Fulmar in 1941/42/43: feasible and/or plausible upgrades?

[Juha]

The Luftwaffe attacked both battleships to split their fire (both received minor damage) and the RN force around the carrier was reduced to only the two BBs, WARSPITE, VALIANT, ILLUSTRIOUS, and destroyers NUBIAN, DAINTY and GREYHOUND and only Nubian had an AA FC system. The other RN forces in the area were screening the Malta Convoy. The radar system did not detect the attack and there was only 3 minutes warning from sighting the Lufwaffe force to first bomb hits. When Illustrious turned into the wind to launch her remaining Fulmars she also moved away from the slower BBs.

In later attacks against Illustrious the fleet formed a more concentrated formation, but not during the initial attack.

Now even 2 BBs, even if Warspite's AA wasn't so powerful but Valiant's was very powerful, best what RN could offer, and 3 DDs wasn't a minimal AA screen. And Adm Conningham believed that he had a ring-side seat to watch the attack, the professionialism of which he greatly admired. And he was on the bridge of Warspite, so the ship couldn't have been so far away. And if 10 out of 43 Stukas attacked the BBs, it was a question of tactics used, not of the size of the AA screen. and also meant that there were 10 Stukas less to attack Illustrious

So conclusion, whether one had 2 seat or single seat fighters, the CAP could be distracted and the CV could be left without fighter protection. Your theory that the observer would greatly increase the possibility of noticing approaching aerial attack isn't IMHO valid, especially when looking the position of observer in Fulmar. 4 SS fighter formation should have been able to adequately observe their enviroment in the limits given by the weather.

 

[Aozora]

Only when radar came into play could interceptions reach a high level of success.

Totally agree - two seat fighters could not make enough of a difference because even double the number of available Mk 1 eyeballs could spot incoming aircraft quickly enough to to ensure a timely interception.

 

[RCAFson]

Now even 2 BBs, even if Warspite's AA wasn't so powerful but Valiant's was very powerful, best what RN could offer, and 3 DDs wasn't a minimal AA screen. And Adm Conningham believed that he had a ring-side seat to watch the attack, the professionialism of which he greatly admired. And he was on the bridge of Warspite, so the ship couldn't have been so far away. And if 10 out of 43 Stukas attacked the BBs, it was a question of tactics used and also meant that there were 10 Stukas less to attack Illustrious, not of the size of the AA screen.

It actually sounds like Cunningham was far enough away that he could admire the view rather than being just a few thousand yards away with the Ju-87s almost directly overhead. However as I stated, the RN had to cover both the valuable convoy and the carrier and this inevitably watered down the defence
.
In any event, the BBs couldn't afford to ignore the attacking Stukas and the Luftwaffe struck with more DBs than attacked in the first wave of SBDs that sank 3 IJN CVs at Midway.

At Midway, for example Yorktown was covered by two heavy cruisers and 5 destroyers (all with AA FC) and for the 2nd attack by 4 heavy cruisers and 9 destroyers, to face much smaller attacks than hit Illustrious and the USN knew full well exactly which ship the IJN was going to attack.

Also in Jan 1941, none of the RN ships had radar AA FC. Radar detection of the approaching Luftwaffe formation was strangely lacking, yet two days before Sheffield had detected a RA raid at 43nm.

 

[Shortround6]

A two seat fighter may have some use as a recon plane looking for ships. Trying to use rear seaters to significantly change the rate of interceptions of attacking aircraft seems like quite a stretch.

Once the attackers are spotted you may need the performance of a single seater to make the interception.

 

[Aozora]

Illustrious was badly damaged but saved by her AFD, so this is an example of the RN's insistence on passive defence paying off. $hit happens - thank god for AFDs! Also, the Luftwaffe threw almost as many DBs, armed with 1100lb bombs against Illustrious, as the USN flew against 4 carriers at Midway. Apparently the Fulmars were able to break up the last part of the first attack and probably prevented more hits and they intervened again (now based in Malta) during a 2nd attack by 15 Stukas, escorted by 5 Me-110s several hours later, and this along with a concentrated AA screen keep the Stukas to only one 1100 lb bomb hit.

