Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40

[tyrodtom]

He was 20-30 feet away, but I could judge his height by the aircraft. I'm pretty sure he was no taller than me.

I too expected a hero and a Colonel to be a giant .

But most air forces probably have a minimum and maximum height for pilots, there's only so much adjustment in the controls and seats for different sizes.

 

[Nikademus]

An excellent post Nikodemus....well thought out and expressed.

Will be very interesting to see the reply

Thank you sir. I do try.

 

[JoeB]

1. However with Pandora's Box reopened, I stand by my earlier view that it's illogical to compare the British situation in mid 1942-43 to the USN situation in Guad as similar when in my opinion they were very different. I further feel it is illogical to include 1943 (post Guad campaign) as highly relevant because the situation there did not highly change in regards to the disadvantages faced by the JNAF after it's losing and highly costly battle against the singular base at Henderson field. The major change that did occur was further to the USN's advantage….deployment of more powerful fighters in large numbers as well as holding the initiative whilst the primary bases of the JNAF remained concentrated in the Northern Solomons

2. There are more variables at work than simply "long distance" and posture. Burma saw the UK performing many offensive patrols, ground support missions and TacR missions as well as escort duty. Coupled with the huge size of Burma and it's numerous airfields this helped foster an environment where one never could predict when and where (and from what direction) an enemy force might come. The JAAF also enjoyed greater numbers in many of their missions. It is interesting to note that "kill ratio" wise the best Allied performer was the ex-AVG P-40's…..better than even 2nd generation planes. Shall we conclude that the P40 is better than these planes? It is interesting to note that the same factors that led to success over Lunga existed these ex AVG'ers. Very long range missions to a singular target - Kumming with plenty of warning for the defenders with the additional tactic borne of experience of ambushing the strike well after it completed its mission and was on the way back. On at least two occasions the latter tactic led to major JAAF defeat kill ratio wise

3. I don't agree. With the other variables exactly the same, I feel that even had the USMC pilots been manning Hurricane II's, they could have achieved a similar feat. Wg Cmdr Paul Ritchie came to a similar conclusion when he investigated the lopsided losses Hurricane squadrons were suffering in Burma in 43. There was no technical reason, in his experienced mind why the Hurricane II, which possessed similar pros and cons to other 1st gen planes like the P-40 and F4F, could not, if *fought properly*, compete with the Type 01 fighter plane. Based on my research, I agree with him. Your logic from past threads suggests that somehow, someway the F4F has a key quality, albeit one you cannot identify that makes it "superior" to other 1st gen Allied fighters.

1. I think you should review more the campaigns in the Solomons, though unfortunately they haven't been covered well in print from both sides (nor the non USN aspect of the G'canal campaign, or the post Nov 15 '42 period; I would recommend Frank's 'Guadalcanal' for strictly Marine actions and those after 11/15/42 in G'canal campaign proper, a few of which were F4F v Type 1 combats as JAAF briefly appeared in Solomons in early '43). The totality is a fair degree of variation of mission types, and the tendency in 1943 was sometimes (as in the Japanese April '43 raids on G'canal) to themselves put up unprecedented numbers of fighters, not generally true that they suffered greater numerical inferiority in the portion of the post Nov 15 '42 fighting which still involved the F4F. I agree the '43 fighting involving F4F doesn't show us anything radically new, but it extends the same general results while adding more combats which do not fit the mold of 'defending a single base Henderson' (which of course the '42 carrier battles don't either, nor F4F escorts of strikes on convoys, etc), and also tended toward parity in fighter-fighter combat result.

The point here being, the characterization of F4F v Zero/Type 1 as basically a single scenario is just not historically correct. Yet the results didn't seem highly sensitive to the scenario.

