Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40

[Shortround6]

On December 2, 1940 sixteen preproduction examples of the F4U-1 are in various stages of assembly and are used to size the production line. The premise of use of the F4U-1 in early service testing was feasible, though the license production mentioned would and did take more time to bear fruit. Regards

A source would be nice. In Dean's AHT we have a sequence of Feb 25 1941 seeing the completion of Navy acceptance tests of the XF4U-1. Mar, 3 1941 the Navy issues a letter of intent to to enter into a production contract. In April Vought finishes up contract negotiations and on June 30, 1941 the Navy places a contract of 584 F4U-1s.
I wonder what happened to those 16 airframes that were being used to size the production line over 6 months before the production contract is issued? Did it take Vought another year (18 months after the production line was being sized) to actually finish them or is the source that says the production line was being sized in 1940 have a misprint and meant Dec of 1941? Which is a still a stretch. First Production plane doesn't fly until June 25 1942 and still has to be "delivered" to the navy.

As for actual production:

 

[renrich]

Bringing up the subject of Eric Brown, I read up on him in wiki. Quite interesting in that the article indicated he is still alive which would make him about 91. Amazing to have a career in aviation as long as he and still be alive. From the article, he was credited with two FW 200s early in the war flying off a carrier. Did not say what type he was flying but it might have been a Martlet. Does anyone know and is he still alive?

 

[R Leonard]

Brown is the world leader in carrier traps, something in the neighborhood of 2400.

Both of his FW 200 shoot downs were in Martlets. From my tiresome standard boiler plate missive on Wildcats outside the Pacific:

- - - 802 Squadron (Lieut Comdr JM Wintour, RN), specialized in FW 200's. Operating off HMS Audacity escorting Convoy OG-74, the first encounter was early on 21 September 1941, when one was brought down under the combined attack of Sub-Lieut's Patterson and Fletcher. Later, in the early afternoon, a Ju 88 was driven off with damage. Shortly thereafter another section chased down a radar contact only to find the Lisbon to Azores Boeing 314 Clipper … they let it go. This was the interception where Sub-Lieut Brown was photographed by the Clipper's pilot flying in formation with his section, with his Martlet inverted. On 8 November, now escorting Convoy OG-76, Lieut Comdr Wintour and Sub-Lieut Hutchinson attacked and shot down another 200, but, in the process, Wintour was killed by return fire. Later that day, Brown shot down a second FW 200 in a head-on pass and Sub-Lieut Lamb drove off a third.

At sea again with still another convoy, HG-76, 802 was now commanded by Lieut DCEF Gibson, DSC, RN. On 14 December, Sub-Lieut Fletcher was shot down and killed strafing surfaced U-131. His action, however, enabled three escorts to close range and take the submarine under fire until her crew was forced to abandon ship. On 19 December, in another head-on pass, Brown brought down his second FW 200; Lieut Comdr Sleigh, using Brown's proven head-on method, shot down another; and Lamb, again, drove off a third with damage. Audacity was torpedoed by U-751 on 21 December and sank with heavy losses, including many pilots. - - -

Rich

 

[RCAFson]

Yes, Brown scored his kills with the Martlet, and his bias in favour of Martlet/F4F is very evident in his writings.

 

[R Leonard]

I'd hesitate to use the word 'bias' as it has a somewhat negative connotation (unless that's your point). Certainly the Martlet was as good as, if not better, than any carrier based fighter the FAA was already using . . . the RN was certainly eager to acquire as many as they could, swooping in to scarf up the undelivered French and Greek contracts as well as forging their own.

Brown, like most F4F variant drivers to whom I've ever spoke, acknowledges that the plane was fun to fly. Most of those with experience in both preferred the straight wing -3's to the stow-wing -4's in terms of overall performance, and those with experience with the entire gamut of prooduction acknowledged the FM-2 as superior to any of the F4F predecessors in performance. None of which means they'd take the F4F-FM production craft over an F6F or F4U if going in harm's way and given a choice (more is almost always better), it simply means that for a craft of it's day it was a pretty good steed. My father, one of those who had flown both the -3's and -4's in combat and often the FM-2 while training others in the fighter pilots' trade always maintained that the 'sweetest' of the lot was the -3, a solid performer, good handling, no surprises, and filled the dance card when needed.

