Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40

[pbfoot]

most accounts I've read and overheard conversations indicate that it was quite a bash on most airfields, but I suspect not mamy pilots would pass aobriety tests on New Years DAy 45

 

[renrich]

If one reads Lundstrom, there is little doubt that his research was extensive and thorough with massive amounts of backup. In the absence of some other historian's well documented research, which has not been posted on this thread, to my knowledge, it seems to me that his conclusions have a lot of credibility. Since few if any of us were participating in WW2, the only way we can learn about it is by researching the material ourselves or reading something from someone who has done the research. To claim that Lundstrom has a bias and is in error about his conclusions seems not very persuasive to me.

 

[parsifal]

What is the estimate of the total number of fighters over Dieppe? And how does that stack up to the fighter forces on either Bodenplatte or November 26, 1944?

Hi Dg

Am at work so havent access to reference material

However 48 Allied squadrons were committed to the battle, the majority of which were Spit Vs. This included the first substantial US fighter committment to the ETO.....3 squadrons of Spit Vs attached to the 31st Pursuit Gp.

Allied losses were 106 aircraft lost

The Germans committed two JGs (JG2 and 26), almost in their entirety, plus some independant squadrons

The JGs were almost exclusively equipped with FW 190 A-3s. These were measurably superior in performance to the Spit Vs equipping the allied fighter squadrons at that time (there was only one squadron of Spit IXs)

The JGs were assisted by some Zerstorer staffels, some recon elements and some ground attack stafelns. Some of the ground attack formations were equipped with FW 190 FBs which appear to have been pressed into service as emergency fighters.

The outcome was heavily in favour of the germans, who enjoyed perhaps their best aerial victory in the west in over two years, and this day probably represented the zenith in the supremacy of the FW 190. Still, the numbers are misleading, since the timne over the target area for the allied fighters was severely limited. since they had to maintain a constant air patrol over the invasion, they were always limited to about 1/3 their force structure at any given moment. Roughly speaking that probably gave the germans near parity at the times they chose to intercept. Still, the german forces were commanded in a very superior manner.


I am not sure of German aircraft losses, but according to this website: http://www.luftwaffe.cz/dieppe.html the germans lost 48 aircraft to 88 Allied fighters and a total of 106 aircraft alltogether. I know they lost 14 pilots outright and a similar number injured, after being shot down. german loss and victory reports are worth noting....they appear to be very accurate on this occasion. Allied claims and loss reports are not as clear

 

[pbfoot]

I believe that most squadrons flew 2-3 sorties that day with some up to 4

 

[buffnut453]

If one reads Lundstrom, there is little doubt that his research was extensive and thorough with massive amounts of backup. In the absence of some other historian's well documented research, which has not been posted on this thread, to my knowledge, it seems to me that his conclusions have a lot of credibility. Since few if any of us were participating in WW2, the only way we can learn about it is by researching the material ourselves or reading something from someone who has done the research. To claim that Lundstrom has a bias and is in error about his conclusions seems not very persuasive to me.

Renrich,

I'm not disputing that Lundstrom did excellent research but his sources are all US-based. There is not one cited documentary source in "The First Team" from other countries' archives. Thus his uncited comment about the USN being the most proficient in the world as regards deflection shooting is wholly without substance. As someone who has done extensive primary source research including the UK, Australia, NZ and the USA, and have had said research published and accepted for a postgraduate dissertation, I know of what I speak! Just because Lundstrom wrote it does not make it so, particularly if he doesn't back up his assertions with source documentation. You can continue to offer his opinion as fact until the cows come home but that doesn't alter the truth that, in reality, he was expressing an opinion and there is no comparative data upon which to base the assertion.

 

[parsifal]

I have to side with buffnut on this one. I fail to see the evidence of a vastly superior performance by USN fighter pilots until well after Midway, and even then, I just cannot see evidence that provides clear links that any such enhanced performance was conclusively the result of being able to undertake deflection shooting. Defelction shooting is such an inherently essential ability a a fighter pilot that it is hard to imagine everybody else ignoring it, or underrating, whilst the USN presses on with a secret and unique ability that nobody else cares about. it is, frankly, unbelievable.

 

[Glider]

Hi Dg

Am at work so havent access to reference material

However 48 Allied squadrons were committed to the battle, the majority of which were Spit Vs. This included the first substantial US fighter committment to the ETO.....3 squadrons of Spit Vs attached to the 31st Pursuit Gp.