2. I see my original point being somewhat distorted. I never said that characteristics of a/c determined outcomes. I said that non-obvious characteristics of a/c *might* affect outcomes, and the F4F's results v other 'first generation' Allied planes might be an example of this. P-40 units in Burma post AVG 42-43, AVG's successor 23rd FG as well as other units, per results in 'Air War Over Burma', had a kill ratio v Type 1of around 3:1, compared to Hurricane's ratio bigger *in the other direction* in the same period, and ratio of USAAF P-51A and P-38 units in a few missions over Rangoon was <1 (note that Japanese loss results in that case are incompletely given in that book, but even if P-51A/P-38 claims were 100% accurate they still didn't do very well). But, as has been legitimately argued in case of Mohawk v Hurricane results in Burma, those are really quite small samples, especially P-51A (P-38's were hardly involved and later demonstrated different results).

And as far as comparing *success* v JAAF fighter units (P-40 Burma 1943) to parity against JNAF fighter units (F4F), the likelihood of superiority of the JNAF v. JAAF must be considered. Whereas in comparing *lack of success* v JAAF fighter units (Hurricane, consistently for a long time) to parity (F4F) v JNAF fighter units, it's easier to say that that demonstrates greater effectiveness by the units attaining parity v JNAF (plus we have direct Zero v Hurricane and Spit combats with kill ratio pretty heavily in Zero's favor, but results for P-40 v JNAF in 1942-43 period were nowhere near the results of P-40's in CBI v JAAF).

So no, I don't think the results of USAAF P-40's in Burma trip up my general *suggestion* that less tangible 'plane' characteristics were perhaps part of the F4F's relative success, which is what I've said in all these debates, never mentioned any magic factor. I certainly never excluded training and other human factors as big determinants of fighter combat outcomes. You mention operational concepts of the P-40 units; of course those had an effect on results, but the P-40 Burma experience really is pretty small and narrow in scenario, F4F experience much larger and considerably more varied, and against the JNAF.

3. Note that you've halfway sidestepped my point there. I said "the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F..in.. Guadalcanal campaign." But you answer in terms of Marines flying Hurricanes. Again, you seem to caricature my argument to be that the F4F was a sole determinant, which I never said. Again and again I've appended *units*, F4F units, Hurricane units, Type 1 units, etc. including in the quote you responded to. If you say Marines/Navy would have done as well with Hurricanes, I disagree if I had to guess. If you counter my actual statement and say Hurricane *units* would have done as well, I think that's more clearly at odds with the evidence, though nothing of this sort is absolutely provable. Anyone can always seize on any difference in combat situations, which exist in virtually any comparison, and say those differences explained the difference in combat results no matter how wide. I think that's fairly obviously implausible if you compare a composite of similar Burma 43/Darwin 43 RAF results to those of F4F's in Solomons in 1942-43, kill ratio difference a factor of *several* against similar opposition, to say the underlying Allied fighter unit effectiveness was the same and that bid difference was just circumstances or luck. (Darwin '43 more similar to Burma 43 than Darwin defense was to Solomons actions? it's hard to believe someone without an ax to grind would try to claim that, and it's not clear to me how 'lack of intensity' of Darwin ops you mentioned would be just in the JNAF's favor not Allies, and less frequent but larger raids also figured into Japanese ops in Solomons in '43). But, can someone who says the difference was *all* due to circumstances and nothing to do with either plane *or* human factors be absolutely *proven* wrong? no.

So IMO there was pretty clear difference in unit effectivness, F4F units superior v JNAF of '42-43 (more so v RAF Hurr/Spit units, USAAF units achieved ~parity v Zeroes in late 42-43 combats, RAAF Kittyhawk units too). And yes some of it was human factors, can you find a quote where I said otherwise? However I believe some of the difference was probably also due to intangible factors of the a/c involved, ie F4F was a more effective combat a/c than it appeared on paper. Of course it can't be completely known, because we don't have evidence of USN/USMC units with Hurricanes, or RAF pressing Martlets into service in Burma. I think the Mohawk example (and better results of H75 than Hurricane over France, see "Battle of France Then and Now", and F4F v same H 75 units in BoF, see link to post #17 on this Tanknet thread, synthesizes the most recent sources in French and English; Shores' 1970's accounts are dated in this case) tend to suggests my thesis has merit, but I accept that Hawk related evidence is far from definitive. I don't OTOH know of any evidence indicating the contrary, besides a single anecdote of mock combat between F4F and Hurricane that comes up time to time. Also I believe someone here tried to argue relative Martlet/Sea Hurricane results in 'Pedestal', proved something in Hurricane's favor but I don't see that that they do, either way.

