Flying Tigers (AVG) and no P-40

[drgondog]

Glider - come back! abandon grief and 'sulk state'. Visualize shooting skeet - but you have to rotate your shotgun (i.e bank the sucker so that 12 O'clock over the shotgun must traverse the path of the bird, swing through it and pull the trigger when you 'feel' the lead is right.

When you shoot an O/U or side by side, the bird is ALWAYS visible because both of your eyes are above the barrels. The barrels traverse either through but parallel to the line of flight with your eyes seeing the clay 100% of the time or find a lead ahead of the bird -and shoot. Either way you see the target above the barrels and the plane of symmetry of the shotgun is vertical.

If you had to rotate your head to the same reference point alignment over the rib, rotate the gun 90 degrees so that the plane of symmetry of the shotgun is the same as the flight path of the clay (horizontal), the entire shotgun would obscure the target as it pulled through the line of flight and in front of the target.

 

[R Leonard]

No, what I said was that there were 159 (117 carrier based and 42 land based) of your "fighter slots" in the South Pacific Theater on 17 December 1942, not in the entire USN as, yes, your original post clearly implied.

In the entire USN on 17 Dec 42, and, again, not counting the training commands, where experienced fighter pilots were in great demand - Jimmie Thach at NAS Jacksonville comes to mind; the CASUs, where there were a plenty of fighters to be driven for one purpose or another; the ACTGs on both the east and west coast; and, really, plenty of other reasons to have fighter drivers around for various purposes; no, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for "fighter slots" and a standardized number of billets in each:

6 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 133 billets
7 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 160 billets
15 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 386 billets
28 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 679 (I found where I missed two in my initial count).

By 7 Dec 1943 the picture was decidedly different, again, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for "fighter slots" and a standardized number of billets in each:

23 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 708 billets.
33 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 786 billets.
28 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 961 billets.
84 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 2455 (and I found where I missed one the first time through here, too).

One of the reasons I stopped my counting in the previous post in November 1943, was to just get to where I could account for the first entry of Essex class carrier in the South Pacific Theater.

One must always remember that not all carriers, and, yes, that even includes Essex class carriers, were in places such as the South Pacific theater on 7 Dec 1943; any more that all squadrons operating from land were safely ensconced away at NAS Olathe, Kansas.

Your results are obviously quite different and I suspect we'll have to leave it at that.

. . . 'fighter slots' was base on the number of fighter aircraft that were 'shooters' where a shooter is an aircraft or pilot combat ready and is deployed in such a manner as combat is probable. I considered all commissioned carriers as having shooter fighter aircraft, they are mobile and can be deployed anywhere. This would also apply to all forward airfields such as Guadalcanal. Fighter squadrons based in Hawaii, for example, even if combat ready, would not be considered shooters.

Am I to conclude from your definition that, say, a fighter pilot who was in on the Lae-Salamaua raid of 10 Mar 42, and went on to score air-to-air credits at Tulagi on 4 May, at Coral Sea on 8 May, and again at Midway on 4 June, by virtue of being assigned to a fighter squadron stationed at NAS Maui, and thus not in combat deployed squadron on 17 Dec 42, was not filling a "fighter slot"? That filling a position in an established fighter organization, does not define a "fighter slot"? Or that a naval aviator of the fighter persuasion might find himself in NAS San Diego as FO in one working up squadron and then a week later find himself as XO of another squadron in action on the other side of the ocean and, yet, was not filling a "fighter slot" in the first, but is filling a "fighter slot" in the second?

If that is how you are defining "fighter slots," then I can only say, my, what a curious point of view. I'd further suggest that your arbitrary definition would have, for, indeed, most of them are now gone so I use the past tense, been the cause of (a) much hilarity, (b) indignation, or (c) heavy sighs of resignation, on the part of the fighter aviation type practitioners of the period.

Also, in Dec, '43, there were 10 carriers operational; three of these were Lexington class. If all 10 carriers had 40 fighter pilots that would be 400 shooter slots. You show four land based squadron which would, if each land base squadron is equal to a CV squadron, bring that to 560 shooter slots available. That's a long way from 2425.

