Force Z with HMS Ark Royal waits for HMS Indomitable

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Admiral Beez said:
I understand, but that's a different ship. We're looking at HMS Repulse.
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Hi
That was put in to show the difference of the two 'sister' ships. From your posts you appeared to be unaware that the Repulse had 3x8 2pdr pom pom guns and 8x20mm. The latter weapon was in short supply, probably why the Renown was not equipped with it in 1941. Certainly there were not large numbers of Oerlikon 20mm in the USA, they introduced it later than the RN so unlikely any trip to the USA in 1941/42 would have added much. The USN was mainly equipped with 1.1 inch (counter part to British 2pdr) and 0.50 mgs, Bofors 40mm came much later. The USN had decided to replace the earlier weapons with Oerlikons and Bofors in late 1940 after assessing the British experience off Norway, but the introduction was relatively slow at first.

Mike
 
EwenS said:
This is a shorter link to Rob Stuart's articles

Colombo strike
Loss of Cornwall and Dorsetshire
Trincomalee attack
Hermes, Vampire etc attack
Ozawa's attack on Bay of Bengal at same time as Operation C

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Right, that's the parent site of Tully's Port. I linked to his profile on the forum because in my experience he is very happy to explain in detail how he came to a given conclusion, as well as defend it in a forum that can be at times quite contrary. He was certainly happy to address what were likely dumb questions from a schlub like me.

He's a gentleman and a smart SoB.
 
For anyone interested in the particulars of the AA capabilities of HMS Repulse here are some scans of the book I bought last month at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, UK.



It's a very interesting book with multiple fold out pages. It's best read under the illuminated magnifier on my hobby table.

The ambiguity about the existence and/or operational status Repulse's Type 286 air search radar is interesting.
 

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Thumpalumpacus said:
The cruiser part of any such battle would be hard-fought, to say the least. The Brits better hope to hit a Type 93 launcher or two.
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What do you think Britain will do at Java Sea, 28 February 1942? The IJN cruisers proved to be deadly... but with two fast CVs and two fast BB/BC the RN can add some muscle to the ABDA force of five cruisers and nine destroyers. Of course nothing occurs in a vacuum, so the IJN will most definitely deploy carriers of their own to the fight.

Unless the DEI can be held, which they can't, I would keep my powder dry and hold Force Z at Ceylon until more RN cruisers and escorts are available. The force as is was too unbalanced.
 

i guess the biggest effect would be that Kido Butai skips the Darwin raid in order to be ready for Zed.

I agree that it needs more escorts and a couple of Countys.
 
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Thumpalumpacus said:
i guess the biggest effect would be that Kido Butai skips the Darwin raid in order to be ready for Zed.

I agree that it needs more escorts and a couple of Countys.
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What do you think of the Didos? They were one of the first concepts of a fleet air defence cruiser, but the 5.25" wasn't well regarded as an AA weapon.

"Unfortunately, the original design of the gunhouse was cramped and the heavy projectile and cartridge cases resulted in a lower rate of fire than expected. In addition, the slow elevating and training speeds of the mounts were found to be inadequate for engaging modern high-speed aircraft."



The later Didos with one less 5.25" and improved dedicated AA guns are better, as described below...

 
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I agree with Drachinifel that the 4.5" would have been a better AA gun for the mission, but much like America's Atlantas, that would have rendered them at best weak in a surface role -- which is why I think the Brits would want to scrape up a couple of Countys for this hypothetical. The 4.5" would still be useful for peppering enemy ships in the superstructure.

Throw in a couple of Tribals to help out in both roles.
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
I think the Brits would want to scrape up a couple of Countys for this hypothetical. Throw in a couple of Tribals to help out in both roles.
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I agree. With this much more significant force at Ceylon I think the US will expect the RN to take a larger part in the fighting at Coral Sea in May, given that the Solomons are British colonies, and PNG is Australian crown territory. I sometimes wonder what the US thought postwar when the British governor returned to Honiara on Guadalcanal after 1,600 U.S. troops were killed, over 4,000 were wounded and several thousand more died from disease retaking the place.

It was one thing for Britain to settle for Operation Ironclad in May 1942, the capture of Madagascar when Sommerville's fleet consisted mainly of the old and slow Revenge class. But with four fast fleets and two fast capital ships, protecting British and Australian territory in Coral Sea might be demanded by USN Admiral King. Assuming Sommerville still gets his older QE and Revenge class ships, these and Formidable can go to Operation Ironclad as per history, whilst Ark Royal, Indomitable, Illustrious (and their Fulmars, Sea Hurricanes, Swordfish and Albacores, yikes), Prince of Wales and Repulse head for Freemantle to rendezvous with Admiral Fletcher and USS Lexington and Yorktown.
 
Admiral Beez said:
I agree. With this much more significant force at Ceylon I think the US will expect the RN to take a larger part in the fighting at Coral Sea in May, given that the Solomons are British colonies, and PNG is Australian crown territory.
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I think such a British presence may have rendered the Japanese push for Moresby risky enough that second-thoughts may have arisen. Or, in a case of Plan B, they could have sailed direct for Western Australia and corrected/covered for an entirely-possible American defeat at Coral Sea?

In either case, it greatly complicates Japanese planning.

