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- #81
Admiral Beez
Captain
As part of a greater force, and without hindsight, sure. Force Z with nine Swordfish is likely still doomed, but it's a more balanced force.
Force Z with HMS Ark Royal waits for HMS Indomitable
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As part of a greater force, and without hindsight, sure. Force Z with nine Swordfish is likely still doomed, but it's a more balanced force.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
Without any fighters Hermes is not deterring any air attacks. And with only nine Swordfish she's probably not deterring surface naval units much either. I suspect the main utility would have been for recon, but even that would be dangerous, signaling the presence of a carrier and attracting Japanese attention, but essentially incapable of self-defense.
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I've just realised you were talking about 1940 not 1941. Too many visits to Simonstown!
Hermes could not have been sent to Singapore. You clearly don't appreciate the extent of her damage. Her hull below the waterline was badly twisted to starboard. From just above the waterline it had been opened up half way back to the island, as if a can opener had been used. Here is a photo of her at Simonstown being repaired, one of a series that was taken of her damage. Note her anchor and the damage extending aft of that on the starboard side which had taken the brunt of the impact. The change in colour marks her waterline.
Sending her to Singapore would have meant passing a perfectly acceptable dockyard and sailing a very badly damaged and unseaworthy ship 5,600 miles across the IO without knowledge of what the weather might be en route. No satellite weather forecasts in those days.
And look at her movements before and after. She was a South Atlantic ship at that point. Only in 1941 is she moved to the southern IO tasked with intercepting Vichy transports.
As for the "Japanese were making moves on FIC as a precursor to their Sept 1940 occupation" it is worth remembering that the Japanese occupation of FIC was a two stage process and the second did not automatically have to happen. It was as a result of changed circumstances, both political and economic, during 1941.
Step 1 - occupation of the northern Tonkin region along the Chinese border in Sept 1940 with the aim of furthering their war in China by cutting it off from supplies being delivered via Haiphong port (near Hanoi) to the Chinese border. Hanoi is about 1,370 miles from Singapore. Despite the French agreeing that the Japanese could station troops in the south, they refrained from doing so.
Historical Atlas of Asia Pacific (26 September 1940): Japanese invasion of French Indochina
While Nomonhan and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact seemed to put an end to ideas of Japanese expansion north, the outbreak of World War II and the rapid German victories over France and the Netherlands left the European colonies in southeast Asia vulnerable. Japan was quick to exploit this new...
Step 2 - occupation of the southern part of FIC starting 28 July 1941. That occurred because the Japanese had only then decided that a strike on Malaya, DEI and Philippines was necessary to secure the resources they required and becasue by then the USSR was tied down in a war with Germany so freeing up troops from Manchuria.
With an active war against Germany going on the need for Hermes in the South Atlantic / IO rates a much greater need than what might or might not happen 1,300 miles north of Singapore. German raiders were active in this area throughout the latter part of 1940 and the whole of 1941.
Edit:- Note Britain was well aware of Japanese aims in China at this time. She had agreed to close the Burma Road taking supplies from Rangoon to China in July 1940 only to re-open it in Oct after US pressure. See the link I posted above. Toggle to the next page to see the progress of the lead up to war.
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- Thread starter
- #84
Admiral Beez
Captain
It's a good question. If HMS Ark Royal and two capital ships are at Ceylon awaiting HMS Indomitable, the Kido Butai may be reluctant to send all six carriers to attack Pearl Harbour.
Shortround6
Major General
Does the Kido Butai know that they are awaiting the Indomitable?
How much did the Japanese know about British ship movements in the Indian Ocean or South Atlantic?
Did the Japanese know about the grounding or even the British intentions for the Indomitable?
Once the British get to Ceylon (or other places in India and South East Asia Japanese agents might send it reports.
Unlike the US the British were at war and with German surface raiders and U-Boats operating in many oceans the British were not announcing ship movements.
Or the Japanese may choose to change the disposition of the rest of its fleet of battleships and carriers.
The Japanese fleet that struck PH consisted of the 6 carriers plus the battlecruisers Hiei & Kirishima, 2 heavy & 1 light cruisers plus 11 destroyers, 8 tankers and supply ships.
The remaining 8 capital ships along with 7 cruisers & 28 destroyers and the carriers Hosho (11xA5M4 Claude and 8xB4Y1 Jean biplane torpedo bombers) & Zuiho (16xA5M Claude & 12xB5N Kate) formed the Main Body of the Japanese Fleet which sortied on 7 Dec to cover the return of the KB. In addition the carrier Ryujo (12xA5M4 Claude + 4 spares & 12xB5N1 + 2 B5N2 + 4 spares) was covering the landings on Davao in the southern Philippines.