There was only one Lexington class carrier still around in Dec 1943, Saratoga. I presume you mean Essex class. There were 24 carriers operational at sea in the report of 7 Dec 43. Eight were CVs (including 5 Essex class), seven were CVLs, and the balance were CVEs of various stripes.
VF-2; USS Enterprise; aboard
VF-5; USS Yorktown; aboard
VF-9; USS Essex; aboard
VF-16; USS Lexington; aboard
VF-18; USS Bunker Hill; aboard
VF-22; USS Independence; aboard
VF-23; USS Princeton; aboard
VF-24; USS Belleau Wood; aboard
VF-25; USS Cowpens; aboard
VF-30; USS Cabot; aboard
VF-31; USS Chenango; aboard
VF-37; USS Sangamon; aboard
VF-60; USS Suwannee; aboard
VC-33; USS Coral Sea; aboard
VC-41; USS Corregidor; aboard
VF-4; USS Ranger; aboard
VF-8; USS Intrepid; aboard
VF-29; USS Santee; aboard
VF-32; USS Langley; aboard
VF-50; USS Bataan; aboard
VC-6; USS Core; aboard
VC-19; USS Bogue; aboard
VC-55; USS Card; aboard
VF-12, nominally assigned to USS Saratoga, operating from ashore, NAB Tarawa, while Saratoga returned to the west coast.

At the Philippines 100 pilots were coming with the P-40s being delivered, all were right out of pilot training.

Really? All of them? Squadron COs, XOs, OpOs, all their flight leaders? Everyone? Admittedly, I don't read much about the Army Air Corps, for (a) I've no particular interest and (b) I worry about the slanted writing one might encounter when reading a work concentrating on the AAF, but I find the concept of all these 2d LT types running around without any leadership a bit hard to believe. Almost enough to stir my poor bones to check out their manning and cross check with the army register . . . well, maybe not, a lot of effort for not much reason.

I would be willing to bet that there were no right-out-of-pilot-training Navy pilots manning the fighters at the Coral Sea or Midway.

How much do you have?

Four pilots reported to Lexington's VF-2 on 11 April 1942, straight from ACTGPac, Ens William Wileman, Ens John Bain, Ens George Hopper, and AP2c Robert Kanze, just in time to depart for Coral Sea on 15 April. And, yes, they all saw action as fighter pilots at Coral Sea three weeks later.

The least experienced pilots in Yorktown's VF-42 (the squadron on which I have the most information on file) at Coral Sea were Ens Harry Gibbs, Ens John Baker, and Ens John Adams, all of whom had joined the squadron on 6 December 1941 upon completion of training. On the eve of the Coral Sea action Gibbs had but 274.4 total hours, including all training hours; Baker, 340.3; and Adams, 396.0. Those compared to the ensign with the most flight hours, Leslie Knox, who had been in the squadron since 14 March 1941 with 811.6. All saw action at Coral Sea; Baker and Knox went MIA on 7 May 42 and declared killed in action on 8 May 1943.

Joining VF-3 on 20 May 1942, straight from ACTGPac and just in time for the 28 May Midway deployment aboard Yorktown, were Ensigns Horace Bass, Mark Bright, Harold Eppler, Robert Evans, Van Morris, Daniel Sheedy, and Milton Tootle. Evans, Morris, and Eppler did not fly in the battle, but, I suppose could be considered to be occupying "fighter slots".

Regards

Rich

 

[Glider]

Glider - come back! abandon grief and 'sulk state'. .

 

[R Leonard]

Naval Aviation Combat Statistics does, indeed, report 116 enemy aircraft shot down by "somebody" in an SBD. A closer examination of the record done by Frank Olynky (historian for the American Fighter Aces Association) in his USN Credits for the Destruction Of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat World War 2 comes up with 95.5 shoot down credits, 13 probables and 17 damaged, as is usually written, 95.5/13/17. Of these, 41.5/5/13 were credits which went to rear gunners and 54/8/4 went to pilots. This does not include any credits which could have been awarded to Marine Corps pilots and rear gunners, though Frank has a tome on the subject of Marine Corps credits, I don't have a copy.

