Operational in 1942 - Purely hypothetical and not worth pursuing. Needed extra HP - see below...
??? Are you honestly saying that building in an extra cockpit didn't exact a performance penalty?? An extra crew member alone = at least 200 lb. Add cockpit, seat, armour etc, plus extra fuselage structure and larger wings = at least another 1,500 lbs. The Firefly was larger and heavier than it would have been had it required one cockpit and would have had a much better performance with the same power given by the Griffon.
Firefly internal fuel carried = 192 imp gal plus up to 180 imp gal external (2 x 90 gal drop tanks). P-51B/C = 153 imp gal plus a 71 imp gal fuselage tank (albeit the latter led to instability until part emptied) + 2 x 75 imp gal drop tanks (or 2x 125 gal ferry tanks).
Read the specifications and show us where a 2,000 lb bomb load was required:
This isn't to deny the abilities of Firefly aircrew, but a single seat fighter with comparable engine power, firepower and range would have been far more useful to the FAA in 1942. Again, the Firefly was larger and heavier than it needed to be because of that second cockpit.
And it never really encountered decent fighter opposition - had the Firefly operated in the strategic and tactical situation imposed in SE Asia by the Japanese in 1942 it might not have fared nearly as well.
Your specification sheets are incomplete and they dont include additional requirements - such as 180rgp instead of 60 and the capability for DT and bombs which even the Fulmar had to meet.
Yes, I can honestly state that it didn't add extra weight (well maybe 400lb or 3% for the observer and seat) because, as I've stated, USN fighters with the same fuel and weapons load had approximately the same weight. Heck even the F4F-4 weighed almost 8000lbs with only 120IG of internal fuel, and if the airframe was redesigned to accept more fuel, then weight would inevitably climb. The fuselage of a large fighter aircraft is almost empty anyway so adding an extra seat was not a major source of extra weight, but the observer also contributed to the aircraft's combat effectiveness by providing extra visibility and by removing some of the work load from the pilot. Another factor is that long range voice communications were not generally possible in 1938/39 until 1942 so that morse code had to be used for long range com links, and this was very difficult for a single crewmember.