Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40

[renrich]

There were a number of USN and Marine pilots who volunteered and were allowed to serve in the AVG by their respective services. If F4Fs were available, it would have been superior to the P40. Although slightly slower than the P40, the F4F3 had a much better rate of climb which would have served it well in the interceptor role. The big problem for the AVG using the F4F would have been availability. All of the Wildcats slated to go to the French and British would have probably been diverted to China.

 

[P-40K-5]

Do you have proof of that prior to the US entry into WW2???

well if you look at the shipping manifests, parts supplier, evaluation reports, target evaluation etc.. theres no doubt the USAAF was pulling the strings.
but as far as direct proof, no I don't. so I may have jumped the gun on that a tad.

 

[R Leonard]

USAAF / USN politics would have had nothing to do with whether or not the F4F could have replaced the P-40 for the AVG had no P-40s been available. There were no F4Fs available to create such a contretemps.

Third and fourth quarter F4F production at Grumman was already earmarked for either the Royal Navy or the US Navy, with the British already taking over the undeliverable French (G-36A) and Greek (F4F-3A) purchases. In the months leading up to the war Grumman was starting to produce the F4F-4, though not without some heartburn causing difficulties, most notably in problems with subcontractors. The USN BuAer Monthly Report, Status of Naval Aircraft, October 1941 reports:

"Delays in production of F4F-4 airplanes have been occasioned by difficulty in obtaining wing hinge fittings for folding-wing airplanes. Delay has been caused by a shortage of machine tools to complete processing of these fittings and further complicated by labor difficulties in the plant of a subcontractor (City Machine and Tool Co. of Cleveland, Ohio). Allocation of the limited production of folding wing fighters scheduled for October, November, and early December, has been made to the British. Deliveries of fighters to the Navy cannot be expected until December. Production of fixed wing fighters in the interim could not be continued due to the fact that jigs and fixtures had already been converted to the folding-wing type."

Generic Wildcat production in that time were: contract 126 for USN F4F-4s, contact 127 for RN G-36Bs (RN version of the F4F-4), and contract 129 for 21 F4F-7s. A large portion of the F4F-4/G-36B type production went to the RN first, not the USN, with 36 G-36B being delivered in October 1941 and 54 more in December. The first production F4F-4s, both of them, were not delivered into USN hands until late November 1941 – barely beating the October BuAer prognostication. (This is not counting the single XF4F-4 which was delivered back in April.)

There was no production slack to provide a land based foreign unit in far away China with carrier capable and needed aircraft. (And, yes, a "foreign unit" contrary to what is an apparently continuing popular belief. The AVG was part of the CAF, not the USAAF.)

Of course, the irony is that a slim majority of the original recruited AVG pilots were naval aviators and most of them carrier qualified - my father, in early 1941, was in his first squadron assignment aboard USS Ranger and remembered when the AVG recruiter came around; at least seven Ranger Air Group aviators took the bait, including two from his squadron.

One might also remember that the P-40s which did go to the AVG were not produced FOR the AVG. There were no undelivered F4Fs lying about which could be shipped to China. The already produced F4F-3s and -3As were already in either in USN or USMC squadrons or in RN service and there was no way F4F-4 production could be siphoned off for AVG purposes.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

well if you look at the shipping manifests, parts supplier, evaluation reports, target evaluation etc.. theres no doubt the USAAF was pulling the strings.
but as far as direct proof, no I don't. so I may have jumped the gun on that a tad.

You did - and did you ever see copies of the "shipping manifest?" If so I'd like to see a copy. Everything else is meaningless, especially if these aircraft, which were destined for the UK were first purchased by the US and then cut loose as surplused or "bailed" government property. The fact that "evaluation reports, target evaluation etc" came from the US is another meaningless situation as the USAAF was the customer who first developed this data. Parts suppliers were determined by the prime contractor (Curtiss) unless there were government directed sources involved. Those components usually consisted of engines, instruments and radios.

The only thing members of the AAF did was allow personnel to talk to Chennault about employment and to resign their commission. Outside of that The AVG was on its own.