Allied losses were 106 aircraft lost

The Germans committed two JGs (JG2 and 26), almost in their entirety, plus some independant squadrons

The JGs were almost exclusively equipped with FW 190 A-3s. These were measurably superior in performance to the Spit Vs equipping the allied fighter squadrons at that time (there was only one squadron of Spit IXs)

The JGs were assisted by some Zerstorer staffels, some recon elements and some ground attack stafelns. Some of the ground attack formations were equipped with FW 190 FBs which appear to have been pressed into service as emergency fighters.

The outcome was heavily in favour of the germans, who enjoyed perhaps their best aerial victory in the west in over two years, and this day probably represented the zenith in the supremacy of the FW 190. Still, the numbers are misleading, since the timne over the target area for the allied fighters was severely limited. since they had to maintain a constant air patrol over the invasion, they were always limited to about 1/3 their force structure at any given moment. Roughly speaking that probably gave the germans near parity at the times they chose to intercept. Still, the german forces were commanded in a very superior manner.


I am not sure of German aircraft losses, but according to this website: Battle over Dieppe 19th August 1942 the germans lost 48 aircraft to 88 Allied fighters and a total of 106 aircraft alltogether. I know they lost 14 pilots outright and a similar number injured, after being shot down. german loss and victory reports are worth noting....they appear to be very accurate on this occasion. Allied claims and loss reports are not as clear

I know that I have said this before and apologise if it should like a scratched record but I would contend that the Luftwaffe didn't do as well as the figures (which I don't disagree with) show. The reasons are simple.

a) Their fighters were vastly superior to the RAF with the exception of one squadron of Spitfire Mk IX who were as good as but not better than the FW190.
b) They were over home ground
c) They had the benefit of radar control
d) They could pick the time and place of their attacks
e) The RAF was tied to defending the fleet and the troops on the ground.
f) The Luftwaffe utterly failed in their primary task of attacking the fleet before the landings, during the landings or in the withdrawal from the beaches.

Of the above (F) is the most important. The RAF achieved what is set out to do, not one large landing craft was sunk by air attack before, during or after the raid and only one escort was sunk in what was almost the last Luftwaffe attack of the day despite the escort only consisting of a handful of Hunt class destroyers.
With all the advantages the Luftwaffe had, they may have done reasonably well, but they should have done a lot better.

 

[JoeB]

We have discussed this component before. I was not focusing just on carrier combats. I stated that in all of 1942, there were 4 x one day carrier clashes (in terms of actual exchange of strikes) followed by one sustained campaign that occured over one single base....with the F4F's fighting primarily defensively...over their own base vs. an opponent that had to fly with limited numbers a distance greater than England to Berlin. (I am also aware of the late-campaign development of Buin and Buna as emergency fields/small fields but the main component remained Base Air Force at Rabaul.)

I 'do' tend to focus on 42 as this was the pivitol year for the A6M as a front line fighter as well as the climax of both the carrier engagements and the result of the struggle for Guadalcanal. Missions with F4F's did occur into 1943 but by this point the conflict was decided and the IJNAF had suffered a level of attrition that signifigantly impacted it's efficiency. I understand you disagree on how big an impact this was in 43 but there we've agreed to disagree.
.

'Agree to disagree' is appropriate only in matters of opinion. In this case it's a fact that kill ratio's of both USN and British units flying 'early' types v the Japanese didn't change much between 1942 and 1943, or the part of the 1943 that's relevant (in terms of a/c like the F4F being used at all in front line service) so there's really no reason to exclude 1943 results; in fact it's quite illogical to consider the 1943 results for say the Spitfire v JNAF and Hurricane v JAAF/JNAF, and exclude 1943 results for F4F's because 'the Japanese were too attrited by then'. And in fact, results in the Solomons at least in early 1943 were not a lot different than in 1942.

Likewise, many of campaigns among which we would compare *Allied* fighter performance involved the Allied a/c on the defensive near their own bases and Japanese fighters at long range. The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by). The Philippines, and some Malayan and DEI operations also saw Zeroes at close to max range over Allied fields, and many Army Type 1 operations early in the war (Malaya, DEI, Burma) likewise (considering the Type 1's shorter range even with drop tanks, and the tanks sometimes not available), same. And again, in cases where F4F's were themselves operating further from base (relative to their similarly short range to other Allied fighters pre P-38 ), carrier battles, antishipping escorts from G'canal, Munda strikes, etc their kill ratio also averaged close to 1.

