Flight to Nowhere during the Battle of Midway June 1942.

[The Basket]

So I am trying to find out about the Flight to Nowhere during the Battle of Midway June 1942.

So off the Hornet, in the first wave, we had

Devastator torpedo squadron (VT-8)
Dauntless dive bomber squadron (VS-8)
Wildcat Fighter Squadron (VF-8)
Dauntless dive bomber squadron (VB-8)

Now there was a difference of opinion of where the Kido Butai was between Lt. Cmdr. John C. Waldron (Devastator torpedo squadron (VT-8) and Cmdr. Stanhope C. Ring (Cmdr Hornet Air Group) and this continued in the flight. Waldron even broke radio silence and told Ring he was going the wrong way. Waldron would against orders fly to where he believed Kido Butai was and the rest of his squadron would follow. VT-8 would lose all its aircraft and all but 1 man. Waldron was right but it cost him his life.

So did the Hornet Air Group fly to find 2 carriers that weren't there? Or did they fly with the Enterprise Air Group and chose the wrong way? How did Waldron know where they were if Ring didn't?

Anyone got a link so I can find exactly which USN air group did what?

 

[Peter Gunn]

Parshall and Tully do a pretty good job of trying to figure it out in "Shattered Sword", just a thought, although I figure you've probably read that already and are trying to dig deeper.

 

[SaparotRob]

I just got my copy of The First Team by John B. Lundstrom out!

 

[The Basket]

So at Midway on the purely USN side we have issues which I will list for your future delight.

TF17 and TF16...

why not one big task force? When Yorktown was attacked it was in its own.

The Air Groups operated independently and so it seemed squadrons within air groups operated independently.

The search for the 2nd imagined IJN carrier group.

Took too long to get the air groups airborne. Unlike the Japanese who could fly off in 15 mins. And flew as one.

What course did Ring fly? Why was Waldron right? How was Thatch and Yorktown Air Group a lot more on the ball?

 

[SaparotRob]

This is from page 330 of the First Team by John B. Lundstrom, first paperback edition.
From what I get from this and other sources, including Wikipedia, is Commander Ring went to the expected location of 2 carriers that weren't there. Lt. commander Waldron went to IJN units actually located from radio reports.

 

[SaparotRob]

The American airgroups went independently because that's all they had trained to do, IMHO. The American air groups didn't have the same amount of experience as the Kido Butai's. Especially Hornet's groups. Newly commissioned and no way to train with a bunch of B-25's sitting on the flight deck.
The Americans launched from TF 16 as soon as contact was made and timed it to strike as Japanese forces were being rearmed. No time to form up. The Yorktown's groups were held to attack the "missing" IJN carriers. When the Yorktown's experienced groups launched, the experience showed.

 

[The Basket]

Did Ring fly West or South West?

The Enterprise Wildcats in all the confusion started to escort the Hornets aircraft.

Why would Ring fly behind the last known course of the Kido Butai?

It would make more sense to head for an interception point between last known course and Midway. Since the Kido Butai were heading for Midway.

One possible is that both Ring and McClusky were heading for this same interception point and found nothing. McClusky turned the right way North West and Ring turned South East towards Midway and found nothing. This could be a reason why so many Hornet Dauntless landed back at Midway.

How old was the sighting of the Kido Butai that the Hornet Air Group was using? If it was 3 hours old then the Kido Butai could be 90 miles away and that is if the original sighting was correct.

 

[GrauGeist]

There were two different USN task forces because Yorktown was still under repair (literally) when she left Pearl to join the others at Midway. Saratoga *almost* made it to Midway, too. So if the battle had happened at a bit later than it did, there would have been 4 US carriers in three task forces.

Also, keep in mind that Nagumo's group was not steaming straight and steady, they had to keep changing their position because of the attacks from American elements from Midway.

Check your books to get an idea of this: Kido Butai was spotted by Spruance's scouts and he launched an attack at 7:50 - but at 7:55, 8:10 and 8:20, Nagumo came under attack by bombers from Midway, resulting in defensive course changes by the Japanese while Spruance's attack force was reroute.

 

[RCAFson]

So I am trying to find out about the Flight to Nowhere during the Battle of Midway June 1942.

So off the Hornet, in the first wave, we had

Devastator torpedo squadron (VT-8)
Dauntless dive bomber squadron (VS-8)
Wildcat Fighter Squadron (VF-8)
Dauntless dive bomber squadron (VB-8)

Now there was a difference of opinion of where the Kido Butai was between Lt. Cmdr. John C. Waldron (Devastator torpedo squadron (VT-8) and Cmdr. Stanhope C. Ring (Cmdr Hornet Air Group) and this continued in the flight. Waldron even broke radio silence and told Ring he was going the wrong way. Waldron would against orders fly to where he believed Kido Butai was and the rest of his squadron would follow. VT-8 would lose all its aircraft and all but 1 man. Waldron was right but it cost him his life.

