Flight to Nowhere during the Battle of Midway June 1942.

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The waves of attacks from Midway Island also helped to keep the Japanese and their battle discipline in disorder helped considerably.

Another aspect, which is often overlooked, is Yamato and his battle group was not with Kido Butai. There were two carriers in his group which, even though being smaller, possessed additional aircraft that could have swayed the battle in their favor.
 
GrauGeist said:
The waves of attacks from Midway Island also helped to keep the Japanese and their battle discipline in disorder helped considerably.

Another aspect, which is often overlooked, is Yamato and his battle group was not with Kido Butai
Click to expand...

True, it was the unceasing attacks from Midway that led the IJN to decide to attack Midway again and that greatly increased their vulnerability when the carrier strike forces showed up.

On the other hand, the Hornet and Enterprise kept attacking the IJN after the carriers were sunk; they IJN lost a cruiser as a result. Of course, the Hornet SBD's finally found the IJN fleet the day after the carriers were sunk, but even so did no significant damage.
 

the Japanese effectively lost two cruisers, as though only Mikuma was sunk, Mogami was so heavily damaged that it was out of the fight until it couldn't make a difference. These were two of Japan's best cruisers, too. They could have made a real difference in the Guadalcanal campaign.
 
Mikuma and Mogami did the 3 Stooges bit and collided to avoid possible torpedo from a USN Submarine. Obviously the Mk 14 issues were unknown to the IJN.

They were sailing towards Midway for a bit of shelling and didn't get the retreat message until late which meant they were close to Midway in broad daylight. This was part of Yamamoto plan to fight a night surface action.

Mogami was damaged and Mikuma stayed to escort. However there were a number of Dauntless attacks and Mikuma got sunk. Althought it's believed the main bulk of the damage was caused by detonation of the Long Lance torpedo and not from the bombs.

American cruisers weak point was their aircraft and IJN weak point was their torpedoes. Mogami survived because it's CO fired off his torpedoes.
 
At the time of the Battle of Midway the IJN might have had reason to fear American torpedoes. The HIJMS Shoho was sunk by 7 working torpedoes the previous month. The Akebono Maru was struck by a functioning torpedo a day or two earlier. Those were probably the only American torpedoes that worked.
 
Back to the OP . . .

If you can get your hands on one, the thing to read is Bowen Weisheit's The Last Flight of Ensign Markland Kelly, Junior, USNR - The Battle of Midway June 4, 1942. He pretty well demolishes the Hornet report in terms of navigation and who went where. Another, that I've not picked up in a while is Robert Mrazek's A Dawn Like Thunder - The True Story of Torpedo Squadron Eight. Mrazek brings up the theory that Mitscher was expecting the Japanese carriers to be operating in two distinct and separated units as that Japanese operational concept was pushed by the intel types back at Pearl. John Lundstrom covers it all nicely in his The First Team - Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway and the subject is also well covered in Robert Cressman, Steve Ewing, et. al. in A Glorious Page in Our History - The Battle of Midway 4-6 June 1942.
 
One of the ironic aspects of the US torpedo problems was that the USN was treating air launched torpedoes too delicately. They wanted them dropped low and slow, but rather than that approach resulting in a gentle entry into the water it caused a "bellyflop" that smacked the torpedo sideways, a loading that was not in its strongest direction. Dropping it from higher and faster led to the torp hitting the water nose first, the way a bomb hits or a diver enters the water, and wooden breakaway tail fins were added to make sure that occurred. Also, the contact fuses were too weak and a direct 90 deg impact was less likely to produce a detonation than one at an angle. So a pilot who dropped his torp in a hurry, high and fast, and without getting a 90 deg angle on the target was more likely to produce a successful hit than one that took more care.

Years later, after the air-launched torpedo problems were fixed, the USN deleted the torpedo tubes on new PT boats and just had them roll air launched type torps overboard off the deck.
 
The "Unknown Battle of Midway" does very good job of pulling things together, and it was written by a professional historian who was an enlisted crewmen aboard one of the carriers. "No Higher Honor" covers the USS Yorktown very well.

You know, it was not until the mid-90's that they really brought all this together, just like it was not until the 80's that they came out with the truth about US Subs in WWII. Was it Neils Bohr who said that scientific advancement is not based on the recognition of new discoveries but rather because of the retirement and deaths of the older experts? The same seems to be true of historians.
 