So the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F's shoes in the Guadalcanal campaign.

I don't think you've made a convincing point, nor has it been made by others so far, that F4F operations were so non-comparable to other Allied fighter ops that the (pretty widely) differing results don't show they were more effective. So arguments about training and a/c characteristics are about *why* the F4F units were more effective than other Allied fighter units, not if they were.

Joe

 

[renrich]

Another point which seems to get lost is the effectiveness of the F4F and it's pilots against Japanese bombers and recon planes. How the F4F did against the Zeke is fun and sexy to contemplate but at least of equal importance was how the USN pilots in their Wildcats did against the IJN bombers and torpedo planes trying to sink our ships or disable our airfields and how they did against the recon planes trying to locate targets. The F4F through November, 1942, was at least pretty even against the Zeke but at that same time and later was very effective against the other types. O Hare used high side deflection runs to kill three bombers and badly damage more and Leonard, in the prelude to Coral Sea killed two observation types using deflection tactics. The USN pilots in Wildcats were very effective against IJN aircraft other than VFs and even more effective when they later got better performing AC such as the F4U and F6F. That those pilots did well in short ranged Wildcats that were not dominant in performance must have had something to do with training and gunnery skills.

 

[pbfoot]

Fred Avery and Henry Miller USMC were both trained by RCAF and served with Boyington on Guadalcanal

 

[Nikademus]

'Agree to disagree' is appropriate only in matters of opinion. In this case it's a fact that kill ratio's of both USN and British units flying 'early' types v the Japanese didn't change much between 1942 and 1943, or the part of the 1943 that's relevant (in terms of a/c like the F4F being used at all in front line service) so there's really no reason to exclude 1943 results; in fact it's quite illogical to consider the 1943 results for say the Spitfire v JNAF and Hurricane v JAAF/JNAF, and exclude 1943 results for F4F's because 'the Japanese were too attrited by then'. And in fact, results in the Solomons at least in early 1943 were not a lot different than in 1942.

Estimated kill ratios can be called 'facts'. A person or person's interpretation of said facts however constitutes an "opinion." Past discussion showed that we have marked differences in "opinion" regarding the meanings behind the ratios, the need to drill down into that debate again was not necessary IMO hence; "Agree to Disagree" in this context was appropriate as a measure of politeness. i.e. we don't agree....lets move on.....more so given you somehow interpreted my past comments as focusing on the carrier battles alone, which was incorrect.

However with Pandora's Box reopened, I stand by my earlier view that it's illogical to compare the British situation in mid 1942-43 to the USN situation in Guad as similar when in my opinion they were very different. I further feel it is illogical to include 1943 (post Guad campaign) as highly relevant because the situation there did not highly change in regards to the disadvantages faced by the JNAF after it's losing and highly costly battle against the singular base at Henderson field. The major change that did occur was further to the USN's advantage….deployment of more powerful fighters in large numbers as well as holding the initiative whilst the primary bases of the JNAF remained concentrated in the Northern Solomons

Likewise, many of campaigns among which we would compare *Allied* fighter performance involved the Allied a/c on the defensive near their own bases and Japanese fighters at long range. The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by). The Philippines, and some Malayan and DEI operations also saw Zeroes at close to max range over Allied fields, and many Army Type 1 operations early in the war (Malaya, DEI, Burma) likewise (considering the Type 1's shorter range even with drop tanks, and the tanks sometimes not available), same. And again, in cases where F4F's were themselves operating further from base (relative to their similarly short range to other Allied fighters pre P-38 ), carrier battles, antishipping escorts from G'canal, Munda strikes, etc their kill ratio also averaged close to 1.

