century - French, Germans, Americans, Russians, Swedes, Norwegians, Japanese, and never looked back, so I see no hurdle for the Italians to mimic the move. Toy a bit with the weight of the bullet and propellant until it works as it should.

As for the 7.7mm (.303), there are some additional challenges in making rimmed cartridges feed reliably. Which is why they have largely been replaced by rimless ones. So maybe at least don't expand usage of that cartridge?

Even before ww1, there were well-working guns that used rimmed cartridges, and Italians have the knowledge to do it. A heavier-barreled Breda SAFAT gives them a very useful GPMG on a dime and on time, and making a bolt-action rifle is not a big deal.
A reason for the adoption of that cartridge for the Army is that will offer extra oomph over the longer ranges and against the targets behind the light cover, as well as because it can do a better job with different bullets (AP, tracer, incendiary...) than the smaller 6.5. Japanese adopted the same cartridge in the 1940s for the infantry small arms, it seems like it worked well.

 

[tomo pauk]

Fitting solid rubber tires and pressed steel wheels to a pre- WW I gun does not make it a 1939 gun. Max range with gun the level (the museum example is slightly tilted) is about 6.8km. This is a combination of MV (502m/s) shell design and low max elevation. If the gun is elevated above 16-18 degrees the gun will strike the trail. Unless you redesign the carriage you stuck. (Box trail like British 25pdr?) and the other failing is the max traverse of 7 degrees total.

Ironically, the new gun of a 100% modern appearance (no irony), the 75/18, was firing at even the lower MV - just 425 m/s - but it offered the considerably longer range due to the greater elevation.
I still think that the 75/18 was a mistake. Go early with a new gun (alternative 75/32 or /34), with a split carriage, that can offer at least 600 m/s (ie. ballpark of the French 75), and preferably 650 m/s, so the max ranges can be 12-13 km. Make the new lightweight carriages for the older guns, they should be able to make it to 10 km due to the greater elevation.
Sell the 65mm guns to anyone that wants these.

 

[Shortround6]

Other people made the switch to the spitzer bullet in the late 19th/early 20th century - French, Germans, Americans, Russians, Swedes, Norwegians, Japanese, and never looked back, so I see no hurdle for the Italians to mimic the move. Toy a bit with the weight of the bullet and propellant until it works as it should.



Even before ww1, there were well-working guns that used rimmed cartridges, and Italians have the knowledge to do it. A heavier-barreled Breda SAFAT gives them a very useful GPMG on a dime and on time, and making a bolt-action rifle is not a big deal.
A reason for the adoption of that cartridge for the Army is that will offer extra oomph over the longer ranges and against the targets behind the light cover, as well as because it can do a better job with different bullets (AP, tracer, incendiary...) than the smaller 6.5. Japanese adopted the same cartridge in the 1940s for the infantry small arms, it seems like it worked well.

As a cartridge/bullet standpoint the Italians were certainly behind the game with round nose/flat based bullets after WW I. The French had adopted the balle D in 1898 with both a very streamline nose and a boat tail and that started the race among the major powers. The bullet was solid brass which was bit wasteful but offered good penetration.

Bolt action rifles don't care what kind of bullet/velocity combo is used as long the bullet is spun fast enough to stabilize. Machine guns get more picky, especially recoil operated guns.
While using two different cartridges in the squad/platoon/company is not ideal it was done in a lot of nations at times, especially modern times (better logistics?)
Just using a more streamline bullet will give (retain) oomph at longer ranges than a slower/heavier round nose bullet. It is also easier to hit with at long range and by long range I meant somewhere between 200-300 meters. Round nose bullets are only somewhat better than round ball.
Problem is that what is a good cartridge for "infantry use" is not a good cartridge for support use. If you want one cartridge compromises have to be made.
The thing with the 7.35 Carcano is that the thing seems to have been designed by saboteurs.