I read Brown as expressing a 'fondness' for the F4F rather than a 'bias". Since that's the plane he took into combat during some pretty bad times and with some success, that expression is unsurprising.

Rich

 

[renrich]

Many, many thanks, Rich. Always good to hear from somone truly well informed. Brown remarked many times is his book about the heavy armament of the Martlet, (Wildcat) either four or six 50s. I believe that it is important for all of us "experts" to recognise that there were fairly major differences in the performance of the several variants of Wildcats.

Brown's longevity is truly remarkable, given his profession. I have always enjoyed his book, "Duels in the Sky" although there are serious inconsistencies in his appraisals of some of the aircraft. In a book I have about Marion Carl, Brown and he seemed to be fairly close friends. I wonder if they ever had any debates about the relative merits of WW2 fighters, especially the Corsair.

 

[davparlr]

Certainly there were three FLEET carriers in commission in the month December 1942 (and if you want to count the last day of the month, there were actually FOUR fleet carriers in commission), but, generically, there were far more available than just the three carriers you mention:

In the last week of December 1942 –
Format: Squadron | rated fighter pilot complement | assigned carrier/station | other status

At sea -
VF-6 | 46 | USS Saratoga | aboard
VF-10 | 32 | USS Enterprise | aboard
VF-72 | 24 | USS Nassau | aboard
VGF-26 | 24 | USS Sangamon | aboard
VGF-27 | 24 | USS Suwannee | aboard
VGF-28 | 24 | USS Chenango | aboard
VGF-29 | 24 | USS Santee | aboard
VGS-9 | 24 | USS Bogue | aboard
VGS-11 | 18 | USS Altamaha | aboard
VGS-30 | 10 | USS Charger | aboard

The Ranger? Card, Core?
So, the Navy went from seven carriers in December, 1941, all fleet, to three fleet, and eight escort carriers for a total of 11 (13?) carriers in December, 1942, a total increase of four carriers (six?). By the way, commissioning does not mean a carrier is combat ready. The Essex was several months away from having a carrier wing. During this same period, the AAF increased its overseas bases from 61 in Dec '41 to 656 in Dec '42, a total increase of 595 overseas airfields, of which I would suspect most were in the combat zone. Officer totals, mostly pilots, went from 24,521 to 127,267, or a total of over 100,000 increase.

Golly, every time I look at the returns I manage to squeeze out a few more . . . now, as of 31 December 1942, at least 250 slots for fighter pilots on carriers at sea presuming typical aircraft complement based on squadron type.

Trivial numbers in comparison to what the Army was trying to fill.

One presumes from the presented "shooter" qualifier that the not inconsiderable percentage of aviators assigned to VF-41 and Essex's VF-9 and who had flown combat off USS Ranger in the invasion of North Africa were no longer qualified to be known as fighter pilots because their ships were tied up at Norfolk NOB, right? Were the pilots of VF-10 (det), ashore at Espiritu Santo in that last week of December 1942 and therefore extremely unlikely to be engaged in combat - indeed they did not during this period - also not fighter pilots either because they were not actually aboard Enterprise? Enterprise was not particularly in harms way at the time, were the people who fly the fighter planes and aboard the ship to be counted in some other category, but not as fighter pilots?