It is also an example of how even radar GCI could still fail as the detection ability was still inadequate at that time (aircraft were not detected soon enough but this is still a bit of mystery to me) and However as we've seen the Martlet ( the only other Allied folding wing fighter but not yet available) had a climb rate little better than the Fulmar (and probably worse using military/combat power), and as I stated earlier the design of Illustrious' lifts prevented her from operating fixed wing fighters and there's no way that folding wing Seafires could have been ready by then. Probably the only way the attack could have been thwarted was by having a standing patrol that had the good fortune to sight the attack and/or by the GCI guessing that the carrier was the primary target.

FAA air defence and fleet AA defence was also hampered due to the fact that the Luftwaffe and RA had multiple targets (the nearby Malta bound convoy) which were strategically more important than the carrier, and so the RN AA escort for Illustrious was very minimal. In the Pacific, the carriers were the always the central target and the fleet was arraigned around them and not a bunch of 15 knot merchantmen.

In all of this you have provided no evidence whatsoever that the Fulmar's observers assisted in any way - just because Fulmars broke up the first attack doesn't mean that the extra eyeball Mk 1s of their observers were the sole reason, or a reason, for the slow flying Stukas being intercepted in time - what it does suggest is that had the Fulmars been single seat fighters with a better acceleration, top speed and rate of climb the Stukas could have been intercepted earlier and more damage could have been done to other raids - perhaps enough to stop even the one bomb hit.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Why did the USN need to build such heavy SS fighters?

Because they were stressed for carrier operations?

 

[tomo pauk]

In a more affirmative tone: USN heavyweights were featuring heavy ( and powerful) 2-stage engine, carrying big loads of fuel, armament and ammo, along with heavy under-slung cargo (bombs, DTs...) They were, of course, fully stressed for CV operations, and were featuring the wings of generous area thickness (= again more weight), so their take off and landing characteristics are within acceptable limits.
In other words, there was almost no way to make a light weight fighter, that would offer long range, while carrying hefty loads of lethality and pilot protection, with big radial engine that was providing plenty of power at broad band of altitudes.

added: USN was not the only one going after heavy fighter, the gorgeous Sea Fury was not particularly light neither.
added 2: the USN heavies were also capable to make 380-410 mph in 1943, something to behold back then for the CV-based fighters, and not achieved by other in-service CV fighters until the end of 1945?

 

[Shortround6]

Aircraft, Fuel load, nominal bomb load,weight (no bombs full fuel), TO HP, combat HP.
F6F-5, 250usg, 2000lb, 12500lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
F4U-1C, 237usg, 2000lb, 12,095lb, 2000hp, 2135hp @ 15000ft
Firefly, 226usg, 2000lb, 11685lb, 1720hp, 1490hp @ 14000ft
P-51, 184usg, ?????, 9500lb, 1495hp, 1595hp @ 17000ft
XF8F, 150usg, ?????, 8810lb, 2100hp, 1600hp @ 1600lb (attempt to build lightweight naval fighter - not CV capable.)
F8F-2, 170usg, 2000lb, 10,337lb, 2250hp, 1800hp @ 23250ft (SAC data actual weight after mod for carrier capability - note the weight growth)
P-51D 270usg, 1000lb, 10,100lb, 1490hp, 1630hp @ 13600ft (Tac planning chart 26 May 1944)
(weight, HP and fuel data for first 5 from Report of the JFC). It is pretty obvious that the Firefly's performance is crippled not by the 2nd crew member but by the low HP rating of it's engine.

Why did the USN need to build such heavy SS fighters?

In part because of the engine selected. The R-2800 was initially proposed as a 1650hp engine on 87 octane fuel. You don't get that kind of power with 87 octane fuel from a small, light engine. During development 100 octane became available and power was initially raised to 1850hp ( shrinking the engine means starting over) and please remember that early American 100 octane is NOT 100/130 or even the 100/115-120 fuel used by the British in the BoB. American 100 octane in 1939-40 and early 1941 was 100/98-103 depending on batch. Getting 2000 hp from such fuel was doable but again the engine stays large and heavy.