The Marines had SBD squadrons in action right up until the end of July 1945. I suppose one could work some magic with the NACS data on monthly sorties per operating area and then go back to the aircraft location reports and determine which squadrons were flying where. On the other hand, and much easier on the eyes, I'd recommend Barrett Tillman's The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War Two, Robert Sherrod's History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II and some quick runs over to

75 Years of Marine Corps Aviation

and

http://www.usmc.mil/news/publicatio...ation of the Philippines PCN 19000314300.pdf

and maybe

VMSB-243 Flying Goldbricks

 

[renrich]

Bill, mighty fine explanation regarding deflection shooting as regards wing shooting ( or clay targets). I was thinking of trying to use wing shooting as an example and kept remembering a method described in an "American Rifleman". It was a Britisher who called his method: " Butt, belly, beak, bang" I had a smile on my face thinking about using that method on a fence line, September 1st in Texas with doves, since the distance between the butt and beak on a dove is so small. It really gets small when the dove is doing forty mph with a tail wind. What you so aptly described with a shotgun is at odds with what I think many on this forum believe is deflection shooting in a fighter. I remember seeing on the Military Channel ( or maybe the History Channel) an example of deflection shooting, supposedly a real event where it showed a Hellcat, wings level, with a Zeke crossing in front at exactly 90 degrees. The Hellcats nose was pointed slightly in front and the Zeke was clearly visible. The Hellcat pilot triggered his guns and the Zeke ran into the bullet stream and blew up. Deflection shooting? Baloney! Something like that can happen just like a dove hunter can stick his barrel in front of a flying bird, pull the trigger and sometimes get lucky. I would not count on getting a limit that way, though. It is a dynamic situation with distance and angles continully changing and the gun needs to be swinging all the time. Actually, at least one of the pilots on the flight deck of Yorktown at Midway during the Japanese attack was practising his deflection shooting with a 45 automatic. Wonder if he hit anything?

I am not going to get into transcribing Lundstrom again but he clearly outlines the experience level of the Fighting Squadrons at Coral Sea and Midway and, of course, Rich has it right. In fact, I believe that in Thach's uneven fight with the Zeros at Midway, his wingman, Dibb, was a rookie and was in his first combat. He did well!

 

[parsifal]

Very intersting discussion guys. One thing I would point out is that the discussion on the relative success of the navy air arm v the AAF versus the AVG versus the Commonwealth air forces is failing to consider in a glaringly obvious fashion, even from such highly knowledgable people as yourselves. You all seem to be looking at just one side of the equation. In fact there are innumerable variables other than deflection shooting training that could go into explaining a lop sided combat result. Most importantly, there seems to be this assumption that the Japanese were uniformly consistent enemy. Wrong. There were any number of variables here, including the experience level of the formations and individuals, the quality of their equipment (something alluded to by Joe B), the extent to which they had rested and the degree they were outnumbered. Then there are other variables such as the geographic location, the weather conditions and so on and so on.

Judging by what I have seen so far, i think it highly questionable to state categorically that USN training in defelection shooting was a major, or even any sort of factor in determining kill ratios. There are so many other variables at work here as to make such conclusions highly questionable.

Comparing a naval battle outcome , that invariably in 1942 saw numbers evenly matched, with fully rested crews, sometimes with crucially important intell advantages to affect the outcome, to a grinding, months long campaign being undertaken at arms length from each other, in which the fatigue of the pilots, the wer and tear of the aircraft, the target distance, the lack of intelligence wre all additional factors not even being mentioned here

 

[renrich]

The IJN pilots of bombers, recon planes and fighters at Coral Sea and Midway were mostly pretty experienced and highly trained. The USN pilots on a number of occasions used their proficiency at deflection shooting to achieve victories with minimal risk to the precious USN pilots and their airplanes. A study of Thach's fight against overwhelming odds at Midway illustrates how his knowledge of deflection shooting helped he and his two wingmen to survive and shoot down several Zekes.

 

[parsifal]

doesnt translate into anything of importance. At least not before Midway, when i grant you, something Strategic could be argued, though I still think it a major stretch to say that this strategic shift was due to the USNs ability to shoot sideways.