WW2-era USN aircraft vs. the Luftwaffe - how would they fare? - Tanknet

Joe

 

[renrich]

In combat against Japanese fighters with the Hurricane, Spitfire, P40, P39 and Wildcat, I suggest that at least some of the apparent advantage in effectiveness the Wildcat had against the A6M, which the AVG in P40s probably never encountered, was that the Wildcat was more resistant to gunfire than the others. Grumman had the reputation for building rugged aircraft and the radial engine of the Wildcat as opposed to the liquid cooled engines of the others was by all accounts less likely to be put out of action by enemy fire. The early A6Ms only carried 60 rounds of ammo for each cannon and the Navy and Marine pilots were aware that the Wildcat could take a lot of hits from the six o clock position from the rifle caliber Mgs and still keep flying with a functioning pilot.

As for those who would discount Lundstrom's assertion that the US Navy pilots were trained more thoroughly in gunnery than any other air force's pilots, I would certainly like to see some references noted which show that the pilots of the other air forces were as extensively trained in deflection shooting as those trained by the USN. It is difficult for me to believe that a historian like Lundstrom would make those statements without having studied the training of the other air forces.

 

[pbfoot]

Ok I'll bite what experience did this Lundstrom guy have working with other militaries that helped him make his blanket statement .

 

[RCAFson]

The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by).

Actual distances (from Google Earth)
Rabual to Guadalcanal = 564 nm x 2 = 1128nm
Kupang, Timor to Darwin = 444nm = 888nm
Palau Jako, Timor to Darwin = 326nm = 652nm!

So the mission distance for the longest possible mission from Timor to Darwin is still 250nm less than Rabual to Guadalcanal, while the minimum distance is 476nm less.

 

[RCAFson]

I don't OTOH know of any evidence indicating the contrary, besides a single anecdote of mock combat between F4F and Hurricane that comes up time to time. Also I believe someone here tried to argue relative Martlet/Sea Hurricane results in 'Pedestal', proved something in Hurricane's favor but I don't see that that they do, either way.

WW2-era USN aircraft vs. the Luftwaffe - how would they fare? - Tanknet

Joe

Eric Brown flew Sea Hurricanes and Wildcats:

F4F-4 Wildcat Versus Sea Hurricane lIC
Here were two fighters almost evenly matched in combat perform-
ance and firepower, with the British fighter holding the edge. The
Hurricane could exploit its superior rate of roll, the Wildcat its steeper
angle of climb. In a dogfight the Hurricane could outturn the Wild-
cat, and it could evade an astern attack by half rolling and using its
superior acceleration in a dive.
Verdict: This is a combat I have fought a few times in mock
trials. The Hurricane could usually get in more camera gunshots than
the Wildcat, but for neither was this an easy job. The Hurricane
would probably have been more vulnerable to gun strikes than the
Wildcat.
Duels in the Sky, p.210

Brown states that the Wildcat was similar in performance to the Hurricane IIc, but we know now that this was simply not true and the Sea Hurricane had completely superior performance, even without using WEP.

The Martlet performed poorly compared to the Sea Hurricane I during Pedestal, just as the stats suggested that it would.

In nearly identical tactical situations, Hurricanes over Ceylon on April 09 1942 performed much better than the F2A/F4Fs defending Midway in June 1942, despite the much less favourable numbers for the Hurricanes.

When we find similar tactical situations, not surprisingly, the aircraft with superior performance has a better combat record.