The power plant weight for the F4U was just about 3900lbs including prop, controls, cowl, oil system and fuel piping ( but not fuel tank weight). You don't stick that kind of weight on a small airplane. The Americans had only one engine that was smaller and offered the right amount of power when design work started on these fighters and that was the Wright R-2600 which, while lighter, was bigger in diameter and didn't have a good supercharger even in the development stage. Please remember that Chance Vought was part of United Aircraft, the Parent Company of Pratt Whitney so maybe they had a bit more fore knowledge of P&W engine developments.

A single stage Griffon is about 680lbs lighter than a two stage R-2800 and that should cover quite a bit of radiator and coolant.

The High powered Merlins and the R-2800s used in the F8Fs weren't much more than a gleam in the engine designers eyes when the R-2800 used in the F4U was OK'd for production.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

It might be possible under still air conditions for the pilot to use morse, but pretty much impossible if he encounters flak and/or enemy fighters as would be expected for a long range recon aircraft.

Quote from Bartsch Doomed at the start: "Grashio had spotted the dive bombers (Ki-30 Anns) below him too. Recognizing them as easy meat, he got on the radio and sent a Morse code message to Sneed." (Bartsch doesn't say whether it was telegrapher's key or perhaps his mike button). He continues, "But when nothing happened, as the Dive Bombers were getting closer on their northwestward course, Grashio repeated his radio morse code call to Sneed and again pointed out the planes to Sneed." (Paper back, page 281)

This was a USAAF pilot in a heavily loaded P-40E, over brown water off the West coast of Bataan, probably not on autopilot and in the process of setting up and about to attack IJA dive bombers over Bataan moments later, all the while concerned about keeping an eye out for the omnipresent Ki-27 fighters. Radio code work isn't impossible from a single seat fighter even in somewhat difficult, distracting circumstances.

 

[RCAFson]

In all of this you have provided no evidence whatsoever that the Fulmar's observers assisted in any way - just because Fulmars broke up the first attack doesn't mean that the extra eyeball Mk 1s of their observers were the sole reason, or a reason, for the slow flying Stukas being intercepted in time - what it does suggest is that had the Fulmars been single seat fighters with a better acceleration, top speed and rate of climb the Stukas could have been intercepted earlier and more damage could have been done to other raids - perhaps enough to stop even the one bomb hit.

There's nothing in the Fulmar Pilot's Notes that requires an observer in the rear seat. If the RN thought that he did no good, they could simply leave him behind, but they didn't. Fulmars operating from shore bases, flying purely interception missions did sometimes leave the observer behind but this doesn't seem to have happened while operating from carriers. Again, we simply have to look at probabilities, and the probability is that a 2nd pair of eyes will assist in locating potential targets and potential attackers, especially when radar is absent. I suspect that most pilots would like to have an extra pair of eyes "checking their six" full time.

The Pilot's Notes do state that the Observer is also a navigator, and he also operates a winch to extend or retract a trailing aerial, which I suspect is used with the long range Morse set. The pilot and observer/navigator can communicate via speaking tube or via the voice radio system, which doubles as an intercom.

The observer also has a swivelling seat so that he can face rearward for better rearward vision when needed, or forward, as the situation requires.

 

[RCAFson]

Quote from Bartsch Doomed at the start: "Grashio had spotted the dive bombers (Ki-30 Anns) below him too. Recognizing them as easy meat, he got on the radio and sent a Morse code message to Sneed." (Bartsch doesn't say whether it was telegrapher's key or perhaps his mike button). He continues, "But when nothing happened, as the Dive Bombers were getting closer on their northwestward course, Grashio repeated his radio morse code call to Sneed and again pointed out the planes to Sneed." (Paper back, page 281)

This was a USAAF pilot in a heavily loaded P-40E, over brown water off the West coast of Bataan, probably not on autopilot and in the process of setting up and about to attack IJA dive bombers over Bataan moments later, all the while concerned about keeping an eye out for the omnipresent Ki-27 fighters. Radio code work isn't impossible from a single seat fighter even in somewhat difficult, distracting circumstances.