There are more variables at work than simply "long distance" and posture. Burma saw the UK performing many offensive patrols, ground support missions and TacR missions as well as escort duty. Coupled with the huge size of Burma and it's numerous airfields this helped foster an environment where one never could predict when and where (and from what direction) an enemy force might come. The JAAF also enjoyed greater numbers in many of their missions. It is interesting to note that "kill ratio" wise the best Allied performer was the ex-AVG P-40's…..better than even 2nd generation planes. Shall we conclude that the P40 is better than these planes? It is interesting to note that the same factors that led to success over Lunga existed these ex AVG'ers. Very long range missions to a singular target - Kumming with plenty of warning for the defenders with the additional tactic borne of experience of ambushing the strike well after it completed its mission and was on the way back. On at least two occasions the latter tactic led to major JAAF defeat kill ratio wise (though in fairness it could be also said that they succeeded in their mission (attacking the airbase))
The SRA campaigns were indeed made possible by the long range abilities of the A6M…it was after all the first strategic fighter and this is a pro that is often forgotten or discounted when discussing this fighter. Like Burma however, a key difference vs. Lunga was that Japanese efforts were not canalized by the location and number of enemy bases, the number of friendly bases, the extremeness of the distance (effectively beyond even the A6M's range and finally the early warning net in place. These factors represented Force Modifiers that greatly enhanced the Allied fighter defense and made it possible at all for the F4F's to defend competitively vs. the attackers. A major part of Lunga's uniqueness. The Darwin situation does not totally match this situation or its intensity. Another difference was training. It has been written in more than one account that the Spit pilots had a learning curve to overcome. This is reasonable given UK fighter performance in other areas, notable North Africa in comparison to the USAAF performance using the same fighter types.

So the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F's shoes in the Guadalcanal campaign.

I don't agree. With the other variables exactly the same, I feel that even had the USMC pilots been manning Hurricane II's, they could have achieved a similar feat. Wg Cmdr Paul Ritchie came to a similar conclusion when he investigated the lopsided losses Hurricane squadrons were suffering in Burma in 43. There was no technical reason, in his experienced mind why the Hurricane II, which possessed similar pros and cons to other 1st gen planes like the P-40 and F4F, could not, if *fought properly*, compete with the Type 01 fighter plane. Based on my research, I agree with him. Your logic from past threads suggests that somehow, someway the F4F has a key quality, albeit one you cannot identify that makes it "superior" to other 1st gen Allied fighters. My study of multiple day to day air combat situations suggests the opposite. Kill ratios are impacted by too many internal and external conditions and it is rare for any one plane to be so superior to other types that this one variable (plane performance) alone accounts for a deviation from the usual 1:1 up to 3:1 overall ratio that results from sustained combat ops. Even on the Eastern front, other variables besides plane performance contributed to the 5:1 or better ratio the Jagdwaffe enjoyed initially…and later at the start of Blau suffered a near 1:1 loss ratio….until the pool of trained VVS fighter pilots were killed off or wounded. The fact of the matter as i see it, is that a ratio closer to "1" is common whilst disjointed results (greater than 3:1) are the exceptions and there is often if not always more than one reason behind it.

I don't think you've made a convincing point, nor has it been made by others so far, that F4F operations were so non-comparable to other Allied fighter ops that the (pretty widely) differing results don't show they were more effective. So arguments about training and a/c characteristics are about *why* the F4F units were more effective than other Allied fighter units, not if they were.

I'm ok with that….because in my opinion I don't think you've made a convincing point either. The F4F's performance is not unusual when taken within the context of it's situation and how it was utilized. There is no magic variable involved with the plane.

 

[parsifal]

An excellent post Nikodemus....well thought out and expressed.

Will be very interesting to see the reply

 

[davparlr]

No, what I said was that there were 159 (117 carrier based and 42 land based) of your "fighter slots" in the South Pacific Theater on 17 December 1942, not in the entire USN as, yes, your original post clearly implied.

I was not implying the entire Navy, only those at the point of the spear. Do not misinterpret my lack of clarity for implication.

In the entire USN on 17 Dec 42, and, again, not counting the training commands, where experienced fighter pilots were in great demand - Jimmie Thach at NAS Jacksonville comes to mind; the CASUs, where there were a plenty of fighters to be driven for one purpose or another; the ACTGs on both the east and west coast; and, really, plenty of other reasons to have fighter drivers around for various purposes; no, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for "fighter slots" and a standardized number of billets in each:

You can have a hundred men on your football team, but only eleven can play in the game. These players are called "shooters".