Let me try another definition that may help you to understand what I am trying to say. I will admit that my incompetence in expressing myself initially has led to your confusion. It is probably the most important concept needed by any commander, what are the resources I have right now to engage the enemy. Put yourself in Admiral Nimitz position and you need to support Guadalcanal. This is what you need to know. What fleet carriers are available, can I use escort carriers, how many aircraft can be put into the combat area including Henderson field, how many pilots are available to support these aircraft? You are not interested in trained pilots in San Diego preparing for a new carrier. You are not interested in pilots at Oahu who have no aircraft available for the battle, except maybe as reserve crews. You are not interested in carriers going through the Panama Canal without an air wing. You are interested in the number of aircraft you can put into the battle area and the pilots, no matter where they are right now, that you can put into those specific cockpits. In the Navy this aircraft number is most importantly dependent on the decks, and sometime land fields, available that can be engaged in the battle. The term I used to identify those assets is "shooters". A term that I suspect is still used in military planning, but no matter what you call it, it is a critical number.
So, applying that criteria, is VF-41 still assigned to the Ranger, do they have aircraft on the Ranger to fly into combat, is the Ranger combat ready. If the CincAtlantic wanted to raid a North African coast would they and their aircraft be available. If yes, they are shooters. If VF-9 is not on the Ranger and is awaiting the Essex, they would not be shooters. No aircraft carrier available. The pilots at Espiritu Santo are definitely in a hostile environment and would be shooters even if they were not engaged in battle at any given time just as the AAF fighter pilots stationed in England and North Africa would be shooters.

Still, other fighter squadrons were ashore, awaiting their turn at bat, or their next turn, as the case might be.

If they meet the criteria of being assigned to a carrier or land field in a combat arena and have an aircraft available to fight in battle, then they are shooters. If all those slots are already filled, then no, they are not shooters, only as possible reserve crew.

The wiggle from fighter slots to "shooters" is duly noted,

Immature comment. I am not deceitful and I am not trying to wiggle out of anything.

but the discussion started, however, , with an accounting of USN fighter pilot slots

This is incorrect. It started out with the comment "At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available." I started out by talking about carriers available and the pilot assigned to these carriers. If instead of "makes 210 fighter slots available" I had put in "210 fighter slots available on those carriers", it would have been much clearer what I was talking about. I never had the intention of including all possible positions where fighter pilots would be assigned, as I continue to repeat myself

"If you want to claim a lack of clarity, okay, fine, but clarity certainly would have precluded a lot of discussion. Consider for example, this statement:
At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available"

At the time I wrote that it was clear to me that I was talking about fighter slots on carriers. It apparently was not clear.

This statement, as pointed out in an earlier response, was not exactly the case, and thus fostered the rest of the discussion. I would hate to think I need spend future evenings in remedial English.

Immature and abusive statement. This adds nothing to the discussion.

So then, does your new definition mean that a pilot at the tip of your spear who is not scheduled to fly and does not fly on a given day is not a fighter pilot for that day?

Apply my criteria. Is there a combat capable aircraft he could climb into? Could he be deployed into combat in that aircraft by the commander?

What shall we do with the customary usage for Task Groups and Task Forces with more than one carrier, rotating

Were the pilots assigned to fly fighter aircraft residing aboard a carrier passing through the Panama Canal not fighter pilots because they were not operating during the passage?

While in the Panama Canal and are unable to operate I am sure would be listed at Nimitz's headquarters as unavailable for combat.

To what excruciating semantic extremes shall we go in order to fit this arbitrary "shooters" mold?

This is not a difficult concept. Every commander has a list of all assets he can utilize for combat. For Naval aviation it would be combat ready aircraft carriers available, combat ready aircraft available, and combat pilots available. The assets available to execute a mission would be termed "shooters" as I have defined it. If it is not called shooters now, it is called something else, but I assure you that this concept exists. Carriers available tend to be limiting factor in combat assets available.

As to the contention that the average USN fighter pilot was better prepared than the average USAAF fighter pilot, with the exception of carrier operations qualifications, I have seen no empirical data which would either lend support to or prove false the theory.

What I find odd is that I see is an attempt to arbitrarily establish a label, or, more accurately, deny a label, based on some personal preference rather than the historical context. Okay for you, but the premise does not even come close to working for me.

I haven't proven it, however just the fact that the vast amount of Amy combat assets in 1942, over 600 overseas bases created and huge quantities of pilots trained and deployed compared to the relative little increase in Naval air combat assets, maybe six carriers, all of these escort carriers, would indicate a massive dilution of combat experienced pilots in the Army verses the Navy. This seems intuitively obvious.

General comment. You seem to think I am lying when I try to clarify what I was saying without even knowing me and then critize me for not being clear. Your tone tends to be abusive and does not lend itself to a professional discussion.