I'm not sure if the quoted passage proves or disproves that a separate radio operator is beneficial, and I note that he is not under attack. It seems to me that the pilot he is attempting to contact might also have had other concerns on his mind, and that overall efficiency would improve if the pilot could order his observer to contact the other pilot's observer.

 

[Shortround6]

There's nothing in the Fulmar Pilot's Notes that requires an observer in the rear seat. If the RN thought that he did no good, they could simply leave him behind, but they didn't. Fulmars operating from shore bases, flying purely interception missions did sometimes leave the observer behind but this doesn't seem to have happened while operating from carriers.

Once you have "paid the penalty" of designing a 2 seat aircraft ( bigger fuselage, bigger wing, etc) trying to get a "refund" by leaving the 160-200lb crewman on the deck/field really doesn't change things much.

The 2nd seater wasn't really a "navigator" in the common sense of the word although he did operate the "navigation"/homing equipment that allowed the Fulmar to find it's own carrier when it was beyond visual range. One reason the shore based planes could leave him behind. The shore base wasn't going to move 30-100 miles while the plane was in the air. And even if the shore based plane couldn't find it's own base it could probably find some air field to land on even if the weather got crappy. The Carrier pilot had a choice of find his ( or a friendly) carrier or see how well his dingy worked.

I can easily buy why the FAA went for the 2 seat fighter in 1937-40 before getting real experience in a shooting war. Continuing the policy in the middle of 1940 may or may not be harder to understand but once the Firefly suffered a number of delays somebody should have pulled the plug on the program before 1943-44. Or re-purposed the airframe and quit calling it a fighter.

Nobody has shown what the differences were in the radios between 1937/40 and 1943/44 but I am thinking there were some differences.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I'm not sure if the quoted passage proves or disproves that a separate radio operator is beneficial, and I note that he is not under attack. It seems to me that the pilot he is attempting to contact might also have had other concerns on his mind, and that overall efficiency would improve if the pilot could order his observer to contact the other pilot's observer.

Conversation with a USN A-7 pilot transitioning to the multi-crew EA-6B, "I'd trade any NFO for 200 pounds of JP-5. (NFO's typically handle the radios)...

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I can easily buy why the FAA went for the 2 seat fighter in 1937-40 before getting real experience in a shooting war. Continuing the policy in the middle of 1940 may or may not be harder to understand but once the Firefly suffered a number of delays somebody should have pulled the plug on the program before 1943-44. Or re-purposed the airframe and quit calling it a fighter.

Nobody has shown what the differences were in the radios between 1937/40 and 1943/44 but I am thinking there were some differences.

In the pre WW2 days radios were big and bulky and tuning them to acquire the desired frequency required a steady ear, time and patience so you had many aircraft having a dedicated radio operator as a standard crewmen. AFAIK most if not all aircraft radios during pre WW2 days were either LF or MF sets with a seperate tuner and transmitter and had no way to pre-tune channels, so you were tuning radios in the same manner as you would an old transistor or AM radio with an analog tuner.

As Shortround pointed out, by mid WW2 radios were much improved and the need for a dedicated radio operator went away.

Does having a dedicated radio operator relive the pilot of some workload? Yes
By 1943 was it really necessary to have a dedicated radio operator on a carrier based aircraft like the Fulmar? NO!

An extra set of eyes is always a good thing but during WW2 to justify an observer/ radio operator in a fighter (with the exception of the Mosquito) who was not at least operating radar was just a waste of time, a waste of aircraft performance and a waste of personnel; history as played out proved this until the extra weight of an additional crewman performing a more meaningful role than operating a radio became a reality (example F-4, Tornado, etc.)

Anyone trying to justify 180 pounds worth of ballast (or a nice thing to have) is trying to justify a losing argument. Having a buddy along for the ride can be comforting but people who never flew airplanes are very unfimilar with terms like "cockpit resource management" and "multi-tasking" when flying a single seat aircraft - operating a "channel tuned" MF or VHF frequency radio (which was the norm by the first few years of the war) is no more difficulat than chewing gum and walking at the same time

Conversation with a USN A-7 pilot transitioning to the multi-crew EA-6B, "I'd trade any NFO for 200 pounds of JP-5. (NFO's typically handle the radios)...