 

[renrich]

Pb, he is a highly respected historian and his books are exhaustively researched. For instance, if you go on the Battle of Midway Roundtable online you will see he is well represented there. If I am not mistaken, one of the members of this forum, who is very well informed is acquainted with Lundstrom, perhaps personally. If an author like Lundstrom publishes something where he makes statements like I have quoted him on in no uncertain terms, then he will lose all credibility. It seems incredible to me that he had not researched the training of all air forces before making statements like he made in the appendix of his book. I hope that if someone on this forum can furnish evidence that contradicts Lundstrom, he will furnish it, so I can become more informed. I will say that if someone scoffs at Lundstrom and his credibility and has never even read his books, then I question that person's objectivity. I have been around a long time, have read countless books about warfare and especially WW2 and own many of those books and I have never read any books other than Shores' "Bloody Shambles" that come close to being as credible as Lundstrom's and that includes Samuel Elliot Morrison and John Keegan. I own many of their books.

 

[renrich]

Hmmmm, Brown on combat between Wildcat V 109F; "The Wildcat, although faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, was still some 60 mph slower than the German fighter. The lower the altitude the less the odds favored the 109F. The Wildcat also had a heavier punch to deliver." Page 66, "Duels in the Sky". Brown's work is highly suspect although his credentials seem impeccable. I don't believe that he ever let being objective stand in the way of his bias.

 

[pbfoot]

Pb, he is a highly respected historian and his books are exhaustively researched. For instance, if you go on the Battle of Midway Roundtable online you will see he is well represented there. If I am not mistaken, one of the members of this forum, who is very well informed is acquainted with Lundstrom, perhaps personally. If an author like Lundstrom publishes something where he makes statements like I have quoted him on in no uncertain terms, then he will lose all credibility. It seems incredible to me that he had not researched the training of all air forces before making statements like he made in the appendix of his book. I hope that if someone on this forum can furnish evidence that contradicts Lundstrom, he will furnish it, so I can become more informed. I will say that if someone scoffs at Lundstrom and his credibility and has never even read his books, then I question that person's objectivity. I have been around a long time, have read countless books about warfare and especially WW2 and own many of those books and I have never read any books other than Shores' "Bloody Shambles" that come close to being as credible as Lundstrom's and that includes Samuel Elliot Morrison and John Keegan. I own many of their books.

I ain't no spring chicken and have been into aviation since the late 50's , now I've never heard of Lundstom and the local libraries do not have his books and I have no intention of making the purchase since I am not really interested in the PTO. I'm sure his research is well done but the last guy that was perfect could walk on water.

 

[RCAFson]

As for those who would discount Lundstrom's assertion that the US Navy pilots were trained more thoroughly in gunnery than any other air force's pilots,

I would suggest that the average USN fighter pilot in 42/43 would have had more total time and more time on type, which would certainly be an advantage, even if the training regimen is similar to the RCAF/RAF. The USN simply had more time to prepare for war (from 39-42), while not suffering a high attrition rate. Additionally, the USN carrier fleet actually contracted from 1942 to mid 1943, but without corresponding high pilot losses, therefore there was no need to dilute front-line squadrons with low time on type pilots.

 

[RCAFson]

Hmmmm, Brown on combat between Wildcat V 109F; "The Wildcat, although faster and more maneuverable than the Sea Hurricane, was still some 60 mph slower than the German fighter. The lower the altitude the less the odds favored the 109F. The Wildcat also had a heavier punch to deliver." Page 66, "Duels in the Sky". Brown's work is highly suspect although his credentials seem impeccable. I don't believe that he ever let being objective stand in the way of his bias.

Exactly, he was highly biased in favour of the aircraft in which he scored his combat kills, namely the Martlet. Yet, even Eric Brown had to admit that the Sea Hurricane IIC (the heaviest Sea Hurricane variant) was better in a dogfight than the F4F-4.

 

[R Leonard]

As for those who would discount Lundstrom's assertion that the US Navy pilots were trained more thoroughly in gunnery than any other air force's pilots, I would certainly like to see some references noted which show that the pilots of the other air forces were as extensively trained in deflection shooting as those trained by the USN. It is difficult for me to believe that a historian like Lundstrom would make those statements without having studied the training of the other air forces.

Or the flip side . . .