 

[RCAFson]

I
I read Brown as expressing a 'fondness' for the F4F rather than a 'bias". Since that's the plane he took into combat during some pretty bad times and with some success, that expression is unsurprising.

Rich

However, if you read all that Brown had to say about the Martlet/F4F except the results of the mock combats and then had to predict the outcome of a mock combat between the Martlet/F4F and Sea Hurricane, one would be led to conclude that the Sea Hurricane would have no chance. OTOH, if you looked at things like climb rate, power to weight and wing loading, it would be obvious that the Sea Hurricane would win - and it did.

Brown also says things about the Sea Hurricane that are contradicted by real world data - for example that it is a death trap when ditching, yet the Catapult launched Sea Hurricane 1A only lost one pilot out of 8 operational sorties, and he may have been hit by return fire. Also I can find no evidence that the Sea Hurricane had a higher operational loss rate than the Martlet, and in fact, it might have had a lower operational loss rate, which is also not predicted by Brown's comments about the Sea Hurricane's deck landing characteristics, except for the comment that it had a lower all down stall speed - 57 knots for the Sea Hurricane and 79 knots for the Martlet/F4F. Brown's comments about the Martlet's climb rate (3300ft/min initial) is unsupported by any documentation that I can find save for the manufacturer's specs for the F4F-3, and real aircraft fell a long ways short of those numbers.

 

[renrich]

Please read Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" if you have doubts about Brown's citing of climb rate of Wildcat. Lots of documentation there. Also read my post about the varying performance figures of the different Wildcat models.

 

[RCAFson]

Please read Dean, "America's Hundred Thousand" if you have doubts about Brown's citing of climb rate of Wildcat. Lots of documentation there. Also read my post about the varying performance figures of the different Wildcat models.

There is lots of info here:

F4F Performance Trials

and none of it even remotely supports the F4F-3 having a climb rate of 3300fpm, except that it was in the manufacturers specs, but actual trials of two f4F-3 aircraft:
Airplane No. ------------1845-1848
Full load weight (lbs.) 6260 7065

fails to show a climb rate anywhere close to 3300fpm:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg
(the above appears to have a climb rate of 3150 fpm faintly pencilled in, but this weight is far below the combat weight of an F4F-3 except with nearly empty tanks and no ammo.
and
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1848-performance.jpg

the USN's own Standard aircraft characteristics:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-3_Wildcat_(Land)_PD_-_14_August_1942.pdf

only shows a rather optimistic climb rate of 2450fpm using military power.

The USN's own testing of actual F4F-4 aircraft, #5262 and #4058 only shows a climb rate of 1850fpm:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-5262.pdf

while testing of F4F-4 #02135 only shows 1850 fpm with military power.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-4-02135-performance.jpg

Extrapolating from the above data, it is impossible to demonstrate the potential for a 3300fpm climb rate for an F4F-3 at any reasonable combat weight.

 

[Nikademus]

. I see my original point being somewhat distorted…..

. Note that you've halfway sidestepped my point there……

Again, you seem to caricature my argument to be that the F4F was a sole determinant, which I never said…..

Here's what I see; You have pretty much ignored the bulk of what I wrote previously, choosing instead to regurgitate your viewpoints and opinions, using just enough of what I wrote to attempt to reinforce your opinions/views along with the typical exercises in verbal gymnastics about what you really meant to say etc etc…..while accusing me of being less than intellectually honest as the above gemlike quotes highlight. In other words, your talking past me, not too me.

In the old days, I would have jumped right back into it and thus completed the duo that the following true-ism immortalizes…."that it takes two parties for there to be two people talking past each other." So for the sake of brevity and succinctness……I will attempt to keep my responses short and to the point.