6 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 133 billets

What carriers? On December 7, 1942, the Navy had three aircraft carriers available for war, the Saratoga, the Ranger and the Enterprise, with maybe 100 fighter billets available. The Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet had all been sunk. The Essex was five months away from appearing in the Pacific with an air wing, the Yorktown seven months and the Intrepid was a year away. I am not sure but I suspect the Independence did not pick up its air wing until July. I am sure most of their aircrews of the sunken carriers were not lost but now did not have carrier billets, except maybe training and land based support/reserve or assigned to air wings for anticipated carriers. Do the lack of deck space, there is a backlog of experienced naval aviators at this stage in the war, all being trained or training others, but not available for combat.

7 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 160 billets
15 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 386 billets
28 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 679 (I found where I missed two in my initial count).

There has never been an argument over the quantity of naval fighter billets available during this period. The only issue is that there was a very limited slots available aboard any aircraft carrier. This meant that many naval aviators were getting training and obtaining flying experience and not shooting at the enemy. Army pilots on the other hand, were quickly filling shooter slots. In 1942 Army overseas airfields increased from 31 to 358, while I really don't know, it is reasonable to assume most of these new fields would contain shooter units. Of course, many of these were bomber type fields. During that same period, the Navy went from seven carriers to three. The experience level of the Navy was condensed, the Army's was diluted.

By 7 Dec 1943 the picture was decidedly different, again, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for "fighter slots" and a standardized number of billets in each:

23 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 708 billets.

By then the Army AF had 559 overseas airfields with 81,000 officers, most of whom were pilots.

33 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 786 billets.
28 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 961 billets.
84 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 2455 (and I found where I missed one the first time through here, too).

These guys were riding the bench, right? They certainly were not pulling triggers against the enemy.

One must always remember that not all carriers, and, yes, that even includes Essex class carriers, were in places such as the South Pacific theater on 7 Dec 1943;

Of course not, that is why I included all carrier pilots as shooters.

any more that all squadrons operating from land were safely ensconced away at NAS Olathe, Kansas.

Navy pilots based on forward based airfield and involved in combat, as the Marines were at Guadalcanal, would of course be considered shooters. I don't know enough about land based naval units to identify the quantity involved in combat.

Am I to conclude from your definition that, say, a fighter pilot who was in on the Lae-Salamaua raid of 10 Mar 42, and went on to score air-to-air credits at Tulagi on 4 May, at Coral Sea on 8 May, and again at Midway on 4 June, by virtue of being assigned to a fighter squadron stationed at NAS Maui, and thus not in combat deployed squadron on 17 Dec 42, was not filling a "fighter slot"? That filling a position in an established fighter organization, does not define a "fighter slot"? Or that a naval aviator of the fighter persuasion might find himself in NAS San Diego as FO in one working up squadron and then a week later find himself as XO of another squadron in action on the other side of the ocean and, yet, was not filling a "fighter slot" in the first, but is filling a "fighter slot" in the second?

You misunderstand my position. "Fighter slots" can be anywhere, in a training squadron, in units in reserve, etc. However, this does not make them a shooter. The pilot you described at NAS Maui would indeed be filling a fighter slot but he became a "shooter" only after he was assigned to the Yorktown or Lexington and could climb into the cockpit of an F4F-3, fly off and pull the trigger on four 50 cals aimed at an enemy aircraft, something he could not do at Maui. At the end of 1942, the typical naval fighter pilot could only compete for 100 shooter spots on the three available carriers, one of which was the Ranger in the ETO. There is a possibility of Naval shooter slots available in forward land bases. I don't know. Right now I am only counting carrier based Naval assets.

The term "shooter" is not my term but a rather a recognized modern term related to the execution of a mission as represented in the following site.
JOINT CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE (JCMD) - FY01 Activity

shooter assets (fighter aircraft, Patriot, Aegis, etc.), and all the other principal systems resident in a theater that can perform one or more JIADS (Joint Integrated Air Defense System} functions

Really? All of them? Squadron COs, XOs, OpOs, all their flight leaders? Everyone? Admittedly, I don't read much about the Army Air Corps, for (a) I've no particular interest and (b) I worry about the slanted writing one might encounter when reading a work concentrating on the AAF, but I find the concept of all these 2d LT types running around without any leadership a bit hard to believe. Almost enough to stir my poor bones to check out their manning and cross check with the army register . . . well, maybe not, a lot of effort for not much reason.

The source is a reference Wikipedia site, Far East Air Force.