That's the rumour.

But there was no sighting of a 2nd group. So you take your whole air group against something that ain't there and you got no proof it is there.

Send a scout if you need but not the whole band. That's a bit wasteful.

To me the only sensible thing is the last sighing was the Kido Butai was heading north west and this would make a westerly direction pretty fair.

Zuikaku, Ryujo, Junyo, Zuiho and Hosho were available but the light carriers were of dubious value. But every aircraft counts in a battle of attrition. The light carriers were either at Aluetian Islands or with the main battle fleet trailing behind. That also included Yamato, Nagato, and Mutsu so pretty powerful.

Apart from light scouting Hosho was a of limited value although her aircraft did take that famous picture of Hiryu burning.
 
Another What If not considered by anyone is that the USS Saratoga arrived in HI very soon after the BoM. As it was that proved to be a big problem for the USS Yorktown, since half its very experienced F4F pilots were taken away and replaced by newbies so that there could be a cadre of pilots for the Sara when it got there. One of those newbies landed atop Thatcher's very experienced deputy and killed him; he was supposed to teach the new guys the Weave.

If the Saratoga had gotten there a week or two earlier and the Yorktown's experienced fighter pilots had been there, on both carriers if not just one, things could have been quite different. The Yorktown Air Group did not make the same mistake that the Hornet and Enterprise air groups did and flew direct to the IJN fleet, just like VT-8.
 

Saratoga had nothing to do with it in any event. And most certainly not the way it happened. Thach's (note correct name and spelling) VF-3 was woefully undermanned. So after Yorktown arrived at Pearl Harbor and the air group ensconced at Ewa Field, the CAG, CDR Oscar Pedersen called in the VF-42 squadron CO, LCDR Charlie Fenton, the XO, LT Vince McCormack, and the Flight Officer, LTJG Bill Leonard (these three being the most senior in the squadron) and gave them the word. ComAirPac decided to augment VF-3 with pilots from VF-42. A good thing as Yorktown's VF-42 was the most experienced navy fighter squadron in the Pacific. Fenton and McCormack were to remain behind as the VF-42 headquarters element and everyone else was to go to VF-3 as temporary duty. Said Pederson, "Billy, gather up everyone else and report to LCDR Thach at Kaneohe Field." So they all loaded up, in an VS-44, I believe, flew over to Kaneohe, and so reported. VF-3 now had Thach and Don Lovelace, the XO, both LCDRs and Leonard, still the most senior after them in the filled out squadron remained as Flight Officer.

Up until then, VF-3 had eleven pilots and 27 F4F-4s at NAS Kaneohe. The squadron did not even have its own maintenance personnel except for a leading Chief; station personnel, under his watchful eye, performed the routine maintenance on the aircraft. Pilots were:

LCDR JS Thach (CO)
LCDR DA Lovelace (XO)
ENS HA Bass Jr
ENS MK Bright
ENS RAM Dibb
ENS HJ W Eppler
ENS RC Evans
ENS VH Morris
ENS MC Tootle IV
ENS DC Sheedy
MACH DC Barnes
MACH TF Cheek

In terms on nice new shiny Ensigns, Bass, Bright, Eppler, Evans, Morris, Tootle, and Sheedy were attached to the squadron on 20 May. Though fresh from ACTG in San Diego, Thach considered their training, especially in gunnery to be quite lacking. It was that facet of their training on which he was concentrating up until the Midway deployment.

To this group were now added the pilots from VF-42, less their command element:

LTJG WW Barnes Jr
LTJG AJ Brassfield
LTJG RG Crommelin
LTJG WA Haas (he, the first USN aviator to shoot down a Zero)
LTJG WN Leonard
LTJG BT Macomber
LTJG ED Mattson
LTJG ES McCuskey
LTJG WS Woollen
LTJG RL Wright
ENS JP Adams
ENS JB Bain
ENS HB Gibbs
ENS GW Hopper Jr (new to VF-42, but served at Coral Sea with VF-2)
ENS GF Markham (new to VF-42, but served at Coral Sea with VF-2)

And back at MCAS Ewa was the VF-42 command element:

LCDR CR Fenton
LT VF McCormack

When VF-3 flew out to Yorktown from Kaneohe it had 27 F4F-4s. Two were badly damaged in a flight deck crash (the crash in which the exec, Don Lovelace, was killed). The damage was not so severe as to cause the planes to be stricken, but was well beyond the capabilities of the, already aboard, VF-42 maintenance and repair folks to fix. The planes were struck below for eventual return to an A&R facility for further evaluation or repair. Evans, the pilot of the plane that crashed into Lovelace's did not fly in the battle.