I think you should review more the campaigns in the Solomons, though unfortunately they haven't been covered well in print from both (nor the non USN aspect of the G'canal campaign, or the post Nov 15 '42 period; I would recommend Frank's 'Guadalcanal'

Thanks for the suggestion. I have. That's why I disagree with your attempts to dilute the significance of the Guadalcanal campaign. Your statement about the totality of the missions being a fair degree of variation does not change the fact that the primary mission of the Wildcats was interception whilst defending a singular location, nor does it address a good number of points I made in my last reply, which I won't bother repeating since you ignored them entirely. Thanks also for the book recommendation. Coincidently, I just happened to finish my third run through with Mr. Frank's book. In particular I found additional specific citations re: the substantial drop in Japanese skill well before 1943 and the end of the Guad campaign, along with other specific outside variables that impacted the kill ratios and made the F4F's performance possible. Given your continued "focus" on the F4F and what you believe is the key "non obvious" factor that explains the ratios, I would suggest respectfully that maybe you should read the book again.

The point here being, the characterization of F4F v Zero/Type 1 as basically a single scenario is just not historically correct.

You again attempt to characterize my arguments as revolving around a single scenario. First it was the 1942 carrier battles you said I was focusing on. Now you've switched to me saying it was only the Guad battle. Wrong on both counts. It does remain true though that Guad was the only *sustained* aerial campaign whereby the F4F was the principal fighter for the US side during all of 1942

2. I see my original point being somewhat distorted. I never said that characteristics of a/c determined outcomes. I said that non-obvious characteristics of a/c *might* affect outcomes, and the F4F's results v other 'first generation' Allied planes might be an example of this.

In other words…..your *focus* remains fixated on the plane itself in large part and you support this view with the kill ratios. Like all statistics however, one can interpret them in a variety of ways Me…..I'm looking at all the variables of each unique campaign, then looking at the planes, then the men who flew them and the tactics involved……looking for patterns, force modifiers etc etc. Hence my conclusions are radically different from yours. You say you do the same....fine....then based on that I'd say a primary difference betweenst us is i weight the outside variables more strongly than you do in comparison to the paper stats of the machines.

It's true that the ex-AVG'ers mission impact on Burma was quite small. However the totality of P-40 operations in Burma included non-AVG/23rd FG ops. It can be said that the Thunderbolt ops were limited in nature, not so the case with P-51A and P-38 ops. It's interesting that you're using the small sample argument to try to weaken the example I showed re: kill ratios after having argued so strongly that the Mohawk vs. Type 01 results were relevant. However used in this context, it's a straw man. It's a fact that aircraft enthusiasts tend to compare planes above all else when discussing air campaigns and matchups, and often the Type 01 is derided as, to quote one old poster, "Rubbish" due mainly to its slow max speed, poor armament and flimsy protection. So based on that, even with the admittedly "small" sample in Burma, the Thunderbolts should have wiped the walls with the rubbish plane 01 almost if not every time. They didn't. That's telling to me. It shows once again that air combat is way more multi-dimensioned than simply comparing paper stats among planes. Another good example is the 01's performance against 4E's in Burma. Paper stat arguments belie their respectable record against these beasts.

3. Note that you've halfway sidestepped my point there. I said "the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F..in.. Guadalcanal campaign." But you answer in terms of Marines flying Hurricanes.

And you didn't read my post very well.

If you counter my actual statement and say Hurricane *units* would have done as well, I think that's more clearly at odds with the evidence, though nothing of this sort is absolutely provable.

Verbal gymnastics….Gotta love em. I stand by what I wrote. Given the factors present at Guadalcanal as well documented by authors like Frank, Lundstrom and Bergerud, yep…..there's nothing to say that USMC pilots flying other 1st gen fighters like the Hurricane, couldn't have done a similar job…..and in case you want to take me out of context, that "similar job" means…..successfully defend the base which is what the battle was really about. As long as the pilots could compete, could frustrate and disrupt Japanese attacks and most of all, bleed the enemy, they were bound to win in the end….and they did. Their overall negative a2a kill ratio slightly in favor of the A6M (per Lundstrom) suffered by the marine/navy pilots does not in any way diminish that victory, nor did their slight ratio victory serve as a balm to the frustrated Japanese. They didn't fight for kill ratios. They fought to win. They lost. Frank and Lundstrom are very specific on WHY they lost. Frank's top three reasons did not involve the F4F's paper attributes.....obvious or non-obvious.