The bullet was only 8 grams (128grains) and while the aluminum nose helped make the bullet a little longer the actual shape, while much better than the 6.5 in the middle, is not as good as the German 7.9mm Mauser on the left. The bullet is only about 5 grains (0.32grams) heavier than the Russian 7.62 x 39 bullet. Granted the velocity was a bit better but the combination was not great. Comfortable to shoot but the long range ballistics was only good in comparison to the 6.5 Carcano. A pointy 6.5mm bullet in the Carcano of 8-9mm grams would (with a proper twist) had given better long range ballistics and hitting power to the existing 6.5mm or the 7.35mm.


The Breda-SAFAT was not a good candidate for a GPMG any more than a US M1919A6 was a good candidate for a GPMG. It was done for expediency but it was never popular despite some heroic actions on Okinawa. The Breda-SAFAT might have made a much better tank machine gun than the Model 38. Using 24 round box magazines inside a tank was not a good feature. But tank machine guns were not one of the big problems with Italian arms procurement.

 

[Shortround6]

Ironically, the new gun of a 100% modern appearance (no irony), the 75/18, was firing at even the lower MV - just 425 m/s - but it offered the considerably longer range due to the greater elevation.
I still think that the 75/18 was a mistake. Go early with a new gun (alternative 75/32 or /34), with a split carriage, that can offer at least 600 m/s (ie. ballpark of the French 75), and preferably 650 m/s, so the max ranges can be 12-13 km. Make the new lightweight carriages for the older guns, they should be able to make it to 10 km due to the greater elevation.
Sell the 65mm guns to anyone that wants these.

The whole 75/18 was based on 'commonalty'. Take the barrel and recoil system from the M34 mountain gun and stick it on a field gun carriage. Voila! New field gun that is better than the old Pre WW I antiques. But not as good as just about anybody else's 75-77mm field guns.
Yes the Italians could have used more ( a lot more) 75/34 field guns.
The only people that want the 65mm guns were antique dealers selling medium lawn ornaments.

The Italian infantry got them because the Italian Alpine divisions had already replaced them with the 75/18 before 1939.
So in 1939/40 they would be looking for their 3rd owners?
Italian infantry might have been better served with 10cm or 12cm mortars. Less accurate but the shells have a lot more oomph when they land
But new mortars cost more than 2nd hand 25 year old guns.

 

[yulzari]

The whole better rifle cartridge is something of a red herring when looking at the Italian WW1 experience. Long range shooting just did not happen with a rifle. Obviously it occurred, but so rarely and with so little effect that shooting beyond 200 metres was not worth considering. That what the 7.35 bullet was for. Optimised for short ranges and the sight reduced to a fixed single rear sight. When the Finns got some 7.35 Carcanos they reduced the fixed sight even further to 100 metres. A 6.5mm spitzer would certainly improve the effective range but the existing Carcanos were not using the current range potential anyway. I cannot comment upon the compatibility of a spitzer bullet with chambering and with gain twist rifling in the Carcano.

In the meantime Italy was knee deep in 6.5 Carcanos and stacks of ammunition for them. Change the bullet to a spitzer you have to change the sights. They had more urgent problems to spend scarce money upon. The mid 1930s decision was to do the job cheaply but efficiently as the service Carcanos were in need of refurbishment anyway. Put them all through a full refurbishment and give back carbine length fixed sight 7.35mm as new. They wanted a bigger but lighter bullet for the up to 200 metre task and the calibre was chosen as the maximum that could safely be rifled into the bore when the original linings were removed. The rifling was a simple constant twist optimised for the 7.35 spitzer and not the old gain twist. Cheaper machining

The decision was conscious and measured and the best way to arm new conscripts and reservists and marginally reduce training if war were declared. All for the best cost/benefit. Planning was for no war before 1943 at the earliest. A very practical period bolt action rifle.

The fault was not with the refurbishment to the new Carcano 38TS but with the timing.