And there was also the escort carrier Kasuga Maru (Taiyo from Aug 1942) which historically was ferrying A5M Claude fighters to Palau, but had been operating as a training carrier to think about.
So there are other carrier assets that the Japanese could bring into play if the British dispositions change. Not their first line admittedly but potentially enough make the RN think. And that makes the RN more likely to consider a night torpedo attack.
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- #87
Admiral Beez
Captain
Perhaps the Japanese will know that Force Z (Ark Royal, PoW, Repulse plus available CLs and DDs) are waiting at Ceylon for Indomitable and other reinforcements. So, now's the time to send detached forces as you describe to sink the still small Force Z.
Too bad the Skua is already gone, as the Indo-Pacific is the place where it might have done well…. if surprise or escorts are on its side.
Too bad the Skua is already gone, as the Indo-Pacific is the place where it might have done well…. if surprise or escorts are on its side.
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Am I uderstanding you correctly? You now want the Japanese to send a force into the IO to attack your imaginary reinforced Force Z at some unstated time prior to Operation C?
Two questions for you. By what route and at exactly what point in time?
There are a very limited number of routes into the IO from the South China Sea / Java Sea areas. Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait are the principal ones. None of those routes is possible until the land on both sides is secured except at huge risk to the Japanese. And that situation didn't exist historically until into March 1942. Then you meet the timescale for the historical Operation C.
While Singapore fell on 15 Feb and southern Sumatra was invaded around the same time (Ryujo was part of the covering group for that and then the Java operations), the Japanese did not begin to move on northern Sumatra until the end of Feb using troops already in Singapore, with Sabang Is at the northern tip falling on 12 March. They then moved on to take the Andaman & Nicobar Islands north of that. Port Blair in the Andamans fell on 23 March 1942. The covering force for that was the cruiser force supported by Ryujo that then went on the rampage in the Bay of Bengal as Malay Force as part of Operation C.
The Kido Butai began to gather at Staring Bay at Kendari from 11 March to prepare for Operation C. They sailed on 26 March.
This isn't contrarianism. This is pointing out some hard reality that cannot be hand waved away.
Do you really believe that an Eastern Fleet with PoW, Repulse and Ark Royal at its core, is going to sit and wait in Ceylon while a second line Japanese force comes after them?
One of the things about Admiral Phillips was that he had been Deputy and then Vice Chief of the Naval Staff between 1939 & 1941. During that time he had reportedly been critical of RN officers who were not, in his view, aggressive enough at prosecuting an enemy. This may have coloured his decision to take Force Z to sea from Singapore in Dec 1941. Now if, for whatever reason, he is sitting at anchor in Ceylon in Jan /Feb 1942 and is presented with a Japanese force, is he going to be any less aggressive than historical?
Historically Indomitable left Capetown 2 Jan bound for Port Sudan to collect RAF Hurricanes to ferry to Java, leaving half her air group at Aden. She launched those Hurricanes on 27/28 Jan and then went to Trincomalee for two weeks from 2-16 Feb before repeating the ferry operation but this time it was diverted to Ceylon, after which she had to go back to Aden to collect the rest of her air group. Historically it was 24 March before she joined the eastern Fleet at Addu Atoll.
Are you proposing that these operations be cancelled? The second was vital to the defence of Ceylon when the Japanese came calling in April. If you do cancel both of them then it is mid-Jan before Indomitable will arrive in Ceylon to reinforce the Eastern Fleet. Even if she only makes a single trip to ferry Hurricanes to Ceylon, she still has to go back to Aden to pick up the half of her airgroup that she left there during each ferry trip and wouldn't be in a position to join the Eastern Fleet until the end of the first week in Feb at the earliest.
Formidable didn't arrive at Colombo until 24 March. Illustrious arrived in South Africa mid-April. Warspite arrived at Trincomalee from the USA via the south of Australia route on 22 March.
And during this period between PH and Operation C the KB itself was not exactly idle:-
21-23 Dec 1941 - Hiryu & Soryu strike Wake Is
23 Dec - Akagi, Kaga, Zuikaku & Shokaku arrive back in Japan
29 Dec - Hiryu & Soryu arrive back in Japan
17-23 Jan 1942 - Akagi, Kaga, Zuikaku & Shokaku hit Rabaul & Kaveing in support of Japanese landing operations in New Ireland
1 Feb - attempt to catch US carriers Yorktown & Enterprise hitting Marshall Is.
19 Feb 1942 - Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu & Soryu strike Darwin in support of the invasion of Timor.
