SoD Stitch
Banned
Yeah, almost looks like the old CV-1 "Langley" with an island; the flight deck looks like it was added on to an existing design . . .
FW 190A vs Hellcat and Corsair
- Thread starter DonL
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Yeah, almost looks like the old CV-1 "Langley" with an island; the flight deck looks like it was added on to an existing design . . .
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
I was involved in building a small limited service hotel in Crested Butte which was a perfect rectangle 55 feet high, 65 feet wide and 220 ft long. If I am not mistaken those were the flight deck dimensions of CV1. I used to stand on the roof of that building and visualise having to land on that deck. Scary!
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
My 42 "Janes" was bought for me by a cousin who was a book dealer in DC. I paid 45 dollars for it. It had been the property of a Commander Victor Logan who was in the Medical Corps of the Navy. I bought the book in about the late 60s, early 70s. The frontispiece, as you know is a picture of HMS Exeter and is the best photo I have ever seen of her. I also have a not original 1914 "Janes". Lordy, I love looking at those old ships back when they had lots of guns, not missile launchers and one puny auto 5 incher. I get a lump in my throat every time I look at the picture of the Exeter and read the caption. In a recent book about the USS Houston, one of the Houston survivors said that on either Exeter or Perth, when they were steaming out of Surabaya harbor en route to the Battle of the Java Sea, the ship's band was playing "A Hunting We Will Go" That gives me goose bumps. My favorite uncle after serving on Saratoga, served on Augusta, flagship of the Asiatic Fleet. He was then detailed to the Houston, that was scheduled to replace Augusta. Another petty officer who was a friend wanted to have a chance to serve in the Asiatic Fleet and my uncle swapped with him and went to the old "Swayback Maru" CA25 in his place and his friend did not come back. Timing is everything.
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
My only other "Janes" is a repro 1905, however I've stuffed in it some photos my Grandfather (an Army Lieutenant stationed in the Philippines) had of some of the surviving Russian ships, from their 1905 misadventure, that were interned in Manila.
Rich
Rich
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
I wouldn´t go so far and downgrade Graf Zeppelin as an outdated design. It had two of a carriers key abilites: beeing fast and long legged.
Her design speed of the 1940 stage was 35 Kts. That brings us to the question, what did they wanted with such an extreme speed? It could, as a matter of fact, outrun any RN US BB, cruiser and DD in the open Atlantic. Against a 30 mp/h wind factor, the Fieselers could start without take off run (35 Kts are slightly over 40 mp/h), strange. Her 16 x 5.91"/55 QF are close to twice the firepower of contemporary light cruisers. Altough beeing critisized for casematte mounted, they have been mounted far above the waterline to ensure they remained dry. How this would work in the Atlantic, I don´t know.
Perhaps thread scenarios played a role in the decision to arm protect her like a large cruiser. Germany had little use for a carrier in the Atlantic (bad weather, which was preferred by the raiders but isn´t good for a carrier).
Her range was comparable to the Twins Tirpitz, around 8000nm @ 19 Kts, which means she could maneuvre quite independently as the other raiders.
She was a bit larger than the officially approved limit. In her last 1943 stage GZ had 33.550 ts max. / 27.650 ts design diplacement, some blisters for more stability ( displacement) and thus a reduced speed to "only" 33.8 Kts design.
Her aircraft complement was 43 planes max (rather small) and the hangar controlls, catapults and aircraft operational systems seemed to be very sophisticated - or just overengeneered.
Flip a coin and see...
Her design speed of the 1940 stage was 35 Kts. That brings us to the question, what did they wanted with such an extreme speed? It could, as a matter of fact, outrun any RN US BB, cruiser and DD in the open Atlantic. Against a 30 mp/h wind factor, the Fieselers could start without take off run (35 Kts are slightly over 40 mp/h), strange. Her 16 x 5.91"/55 QF are close to twice the firepower of contemporary light cruisers. Altough beeing critisized for casematte mounted, they have been mounted far above the waterline to ensure they remained dry. How this would work in the Atlantic, I don´t know.
Perhaps thread scenarios played a role in the decision to arm protect her like a large cruiser. Germany had little use for a carrier in the Atlantic (bad weather, which was preferred by the raiders but isn´t good for a carrier).
Her range was comparable to the Twins Tirpitz, around 8000nm @ 19 Kts, which means she could maneuvre quite independently as the other raiders.
She was a bit larger than the officially approved limit. In her last 1943 stage GZ had 33.550 ts max. / 27.650 ts design diplacement, some blisters for more stability ( displacement) and thus a reduced speed to "only" 33.8 Kts design.
Her aircraft complement was 43 planes max (rather small) and the hangar controlls, catapults and aircraft operational systems seemed to be very sophisticated - or just overengeneered.
Flip a coin and see...
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
The theoretical performance of the GZ still all boils down to carrier doctrine. This is something for which the British, Japanese, and Americans naval aviators sweated and bled for in the 1920's and 30's. The Germans had no such experiences and, thus, no doctrine. The GZ was just a fluke case of the Germans saying to themselves "Gee, everyone else important has aircraft carriers . . . we better build one, too."