Here's the REAL story....

"Planes were a tough problem. China had been a long-time, profitable customer for Curtiss-Wright, so my old friend, Burdette Wright, Curtiss Vice-President, came up with a proposition. They had six assembly lines turning out P-40's for the British, who had taken over a French order after the fall of France. If the British would waive their priority on 100 P-40B's then rolling off one line, Curtiss would add a seventh assembly line and make 100 later-model P-40's for the British. The British were glad to exchange the P-40B for a model more suitable for combat.

"The P-40B was not equipped with a gun sight, bomb rack or provisions for attaching auxiliary fuel tanks to the wing or belly. Much of our effort during training and combat was devoted to makeshift attempts to remedy these deficiencies. The combat record of the First American Volunteer Group in China is even more remarkable because its pilots were aiming their guns through a crude, homemade, ring-and-post gun sight instead of the more accurate optical sights used by the Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

"Personnel proved a tougher nut to crack. The military were violently opposed to the whole idea of American volunteers in China. Lauchlin Currie and I went to see General Arnold in April of 1941. He was 100% opposed to the project.

"In the Navy, Rear Admiral Jack Towers, then Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics and later Commander of the Navy's Pacific Air Forces also viewed the A.V.G. as a threat to his expansion program. . .

". . . It took direct personal intervention from President Roosevelt to pry the pilots and ground crews from the Army and Navy. On April 15, 1941, an unpublished executive order went out under his signature, authorizing reserve officer and enlisted men to resign from the Army Air Corps, Naval and Marine air services for the purpose of joining the American Volunteer Group in China.

"Orders went out to all military air fields, signed by Secretary Knox and General Arnold, authorizing bearers of certain letters freedom of the post, including permission to talk with all personnel . . ."

HISTORY: American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers)

The AVG was NEVER under USAAF control until 1942 when the unit was absorbed into the 14th AF and Channault was eventually promoted to General

USAAF / USN politics would have had nothing to do with whether or not the F4F could have replaced the P-40 for the AVG had no P-40s been available. There were no F4Fs available to create such a contretemps.


There was no production slack to provide a land based foreign unit in far away China with carrier capable and needed aircraft. (And, yes, a "foreign unit" contrary to what is an apparently continuing popular belief. The AVG was part of the CAF, not the USAAF.)

Of course, the irony is that a slim majority of the original recruited AVG pilots were naval aviators and most of them carrier qualified - my father, in early 1941, was in his first squadron assignment aboard USS Ranger and remembered when the AVG recruiter came around; at least seven Ranger Air Group aviators took the bait, including two from his squadron.

One might also remember that the P-40s which did go to the AVG were not produced FOR the AVG. There were no undelivered F4Fs lying about which could be shipped to China. The already produced F4F-3s and -3As were already in either in USN or USMC squadrons or in RN service and there was no way F4F-4 production could be siphoned off for AVG purposes.

Here's a link that had 23 former Navy or Naval Aviators as Flying Tigers.

http://www.warbirdforum.com/roster1.htm

 

[R Leonard]

From the same site I count, from 105 individuals identified as pilots with the 1st AVG:
58 naval aviators (USN, USMC)
40 identified as army or former army
5 from the CAF flight school
2 not noted

This does not count 18 USAAF pilots temporarily assigned in June and July 1942 nor 3 CAF instructors recruited at the time of the main AVG recruiting effort who did not serve in the AVG.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

From the same site I count, from 105 individuals identified as pilots with the 1st AVG:
58 naval aviators (USN, USMC)
40 identified as army or former army
5 from the CAF flight school
2 not noted

This does not count 18 USAAF pilots temporarily assigned in June and July 1942 nor 3 CAF instructors recruited at the time of the main AVG recruiting effort who did not serve in the AVG.

Thanks for the recount - I was falling asleep when I was finishing that post.

 

[renrich]

A lot of the AVG seemed to have been naval aviators. No wonder they were effective. If memory serves some were not currently flying fighters but I believe then that naval aviators were supposed to be qualified in many different types.

