SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The problem with HMS Courageous was the guy in charge.
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HiMy point was that amassing this hypothetical force at Ceylon may well strain deployments elsewhere, especially cruisers and carriers.
As for PoW, Repulse, and AR, if they're ordered to gather at Ceylon in October 41 and do not go to fight the Malay landings, they're available to help Australia if the Japanese defeat Fletcher in May.
I'd accept that there had to be issues with the guy in charge of HMS Glorious, but what was wrong with captain of Courageous.The problem with HMS Courageous was the guy in charge.
In Sept of 1939 the population's lifeblood was NOT being cut off. The Germans only had just of 50 U-boats all told and only about 20 could be at sea at any given time. Many if the German U-Boats were the type IIs with 3 torpedo tubes and two reload torpedoes (5 torpedoes total).I'd accept that there had to be issues with the guy in charge of HMS Glorious, but what was wrong with captain of Courageous.
The concept of using carriers to hunt u-boats was sound; the Hunter-Killer groups were based around a CVE and her escorts. RN might have had a little too much faith in ASDIC (reading their own press releases). And might not have been ideal for a fleet carrier, but when you don't have any CVEs to leave the ship in harbour while the populations lifeblood is being cut off wasn't going to happen.
Not to nitpick, but it seems when Guadalcanal is brought up it's always, (and only) the Marine casualties listed. Not to knock that but what seems to never be mentioned is that something like twice as many U. S. sailors lost their lives in the Guadalcanal campaign, by my quick count, ~3,500+ and that's not including the two carrier battles of Eastern Solomon's and the Santa Cruz islands or the amount wounded/missing.I sometimes wonder what the US thought postwar when the British governor returned to Honiara on Guadalcanal after 1,600 U.S. troops were killed, over 4,000 were wounded and several thousand more died from disease retaking the place.
All of which comes no where near touching the Japanese losses of over 20,000 who died either in combat or from disease or starvation, many without known graves. I went to school in the 1970s with the son of a Solomon Islands Govt Official and recall him saying that finding remains of Japanese troops was still a regular occurance 30 years after the campaign ended.Not to nitpick, but it seems when Guadalcanal is brought up it's always, (and only) the Marine casualties listed. Not to knock that but what seems to never be mentioned is that something like twice as many U. S. sailors lost their lives in the Guadalcanal campaign, by my quick count, ~3,500+ and that's not including the two carrier battles of Eastern Solomon's and the Santa Cruz islands or the amount wounded/missing.
Those night battles in the Slot were ferocious, I'm mostly an AAF guy but I'm pretty much in awe of what those fellows went through, in fact at Savo Island, the USN lost almost 1,100 killed in one engagement.
Strange sometimes how certain things can get lost to history.
Indeed, if you're going to play that game you use your older, smaller and more expendable carriers, HMS Argus for one, then if needs must, Hermes and Eagle. Ideally rush some hanger-less, planked over merchant conversions like HMS Audacity into service.Risking large, fast, expensive fleet carriers to try to sink 250-300 ton coastal U-boats was not good planning, no matter how successful (or not) slow, cheap, converted merchantmen were.
I meant to write "the problem with HMS Glorious was the guy in charge." Not Courageous. It's still bugging me. Whiffed a perfectly good word play.The problem with the HMS Glorious was that it was not flying air patrols. If someone had been flying circles around the carrier they would have spotted the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the Swordfish would attacked without the defending Fw-190s.
Indeed. Imagine had Glorious maintained a two or three ship Sea Gladiator CAP (she had nine aboard) circling the carrier along with her five torpedo-armed Swordfish on deck (with depth charges ready in case the threat turns out to be a uboat). Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would have been discovered with Glorious still over the horizon, the carrier could fire up all boilers, and the five Swordfish would be started, warmed up and launched within 20 mins and a radio call made to the Ark Royal CSG. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau will be lucky to make it home.I meant to write "the problem with HMS Glorious was the guy in charge."
The British U class submarines were designed in 1936 and the first 3 entered service in 1938. They were designed to be clockwork mice to be used to train the anti sub surface ships.I'm not confusing '41 capabilities with '39. RN went into WWII thinking they had the answer to the u-boat threat - Air Power (carrier) finds the German ship, and forces it to submerge, Destroyers arrive on scene. ASDIC on DDs picks up the u-boat, depth charges are dropped, and submarine eliminated. Rinse. Repeat if necessary
Indeed, if you're going to play that game you use your older, smaller and more expendable carriers, HMS Argus for one, then if needs must, Hermes and Eagle. Ideally rush some hanger-less, planked over merchant conversions like HMS Audacity into service.
I don't believe they were full squadrons?2 squadrons of Saro London and 1 of Saro Stranraer flying boats.
On the outbreak of war Britain only had about 55 submarines, including about 12 H & L class dating back to 1918/19. But even the latter were pressed into front line service in the early days of the war. About half the remainder dated to the late 1920s / early 1930s and had been designed for operations in the Far East against Japan. When transferred to the Med in late 1940 they suffered heavy losses being too big for the theatre. In the period 1935-38 the emphasis was on replacing those boats with the more modern T class. It was only with the 1939 War Programme (planned pre-war and implemented on 3 Sept 1939) that construction of the S class (from the early 1930s) was restarted and the U class set up for mass production. But it was July 1941 before the first wartime ordered U class began to enter service and March 1942 for the first of the wartime S class. Wartime submarine construction only managed to keep up with losses to at least the end of 1942.The British U class submarines were designed in 1936 and the first 3 entered service in 1938. They were designed to be clockwork mice to be used to train the anti sub surface ships.
How much they were used for this I don't know but they were modern subs close in size to the German U boats and they should have been quieter than the WW I relics they were testing Asdic on in the 1920s and early 30s.
Somebody should have figured out that all was not going to plan in 1938-39. The U class was also capable of about 10knts submerged instead of 8-9kts like most German U-boats.
So they are more challenging targets. Given even 15 minutes between sub submerging and DD arriving a 10 kt boat can be an area over 50% larger than an 8kt boat.
The British were still using the same depth charges that they used in WW I that sank at the same speed, and used the same fuses.
The 100lb anti sub bomb for aircraft was a gift wrapped present for the German U-boat forces.
It seems that once Asdic was developed and issued the U-boat problem was declared solved and everybody was off to the next problem. Like how to mount a couple of quad .50 cal machine guns on destroyers as AA guns.
Don't know. If it was 6-8 per squadron it only makes the AS problem harder to tackle.I don't believe they were full squadrons?
More like 6-8 planes per squadron?
I think the British only had 17 Stranraers. The Canadians built 40 of them.Don't know. If it was 6-8 per squadron it only makes the AS problem harder to tackle.
There were 30 production Londons built from 1936 and in use by 3 squadrons in 1939 so far as I can tell from a quick look. 57 Stranraers from 1937. So how many had been lost before 1939?