So did the Hornet Air Group fly to find 2 carriers that weren't there? Or did they fly with the Enterprise Air Group and chose the wrong way? How did Waldron know where they were if Ring didn't?

Anyone got a link so I can find exactly which USN air group did what?

The USN favoured independent carrier TFs because they thought it reduced the risk that a single TF could be destroyed by a single enemy strike. They also were worried about the time it took to launch and form up the large strikes as required by their policy of carrying 1/2 or more of their aircraft on the flight deck. The IJN (like the RN) favoured carrying their aircraft in the hangar and favoured smaller strikes (per carrier), more quickly, allowing for faster launching and faster formup. It took Hornet and Enterprise nearly an hour to launch and form-up their strikes and this led to a number of complications, such as outdated intel by the time the strike began to proceed to the target area.

 

[MIflyer]

Lt Commander Waldron reasoned that the IJN fleet would not be traveling as fast as the Hornet Air Group Commander assumed because it was operating under combat conditions, avoiding subs, and turning into the wind to launch and recover aircraft. On the USS Yorktown they reached the same conclusion, but launched later than the Hornet and Enterprise, hoping to arrive while the IJN defneses were in disarray. John Waldron agreed to follow the course he was ordered to but about 30 min after launch announced over the radio that he still thought the course he wanted to fly was the correct one. He was told to shut up and follow the ordered course, responded the same way again and was told the same thing. He then said to his men, "Hell, I know where the Japanese are, follow me." and turned onto the course he thought was correct - and it was.

Unknown to Waldron or anyone else the Wildcats of the Enterprise were following his VT-8, under the impression that it was the Enterprise TBDs. While Waldron led his men in a desperate attack that proved to be crucial to the battle, the Enterprise Wildcats circled high overhead, waiting for the radio call to come down and fight that they never received, since they were on a different frequency than the Hornet airplanes. Wildcats at that time could only talk on one frequency.

The Enterprise Air Group had to go looking for the IJN when they found the position they had assumed was the correct one was in fact was wrong. The Yorktown Air Group flew a course like Waldron's and also hit the IJN fleet dead nuts, but a bit later, arriving about the same time as the Enterprise Air Group. Note that neither the Enterprise nor the Yorktown SBD's had any fighter escort.

Reference Books: A Dawn Like Thunder, The Unknown Battle of Midway, and No Higher Honor.

 

[SaparotRob]

Thanks for the heads up on those books MIflyer.

 

[The Basket]

Thatch is quite angry at the planning of the first wave.

He was told only 6 Wildcats were escorting the strike. Problem is the Dauntless and Devastator flew very different at different speeds and different altitudes so it was decided in the Yorktown Air Group that the 6 Wildcats would escort the Devastators. The rest of the Wildcats would be CAP over the bow in case the IJN launched an air strike.

Even with 6 Wildcats, 10 out 12 TBDs were lost. Including the CO of VT-3 Lem Massey who discussed with Thatch whether he should escort the TBDs or SBDs.

 

[MIflyer]

First, when the Yorktown got back to Pearl from Coral Sea they took away half of Thatch's highly experienced squadron to form a new unit that would equip the USS Saratoga, when it got in soon after the BoM. Then, a rookie Wildcat pilot landed on top of the experienced officer Thatch had planned to train the new guys. So the new guys did not get to learn the Thatch Weave. During the battle the Yorktown got separated by 50 miles from the Enterprise and Hornet, making mutual aid impossible and so they only allowed Thatch to take 6 Wildcats with the strike force. He chose to put all 6 with the TBD's. With about 50 Zeros covering the IJN fleet when the Yorktown and Enterprise airplanes got there Thatch's wildcats were almost purely defensive, although he thought they shot down at least 6 Zeros just covering each other. They finally had to break off and leave the TBD's.

With Thach's Wildcats down covering the TBD's, the Enterprise Wildcats having followed VT-8 and not engaging in the battle, and the 10 Wildcats from the Hornet all ditched, that left NO fighter escort for the Yorktown and Enterprise SBD's when they arrived overhead. But by then it was too late for the Zeros down on the deck to climb and intercept the SBD's.

Of course the other big thing that VT-8 did was spoil the IJN attack on the US carriers just long enough for the other TBDs and SBD's to get there. The IJN was swapping out the bombs on the Kates for torps after the got the info on the US carrier location. Then VT-8 showed up and turned that simple 30 min task into one that would never be completed.

Surviving Yorktown TBD pilots reported that the Zero attacks slacked off quite rapidly after the IJN carriers blew up.

 

[The Basket]

That's why having all 3 carriers together is beneficial as they can offer better defence on a limited capacity.

The TBD had a 85% loss rate and no torpedo hits so that's horrific.

The Yorktown was late launching its aircraft as they had to land scout planes and also hang back in case more carriers were found. The IJN used it's cruisers for scout planes and not it's carriers which kinda makes sense in this scenario.