 

[Shortround6]

The whole better rifle cartridge is something of a red herring when looking at the Italian WW1 experience. Long range shooting just did not happen with a rifle.

It didn't happen with most/all WW I armies.
The problem was with the ammo selections of the different nations. The 'firepower' of the infantry had shifted from the rifle to the machine gun during WW I. But the standard of MG issue per battalion and shifted from 2-4 machine guns per battalion to a dozen or more guns per battalion and in 1918 may armies were issuing Lewis guns, Chauchat', BARs and cut down Maxim guns in addition to the Battalion machineguns.

In fact it had shifted so much that the US, British and Germans all came up with special long ranged ammo for the tripod mounted machine guns that allowed for long range fires (like over 1800-2000 meters) and the French 1890 balle D already allowed for long range fire.

The US shows some the choices in ammo and how it affects things.
The US adopts the 1903 rifle and cartridge (basically a more powerful 30-40 Krag)with a round nose 220 grain bullet at 2300fps. Within months the US realized they had screwed up and came up with 30-06 (slightly shorter neck) that would allow for a 150 grain flat based spitzer to be fired at 2700fps. The existing rifles could have the existing barrels taken off, shortened a bit and rechambered for the 2mm shorter cartridge with the proper gap between bullet and rifling for good accuracy. Also needed some new sight part/s. All was good until 1916/17 when the US figured out that the exiting 150 grain/2700fps load, while good for long range rifle shooting (600-800yds) was seriously lacking for long range machinegun fire. That 1800-3000yd barrage fire well loved by WW I machinegun theory.
The US leapt into action and came up with the M1 30-06 load with a 172 grain spitzer boat tail bullet at just under 2700fps which added about 2000 to the max range. However max range called for a lot of elevation and most/all bullets started tumbling well before reaching max range. Effective range could be around 2000 yds less than max range. This was in 1917/18.
US manufactures millions of rounds of both kinds of 30-06 ammo in 1918-1919 (production took a while to stop) which had several effects in the early 30s.
1 was that the US decided they had too much ammo in storage to change over to the .275 Pederson round for a new semi auto rifle.
2. US policy was to use the oldest ammo first for training. Which meant that the 1917 M1 load with the boat tail bullets didn't show up on training ranges until the mid 30s at which point they discovered it was so long range that it was unsafe on many existing ranges, which lead to the M2 ball 30-06 ammo which was the old 1906 load updated with new powder.
The new load operated at lower pressures than the old and didn't put as much wear and tear on the M1 rifles but any 30-06 gun could fire any 30-06 ammo although sight settings may be off.
The US did try to issue the 172grain BT Spitzer to the Browning belt fed machine guns where they could (some what easier as the Brownings were feed by belts).
Yes the M1 rifle and the Bar were a bit over powered for squad weapons. But the US was trapped into the 30-06 cartridge (mostly) for weapons development and didn't break out until the M-16. The 7.62x 51 was not even a 30-06 junior. It was the old 1906//1930s M2 load in a short case allowed by new powder development. Some armies were more than stupid when it comes to weapons development.

Yes a large side track. But the Italian 7.35 saga is rather sad. Use a shorter, fatter, lighter bullet with a better point but don't fire it than much faster. Try to use it in both rifles and the platoon LMGs, which means you NEED a larger more powerful round in the the company/battalion/AFV machine guns complicating the logistics.
Now the Italians get caught by the terrain they are fighting in. Instead of mountains, cities and forests like many other nations (and Italian planning?) they wind up doing most of the fighting in North Africa with some of the most wide open terrain of WW II. Most (all?) countries did not need the complicated sights used by the Americans but using a fixed distance on the main battle rifle is a mistake. May simplify training but it your average soldier can't hit well on the training range he isn't going to risk firing at long range (long being much beyond training range). You spend a lot of money on a good bolt action rifle and powerful ammo (compared to a 9mm submachine gun) and then save a few lira on the back sight?