Anyone can always seize on any difference in combat situations, which exist in virtually any comparison, and say those differences explained the difference in combat results no matter how wide. I think that's fairly obviously implausible if you compare a composite of similar Burma 43/Darwin 43 RAF results to those of F4F's in Solomons in 1942-43, kill ratio difference a factor of *several* against similar opposition, to say the underlying Allied fighter unit effectiveness was the same and that bid difference was just circumstances or luck.

I think it's pretty implausible that you continue to ignore and discount the very specific factors that made the Guadalcanal battle in particular unique. Further, your attempt to paint me as being into "Chaos theory" and that I was suggesting that differences in ratio results were merely 'circumstances' (unnamed) and 'luck' qualifies as an good example of the distortion of which you accused me of.

Of course it can't be completely known, because we don't have evidence of USN/USMC units with Hurricanes, or RAF pressing Martlets into service in Burma. I think the Mohawk example (and better results of H75 than Hurricane over France, see "Battle of France Then and Now", and F4F v same H 75 units in BoF, see link to post #17 on this Tanknet thread, synthesizes the most recent sources in French and English; Shores' 1970's accounts are dated in this case) tend to suggests my thesis has merit, but I accept that Hawk related evidence is far from definitive.

Well here again we disagree. I own the book you've mentioned (BoF: Then and now) though I haven't distilled all the info from it yet. I have distilled Shores' work on it. Your comment about his work being dated is a straw man. Lundstrom's work could also be called "dated" as well. Just because a historical work is "old" doesn't invalidate either its raw data or the specific points that the author makes…which in my view, your 'thesis' largely ignores. (Shores made some telling comments comparing performance of the H-75 to the early 109D's as well as the later E variant.) If you're going to try bashing Shores again, you'll need to do better, otherwise, don't bother with the source bashing.

The BoF book "is" valuable though in that it covers the Blitzkrieg period as well as the Sitzkrieg era whilest Shores only covers the latter. That's why I bought it. The ratios experienced in the Sitzkrieg period were not unusual when I looked at all the factors and read the comments of the author as well as the pilots who flew the planes. Similar patterns exist on other battlefields but there as with every battlefield, there are a set of unique qualifyers as well. I do feel that much of the surprise that comes from the good competitive performance of the H75's in 1940 is due to an underlying and persistent prejudice that often comes up anytime French military performance in WWII is touched upon. In other words….they never get any street cred.

 

[renrich]

Page 473, Dean, "The fastest and lightest Wildcat was the F4F3 which touched 335 MPH at 22000 feet. In addition the climb rate of the early F4F3 was over 3300 fpm at SL, very sprightly performance for it's time. The heavier F4F4, in contrast, could make less than 2500 FPM at SL and as the curve shows the performance decreased rapidly at the higher altitudes to little over 1500 FPM at 15000 feet in spite of using the two stage supercharged engine," " Though not shown on this chart, the final FM2 model from Eastern retrieved most all the F4F3 climb performance; it took 3.7 minutes to make 10000 feet and 8.0 to 20000." The graph is from manufacturers and USN data. It is little wonder that the USN fighter pilots were less than enthusiastic about the F4F4.

 

[slaterat]

Dean is being very generous regarding the performance of the F4F. The prototype could do 334 mph at 20,500 ft. American Navy testing showed much more modest results. The F4F-3(285 built) making 330 mph and < 2400 ft/min climb rate. The F4F3a(95 built) , lacking the two stage supercharger showed decreased performance of 312 mph.

The F4F-4(1,195 built)became the most common F4F in 1942. It featured folding wings, 6 mgs, pilot armor and self sealing tanks. Weight went up and performance went down. F4F-4s doing about 320 mph and climb rates of <2000 ft/min.

The Martlets of the FAA generally had lesser performance than the Wildcats largely due to the export engines they were stuck with,ie the Wright cyclone and the S4C4-G twin wasp Typical performance was top speeds of 300 mph and climb rates about 1600ft/min.