As found in FM 1-15, Army Air Force Field Manual – Tactics and Technique of Air Fighting – April 19, 1942

SECTION III
COMBAT TACTICS

80. GENERAL. - a. In the performance of its defensive mission in antiaircraft security, pursuit aviation in all circumstances adopts the most strenuous tactical offensive. Combat tactics are based on the infliction of the maximum casualty effect upon the enemy forces with minimum losses to its own forces.
b. In the direct defense of other aviation forces, pursuit provides security by escort. Combat tactics are based on providing the freedom of action required by the escorted force in the execution of its mission.

81. PHASES OF COMBAT. - a. Approach to combat. - The approach to combat has a greater influence on the result of the combat than any other phase of operations. Surprise affords a tremendous advantage. Approach to attack from the most vulnerable or blind sector of the hostile formation confuses the enemy as to the proper counteraction to be taken. Fighter pilots must be thoroughly familiar with the military characteristics and most vulnerable sectors of enemy aircraft and formations. When the enemy is sighted, the attack or the maneuver for attack position should be initiated without delay.
b. The combat. - The combat must be carried out with speed and determination. The first blow is very important. Sustained fire beginning at ranges where effective fire or hits may be reasonably scored and continued through to close ranges is most effective. Every effort is made to maintain the organization of the force and prevent the development of the engagement into a melee of individual combats.
c. Exploitation or withdrawal. - Determined effort is made to take advantage of any confusion and dispersion of the enemy force which may result from the initial assault. If the assault has been indecisive or unfavorable, a withdrawal is effected in such manner as to minimize losses while regaining the tactical advantage.

SECTION IV
INDIVIDUAL OFFENSIVE TACTICS

82. GENERAL. - Thorough training of the pilot in the fundamentals of individual combat tactics is of vital importance. The pilot must be prepared to conduct individual air fighting missions under one or more of the following situations:
a. In pursuit versus pursuit action when the forces become temporarily disorganized and out of tactical control.
b. When tactical unity of a formation has been disrupted through adverse weather or visibility conditions.
c. As a result of dispersion caused by surprise attacks or an attack by overwhelming numbers.
d. When separated from his formation and a target of opportunity presents itself.
e. In night pursuit operations.

83. FUNDAMENTALS OF COMBAT.-All successful pursuit combat is performed by the application of four fundamentals -
a. Surprise.-Strike the enemy first-
(1) By taking advantage of the sun's rays, clouds, and visibility conditions.
(2) By approaching the enemy's most vulnerable quarter.
(3) By taking advantage of enemy preoccupation.
b. Offensive.-The pursuit pilot must attack with energy and determination, pushing the attack until either the enemy is destroyed or his own ammunition exhausted. Should he be placed on the defensive, he must by his own skill strive to regain the offensive as soon as possible.
c. Concentration of fire.-Fire of all guns is directed at the most vulnerable parts of the airplane, that is, personnel, fuel tanks, controls, or other vital parts. In most airplanes these are all contained in a relatively small portion of the fuselage and may be protected by defensive armament. To deliver destructive fire on this target demands extreme accuracy. Successful attacks require concentration of fire at effective ranges.
d. Security.-For adequate security, compatible with his mission for himself and his equipment, the pursuit pilot must-
(1) Be always on the alert, watching especially the upper rear hemisphere. Observation of the air for enemy aircraft must be rapid, systematic, and thorough, always covering first the more dangerous regions above followed by the regions below.
(2) Never needlessly sacrifice the advantage of superior altitude in an attack.
(3) Never fly straight at any enemy when within effective range of his guns except when actually firing.
(4) Follow through in an attack beyond effective range of hostile defensive fire.
(5) Never lose sight of the opponent.

84. ATTACK ON A SINGLE-SEATER.- a. The best position from which to attack a single-seater airplane is from above and to the rear of the target. In this position the attacker has the advantage of speed and power of maneuver gained from superior altitude.
b. In the execution of a surprise attack, care must be exercised to avoid overrunning the opponent, as this will result in placing him in a favorable position to fire on the attacker or to escape by quickly turning before the attack can be resumed.