According to Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" the first delivery of Martlets to the British was 81 planes in July, 1940, and a further delivery of 130 in March of 41. I suppose if FDR had wanted to he could have switched those to the AVG. In Lundstrom, "The First Team" I was very surprised to read that the Navy in the early days of the Pacific war had a hard time scraping together enough Wildcats to equip it's squadrons on the carriers and in one case had to operate a squadron with mixed Buffalos and Wildcats and in another had to mix F4F3s and F4F3As. Who knew?

 

[davparlr]

A lot of the AVG seemed to have been naval aviators. No wonder they were effective.

Hmmm, and your support for this comment is? Just looking at the AVG(Flying Tigers) aces, the Navy vols had 10 aces with average kill of 7.6. The Army had 9 aces with an average kill of 7.3., however, with 45% more pilots, the Navy had a fewer percent of aces, the Navy having 17% of their pilots being aces and Army having 23% of their pilots being aces. Not an overwhelming argument for Navy superiority in effectiveness.

 

[davparlr]

There seems to be a variety of the number of AVG aces. I am not sure my previous post is accurate given the different opinions.

 

[renrich]

Dav, the reason for that remark is that I am under the impression, based chiefly on John Lundstrom's books, that USN trained pilots at that time were among the best trained pilots in the world, particularly in gunnery skills. According to him, " Man for man, the Navy's pre war pilots had far more practical shooting practice than the pilots of other air forces." Page 460, "The First Team." Deflection shooting was a skill the USN sought to specialise in. Page 467, "The First Team" "The pilots of the U S Navy and Marine Corps were virtually the only fighter pilots trained from the beginning to utilize and regularly succeed in deflection shooting." A reading of his section in that book on "Fixed Aerial Gunnery" is most instructive. However, one must have very flexible wrists in order to emulate the fighter in a full deflection gunnery run.

However the P40 was not well suited for deflection shooting so that must have hampered the USN trained pilots. To me, however, it seems obvious that a carrier qualified pilot has to be a somewhat better trained pilot than pilots trained only for operations from land bases.

 

[davparlr]

However the P40 was not well suited for deflection shooting so that must have hampered the USN trained pilots. To me, however, it seems obvious that a carrier qualified pilot has to be a somewhat better trained pilot than pilots trained only for operations from land bases.

I have not read any of Lundstrom's books but a quick google indicates he has a Navy interest, and, maybe bias, but I won't say he has. I also have no reason to doubt the Navy emphasized deflection gunnery more than the AAF, which, in my opinion, would certainly be an advantage. As far as carrier quals, at least when I was in training, the AF pilot training was for a year. I believe the Navy pilots carrier qualed in 18 months. The Marine pilots in my pilot training class went on to another six months of Navy carrier quals after getting their AF wings. As such, the added flying time and general training would give a newly "winged" Navy/Marine pilot more experience than a newly "winged" AF pilot. I suspect this was also true in WWII. However, in my opinion, carrier qualification in itself does not imply a better trained combat pilot. Carrier qualification is 100% low speed maneuvering and precision flying, probably within 30% of stall. I think this expertise is, for the most part, non-transferable to combat ops at 15k ft and 250 kts. Combat training, on the other hand, helps a lot, as Vietnam proved. And which, by the way, the Navy was quicker than the AF in identifying the need.

My opinion is that if you took well trained and experienced pilots from modern air forces like Britain, Germany, Israel, Air Force, Navy, etc. Put them into similar aircraft, their combat proficiency would all be quite similar, which I think was also true in WWII.