After Lovelace was killed, the squadron was re-organized thusly (and I have in my possession what is probably the only original copy of the squadron organization – see below:

Rank/Name - - Parent Squadron - - Bu# - - Side# - - Radio Call

1st Division
LCDR JS Thach (CO) - - VF-3 - - 5171 - - 1 - - Red 1
ENS RAM Dibb - - VF-3 - - 5170 - - 2 - - Red 2
LTJG BT Macomber - - VF-42 - - 5169 - - 3 - - Green 3
ENS ER Bassett - - VF-42 - - 5168 - - 4 - - Green 4
MACH TF Cheek - - VF-3 - - 5167 - - 5 - - Orange 5
ENS DC Sheedy - - VF-3 - - 5165 - - 6 - - Orange 6

2nd Division
LTJG RG Crommelin - - VF-42 - - 5152 - - 7 - - White 7
ENS JB Bain - - VF-42 - - 5151 - - 8 - - White 8
ENS RL Wright - - VF-42 - - 5150 - - 9 - - Yellow 9
ENS GF Markham - - VF-42 - - 5149 - - 10 - - Yellow 10
LTJG ES McCuskey - - VF-42 - - 5148 - - 11 - - Silver 11
ENS MK Bright - - VF-3 - - 5147 - - 12 - - Silver 12

3rd Division
LTJG WN Leonard (XO) - - VF-42 - - 5244 - - 13* - - Blue 13
ENS JP Adams - - VF-42 - - 5245 - - 14** - - Blue 14
LTJG WA Haas - - VF-42 - - 5144 - - 15 - - Black 15
ENS GA Hopper - - VF-42 - - 5143 - - 16 - - Black 16
MACH DC Barnes - - VF-3 - - 5142 - - 17 - - Purple 17
ENS MC Tootle IV - - VF-3 - - 5080 - - 18 - - Purple 18
* was # 26; renumbered on 30 May 42 by VF-42 maintenance personnel when Leonard became XO.
** was # 27; renumbered on 30 May 42 by VF-42 maintenance personnel when Adams became XO's wingman.

4th Division
LTJG AJ Brassfield - - VF-42 - - 5066 - - 19 - - Brown 19
ENS HB Gibbs - - VF-42 - - 5049 - - 20 - - Brown 20
LTJG ED Mattson - - VF-42 - - 5153 - - 21 - - Scarlet 21
ENS HA Bass - - VF-3 - - 5050 - - 22 - - Scarlet 22
LTJG WS Woollen - - VF-42 - - 5093 - - 23 - - Lavender 23
LTJG WW Barnes Jr - - VF-42 - - 5239 - - 24 - - Lavender 24

Spare Aircraft - - 5243 - - 25
Depot Level A&R Repair Needed - - 5146 - - 13 (old)
Depot Level A&R Repair Needed - - 5145 - - 14 (old)

Not flying -
ENS HJ Eppler - - VF-3 - - Spare Pilot
ENS VH Morris - - VF-3 - - Spare Pilot
ENS RG Evans - - VF-3 - - Spare Pilot

And of the Thach's Beam Defense (later named by Jimmy Flatley as "Thach Weave"? In Thach's first division, he and his wingman Dibb were familiar with the tactic. I believe his third section, Cheek and Sheedy were familiar though to a lesser degree, Cheek was checked out for sure, but Sheedy had not long been in VF-3 so how much practice he may have had with Cheek, I don't recall Tom or Dan ever mentioning it specifically, is problematical. I'd note in their action (Cheek and Sheedy, that is) they were operating as an unsupported section and did not themselves employ the beam defense when attacked. Thach's second section, Macomber and Bassett, were both from VF-42 and had not been exposed to, much less practiced in, the beam defense concept.

Those who flew fighters off Yorktown at Midway, Thach included, were very clear in that there was no familiarization, even on paper, with his beam defense on the trip out, after all, they had but 5 days. The VF-42 pilots, in particular, had absolutely no training or any other familiarization with the beam defense. Thach was, however, interested in the weaving done by the VF-42 VT escort at Coral Sea, but that was primarily to keep speed up while shepherding the slower TBDs.