Apples and oranges and you're comparing aircraft generations apart - NFOs on A-6s and especially EA-6Bs (a four man crew) did waaaay more than operate radios.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Apples and oranges and you're comparing aircraft generations apart - NFOs on A-6s and especially EA-6Bs (a four man crew) did waaaay more than operate radios.

Yes indeed, but I loved the story of this rather atavistic attitude of this soon to be EA-6B squadron commander toward 'Non-Flying Officers' (sic) and we did operate radios, but of course did not typically transmit in Morse. Morse was used strictly in the listening mode to identify TACAN and/or IIRC VOR stations although I may be mixing that (VOR ident) up with my private pilot experience, although I had learned Morse long before that (circa 1969). as I can't remember whether we had VOR capable gear.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Yes indeed, but I loved the story of this rather atavistic attitude of this soon to be EA-6B squadron commander toward 'Non-Flying Officers' (sic) and we did operate radios, but of course did not typically transmit in Morse. Morse was used strictly in the listening mode to identify TACAN and/or IIRC VOR stations although I may be mixing that (VOR ident) up with my private pilot experience, although I had learned Morse long before that (circa 1969). as I can't remember whether we had VOR capable gear.

Morse still used for navaid identification (VOR TACAN and NDB when found)

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I'm not sure if the quoted passage proves or disproves that a separate radio operator is beneficial, and I note that he is not under attack. It seems to me that the pilot he is attempting to contact might also have had other concerns on his mind, and that overall efficiency would improve if the pilot could order his observer to contact the other pilot's observer.

You may have made an (understandably) incorrect assumption about the situation described in the Bartsch's text. An observer in Sneed's aircraft might indeed have helped by threatening his pilot with bodily harm if he didn't attack the IJA Anns he clearly observed below him. Sneed was in the grip of an extended nervous breakdown which lead within a week to his relief from flying duties by flight surgeon's order. This was essentially his last 'combat' flight as he had apparently, on this and other occasions, come to the conclusion that his own personal war was over. Yes, Grashio wasn't under attack, but he was existing in an undernourished, sleep deprived state typically of the small cadre of overtaxed flyers fighting in defense of MacArthur's troops in the PI in late January of 1942. I would characterize that as a stress level few of us can imagine even compared to that experienced in combat. What you correctly imply is the lack of time available to an aircrew when under attack. That certainly is a factor absent in this case, although I'd submit that the time factor is present at some undetermined level in this particular situation.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

You may have made an (understandably) incorrect assumption about the situation described in the Bartsch's text. An observer in Sneed's aircraft might indeed have helped by threatening his pilot with bodily harm if he didn't attack the IJA Anns he clearly observed below him. Sneed was in the grip of an extended nervous breakdown which lead within a week to his relief from flying duties by flight surgeon's order. This was essentially his last 'combat' flight as he had clearly on this and other instances been forced to the conclusion that his war was over. Yes, Grashio wasn't under attack, but he was existing in an undernourished, sleep deprived state typically of the small cadre of overtaxed flyers fighting in defense of MacArthur's troops in the PI in late January of 1941. I would characterize that as a stress level few of us can imagine even compared to that experienced in combat. What you correctly imply is the lack of time available to an aircrew when under attack. That certainly is a factor absent in this case, although I'd submit that the time factor is present at some undetermined level in this particular situation.

AVIATE

NAVIGATE

COMMUNICATE

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Morse still used for navaid identification (VOR TACAN and NDB when found)

That's good, you never know when an airman will find he has become a POW.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

AVIATE

NAVIGATE

COMMUNICATE

But the truly competent aircrew may have occasion to add to his mantra:

"Intimidate" in no particular priority...

It's why an experienced NFO's nav bag always contains a little ball peen hammer.

But of course the knowledgable pilot will have brought a roll of duct tape on every flight.