 

[Nikademus]

Lundstrom's books are written primarily from the American viewpoint. While he does utilize Japanese records and documents Japanese methods, the combats are pretty much portrayed from the US side leaving the actions and thoughts of the individual Japanese pilots open to speculation and conjecture. Whether that translates into a bias of sorts is subject to debate. He does note that he felt that the F4F was a better vehicle for DS vs. the A6M so one could argue that acheiving similar feats of DS in an A6M requires "greater" skill at the art. His comments on training methods of other nations is non-specific but in other books i've noted that DS or as the Germans called it "Cross Shooting" was not neglected but neither was it institutionalized. Like the USN i think it came down to actual experience once posted to the squadrons. The USN VF's however were a small bunch like the Kido Butai squadrons so creating an elite force within their ranks was easier than in a larger mass produced airforce such as the RAF, or USAAF at the beginning stages of the war.

Myself....i think he does give the USN side the benefit of the doubt and his viewpoints on USN gunnery training being 'the best' represent his opinion but not indisputable fact. His section on Japanese training vs. American training leaves the question of "who was better trained at deflection shooting" subject to debate but one also has to go beyond the appendixes to realize that what made the USN VF pilots good shooters was NOT their training initially but the post training efforts of the squadron CO's like Thatch who drilled his men relentlessly using IBP's. It was only later in the war that Thatch's innovations in gunnery were made standard in USN training packages.

As for how the AVG would have done with a different plane. If the circumstances were the same i'd say they'd have done similarily. The plane is only one component and as JoeB pointed out...the Japanese actually fought the bulk of their engagements vs. the AVG in outdated Ki-27....yet the exchange ratio was not severe despite this obsolecence. In the end it comes down to all the factors, ground control, tactics, pilots, early warning etc etc. I think even with Hurricanes the AVG would probably have done decently despite that plane's bad track record in the PTO.

 

[tyrodtom]

I wonder if the Navys deflection shooting would have worked as well against another opponent ?
Or could another opponent have got as good a results ?

The Navys aircraft in most cases were armed with 4-6 fast firing .50 caliber guns firing at aircraft with in most cases no selfsealing tanks, no armor, and lighter weight structures. It didn't take many hits to bring them down.

Turn the tables around with the Japanese. How well would a Zeros armament work in deflection shooting, 2 ineffective .30s, and 2 slow firing, slow velocity 20mms, do against our much better protected aircraft ?
Or in the Flying Tigers case, how successful could a Oscar, with 1 .30 , and 1 .50 cal deflection shoot against a P-40.

My understanding of deflection shooting is you try to put your pattern of bullets where the enemy will be, the more bullets in your pattern, and the bigger the pattern, the better your chanch of a hit. Like skeet shooting.

 

[tomo pauk]

Deflection means shooting at target at angles notably different than 0 or 180deg, ie. different from enemy 6 or 12 o'clock. Any 'normal' plane was capable to do it, of course, but having homogeneous battery (=all bullets/shells follow the same trajectory) is advantageous here. If the armament is centrally mounted too, pilot don't have to worry that left or right group will be firing by the side of enemy plane.
Deflection shooting can cancel out pilot's armor too, since the hits came from side.

 

[pbfoot]

Deflection shooting was emphasised in training in the RFC and much of the gunnery training was performed in Beamsville Ontario , during the winter of 1917 training was transferred to Texas at which point the US was included in the training for their future Air Arm

 

[renrich]

The point that Lundstrom made about the efficacy of high deflection shooting was that, because of the Zeke's good performance and maneuverability compared to the F4F, the US pilot was unlikely to get more than a snap shot at an enemy in passing and their training in deflection shooting helped them have confidence they could make that shot. The full deflection gunnery run also made a bomber's defensive gunners have a very difficult firing solution. Butch O Hare's famous fight with the Betties where he claimed at first six kills resulted in his plane receiving only a single hit from Japanese defensive fire. All or most of his runs were deflection runs.

Lundstrom made another point and we have discussed this before on this forum with many claiming the following made no difference: Because of the layout of the airplane and the long inline engine most European and American fighters did not have the visibility over the nose to make a full, that is 90 degree deflection gunnery run. From memory I believe he said that the cowling of the airplane had to slope away from the windshield by at least 6 degrees in order for the pilot to see where he had to be aiming and also see the target airplane. In trying to understand the full deflection gunnery run diagrams in Lundstrom's book was when my wrist got sore. Once those diagrams made sense to me I understood about the point he made about over the nose visibility. The part that is mandatory to understand is that the full deflection gunnery run is a dynamic situation with the angles between the attacker and the defender continually changing.