85. ATTACK ON A TWO-SEATER.- It is more difficult to gain surprise for attack on a two-seater than on a single-seater airplane. The best position for launching the attack will be dependent upon the blind angles of the two-seater, though the most vulnerable sector usually is found by approaching from the rear and below. Forcing the two-seater to execute rapid maneuvers to avoid the attacker's fire will greatly reduce the accuracy of defensive fire power of the rear seat gunner.

86. ATTACK ON A MULTISEATER.-An attack on a multiseater by a single pursuit airplane will be hazardous if all possible approaches to it are effectively covered by defensive machinegun fire. A determined following attack may be made from the rear at the same level or slightly below the target. The rear gunner in the multiseater is the initial target. Concentrated fire at close ranges may be necessary to destroy multiseater aircraft. Withdrawal from such attack should be made in a manner to avoid the defensive fire of the hostile aircraft, preferably to the rear.

Pretty straight forward, fly up their fannies let 'em have it.

Rich

 

[R Leonard]

comments from various posts from long ago

Certainly there were three FLEET carriers in commission in the month December 1942 (and if you want to count the last day of the month, there were actually FOUR fleet carriers in commission), but, generically, there were far more available than just the three carriers you mention:

In the last week of December 1942 –
Format: Squadron | rated fighter pilot complement | assigned carrier/station | other status

At sea -
VF-6 | 46 | USS Saratoga | aboard
VF-10 | 32 | USS Enterprise | aboard
VF-72 | 24 | USS Nassau | aboard
VGF-26 | 24 | USS Sangamon | aboard
VGF-27 | 24 | USS Suwannee | aboard
VGF-28 | 24 | USS Chenango | aboard
VGF-29 | 24 | USS Santee | aboard
VGS-9 | 24 | USS Bogue | aboard
VGS-11 | 18 | USS Altamaha | aboard
VGS-30 | 10 | USS Charger | aboard

Golly, every time I look at the returns I manage to squeeze out a few more . . . now, as of 31 December 1942, at least 250 slots for fighter pilots on carriers at sea presuming typical aircraft complement based on squadron type.

Further, at the end of December 1942, as shown above, only two fleet carriers were at sea and one of those, Enterprise, without its full fighter complement. The other two, Ranger and Essex, were in port, see below. Standard USN practice, unto today, is to move squadrons, fighter and otherwise, ashore when the carriers to which they are assigned are in port. This practice allows for continued flight operations for training and proficiency; thus:

VF-10 (det) | 14 | USS Enterprise | operating from ashore, Espiritu Santo
VGS-13 | 18 | USS Core | operating from ashore, NAS Seattle
VGS-20 | 18 | USS Barnes | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VGS-21 | 18 | USS Block Island | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VGS-23 | 18 | USS Breton | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VGS-25 | 18 | USS Croatan | operating from ashore, NAS Alameda
VF-41 | 46 | USS Ranger | operating from ashore, NAS Norfolk
VF-9 | 46 | USS Essex (commissioned 31 Dec 42) | NAS Norfolk

One presumes from the presented "shooter" qualifier that the not inconsiderable percentage of aviators assigned to VF-41 and Essex's VF-9 and who had flown combat off USS Ranger in the invasion of North Africa were no longer qualified to be known as fighter pilots because their ships were tied up at Norfolk NOB, right? Were the pilots of VF-10 (det), ashore at Espiritu Santo in that last week of December 1942 and therefore extremely unlikely to be engaged in combat - indeed they did not during this period - also not fighter pilots either because they were not actually aboard Enterprise? Enterprise was not particularly in harms way at the time, were the people who fly the fighter planes and aboard the ship to be counted in some other category, but not as fighter pilots?