At Coral Sea, the Japanese lost about 88 aircraft to 60 USN aircraft. I dont have the figures on me right now (coffee break at work....), but Ill bet a greater proportion of Japanese aircraft were lost on the ground, in comparison to the Americans. My hypothesis here is based on the fact that the japanese Shokaku and Shoho were both divebombed, which had the effect of knocking the flight deck out more or less immediately (and thereby trapping the planes on that deck), whereas the lethal damage to Lexington was done by torpedoes, and continued to operate for some time, despite the fatal hits. This gave the Americans time to offload some of the aircraft on the lex before she succumbed. I would be very surprised if the Americans could claim a 1:1 exchange ratio or even that the efforts of her fighters were of decisive importance in the outcome of the battle. They were a factor, a significant factor even, but I am doubtful they were a critically important factor.

Lastly, even though the CAGs of CarDiv5 were experienced, they were far from the most experienced, as their role at Pearl demonstrates. Shohos CAG was probably less well trained than either of the USN carriers. And lastly, during the battle, the USN fighters were operating defensively, whereas the Japanese were on the attack. These situations invariably confer major advantages to the defender, so the comparison is skewed by any number of factors, many of which I have not even mentioned.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... though I still think it a major stretch to say that this strategic shift was due to the USNs ability to shoot sideways. "

Interesting how this thread has evolved. Very informative.

For what it's worth, Parsifal, the unspoken question in this whole deflection shooting thingy is this: "does being proficient in 'shooting sideways' bestow competitive advantage on a dog-fighter?". The answer is for the most part "yes". Buzz Beurling the Canadian Malta spitfire ace was a skilled bird hunter. So was Chuck Yeager (grub in the pot dirt poor Arkansas). Stanford Tuck in his pre-RAF days was a merchant seaman who amused skippers by "offing" sharks (that's deflection shooting through water).

You get my point ... and I'm sure each-of-you has examples of great marksman-hunters who were successful fighter pilots.

By 1939 the USN had learned a great deal about naval (peacetime) operations. They did a great job training. The proof is in the results at Midway. And it wasn't just the pilots. It was overall naval aviation ops.

Hunters make great fighter pilots. So do sportsmen -- especially hockey players. .

MM

 

[drgondog]

Bill, mighty fine explanation regarding deflection shooting as regards wing shooting ( or clay targets). I was thinking of trying to use wing shooting as an example and kept remembering a method described in an "American Rifleman". It was a Britisher who called his method: " Butt, belly, beak, bang" I had a smile on my face thinking about using that method on a fence line, September 1st in Texas with doves, since the distance between the butt and beak on a dove is so small. It really gets small when the dove is doing forty mph with a tail wind. What you so aptly described with a shotgun is at odds with what I think many on this forum believe is deflection shooting in a fighter.

I have to say without a lot of bragging that I am a pretty good shot with a shotgun. I was second alternate (Poston was 1st) to Satterwhite and Bauer at 76 Olympics in International Skeet. Neither of us made Montreal but I am a NRA Lifetime Expert at International Skeet and Trap. Having said this, 1976 was my last registered clay target competition as I became enamored with Flyers - both Hand Thrown and Box birds and have shot pigeons in Argentina, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Monaco (before it was banned in Italy and Monaco), Texas, California, Georgia, Indiana, and Pennsylvania. When there is big money all the top clay target shooters go to the game. I don't claim to be 'top' but I am pretty good.

IMHO the Brit was dead on (Harry Lawrence from Purdey's?). I simplify it to 'see the bird, shoot the bird' as a 'swing through shooter'. The American Skeet champions see the bird, swing along in front until they see a specific lead and pull the trigger - it is described as 'sustained lead'. This is a close analogy to a fighter pulling through an opponent, getting the nose out in front and hosing him down - ala Gunther Rall or Hans Marseille.

Anything that moves fast (like a west Texas dove in a 30 kt tail wind) requires a fast move through the bird and at some point your computing gunsight brain tells you that you have the barrel moving through the flight path, see a necessary 'gap' - an pull the trigger. Ditto a hand launched pigeon suddenly at 50 mph and NOT flying in a straight line. You have zero time to do the 'sustained lead' thingy. I teach those that care to listen that you focus on the 'beak' (what I mean by 'see the bird') and that it will tell you the line, and what you have to do is follow the 'line as you bring your shorgun into your face and shoulder - and bang - the shot actually takes place shortly therafter as you swing through.

