French Kill Claim Requirements?
- Thread starter elbmc1969
- Start date
That is a good question
fubar57
Lieutenant General
From "French Aces of World War 2" by Barry Ketley, Osprey Publishing Limited, 1999
GregP
Captain
During WWI the French had one of the strictest victory claiming rules, but that was not the case for the Armee de L'Air in WWII. A pilot was given credit for a victory by personally shooting down an enemy aircraft, helping with the shoot down, or by claiming a probable victory.
As a result, the brief Battle for France produced a plethora of aces. French pilots of WWII were a nomadic lot. Many pilots served not only with the Armee de L'Air, but when France capitulated to the Germans in 1940, many went on to serve with the Vichy Air Force, the RAF, the VVS and even with the Free French forces. Each of these air forces had their own aerial victory criteria, and as such pilots serving with more than one air force may become an ace through their accumulation of claims for each service they flew with.
As a result, the brief Battle for France produced a plethora of aces. French pilots of WWII were a nomadic lot. Many pilots served not only with the Armee de L'Air, but when France capitulated to the Germans in 1940, many went on to serve with the Vichy Air Force, the RAF, the VVS and even with the Free French forces. Each of these air forces had their own aerial victory criteria, and as such pilots serving with more than one air force may become an ace through their accumulation of claims for each service they flew with.
- Thread starter
- #5
This makes me wonder how some sources count total kill claims by French pilots. There are a lot of silly claims of "1,000 kills," which is an obviously inflated number. If you add up individual victories, instead of unit victories, it's easy to get to that total. (I'm talking about 1940.)
GregP
Captain
- Thread starter
- #8
No one implied that you were making things up, only that Vincenzo saw a discrepancy between sources. For that matter, he may have been treating your information as more accurate than the snippet that fubar57 posted.
After debunking the 1000 victories myth, here the consensus would turn around +/- 650 confirmed kills between september 1939 / june 1940 plus around 250 / 270 probables, including the Czech / Polish serving with the Armée de l'Air.
The trouble with Air Aces Homepage is that for the Vichy era, there are aces whose victories marks would be at least partially roundels or stars instead of crosses or Regia Aeronautica roundels. This created troubles when the the FAFL merged with them after november 1942, and notably when the Normandy Niemen was beefed up with ex-Vichy reinforcements.
The trouble with Air Aces Homepage is that for the Vichy era, there are aces whose victories marks would be at least partially roundels or stars instead of crosses or Regia Aeronautica roundels. This created troubles when the the FAFL merged with them after november 1942, and notably when the Normandy Niemen was beefed up with ex-Vichy reinforcements.
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fubar57
Lieutenant General
This is why I always try to include a publishing date. A lot of info has come about in over 20yrs
- Thread starter
- #11
That sounds at least generally plausible. Was there a discussion here, or does the 650 come from some other source?
GregP
Captain
yulzari
Staff Sergeant
[QUOTE="Frog, post: 1802388, member: 79014"
The trouble with Air Aces Homepage is that for the Vichy era, there are aces whose victories marks would be at least partially roundels or stars instead of crosses or Regia Aeronautica roundels. This created troubles when the the FAFL merged with them after november 1942, and notably when the Normandy Niemen was beefed up with ex-Vichy reinforcements.
[/QUOTE]
Issues of ex Vichy forces marginalising ex Free French personnel are still a taboo subject at home. I do wonder how the Vichy kill reporting compared to their Commonwealth opponents. De Gaulle cynically appeased Vichy to maximise French forces as they could quickly deliver African troops in 1943. Especially North African infantry. The resentment still lingers. Much as the resentment of ex communist resistance against their persecution gives rise to tales of communist strong areas being more likely to have their conscripts sent to Algeria later.
The trouble with Air Aces Homepage is that for the Vichy era, there are aces whose victories marks would be at least partially roundels or stars instead of crosses or Regia Aeronautica roundels. This created troubles when the the FAFL merged with them after november 1942, and notably when the Normandy Niemen was beefed up with ex-Vichy reinforcements.
[/QUOTE]
Issues of ex Vichy forces marginalising ex Free French personnel are still a taboo subject at home. I do wonder how the Vichy kill reporting compared to their Commonwealth opponents. De Gaulle cynically appeased Vichy to maximise French forces as they could quickly deliver African troops in 1943. Especially North African infantry. The resentment still lingers. Much as the resentment of ex communist resistance against their persecution gives rise to tales of communist strong areas being more likely to have their conscripts sent to Algeria later.