In reading some of the Mike Williams papers I seem to remember the USN making the point that the FW190 and the P47 did not lend themselves well to deflection shooting because of poor visibility over the nose. The early jet fighters that still principally used guns in air to air combat all had excellent visibility over the nose. According to Linnekin in "80 Knots to Mach Two" the USN still was putting a lot of emphasis on deflection shooting in the 1945-50 period. He flew a lot of gunnery runs in F6Fs, F8Fs and F4Us during that time.

 

[Glider]

His comments on training methods of other nations is non-specific but in other books i've noted that DS or as the Germans called it "Cross Shooting" was not neglected but neither was it institutionalized. Like the USN i think it came down to actual experience once posted to the squadrons. The USN VF's however were a small bunch like the Kido Butai squadrons so creating an elite force within their ranks was easier than in a larger mass produced airforce such as the RAF, or USAAF at the beginning stages of the war.

I have to admit that I have seen this statment about the USN training pilot more extensively in deflection shooting than other forces but have found no evidence to support it. Pre war USN pilots had more training in combat training but and its a big but, pre war all USN pilots had to train as fighter, dive bomber and torpedo bomber pilots. Due to this they spent longer in armament camps but only because they didn't specialise. From May 1941 the USN realised that this couldn't continue and specialised. From this time on from what I have seen they had similar gunnery training to the USAAF. Certainly the time spent in OCU was similar and FAA pilots who trained on the USN courses didn't comment that the training was much different from that received by pilots trained by the FAA. As you would expect more time was allocated to carrier qualifying

I admit that when I get the time I intend to look at this in more detail so could be wrong but right now this does seem to be the situation.

 

[JoeB]

I have not read any of Lundstrom's books but a quick google indicates he has a Navy interest, and, maybe bias, but I won't say he has.

My opinion is that if you took well trained and experienced pilots from modern air forces like Britain, Germany, Israel, Air Force, Navy, etc. Put them into similar aircraft, their combat proficiency would all be quite similar, which I think was also true in WWII.

If you don't know Lundstrom has a bias, why suggest it?

Your last point might be true of today or recently among 'well trained and experienced pilots' but wasn't usually that relevant in WWII because WWII fighter combat usually didn't pit well trained *and* experienced pilots on each side against one another. The question in WWII wasn't whose well experienced peacetime pilots were better but who could rapidly expand and maintain (in spite of losses) the most effective *fighter units*, and the results were not anywhere near uniform.

Moreover, the circumstances of the war would sometimes pit against one another fighter arms in different stages of the process of expanding, filling in losses, etc, and feature quite different degrees of overall combat experience within opposing air arms, especially when a new combatant entered the war against those already involved for awhile.

If you do actually read Lundstrom's books (on USN fighters, he's written well on other topics too) you won't find much if any editorial or opinion. In fact he's sometimes criticized for that, just telling lots of detailed facts from both sides, with no 'thesis', as some historians feel other historians should have to be really serious historians. I believe his statements of the relative emphasis on gunnery training in USN are factual, not opinions. It's also a fact (though Lundstrom nowhere states it because it's not directly relevant to his narrative) that USN fighters were distinctly more effective than USAAF ones in the Pacific early in the war especially, though the Japanese were of that opinion in general for the whole war. I've seen that stated in Japanese references more than once, and I've never seen the opposite stated. A USAAF tactical manual (of the 5th AF) stated the same conventional wisdom about the Japanese, interestingly: JNAF fighters more effective than JAAF.