With a Flyer you have to see both the beak and the angle of the wing of a quartering away bird - that will tell you about additional deflection. My father was a good shot, but I was actually a better one.

 

[renrich]

mm, add another good wing shooter who may have been the best fighter pilot in US service in WW2. Joe Foss reportedly had a lot of experience growing up as a bird hunter. He had, I think, 26 kills, all in the F4F4 in the Solomons. At that time the IJN still had many of those highly experienced, elite pilots from the beginning of the war. The Wildcat he flew was inferior in performance to the Zeke, although more rugged and better armed. The conditions Joe and his fellow pilots and the ground personnel fought in were rugged, as far as food, clothing and shelter were concerned and maintenance of the airplanes must have been a nightmare. I feel sure that Foss was a good deflection shooter.

Bill, I used to have the knack for wing shooting but as my depth perception has gone away, my wing shooting ability has declined. But, when I walk here in Arizona I often flush covies of quail and in my imagination I swing my Browning Double Automatic with the skeet barrel, pull lead and bang. I am still getting some hits but quail are an easier shot than doves. The human brain coupled to the eyes are marvelous things.

 

[drgondog]

Ren - I often tell my students that everything is about the gun mount, the swing through the trailing wake and the beak - it is all about not defeating the best analogue fire control system on this earth.. head and neck relaxed, bring the stock to the cheek, eyes level, eyes focused on the beak..

 

[Nikademus]

doesnt translate into anything of importance. At least not before Midway, when i grant you, something Strategic could be argued, though I still think it a major stretch to say that this strategic shift was due to the USNs ability to shoot sideways.

At Coral Sea, the Japanese lost about 88 aircraft to 60 USN aircraft. I dont have the figures on me right now (coffee break at work....), but Ill bet a greater proportion of Japanese aircraft were lost on the ground, in comparison to the Americans. My hypothesis here is based on the fact that the japanese Shokaku and Shoho were both divebombed, which had the effect of knocking the flight deck out more or less immediately (and thereby trapping the planes on that deck), whereas the lethal damage to Lexington was done by torpedoes, and continued to operate for some time, despite the fatal hits. This gave the Americans time to offload some of the aircraft on the lex before she succumbed. I would be very surprised if the Americans could claim a 1:1 exchange ratio or even that the efforts of her fighters were of decisive importance in the outcome of the battle. They were a factor, a significant factor even, but I am doubtful they were a critically important factor.

Lastly, even though the CAGs of CarDiv5 were experienced, they were far from the most experienced, as their role at Pearl demonstrates. Shohos CAG was probably less well trained than either of the USN carriers. And lastly, during the battle, the USN fighters were operating defensively, whereas the Japanese were on the attack. These situations invariably confer major advantages to the defender, so the comparison is skewed by any number of factors, many of which I have not even mentioned.

The fighter vs. fighter exchange ratio at Coral Sea was 2:1 in favor of the Japanese. Looking beyond the stats, The Shoho fighter groups performance was lackluster. Part of this was due to most of their numbers flying A5M but primarily it was that they were heavily outnumbered. The first "Zero" kill by an F4F was an ambush from above and behind on one that never saw his attacker and was flying low having recently scrambled. The F4F performance during the attack on Shokaku was more impressive and was a rare situation of good escort by the F4F's (protecting the bombers on offensive missions was not a high point for the F4F VF's in 42.....a fact not displayed by the raw stats)

The Japanese VF performance was most impressive over Lex and York. In addition to not losing any of their numbers and shooting down several F4F's...they protected their charges to the best of their abilities and generally put the defenders on their back heels...forcing one entire CAP section into a defensive Luffberry circle. They also bagged five SBD's flying on "torpedo defense CAP"...a bloody result which was largely responsible for the USN ultimately abandoning that tactic in favor of putting more genuine fighters on their carriers, leaving SBD's to bomber and scout duties.