 

[slaterat]

I really don't believe that the F4F had some intangible quality that made it a better combat combat aircraft than the Hurricane or the P 40. The greatest intangible asset it had in 1942 , when compared to the Hurricane and P 40 was operating from an aircraft carrier. There's a reason why combatants use carriers. Its a complete mobile weapons platform . It comes with command and control, EWS, radar ,scouting patrols, full logistics, fuel, ammo, spares, ground crew, repair crew, tools, anti aircraft defense ect. Hurricanes deployed in Singapore, Sumatra, Java and Burma lacked all of these. Additionally Hurricanes operating out of Singapore were outnumbered on a combat by combat basis on the average of 3.75 to 1, counting fighters only. I don't think Wildcats were up against those type of odds when operating from carriers.

RCAF son made a good point regarding Sea Hurricanes. They enjoyed a better K/D ratio than any other Hurricanes despite their decreased performance when compared to their land based Hurricane counterparts. How come? I believe its largely because of the above mentioned factors.

 

[RCAFson]

Tthe F4F-3 specs called for these weights and climb rates:
Gross weight (lbs.) 6895/6891/7432 lbs
Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft./min.) 3300/3180/3070 fpm

but the reality was a climb rate that fell far short of these numbers and at 7432lb, the combat climb struggled to exceed 2000 fpm.

But lets look at the basic physics of the F4F-3: it was a 7400lb aircraft with only 1200 hp and it had 260sq ft wing area. The numbers are just hopelessly optimistic and when the F4F-4 specs were drawn up (an aircraft with exactly the same engine) they were revised downward:
F4F-4 specs:
Gross weight (lbs.) 7426/7424/7972 lbs
Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft./min.) 1920/1810/1690 fpm
Time to climb to 10000 ft. (min.) 5.7/6.0/6.5 min
Time to climb to 20000 ft. (min.) 12.7/13.1/14.7 min

F4F-3 specs:

Gross weight (lbs.) 6895/6891/7432

Initial rate of climb at sea level (ft./min.) 3300/3180/3070
Time to climb to 10000 ft. (min.) 3.5/4.1/4.2
Time to climb to 20000 ft. (min.) 7.6/8.1/8.4

now compare the F4F-4 at 7426 lbs versus the F4F-3 at 7432 lbs:

F4F-4/F4F-3 (same engine!)

SL climb rate 1920/3070 fpm

time 10K ft: 5.7/4.2 min

time to 20K ft: 12.7/8.4 min

The F4F-4 numbers reflect the reality of actual aircraft testing, whereas the F4F-3 numbers are pure fantasy, never to be realized by actual aircraft.

The myth of the spritely F4F-3 is just that, a myth, and one that has no basis whatsoever in fact, and it is time to kill this myth, because it seriously distorts the reality that faced F4F-3 pilots in actual combat.

F4F Performance Trials

 

[renrich]

Your problem, among other things, is that when you compare the F4F3 at 7432 lbs to the F4F4 at 7426 lbs is that you are comparing apples to oranges. The fighter weight of the F4F3 is 7150.7, not 7432 whereas the fighter weight of the F4F4 IS 7426. The so called myth of the good performance of the F4F3 compared to the F4F4 is not a myth but reality. The USN pilots were dismayed when an aircraft they felt was fairly competitive with the A6M was replaced by one with decidedly less performance. One pilot compared the F4F4 to a TBD with a torpedo. Maybe a slight exaggeration. Eric Brown says in his book that the Wildcat had a climb rate of 3300 fpm and the Wildcat II could get 328 mph at 19500 feet. Those are in the same ball park as Dean.