It boils down to how this might affect Malta, and therefore North Africa.
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
It boils down to how this might affect Malta, and therefore North Africa.
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I don't think it would make much of a difference. Ironclad will still go ahead, so Madagascar is still neutralized, and Indomitable and Formidable were at Ceylon from Feb 1942 (and Illustrious from May 1942) onwards. Of course POW, Repulse and Ark Royal were all sunk in the autumn 1941, so sending them to Coral Sea in late April 1942 should have no impact. Malta and the MTO might benefit from the addition of HMS Hermes to the Furious, Eagle and Argus force, especially once/if HMS Eagle is sunk. If through greater RN participation in the PTO USS Lexington and Yorktown aren't sunk in May/June 1942 perhaps HMS Victorious can stay in the Atlantic and Med rather than join the USN.
 

My point was that amassing this hypothetical force at Ceylon may well strain deployments elsewhere, especially cruisers and carriers.

As for PoW, Repulse, and AR, if they're ordered to gather at Ceylon in October 41 and do not go to fight the Malay landings, they're available to help Australia if the Japanese defeat Fletcher in May.
 
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Thumpalumpacus said:
As for PoW, Repulse, and AR, if they're ordered to gather at Ceylon in October 41 and do not go to fight the Malay landings, they're available to help Australia if the Japanese defeat Fletcher in May.
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Are they? Does everyone appreciate the importance of the IO? While the IO often seems like a backwater to the war being fought in the Med or the Pacific it actually had a vital role to play especially in 1942/43.

In the immediate aftermath of the loss of Force Z Admiralty policy reverted to what it had been up until cAug 1941 ie a defensive strategy of protecting the IO and its trade routes to Egypt, Persian Gulf, India & Australasia from Japanese incursion. Hence the "fleet in being" emphasis after the loss of Singapore. The importance of the IO to the overall war effort was recognised by the USA. It is not as "sexy" as fighting carrier battles across the broad expanses of the Pacific but vital nevertheless.

Lose control of the IO, the risk was then loss of Egypt due to the inability to reinforce it (check out the WS troop convoys being run on an almost monthly basis in 1942). Then what happens? The Persian Gulf was the home of the Abadan oil refinery which supplied virtually all the oil products to the forces in the ME and India (including the Hump air route to China from April 1942) after the loss of the DEI oilfields and refineries. As time went on the Gulf increased in importance as the means of getting lend lease supplies to Russia (eventually 45% of aid to Russia went by this route).

The Persian Gulf Command and the Lend-Lease Mission to the Soviet Union during World War II - The Army Historical Foundation

By Lieutenant Colonel Danny M. Johnson, AUS-Ret. When the subject of the the U.S. Army and the Persian Gulf comes up, the first thing today’s Americans often think of is […]
armyhistory.org
Keeping Russia in the war is a priority as it soaks up a huge amount of the German war effort that could otherwise be redeployed.

So, in the highly unlikely event that these three ships would have been available in this far fetched scenario, it is far more likely that they would have been retained in the IO, perhaps thereby releasing some of the reinforcements that were en route for the western Med. For example Indomitable to the Med and no need to borrow Wasp in April / May 1942 for ferry runs to Malta with Spitfires.
 
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EwenS said:
Are they? Does everyone appreciate the importance of the IO? While the IO often seems like a backwater to the war being fought in the Med or the Pacific it actually had a vital role to play especially in 1942/43.
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With Sommerville's historical fleet at Ceylon plus Phillip's Force Z we can do both. Send a carrier and perhaps POW to Coral Sea, keep the rest to protect the IO and for Ironclad.
 
But you don't just send a battleship and a carrier without escorts do you? Even Force Z took along an ad hoc escort of 4 destroyers - Electra, Express, and dating from WW1 Tenedos and Vampire.

The things that the Eastern Fleet were shortest of in early 1942 were modern cruisers and destroyers to escort major units. The only modern cruisers in the IO at the time of Ironclad were Newcastle & Hermione plus Devonshire. Everything else was C,D,E class. Even for Ironclad all the destroyers available to the Eastern Fleet were allocated and totalled 18 ships.

Hermione and at least 5 of those destroyers were on loan from the western Med arriving only in mid-April. To cover a fleet with 5 Battleships and 3 carriers.
 
So how many destroyers is enough?

US TF39 to join Home Fleet in March 1942 - Washington, Wasp & 2 CA with 8 DD
Doolittle Raid April 1942 - 2 CV, 4 CA/CL & 2 oilers with 8 DD
US TF61 to join Home Fleet in mid-1943 - 2 BB and 5 DD

By mid-war escort carriers were being sent out on hunter-killer ops with 6 DD / DE / frigates. RN policy was to maintain 2-3 as close carrier escort and use the remainder for hunting ahead of the force. Having 6 escorts didn't stop the Block Is being sunk in 1944.
 
You can't stop 100% of the subs getting through and there is always "luck" but it is a bit easier to guard a group of ships than a single one.
Sorry, stating that badly.
If you have 4-6 escorts forming a perimeter then it doesn't take much in change in perimeter to put one or two addition high value ships inside the perimeter.

When considering escort there is not only the number of escorts but their ability.

Courageous started with 3 escorts but 2 were detached to peruse a contact a number of hours away, effectively removing them form the escort role.

Mid-war escorts also had better sensors and greatly expanded amounts of ASW weapons, even if it was just doubling or tripling the Dc carried and not adding more K guns or something more lethal. US Destroyers, mostly, had better AA suites so they could perform the dual escort role better.
The US destroyers of the Benson/Gleaves class were also about 200-250 tons larger standard displacement and more when at full load than the British between the wars standard destroyers. you can do a lot with around 18% extra displacement.

The British often didn't have the number of escorts they would have liked for fleet operations.
 
The problem with the HMS Glorious was that it was not flying air patrols. If someone had been flying circles around the carrier they would have spotted the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the Swordfish would attacked without the defending Fw-190s.
 
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