Still, other fighter squadrons were ashore, awaiting their turn at bat, or their next turn, as the case might be. Note the first on the list, VF-3, in those days commanded by Lieut Comdr Edward "Butch" O'Hare, who, by your measure, was then something other than a fighter pilot. The next on the list, VF-11, had not a few pilots who had flown combat at Coral Sea or Midway, and at least one at both, but I guess, by your definition, they can't be fighter pilots filling slots in fighter squadrons either, right? And I suppose the same would apply to those combat worn pilots of VF-71 on their way back stateside from their tours at sea on USS Wasp and ashore from Guadalcanal, right? None of these gents would be qualified as fighter pilots under your circa 2001 "shooters" definition.

VF-3 | 35 | NAS Kaneohe
VF-11 | 46 | NAS Maui
VF-12 | 46 | NAS San Diego
VF-16 | 46 | to USS Lexington | organizing work-up, NAS Quonset Point
VF-17 | 46 | to USS Bunker Hill | organizing work-up, NAS Norfolk
VF-22 | 28 | to USS Independence | organizing work-up, NAS Norfolk
VF-23 | 28 | to USS Princeton | organizing work-up, NAS Willow Grove
VF-24 | 28 | to USS Belleau Wood | organizing work-up, NAS Norfolk
VF-71 | 32 | Enroute NAS San Diego
VGS-1 | 18 | NAS San Diego
VGS-12 | 18 | NAS San Diego
VGS-16 | 18 | NAS Pearl Harbor
VGS-18 | 18 | NAS Seattle
VGF-39 | 18 | NAS Norfolk
VGS-30 | 18 | NAS Norfolk

The wiggle from fighter slots to "shooters" is duly noted, but the discussion started, however, , with an accounting of USN fighter pilot slots, not the contemporary parlance of "shooters." When discussing events of 70 years ago I try to avoid the alfa, bravo, charlie, delta, echo, etc of more recent times and stick to the able, baker, cast, dog, easy, etc of the period in question as it tends to keep the terminology straight. In discussions with more than just a handful of USN fighter pilots (and other communities as well) from those war years the term "driver" was occasionally heard; mostly, though, the descriptive word heard was the simple "pilot," or, from sticklers for the proper word, "aviator." Your "shooter" on the other hand is a true anachronism in terminology, nomenclature, and usage; it seems a little odd to insert the term at this point as some sort of qualifier.

If you want to claim a lack of clarity, okay, fine, but clarity certainly would have precluded a lot of discussion. Consider for example, this statement:

"At the start of the war, the Navy had seven front line carriers, on each of these approx. 30 aircraft were fighters (in reality it would be less early on) so that makes 210 fighter pilot slots available"

This seems to me to be very clear, unambiguous, and devoid of qualifiers. This statement, as pointed out in an earlier response, was not exactly the case, and thus fostered the rest of the discussion. I would hate to think I need spend future evenings in remedial English.

So then, does your new definition mean that a pilot at the tip of your spear who is not scheduled to fly and does not fly on a given day is not a fighter pilot for that day?

What shall we do with the customary usage for Task Groups and Task Forces with more than one carrier, rotating "the duty" between carriers from day to day? Does your definition mean that on the "down" day the fighter pilots of the "down" carrier are not fighter pilots if not scheduled for operations?

Were the pilots assigned to fly fighter aircraft residing aboard a carrier passing through the Panama Canal not fighter pilots because they were not operating during the passage?

Since carriers usually started at Point A and proceeded across miles and miles of ocean, more often than not without an enemy in sight, to do their business at Point B, were the people who fly the fighter planes and aboard the ship not fighter pilots until arrival at Point B? Were they in some other status up to that point? What would that be? And if not fighter pilots while ashore at Point A pre-deployment, when does their status change?

Does such parsing mean that, say, picking someone not necessarily at random, George W Anderson, Jr., CNO from 1 August 1961 to 1 August1963, who received his wings in October 1931, served in VOS-1 thereafter, then in Flight Test, then VF-2, then pre-comm crew USS Yorktown (CV-5), then VP-44; and during the war served successively on BuAer staff, Plans Division; USS Yorktown (CV-10), Navigation Officer; ComAirPac staff, Plans; CinCPac/POA staff, Asst to Deputy Commander; and CominCh staff, Strategic Plans could not be called a Naval Aviator because he held no flying billet during the war?