At least the British gave the soldiers the illusion they could shoot back at long range

It turns out that according to one study that about 50% of rifle fire was done at 200yds/meters but that means that 50% was done at over 200 yds/meters. 98% was done at 400yds/meters or less. Yes really long range was rarity. But abandoning the 300-400yd/meter range band might not have been smart.
Same study said that 50% of machinegun fire was at 400 yds/meters or over. If you want a common cartridge for both roles which side to you favor/lean towards?
Now a problem for the Italians is they don't have enough LMGs per platoon/company to equal the British number of LMGs per platoon company at 200yds and beyond and the Italian rifles don't have the sights or ammo to try to fill in even if the officers can get them to shoot (same for the British, getting the troops to shoot at the longer ranges was always difficult.)

The Italians need to figure out where they are going to be fighting, what weapons are going to work where, how much training they are going to pay for.
If you want a gun that uses a single sight setting for ease of training then buy gun/cartridge combo that gives a flat trajectory out to 300-400meters.
Italians tried to build a gun that used a single sight setting and then due to circumstances paired with a cartridge that gave a rather curved trajectory.

 

[TM06]

The problem I have with 7.35 Carcano is the unnecessary logistical strain it brought with it for what is - in my opinion - an underpowered and outmatched cartridge. Italy was already juggling 3 rounds of a similar size (.303 British, 8mm Mauser, 8 x 59 Breda) and adding another brand new cartridge on top of that just made the strain worse.
The Spitzer tail design for the 6.5 Carcano can be achieved significantly earlier than the 7.35's introduction by at the very least two decades - more than enough time to fix the previously mentioned rifling issues.

 

[TM06]

Even before ww1, there were well-working guns that used rimmed cartridges, and Italians have the knowledge to do it. A heavier-barreled Breda SAFAT gives them a very useful GPMG on a dime and on time, and making a bolt-action rifle is not a big deal.
A reason for the adoption of that cartridge for the Army is that will offer extra oomph over the longer ranges and against the targets behind the light cover, as well as because it can do a better job with different bullets (AP, tracer, incendiary...) than the smaller 6.5. Japanese adopted the same cartridge in the 1940s for the infantry small arms, it seems like it worked well.

The Breda-SAFAT was not a good candidate for a GPMG any more than a US M1919A6 was a good candidate for a GPMG. It was done for expediency but it was never popular despite some heroic actions on Okinawa. The Breda-SAFAT might have made a much better tank machine gun than the Model 38. Using 24 round box magazines inside a tank was not a good feature. But tank machine guns were not one of the big problems with Italian arms procurement.

For what it's worth, there were actually some instances of the 7.7 Breda-SAFAT being used as an ad-hoc light machine gun, so it's not too far out of the realm of possibility. Give it a proper box magazine to stick those belts in alongside a more robust stock and it'd probably be fine as far as GPMG's go.

 

[Shortround6]

Just because aircraft guns were used as ad-hoc ground guns does not mean it was a good idea is less stressful/chaotic times.

German MG 15 adopted (badly) for ground use. Granted you can do a better conversion in peace time (or in phony war)
But the gun weighed about 8KG in aircraft form (unloaded without bipod and butt stock) and was about 52in long with the buttstock.
The gun was heaver when loaded and equipped for ground combat and longer than anybody else's light machine gun.
It fired fast (over 1000rpm) but without a high speed (150mph and up) air flow it overheated quickly in ground use (needs a heavier barrel/or fins)
The gun ONLY accepted the 75round double drum which was problem in ground use. Hand carry vs vehicle mount.
In peace time a few changes could have been made.

The Breda-SAFAT (and the Browning 1919A6) had problems of their own as ground guns. (ground means infantry, not pintle mounted AA gun or pintle mounted vehicle gun)
Rigging up a box to hold the belt is not a big problem. Rigging up better sights for ground use in not a big problem.