Far East Air Force (United States) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Since 10 February 1941, FEAF had received 203 new pilots (140 of which became pursuit pilots), but all but 28 were fresh from flight schools and required further individual training, which cut into needed unit tactical training.[33]

The reference note is interesting which support my original premise.

Bartsch Doomed, pp. 7, 12–13, 25, 28–29, and 434–440. The AAF decided to use its experienced pilots in the United States as training cadre for newly-created units rather than reinforce overseas units. As a result FEAF pilots were unusually young and inexperienced when war began. The 1941 pilot levies were: 10 February: 24 from Class 40-H; 8 May: 39 from Class 41-B; 24 June: 96 from Classes 41-C and 41-D; 23 October: 16 from Class 41-G. While 22 of the 28 pilots of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, who arrived 20 November, were from these same classes, they had experience flying P-40 aircraft before deployment to FEAF.

 

[davparlr]

Continued

How much do you have?

That's why I never gamble!

Four pilots reported to Lexington's VF-2 on 11 April 1942, straight from ACTGPac, Ens William Wileman, Ens John Bain, Ens George Hopper, and AP2c Robert Kanze, just in time to depart for Coral Sea on 15 April. And, yes, they all saw action as fighter pilots at Coral Sea three weeks later.

The least experienced pilots in Yorktown's VF-42 (the squadron on which I have the most information on file) at Coral Sea were Ens Harry Gibbs, Ens John Baker, and Ens John Adams, all of whom had joined the squadron on 6 December 1941 upon completion of training. On the eve of the Coral Sea action Gibbs had but 274.4 total hours, including all training hours; Baker, 340.3; and Adams, 396.0. Those compared to the ensign with the most flight hours, Leslie Knox, who had been in the squadron since 14 March 1941 with 811.6. All saw action at Coral Sea; Baker and Knox went MIA on 7 May 42 and declared killed in action on 8 May 1943.

I was surprised to read this when I read "The First Team". Typical Army pilot out of advanced training had 200 hrs. so the carrier quals of 70+ hours seems about right.

Here is some clarifications of my post.

A "fighter slot" would be any position that requires a fighter pilot e.g. carrier fighter pilot, States based fighter instructors, land assign fighter squadron pilot, etc.

A "shooter" would be any pilot manning a plane in a position to take the war to the enemy.

My overall premise is that the typical Navy pilots on the carriers in 1942 and 1943, were more experienced with more flying hours than their Army counterpart due to lack of carrier availability. If the Navy had produced carriers at the rate the Army produced air bases (not feasible), they also would have experienced a diluting down of experienced pilots.

 

[fibus]

If the AVG had the P39 they would have done better with it using the same tactics. Like the P40 it was altitude limited by the same engine.
So if the P39 had been available that would have been the plane to use and it was in the same time frame.
It would be worthwhile to read the comparison of the P39 and the Zero written by Grumman test pilot Corky Myer. Again in that same time frame Yeager thought he could beat any other aircraft at low altitude.

 

[Shortround6]

Again in that same time frame Yeager thought he could beat any other aircraft at low altitude.

Yeager didn't graduate flight school until March 10th, 1943. While he did many remarkable things and is an amazing man making pronouncements on the combat capability of an earlier model aircraft that he may never have flown probably isn't one of them. He did fly P-39s but the ones available in the summer/fall of 1941 used a different model engine and had a variety of equipment problems that kept them from being combat worthy.

 

[tyrodtom]

Yeager never flew the P39 in combat, and never went up against a hostile zero. Good as he was, even he could give unqualified opinions.

As a sidenote, I was on the flightline at Pleiku in late 67 or early 68 delivering bombs for B-57s, when the groundcrew of one pointed at a pilot doing his walk around on a nearby B-57.
He asked if I knew who that pilot was ? I looked, just saw a Col. in a flightsuit. He said that's Col. Yeager , and I yelled back, you mean Chuck Yeager ?
We both sort of stopped, you didn't call unfamiliar Colonels by their first names, but the flight line was so noisy nobody noticed.

 

[gjs238]

Would Chuck Yeager even fit in a P-39?!
Edit: How did he get in a P-39?!

 

[tyrodtom]

Chuck Yeager flew the P-39 in training in the US before he went overseas.

He was just the average size guy then. When I saw him in the late 60s, he looked shorter than me, i'm 5' 11".

 

[gjs238]

OK, guess I saw bad info on the internet - I saw 6'2"