The matter of opinion would be whether gunnery training per se was a major reason for that, and Lundstrom doesn't say so (not having even said USN fighters were more effective). But as Nickademus alluded to, the situation of USN in fielding fighter units in 1942 was much different than RAF, which was trying to maintain a force that had grown much bigger relative to prewar size and taken heavy cumulative losses already by late '41. The USN had actually fewer carriers to fill w/ planes as '42 went on, not signficantly more until 1943, not way more till 1944. And it was also different than USAAF which had more pressure to field an expanded force more quickly (with huge demand to create a big bomber force, too), and the USAAF also lacked the leavening of combat experience in contemporary (say 1942) RAF units in the Far East.

You can easily see the USN v USAAF comparison by studying the pilot and unit info in Lundstrom and compare with the books of his 'counterpart', more or less, Willian Bartsch ("Doomed at the Start" about USAAC/F fighters in PI, his new "Every Day a Nightmare" about DEI campaign). The USN units actually sent a lot of very experienced pilots back to training commands even before the Navy saw any serious action, but still their units had better cohesion and training *as units* than the ill prepared USAAF fighter units in PI, DEI and early New Guinea campaigns. And the USN fighters did much better in fighter combat according to Japanese loss records, than either USAAF or RAF in the Pacific in 1942; did not do better than the AVG but arguably faced considerably tougher Japanese opposition.

The AVG was a different animal altogether, as collection of almost nothing but experienced peacetime pilots, in that one case it's kind of like your assumption. In fact some AVG'ers were outright old by fighter pilot standards of those days, a few proved too old and no longer up to a young man's game. See Dan Ford's "Flying Tigers". The AVG's profile of flying experience, though they had almost no combat experience (one AVG pilot had seen previous combat, in Spain, 'Ajax' Baumler), didn't resemble that of either their Japanese opponents (largely still peacetime type profile, but with a fair amount of combat experience from China), or USAAF or RAF, or almost any other fighter unit of WWII. Which AVG pilots came from the Army v. the Naval services was probably a secondary factor, I agree with that.

Joe

 

[Nikademus]

I have to admit that I have seen this statment about the USN training pilot more extensively in deflection shooting than other forces but have found no evidence to support it. Pre war USN pilots had more training in combat training but and its a big but, pre war all USN pilots had to train as fighter, dive bomber and torpedo bomber pilots. Due to this they spent longer in armament camps but only because they didn't specialise. From May 1941 the USN realised that this couldn't continue and specialised. From this time on from what I have seen they had similar gunnery training to the USAAF. Certainly the time spent in OCU was similar and FAA pilots who trained on the USN courses didn't comment that the training was much different from that received by pilots trained by the FAA. As you would expect more time was allocated to carrier qualifying

I admit that when I get the time I intend to look at this in more detail so could be wrong but right now this does seem to be the situation.

Within the pages of Lundstrom's book one found citation of the active duty VF CO's as the real force behind the improved gunnery of the graduated VF pilots. Thatch in particular was cited as drilling his men continuously in mock dogfights, sometimes 'while chewing on an apple' (loved that comment). In contrast, during the Midway chapter, when the new Hornet's airgroup was commented on by the other pilots, it was generally negative in terms of their proficiency and that gunnery needed work in re: the fighter pilots. It was only later in the war that Thatch and his supporters were able to institutionalize his gunnery philosophies directly into the training program before being posted to a carrier.

A friend of mine later supported this by citing an actual training manual from the day he had access too.

 

[Glider]

That would make sense. As you rightly point out there is a lot of difference in Thatch training his people in the operational squadron, and the pilots being trained before being assigned to the combat unit. There are many cases of pilots in all airforces being given more extensive training once they reach the front line, there was nothing special about that.
As for it being later in the war before additional gunnery training being included in the OCU training that also happened in those airforces that had the time, again nothing unusual in that.
The observation that the newly trained Hornet airgroup needed work to improve their gunnery was only to be expected. One benefit of being on a carrier squardon was that you normally had some time before going into combat for additional training. When a pilot joined a land based unit in the front line they were often in combat within a couple of days. Naval air operations were normally different, you joined the ship and the ship had to get to the combat area. As you would expect, there were times when in the middle of a campaign pilots were thrown in the deep end but that was the exception rather than the rule.