The Browning/Breda guns were a bit heavy. Problem for troops on foot.
The Breda was fast firing. The Browning/Breda had changeable barrels but not quick change.
US actually slowed down their 1919 air cooled guns around 10-15% compared to their 1917 water cooled guns. This is doable for the Italians.
But this flies in the face of the GPMG as the Germans practiced it. Germans wanted high cycle rate for AA use but paired it with a quick change barrel to solve the heat problem.
The Jury is still out on belt fed guns for squad/platoon use. Many armies like the fire-power, most do not like the extra hole/s for ingress of dirt/crud. Belts not in containers are problems in certain terrain. Long belts are heavy, not all machine gunners have the body of Arnold Schwarzenegger (or movie special effects men that can make a 200 round belt last for 800 shots
Belt feed guns make sharing ammo between the machine gun and the riflemen very difficult in combat. British riflemen could reload Bren gun magazines in combat, not often but it was possible. Germans used a 50 round non-disintegrating belt, Assistant gunner could toss an empty belt to a rifle man and have him reload the belt. Guns that use disintegrating belts need more time to pickup all the little links
US in 1940-41 (pre Pearl Harbor) for the BAR were planning on the assistant gunners carrying some of the ammo load in in the 5 round or 8 round clips used in the rifle and refilling the magazines. How long that lasted I don't know, maybe never saw combat.
Gunner and assistant gunner had 19-20 magazines. The rest of the 852 round load was carried in 48 round bandoliers (M-1 clips) shared between the assistant gunner and the ammo carrier.
Moving around 750-850 round of ammo in 100-200 round belts is hard if you are trying to keep hands free (able to use own gun if needed without dropping the ammo container).

A lot depends on the doctrine of the different armies (and their logistics/transport).
The Breda 30 seems to be very bad combination. Having one or more infantrymen trying to reload those 20 magazine chargers in the field while stripping the ammo out of their Carcano clips may have been fairly simple but not as easy as using US stripper clips or M-1 clips?

Maybe the Breda-SAFAT would have been a better gun than the Breda 30 but that is like saying that food poisoning is better than flu because it doesn't last as long

 

[muskeg13]

Just using a more streamline bullet will give (retain) oomph at longer ranges than a slower/heavier round nose bullet. It is also easier to hit with at long range and by long range I meant somewhere between 200-300 meters. Round nose bullets are only somewhat better than round ball.

The underlined statement isn't even remotely correct, particularly when speaking of the very long for caliber ~160 grain 6.5mm bullets used in the 6.5mm Carcano and the original 6.5 Swede and Norwegian cartridges. The performance difference between a round ball and even a short round nose "conical" projectile is so much improved to almost defy comparison. Also, look at the shape of the nose of the 6.5 Carcano in the picture above, it may not be needle sharp, but it's not that blunt either. Today there are many modern projectiles designed for long range that actually have a small flat point.

The ballistic coefficient (BC) of a .265 round ball is only 0.0376, while the BC of a (Hornady) .264 diameter 160 grain round nosed bullet is 0.283. Going down to 140 grain spitzers, Hornady lists the flat base projectile's BC at 0.465 and the boattailed version at 0.520. I know the Carcano is supposed to be .268 diameter and weigh 162 grains, but for comparison, I think using the Hornady data is close enough. Applying the calculation below to the 162 grain Carcano round, the rough estimated BC is 0.2119843. There are other factors to consider to derive a more precise BC, like ogive and base shapes and velocity. In addition to bullet nose and base, usually the longer the bullet length, the higher the BC as long as there is sufficient velocity and twist rate to maintain stability.

I believe the notion is overblown that the long round nose projectiles unduly handicapped Swedish, Norwegian and Italian riflemen (MGs are a different story). The long round nose cartridge served the users well enough that Sweden didn't adopt a 140 grain spitzer until 1941, and by that time Norway was into it's second year of German occupation and Italy was in the middle of WW2 with things not going so well.