21 Feb-10 Mar - Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu & Soryu cover invasion of Java
7 Mar - Shokaku & Zuikaku chase USS Enterprise raiding Marcus Is.
26 Mar - 5 carriers depart on Operation C. Kaga back to Japan to repair damage caused by grounding.
So unless you want to change the Japanese plans for expansion southwards the KB is simply not available.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I used to think I knew stuff about World War II. Very informative post, Sir.
- Thread starter
- #90
Admiral Beez
Captain
I've got Force Z with HMS Ark Royal holding at Ceylon from late November 1941 until HMS Indomitable arrives in mid-January 1942. Indeed, Malaya and Singapore do not fall until Feb, but with Malaya being a mostly IJA affair, what's to stop the IJN in early January 1942 from traversing the Malacca to enter the Indian Ocean to attack the RN based at Ceylon before Indomitable and other reinforcements arrive?
AB
Perhaps it would be a good idea if you took some time and familiarise yourself with all the British shipping movements that occurred between Ceylon and Singapore in the Dec 1941-Feb 1942 period and the many ships, particularly cruisers, used to escort them. While these routed via Sunda Strait any Japanese force heading for Malacca Strait has to cross their routes. Also look at the various ships in the British Far East commands and their movements in the period.
Maybe start with the Admiralty War Diaries
And having accessed the IO and stirred up a hornets nest, how do you propose that a Japanese force is going to be allowed to return through the Malacca Strait? It can't remain forever as the tanker support isn't available.
On Xmas day 1941, the Allied air strength at Singapore still included 54 Buffaloes, 21 Hudsons, 24 Blenheims, 14 Dutch Glenn Martins, 29 Vildebeest, 5 Albacore, 4 Catalinas and a miscellany of other types. The RAF is going to sit idly by while a Japanese task force sails past its front door and up the Malacca Strait out into the IO?
If you are going to insist on pursuing "what ifs" at least ensure that they have some credible starting point. This is now into the realms of pure fantasy!
Edit:- Oh and again geography. Take a look at a detailed map of the Malacca Strait at its southern end around Singapore. It is only a couple of miles wide and not easy to navigate due to sand bars. And there is a jumble of islands there just to make navigation away from the main channels even more difficult. Probably all well within the range of those big guns on Singapore itself. 15" reaching out 20 miles. 9.2" reaching out 15 miles. Doing what they were placed there to do.
Perhaps it would be a good idea if you took some time and familiarise yourself with all the British shipping movements that occurred between Ceylon and Singapore in the Dec 1941-Feb 1942 period and the many ships, particularly cruisers, used to escort them. While these routed via Sunda Strait any Japanese force heading for Malacca Strait has to cross their routes. Also look at the various ships in the British Far East commands and their movements in the period.
Maybe start with the Admiralty War Diaries
And having accessed the IO and stirred up a hornets nest, how do you propose that a Japanese force is going to be allowed to return through the Malacca Strait? It can't remain forever as the tanker support isn't available.
On Xmas day 1941, the Allied air strength at Singapore still included 54 Buffaloes, 21 Hudsons, 24 Blenheims, 14 Dutch Glenn Martins, 29 Vildebeest, 5 Albacore, 4 Catalinas and a miscellany of other types. The RAF is going to sit idly by while a Japanese task force sails past its front door and up the Malacca Strait out into the IO?
If you are going to insist on pursuing "what ifs" at least ensure that they have some credible starting point. This is now into the realms of pure fantasy!
Edit:- Oh and again geography. Take a look at a detailed map of the Malacca Strait at its southern end around Singapore. It is only a couple of miles wide and not easy to navigate due to sand bars. And there is a jumble of islands there just to make navigation away from the main channels even more difficult. Probably all well within the range of those big guns on Singapore itself. 15" reaching out 20 miles. 9.2" reaching out 15 miles. Doing what they were placed there to do.
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southjn1982
Airman
- 64
- Dec 15, 2020
You didn't answer becouse you couldn't as I suggested check out Dr Clarkes work on the subject thier was a pause it happened deal with it. I also worked and lived in Glasgow for 40 years including on the shipyards in question the light is not an issue