Midway saw the stat war go in favor of the US VF...mainly due to Thach's incredible effort....however it should be noted that this was borne by the fighters being entirely on the defensive, with no impact on the US bombers that they were supposed to escort. It was also indicated from my readings that Thach and his mates benefited from the defending fighters being out of cannon ammo. Japanese VF performance overall at Midway was impressive. They shot down over 40+ enemy bombers....and again on escort duty, despite being outnumbered, they gave better than they received during the torpedo run that ultimately led to Yorktown's demise, most importantly they tied up defending fighters. (not all of course....too many defenders....but enough)

 

[pbfoot]

Been following this and adding the odd chirp about US Naval training and RAF (RCAF) training of the same period. I have done a little basic research of those that expierienced both systems as I feel these genntlemen are the ones most qualified to comment
Holley Hills 1st ever P51 (414 Sqn RCAF) kill over Dieppe and 4 Japanese aircraft in Marianias Turkey shoot (must be only guy to fight in largest air battle ETO and PTO ) no comment on difference
Chalmers (Slick) Goodlin RCAF USN same guy who flew X1 stated There can be no doubt RCAF training particularly in Instrument flying served me well and was second to none
George Suttom flew PBYs with both RCAF and later USN stated there was little difference in training except for the fact SNR USN Offivers held A belief that US training was superior when it was not
There are others (will reaqquire the Names)and the opinions are usually that the RCAF provided an equal if not superior training syllabus particularly and with much empahsis on better Instrument flying however there was no comment by any source on better USN gunnery training

 

[Glider]

Been following this and adding the odd chirp about US Naval training and RAF (RCAF) training of the same period. I have done a little basic research of those that expierienced both systems as I feel these genntlemen are the ones most qualified to comment
Holley Hills 1st ever P51 (414 Sqn RCAF) kill over Dieppe and 4 Japanese aircraft in Marianias Turkey shoot (must be only guy to fight in largest air battle ETO and PTO ) no comment on difference
Chalmers (Slick) Goodlin RCAF USN same guy who flew X1 stated There can be no doubt RCAF training particularly in Instrument flying served me well and was second to none
George Suttom flew PBYs with both RCAF and later USN stated there was little difference in training except for the fact SNR USN Offivers held A belief that US training was superior when it was not
There are others (will reaqquire the Names)and the opinions are usually that the RCAF provided an equal if not superior training syllabus particularly and with much empahsis on better Instrument flying however there was no comment by any source on better USN gunnery training

This ties in with what I have found out with the added proviso that the RAF/RCAF training also put more ephasis on aircraft recognition.

 

[drgondog]

Holley Hills 1st ever P51 (414 Sqn RCAF) kill over Dieppe and 4 Japanese aircraft in Marianias Turkey shoot (must be only guy to fight in largest air battle ETO and PTO ) no comment on difference

What is the estimate of the total number of fighters over Dieppe? And how does that stack up to the fighter forces on either Bodenplatte or November 26, 1944?

 

[renrich]

I suspect that a pilot would always believe his training was at least equal to the training of all other pilots, just as the airplane he flew was at least equal to the other guy's airplane. Hard to get an objective opinion. The only good way to compare training is to get a copy of the training syllabus and then what was the follow up training once a pilot went to an operational unit. A pilot trained in a patrol aircraft would hardly undergo the same gunnery training a fighter pilot would.

 

[pbfoot]

Ren I'm under a little duress and lost the other names i accrued for my little study,but will relocate.
Bill my question for you is how many Allied pilots were sober suring Bodenplatte

 

[buffnut453]

I suspect that a pilot would always believe his training was at least equal to the training of all other pilots, just as the airplane he flew was at least equal to the other guy's airplane. Hard to get an objective opinion. The only good way to compare training is to get a copy of the training syllabus and then what was the follow up training once a pilot went to an operational unit. A pilot trained in a patrol aircraft would hardly undergo the same gunnery training a fighter pilot would.

Which is precisely the point I've been making all along regarding Mr Lundstrom. His statements about the quality of USN air gunnery training are only valid if he has taken the steps you outline and, sadly, there are no indications that such extensive research was undertaken.

 

[drgondog]

Ren I'm under a little duress and lost the other names i accrued for my little study,but will relocate.
Bill my question for you is how many Allied pilots were sober suring Bodenplatte

I confess I have no idea. I would suspect however that while the Battle of the Bulge is only two weeks old that all pilots on the Continent were in a lot better shape than the ones based around London. Having said this, apparently drunk or sober the Allies acquitted themselves well.

Was the number of sober pilots exceeded by the ones in the air over Dieppe?