FYI: The calculation to obtain a rough estimate of the ballistic coefficient is:
Projectile weight in grains/10640 x projectile diameter in inches x projectile diameter in inches.

 

[TM06]

Maybe the Breda-SAFAT would have been a better gun than the Breda 30 but that is like saying that food poisoning is better than flu because it doesn't last as long

Oh don't get me wrong, I'm not saying it would be an absolutely exemplary option or anything like that. But it would be a relatively economical option that they could get in decent numbers somewhat quickly. Out of the indigenous options, It's the lightest and most comparable to contemporaries. But I do acquiesce that a licence-produced version/indigenous copy of the ZB 26 would likely be better.

 

[History Learner]

Italy had a bad habit of shooting itself in the foot when it came to military development, from the shortsighted decision to nix inline engine development in 1933 to building tanks designed for the mountains of Sicily then using them in the deserts of Africa and the steppes of Russia.
So let's fix all of it, shall we?

Some possible theoreticals to kickstart the discussion:

• Regia Aeronautica does not cancel all development of inline engines in 1933.
• Isotta Fraschini Asso XI / Asso L.122 becomes the main inline engine of Italian fighter aircraft.
• Scotti 20 mm or Breda 20 mm developed into aircraft-worthy cannons so Italy isn't reliant on the German MG 151/20.
• Italy invests more heavily into welding technologies, supplanting the riveting used to make a majority of their tanks.
• Breda 30 LMG is replaced by either an indigenous copy of the ZB 26 or an MG 42/Bren equivalent.
• Mussolini does not mandate that steel be primarily withheld for the Navy, opening up more resources for the other military branches.
• Heavier development of the Alfa Romeo 135 radial / other high-potential radial engines.
• Earlier aircraft carrier development for the Regia Marina.

Italy's main issue was much the same as the Soviets in 1941; the expansion of the war to themselves caught them amid a military modernization effort (Scheduled to end in 1942 and having been delayed due to the costs of earlier wars in Ethiopia and Spain) that left their forces disorganized once combat was joined. Unlike the USSR, Italy's problems were largely self-inflicted given Mussolini's impulsive decision to enter the war and they lacked the strategic depth and resources of the Soviets to compensate. One thing that could mitigate this is Balbo living in 1939, as his death kickstarted a process that left Italian forces in North Africa extremely unprepared for Italian entry into the conflict. This could have major effects, as noted by the Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940-December 1940:

The Italian Army developed a new and revolutionary doctrine of combined arms warfare in 1938 based on the lessons learned from their experiences of the 1930s. The success from the use of Italian combined arm teams in Spain and in Ethiopia proved the concept of motorized forces and the natural follow-on of mechanization for the Italian Army. This doctrine was called the War of Rapid Decision. With this doctrine the Italian Army had developed a new and dynamic operational art of war. The Italian military in Libya had all the necessary elements to be successful utilizing this new doctrine. In addition it had a commander that already successfully used and demonstrated an applied motorized doctrine in the Italo-Ethiopian war where it proved victorious to him. Marshal Graziani didn't utilize this new doctrine.

The operational plan Marshal Graziani and his staff did execute was an advance in mass for the invasion of Egypt. The operational plan Marshall Graziani and his staff should have developed was for a two-phase invasion, utilizing Italian mechanized doctrine, based on the forces available to him. This plan would have called for the stripping of all the trucks from the Italian 5th Army and using the just-arriving Italian M.11 medium tanks as the main mechanized striking force. The Italian army should have formed a mechanized force to invade Egypt, only followed by garrison troops to maintain the lines of communication. Based on the amount of transport available in Libya, his staff estimated they could have fully motorized two divisions and a brigade of Libyan troops (Knox 1982, 156). Combined with the available armor and motorized artillery forces, he would have had a potential mechanized force to invade Egypt with in August of 1940. The only realistic motorized formation that could have been formed is with the Comando Carri Armati della Libia, possibly three or four artillery Regiments, and one motorized infantry division.​