To what excruciating semantic extremes shall we go in order to fit this arbitrary "shooters" mold?

References to USAAF bases and pilots are noted, though I fail to see where their mention is cogent to the original statements regarding USN fighter squadron complements. The USAAF expansion was more than an order of magnitude greater than USN expansion. From the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1945 the NATC produced 65,478 designated naval aviators; this includes USN, USMC, USCG, and some non-US types. The USAAF training command produced 768,009 pilots in the same period. 1944 was the biggest year for both; NATC with 21,067 compared to the USAAF turnout of 299,405. Any comparison is something of a non-sequitur.

As to the contention that the average USN fighter pilot was better prepared than the average USAAF fighter pilot, with the exception of carrier operations qualifications, I have seen no empirical data which would either lend support to or prove false the theory.

What I find odd is that I see is an attempt to arbitrarily establish a label, or, more accurately, deny a label, based on some personal preference rather than the historical context. Okay for you, but the premise does not even come close to working for me.

 

[renrich]

The F4F4 was the worst performing Wildcat. The FM2 finally regained the performance of the early F4F3s, but with protected tanks and armor. In Brown's description of a dogfight beween himself and a Wildcat, we don't know who was in the Wildcat. I suggest that the Sea Hurricane and Wildcat were close enough in performance that pilot skill would have a lot to do with the outcome. If Brown had been flying his Hurricane against O Hare, Foss, Thach, or some others I doubt he would have had much success. An example of pilot skill with combat experiece is as follows: Boone Guyton, Vought chief test pilot of the Corsair, former Navy dive bomber pilot and with more hours in the Corsair than anyone in the world at that time, took on Ken Walsh, Marine ace in the Corsair, in a mock dogfight. Guyton was in a brand new F4U with a 60 gallon water tank for WEP. Walsh was in his "personal" brand new F3A with the standard water tank of 10.3 gallons. Walsh "shot" him down three times. Guyton also flew gunnery runs on a sleeve with Joe Foss and Guyton had little or no success while Foss riddled the sleeve.

Lundstrom's assertion was that USN pilots were trained extensively in full deflection gunnery skills where as other air force's pilots were not with the partial exception of the IJN. He seemed to believe that this training helped the USN trained pilots to become overall better gunners even though most kills were low deflection shots. I believe he felt that the experience in full deflection shooting helped the Navy pilots when they were on the defense also.

 

[RCAFson]

Walsh was in his "personal" brand new F3A with the standard water tank of 10.3 gallons.

F3A?

 

[R Leonard]

F3A?

Under license, Brewster built F4U Corsair. Goodyear built under license, too, the FG-1. All looked pretty much the same to the casual observer.

 

[Rivet]

I'm in agreement with Jerry's statement that the P-39 might have been the alternate mount for the AVG had not the British Lend-Lease P-40's not been readily available.

The Republic P-43 Lancer was flown from AVG fields and is mentioned in "God is My Co-Pilot" as being flown by Americans.

Here's a thought. Shipment and usage by the AVG of the Chance-Vought F4U-1 for service evaluation early in the game.

Regards

 

[Shortround6]

Here's a thought. Shipment and usage by the AVG of the Chance-Vought F4U-1 for service evaluation early in the game.

First 2 production F4U-1s are delivered from factory almost year after the AVG P-40s are unloaded in Rangoon.

 

[Rivet]

On 1 October,1940 the XF4U-1 became the first single-engine U.S. fighter to fly faster than 400 mph by setting an average ground speed of 405 miles per hour during a flight from Stratford to Hartford, Connecticutt. On December 2, 1940 sixteen preproduction examples of the F4U-1 are in various stages of assembly and are used to size the production line. The premise of use of the F4U-1 in early service testing was feasible, though the license production mentioned would and did take more time to bear fruit. Regards

Edit: The major problem in getting the F4U into the hands of the AVG would have been logistical. The aircraft was a Naval project.