- Thread starter
- #15
From Philippe Garraud, L'ACTION DE L'ARMÉE DE L'AIR EN 1939-1940 : Facteurs structurels et conjoncturels d'une défaite
La « drôle de guerre » dans les airs
Dans le domaine aérien, cette expression n'est pas du tout justifiée. L'activité a été relativement soutenue, contrairement à l'inactivité qui a caractérisé le front terrestre. Et un bilan est relativement aisé à faire dans la mesure où les différentes sources sont très largement convergentes, le nombre des victoires « sûres » homologuées à l'aviation de chasse en 9 500 missions de chasse étant compris entre 72 et 82. C'est le premier chiffre qu'on retiendra, pour la perte de 93 appareils, selon l'estimation plus « serrée » et rigoureuse de C.-J. Ehrengardt et al., qui excluent en particulier les doubles comptes, c'est-à-dire l'attribution à plusieurs unités d'une même victoire obtenue en coopération. Ce mode de comptabilité spécifique, on y reviendra, ayant un effet inflationniste, tant sur le plan individuel que collectif : le total des scores individuels des pilotes d'une unité étant largement supérieur au nombre des victoires homologuées à l'unité ; et le total des scores des unités étant lui aussi (mais dans une moindre mesure, du fait que ce cas de figure est moins fréquent) supérieur au nombre des appareils ennemis présumés détruits.
"In the air domain, this expression is not at all justified. Activity was relatively sustained, unlike the inactivity that characterized the land front. And an assessment is relatively easy to make insofar as the different sources are very largely converging, the number of "sure" victories approved for fighter aircraft in 9,500 fighter missions being between 72 and 82. the first figure that will be retained, for the loss of 93 aircraft, according to the more "tight" and rigorous estimate of C.-J. Ehrengardt et al., which exclude in particular double counting, that is to say the attribution to several units of the same victory obtained in cooperation. We will come back to this specific method of accounting, having an inflationary effect, both individually and collectively: the total of the individual scores of the pilots of a unit being far greater than the number of victories approved for the unit; and the total scores of the units also being (but to a lesser extent, because this scenario is less frequent) greater than the number of enemy aircraft presumed destroyed."
Garraud further examines the claims during the May campaign.
La « drôle de guerre » dans les airs
Dans le domaine aérien, cette expression n'est pas du tout justifiée. L'activité a été relativement soutenue, contrairement à l'inactivité qui a caractérisé le front terrestre. Et un bilan est relativement aisé à faire dans la mesure où les différentes sources sont très largement convergentes, le nombre des victoires « sûres » homologuées à l'aviation de chasse en 9 500 missions de chasse étant compris entre 72 et 82. C'est le premier chiffre qu'on retiendra, pour la perte de 93 appareils, selon l'estimation plus « serrée » et rigoureuse de C.-J. Ehrengardt et al., qui excluent en particulier les doubles comptes, c'est-à-dire l'attribution à plusieurs unités d'une même victoire obtenue en coopération. Ce mode de comptabilité spécifique, on y reviendra, ayant un effet inflationniste, tant sur le plan individuel que collectif : le total des scores individuels des pilotes d'une unité étant largement supérieur au nombre des victoires homologuées à l'unité ; et le total des scores des unités étant lui aussi (mais dans une moindre mesure, du fait que ce cas de figure est moins fréquent) supérieur au nombre des appareils ennemis présumés détruits.
"In the air domain, this expression is not at all justified. Activity was relatively sustained, unlike the inactivity that characterized the land front. And an assessment is relatively easy to make insofar as the different sources are very largely converging, the number of "sure" victories approved for fighter aircraft in 9,500 fighter missions being between 72 and 82. the first figure that will be retained, for the loss of 93 aircraft, according to the more "tight" and rigorous estimate of C.-J. Ehrengardt et al., which exclude in particular double counting, that is to say the attribution to several units of the same victory obtained in cooperation. We will come back to this specific method of accounting, having an inflationary effect, both individually and collectively: the total of the individual scores of the pilots of a unit being far greater than the number of victories approved for the unit; and the total scores of the units also being (but to a lesser extent, because this scenario is less frequent) greater than the number of enemy aircraft presumed destroyed."
Garraud further examines the claims during the May campaign.