The first phase of the operation would have been the Italian Army occupying the city of Sollum. This first phase would see them crossing the wire and occupying Sollum with the available infantry and artillery formations. This force would stay and garrison the city, protect the line of communication, and act as a reserve. This phase of the operation would see the Metropolitan Italian nonmotorized divisions advance along the coast and attack through Halfaya Pass and occupy Sollum. This would have allowed the Italian army to control this strategic terrain and use it has the starting point for the second phase of the operation.​

The second phase of the plan would see two primary forces advancing on two separate axes of advance to Mersa Martuh. Two separate forces attacking on two separate axes of advance would make this attack. The slow moving foot infantry could advance along the coastal road. This would allow the Italian binary nonmotorized infantry divisions to utilize the only road network available to them and have some use in the campaign. The Metropolitan Italian nonmotorized divisions would advance along the coast and continue forward to an intermediate objective of Sidi Barrani and then on to the final objective Mersa Martuh. The southern column consisting of the Libyan Divisions and the armored Comando Carri Armati della Libia would advance on the Dayr al-Hamra–Bir ar Rabiyah–Bir Enba track to flank the escarpment, and the enemy, with the ultimate objective of Mersa Martuh. In this manner, the Italian army could have met the British at Mersa Martuh utilizing the non motorized Italian formations in a suitable role, and the motorized formations to flank their defense and cut the British line of communications defeating, them at Mersa Martuh.​

This plan would have been an example of Italian mechanized doctrine utilizing the available forces. The combination of the advance of forces moving along the coast, pinning the enemy, and the Italian mechanized forces operating to turn the enemy's flank followed Italian mechanized doctrine. This plan would have the Italian mechanized elements making long flanking movements through the desert. Such employment would have been ideally suited for the mechanized forces, according to Italian doctrine. Only under this concept and applying their mechanized doctrine would Italian forces have had a reasonable chance for success against the British. Since Marshal Graziani failed to apply Italian doctrine he was defeated in detail by a significantly smaller British force in the western desert.​

Had the Italian Army and Marshal Graziani struck early in the desert campaign and in strength utilizing their new doctrine it is doubtful that the British could have stopped them short of the Nile river. Instead of pursing that goal the Marshal Graziani asked for more resources to accomplish that mission instead of acting. When Marshal Graziani was forced into action, the Italian Army in North Africa didn't adopt a plan of an attack in depth but reverted to a plan utilizing an attack in mass. This failing caused the Italian army to be defeated during its invasion of Egypt. One can only speculate on the reasons for Graziani's failure to employ the rapid decision doctrine. Surely one key factor was the Italian Army's deficiency in the areas of the army leadership, training level of the different organizations, leadership of the organizations, unit cohesion, logistics, and armored vehicles. A combination of these factors made the Italian Army less effective then it could have been in the campaign.​

The one two blow of Germany defeating France and Italy conquering Egypt in the same campaign season probably would've been enough to shock the British into seeking terms as they did consider throughout the Summer of 1940.

 

[bf109xxl]

Italy's main issue was much the same as the Soviets in 1941; the expansion of the war to themselves caught them amid a military modernization effort

Even if the Soviets had managed to complete modernization in time to 1941, the result would probably not be much better for them. The Soviets' problems were not only and not so much in armaments, but in the qualifications of military personnel, suboptimal structures (e.g., huge mechanized corps), etc. The explosive expansion of the army led to a sharp decline in the level of officer personnel; young graduates of military schools without sufficient experience were in high command positions, and the situation was worsened by repressions - this was especially true of the highest officer ranks. The Soviets missed the advancing of the Wehrmacht to the border and did not have time to deploy the required forces close to the borders. Some decisions, such as the simultaneous construction of concrete runways on dozens of airfields in the western districts, were simply idiotic, since they not only forced to concentrate large numbers of aircraft on a small number of airfields, but they were also under-resourced.
The Soviets had enough forces to stop the blitzkrieg and wage a war of attrition - even with incomplete modernization, they were numerically vastly superior to the Wehrmacht in many kinds of weapons! - but they did not know how to use them wisely, and the German command was well aware of the level of the Soviet high command and the problems of the Red Army in general.