The F4F3 had the R1830-76(SC2-G) engine
The F4F4 had the R1830-86(S5C7-G) engine
Martlet I and Martlet IV had the R 1820-40(G205A)
Martlet II and III had the R-1830-90, the same engine as the F4F3A
Martlet VI had the same engine as the FM-2


The argument that shipboard fighters have a built in advantage over land based fighters does not make much sense. To begin with a ship board version of a landbased fighter has to be structurally stronger and thus weigh more. It also has to be protected from corrosion which adds weight and complexity and requires more maintenance. Depending on mission requirements carrier fighters often must carry less fuel. ammunition and other ordnance than a land based aircraft. It is no accident that the A6M had a combat radius of around 300 miles from a carrier but 500 miles from a field. Most overwater fighters carry a life raft and survival gear which add weight. Often, especially in 1942, some of the aircraft were not equipped with homing devices and many that were so equipped found they did not work and were very short ranged. Getting back to home base for a carrier aircraft was often very problematical. often home base was not where it was supposed to be. Plus the pilots had to be better navigators and weather reports in the Pacific were much less reliable than for land based fighters. The factors go on and on. The fact is that until November, 1942, the Wildcat held it's own with the A6M and after that did even better. I don't believe that can be said for the P40 or Hurricane.

 

[RCAFson]

Your problem, among other things, is that when you compare the F4F3 at 7432 lbs to the F4F4 at 7426 lbs is that you are comparing apples to oranges. The fighter weight of the F4F3 is 7150.7, not 7432 whereas the fighter weight of the F4F4 IS 7426. The so called myth of the good performance of the F4F3 compared to the F4F4 is not a myth but reality. The USN pilots were dismayed when an aircraft they felt was fairly competitive with the A6M was replaced by one with decidedly less performance. One pilot compared the F4F4 to a TBD with a torpedo. Maybe a slight exaggeration. Eric Brown says in his book that the Wildcat had a climb rate of 3300 fpm and the Wildcat II could get 328 mph at 19500 feet. Those are in the same ball park as Dean.

The F4F3 had the R1830-76(SC2-G) engine
The F4F4 had the R1830-86(S5C7-G) engine


.

I know what Brown says and also know what actual performance testing of F4F-3 and -4 aircraft reveal, which is why I stated that Brown was biased in favour of the Martlet/F4F.

The basic physics simply don't add up. An aircraft with 260 sqft wing area, 7200lb and only 1200 hp simply cannot climb at ~3300fpm. It is physically impossible.

These two engines are both 2 stage, 2 speed and have exactly the same normal power rating at low altitude of 1100hp until 2500 ft for the -76 and 3300 ft for the -86. The T/O rating is also 1200hp for each. later variants of the F4F-3 used the -86 engine:
http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-3_Wildcat_(Land)_PD_-_14_August_1942.pdf

F4F-3 #1848 (with a -76)was tested at 7300lb and the initial climb rate was 2025 (normal) and 2450 fpm (military - pencilled in):
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1848-performance.jpg

F4F-3 #1845 (with a -76)was tested at 6262lb and the initial climb rate was 2450 (normal) and 3150 fpm (military - faintly pencilled in):
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/f4f-3-1845-performance.jpg

FM-2 (wildcat VI) at 7049 lbs and 1300hp = 3120 fpm (combat)
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f4f/wildcat-VI-ads.jpg


I hope you are not suggesting that a less than 200lb drop in weight will increase the climb rate from about 2450fpm to over 3000?

 

[RCAFson]

Depending on mission requirements carrier fighters often must carry less fuel. ammunition and other ordnance than a land based aircraft. It is no accident that the A6M had a combat radius of around 300 miles from a carrier but 500 miles from a field.

I suspect that the difference in combat radius is mostly due to the fact that a carrier fighter has to allow for lengthy loiter times forming up and landing.

 

[Lighthunmust]

Does anyone posting here have primary documentation of why the F4F-4 was produced with 6 guns and less rpg? Did the folding wing design interfere with storage of the same rpg of a -3 if the -4 had four guns. The only source I have is secondary, AHT, saying the British influenced Grumman to make the change.

 

[RCAFson]

Does anyone posting here have primary documentation of why the F4F-4 was produced with 6 guns and less rpg? Did the folding wing design interfere with storage of the same rpg of a -3 if the -4 had four guns. The only source I have is secondary, AHT, saying the British influenced Grumman to make the change.

I don't have primary documentation, but IIRC, it was because the UK found that the "average" pilot came back with ammo remaining and was unlikely to make repeated firing passes. Accordingly it was better to have more guns to produce a higher kill rate per firing pass.