Hiryu had a few Kaga Zeroes and an Akagi Kate so would have been a mix. Hiryu now had more Zeroes than it started with as all surviving Zeroes landing on the surviving carrier...although not much longer.

Woulda coulda shoulda but in my view Hiryu should have done 270' West and got out of Dodge ramming speed as soon as was decent.

Hiryu fights another day. Keeping Hiryu within the range of USN strike aircraft was pure dumbassary in my humble opinion. Asking for a dive bombing.

 

[MIflyer]

The USN was using PBY's for search and soon found out that had its drawbacks. The PBY's long range cruise speed was 75 kts, which meant that they better hoped they did not encounter any Spads or heavily armed J-3 Cubs. Betty bombers operating out of Wake Island would go after the PBY's, along with every other type of aircraft in the Japanese inventory. Meanwhile the USAAF B-17's were not only finding the IJN fleet but flying right over it in broad daylight and spraying bombs all over the place. This led to the USN commander on Midway assigning Navy officers as observers in USAAF B-17's. Army personnel had a tendency to report anything larger than a rowboat as at least a cruiser. This led to the USN's use of the PB4Y-1 and PB4Y-2 for scouting in areas where enemy air opposition was expected.

 

[The Basket]

The IJN on the carriers didn't have radar so it's eyeballs all the way.

As longs as there was a bit of cloud to hide in then Catalinas were reasonably safe.

But even the scout planes on the cruisers treated the Cats as fair game.

Plenty of good pix of the Kido Butai avoiding the bombs from the B-17s.

Good point to mention is the available pix show plenty of flak when Yorktown is in trouble but hardly a puff when the IJN is under fire.

At Santa Cruz it was said the IJN pilots were astonished by the Flak coming their way.

 

[SaparotRob]

That's why having all 3 carriers together is beneficial as they can offer better defence on a limited capacity.

The TBD had a 85% loss rate and no torpedo hits so that's horrific.

The Yorktown was late launching its aircraft as they had to land scout planes and also hang back in case more carriers were found. The IJN used it's cruisers for scout planes and not it's carriers which kinda makes sense in this scenario.

Hiryu had a few Kaga Zeroes and an Akagi Kate so would have been a mix. Hiryu now had more Zeroes than it started with as all surviving Zeroes landing on the surviving carrier...although not much longer.

Woulda coulda shoulda but in my view Hiryu should have done 270' West and got out of Dodge ramming speed as soon as was decent.

Hiryu fights another day. Keeping Hiryu within the range of USN strike aircraft was pure dumbassary in my humble opinion. Asking for a dive bombing.

As to the dumbassary of keeping Hiryu with the surface forces, I think just about every naval historian and amateur agrees with you.

 

[MIflyer]

At Coral Sea they put two Wildcats down with the TBD's. They lost both the Wildcats but lost no TBD's, which went in and got some hits.

At Midway Yorktown put all 6 of their Wildcats on the strike force down with the TBD's. Both Enterprise and Hornet put all of their strike force Wildcats up with the SBD's, and as a result they did not engage in the battle.

If they had put just two Wildcats down with VT-8, they would have shot down the floatplane that spotted the TBDs on the way in, flying along beside VT-8 to observe them and report. There were "only" 7 Zeros over the IJN fleet at that time.

It also would have been nice that when VT-8 spotted the IJN fleet and Commander Waldron announced that over the radio, when the Hornet Air Group commander heard that he would have asked Waldron where he was. As it was, it was pretty stupid that none of the USN carriers had a plan B worked out if the IJN was not where they thought it would be. Saying, "Plan A is Ring's and Plan B is Waldron's." would have been sheer genius.

 

[The Basket]

Could the Zeroes at Midway carry bombs? They were running out of Vals and Kates so throw up a few Zeroes for flavour.

Not many fighter pilots gonna go in low and slow with the TBDs,.... that just sucks.

The Dauntless was hella nifty dogfighter. So with bombs gone it was no sitting duck.

The loss rate of the TBD would make a Kamikaze weep. I wonder had they lost Midway with that loss rate then heads would roll. The whole first wave attack by the USN was very poorly coordinated and they even lost contact with Hiryu after the other 3 carriers went boom. Victory can hide many sins.

Maybe if Hornet air group found Hiryu then all 4 carriers would have gone in ten minutes and Yorktown would have survived.

 

[MIflyer]

Given the quality and quantity of the opposition and the lack of fighter escort, I doubt very much that TBF's would have fared any better than the TBD's. Add to that the crappy Government-Feather-Merchant-Torpedoes and the whole thing only looks like a good way to divert the Zeros from the SBD's. The few TBF's from VT-8 that launched from Midway Island did not do at all well, either.

Yorktown would have survived if the IJN sub had not penetrated the destroyer screen and sunk her. In contrast, the USS Nautilus attacked the abandoned IJN Akagi and was credited with sinking her, but in fact none of the US torps detonated and Akagi was sunk by its own escorts.