 

[Shortround6]

Italy's main issue was much the same as the Soviets in 1941; the expansion of the war to themselves caught them amid a military modernization effort (Scheduled to end in 1942 and having been delayed due to the costs of earlier wars in Ethiopia and Spain) that left their forces disorganized once combat was joined. Unlike the USSR, Italy's problems were largely self-inflicted given Mussolini's impulsive decision to enter the war and they lacked the strategic depth and resources of the Soviets to compensate. One thing that could mitigate this is Balbo living in 1939, as his death kickstarted a process that left Italian forces in North Africa extremely unprepared for Italian entry into the conflict. This could have major effects, as noted by the Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940-December 1940:

The operational plan Marshal Graziani and his staff did execute was an advance in mass for the invasion of Egypt. The operational plan Marshall Graziani and his staff should have developed was for a two-phase invasion, utilizing Italian mechanized doctrine, based on the forces available to him. This plan would have called for the stripping of all the trucks from the Italian 5th Army and using the just-arriving Italian M.11 medium tanks as the main mechanized striking force. The Italian army should have formed a mechanized force to invade Egypt, only followed by garrison troops to maintain the lines of communication. Based on the amount of transport available in Libya, his staff estimated they could have fully motorized two divisions and a brigade of Libyan troops (Knox 1982, 156). Combined with the available armor and motorized artillery forces, he would have had a potential mechanized force to invade Egypt with in August of 1940. The only realistic motorized formation that could have been formed is with the Comando Carri Armati della Libia, possibly three or four artillery Regiments, and one motorized infantry division.​

​

Had the Italian Army and Marshal Graziani struck early in the desert campaign and in strength utilizing their new doctrine it is doubtful that the British could have stopped them short of the Nile river. Instead of pursing that goal the Marshal Graziani asked for more resources to accomplish that mission instead of acting. When Marshal Graziani was forced into action, the Italian Army in North Africa didn't adopt a plan of an attack in depth but reverted to a plan utilizing an attack in mass. This failing caused the Italian army to be defeated during its invasion of Egypt. One can only speculate on the reasons for Graziani's failure to employ the rapid decision doctrine. Surely one key factor was the Italian Army's deficiency in the areas of the army leadership, training level of the different organizations, leadership of the organizations, unit cohesion, logistics, and armored vehicles. A combination of these factors made the Italian Army less effective then it could have been in the campaign.​

An Awful would depend on everything going just right for the Italians.
Stripping too many trucks from other units to form motorized units capable of deep penetration means you have neutered the host formations.
Without trucks you are depending on horses, mules or camels to move ammunition, food and water for the foot infantry. In the desert there is only so far you can travel on foot or with animal power before your "supply train" is just carrying animal fodder. You need at least some trucks even for the garrison troops to move into position.
Both sides in NA were continually outrunning their transport capability (number of trucks) through much of 1942 and into 1943.
Mobile formations, even in trucks, need more radios. Slow formations can lay phone/telegraph lines. Italians were always short of radios.
Without a change in production numbers the Italians did not have enough 11/39 tanks to pull off a race to the Nile.
The 11/39 was a pretty crappy tank and the British did not need Maltida's to stop it.
And once the 11/39s are running short the L3/35 can't defeat the British MK VI light tanks or armored cars. British were handing out .55 AT rifles like popcorn at a double feature and the L3/35 were one of the few things they could actually defeat. The L3/35 was a pretty poor device to plan an armored thrust/advance around if you were facing anything better than ill-equipped tribesmen.