Ironically, the successful escort of the VT-5 attack on the Shokaku at Coral Sea led to the decision to assign fighter escorts to the Hornet SBD squadrons rather than the doomed VT-8. While the VF-42 escort of VT-5 did not particularly shoot down any of the defending Zero CAP, they did manage to drive them off and no TBDs were lost . . . in the meantime the escorts of the Yorktown SBDs in the same action were unable to prevent to loss of some of their charges. Powers that were on Hornet decided then that since there were no TBD losses, forgetting apparently about the VF-42 escort, and most losses were amongst SBDs, the entire VF-8 escort was assigned escort for the VB-8/VS-8 strike formation despite the protestations of the VT-8 CO, LCDR Waldron, and the VF-8 CO, Mitchell.

Anyway, back to the VF-3 make up, thus, overall, 59% of the pilots in the squadron were TAD from VF-42. 33% of the fighter pilots flying off Yorktown in the battle were from VF-3 and 67% from VF-42. 75% of Division leaders and 75% of section leaders were from VF-42, again, the most experience fighter squadron in the theater.

VF-3 Squadron organization 31 May 1942



VF-42 aboard Yorktown, February 1942
 
Last edited:
Great reading!
 

As always, fascinating reading, many thanks! Just confirming my assumption - I notice 4 pilots were shown as "MACH" - Enlisted Pilots?
 
FLYBOYJ said:
As always, fascinating reading, many thanks! Just confirming my assumption - I notice 4 pilots were shown as "MACH" - Enlisted Pilots?
Click to expand...
The Navy (and Marines) had an enlisted pilot program between '37 and '41, so it's possible. If I recall right, the Lexington had a mess cook that was a pilot at one point.
 
FLYBOYJ said:
As always, fascinating reading, many thanks! Just confirming my assumption - I notice 4 pilots were shown as "MACH" - Enlisted Pilots?
Click to expand...

Thanks, gives me something to do now that I've retired.

Formerly enlisted pilots, Naval Aviation Pilots (NAPs); Machinist (MACH) was a warrant officer rank. The Machinists in VF-3 were previously enlisted NAPs. Most of the NAPs who were 1st class of whatever rate were offered appointments as warrant officers in the March-April 1942 time period. Thus if one were an AMM1c (NAP), he was offered a promotion to Machinist; a GM1c (NAP) would be offered a promotion to the warrant rank of Gunner; and so on. If one was a chief petty officer and a NAP the offer was to the higher of the two warrant grade, e.g, a CRM (NAP) would be offered a promotion the Chief Radio Electrician (CRE) warrant rank; an ACMM (NAP) would have been offered the Chief Machinist (CMACH) rank. Not just a few of the CPOs, mostly based on time in service and evaluations were offered direct commissions to Lieutenant (jg). Most, but not all, accepted the offered warrant appointments or commissioned promotions and most who accepted warrant appointments were later offered commissions and most accepted. Tom Cheek, for example, was an AMM1c (NAP) in VF-2 aboard USS Lexington when Pearl Harbor was attacked. He was promoted to Machinist on 1 April 1942, to Lieutenant (jg) on 1 May 1943, to Lieutenant on 1 July 1944 to the end of the war. Tom retired as a commander after 20 years service in 1956.
 
Last edited:
Hi Rich! Great info, I read up on this after you posted and looked up Tom Cheek, what a story!

I just retired as well, I'm practicing my "get off my lawn" voice.
 
Very interesting data! But the book "No Higher Honor" explains that USS Saratoga was a factor because a potion of the USS Yorktown's highly experienced F4F pilots were removed from the unit to act as the basis for a VF unit to equip the ship when it arrived.

And the book also explains that Thach's name was not really "Jimmy."
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

M
USAAF aircraft lost through transport sinkings during Battle of the Atlantic?
Replies
2
Views
406
fubar57
Paper comparing the flight performance of the P-40E Warhawk and the A6M2 Zero
Replies
8
Views
1K
Ivan1GFP
I
S
Battle of Britain:
Replies
15
Views
1K
fubar57
FW-190 and The Battle of Britain
2 3
Replies
40
Views
2K
Admiral Beez
A
W
The scarcity of fighter to fighter FW-190A pilot combat accounts...
2 3
Replies
52
Views
3K
GrauGeist
Menu
Log in
Register