Though it appears elsewhere in another thread, and really has nothing to do with FW 190s vs F6Fs and F4Us, I am really getting tempted to drag out my standard trashing of the GZ as an operating platform.
Bottom line is that as an effective war-fighting weapon, the GZ was just a lot of wishful thinking.
Rich
Though it appears elsewhere in another thread, and really has nothing to do with FW 190s vs F6Fs and F4Us, I am really getting tempted to drag out my standard trashing of the GZ as an operating platform.
Bottom line is that as an effective war-fighting weapon, the GZ was just a lot of wishful thinking.
Rich
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Rich, I remember that thrashing you made, and hope you can find it and resurrect it.
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
My position is that Graf Zeppelin was nothing special as a carrier but it is wrong to underestimate the ship. The Luftwaffe and navy both drew experience from Akagi in 1935-1939.
You should factor in what could be done AGAINST Graf Zeppelin (a reasonable timeframe for sortiing is in late 1941) or worse, against Tirpitz Zeppelin.
The only fast BB´s the RN has in late 1941 are Renown KGV. Together they are able to take on Tirpitz (altough this must be considered risky as denmark street showed) but Tirpitz is covered by Graf Zeppelin as well. Both ships are faster than either KGV Renown and Graf Zeppelin is much faster than any single ship the RN (or for that matter, the USN) can send to intercept her. I suspect a breakout into the North Atlantic by late 1941 is kind of an worst case scenario for the RN. More worrisome, even a slow Fi-167 is a much more potent "raider" and "scout" than a BB or CA. A CA projects firepower effectively to 25000 yards, a BB projects firepower effectively to maybe 30.000 yards (debatable, I doubt anything past 26000 yards) but a Fieseler to around 300.000 yards. A merchant beeing detected and (if alone) attacked is an easy prey. A convoi maybe tracked until Tirpitz projects it firepower on it. Unlike Jervis Bay, dispersing the merchants inspite of Tirpitz makes them an easier target for the carrier (for this part the dive torpedo bomber). A hit like those received by Bismarck are less probable due to improved AAA FC of Tirpitz, the more AAA of GZ (10x 4.1"/65 DP, later 12 x 4.1"/65) and the fightercover (even if the 9-12 Bf-109 are few indeed, the RN didn´t send larger airattacks in, as well).
best regards,
delc
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The GZ suffered from being neither a true aircraft carrier, nor an armoured cruiser.
The KM would have done better to remove most of the guns and armour and stowed more aircraft in its place.
In the end, even a slow moving torpedo bomber like the Devestator or Swordfish would have sent her to the bottom.
The KM would have done better to remove most of the guns and armour and stowed more aircraft in its place.
In the end, even a slow moving torpedo bomber like the Devestator or Swordfish would have sent her to the bottom.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
I've read some of the post here with great interest - although I will never underestimate the ability of airmen from Germany during WW2, to say that there was a chance of Germany operating a carrier in any considerable capacity during WW2 is just not realistic. As Rich pointed out not only was the doctrine missing but we could dwell on pilot and just as important "flight deck training." The UK, US and Japan honed in the skills of carrier operation years before the first metal chip was even cut on the GZ. Not only "would" Germany "have" been 20 years behind in actual pilot training, but the whole flight deck ops learning curve "would of" had to been developed in a very short time span. I'm not saying they "would of" been able to some what pull it off, but I guarantee that not only there "would of" been a lot of aircraft in the drink but I think you "would of" seen dozens of operations personnel injured and killed just achieving a "learning curve" and I don't care how much assistance the Japanese "would of" given Germany. Aircraft carrier operations was something learned over a period of time based on experience and much trial and error and that experience not only included pilots but maintainers and flight deck personnel as well. To say Germany "could of" operated a carrier, they "would of" had to start planning and training the day after Hinderburg was buried...
I won't go into the lack of even remotely adequate carrier aircraft, and I'm not talking operating Storch or Fi 167 squadrons either....
I won't go into the lack of even remotely adequate carrier aircraft, and I'm not talking operating Storch or Fi 167 squadrons either....
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Today marks the 65th anniversary of the first flight of the F6F Hellcat.
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
Part I
Okay, here's the problems with the Graff Zeppelin concept.
At the root of the problem is the plain fact that the Kriegsmarine had no naval doctrine that included carriers. Great Britain, Japan, and the US, the major players in the aircraft carrier business, had been operating pure aircraft carriers since the 1920's in case of the later two and, without looking it up, about 1918 for Great Britain. By "pure carrier" I mean carriers whose airplanes are wheeled, are recovered aboard ship by some sort of arrestor arrangement (however primitive in the early years), and could also be operated from land bases. Further, the aircraft in use (again except for the very early models) were specifically designed for carrier operations. The navies of these three nations worked out the problems and challenges of carrier operations in the 20's and 30's and became, each in their own way, the best in the business. The feeble attempts of the Germans (and the Italians) to, first of all, develop aircraft carriers, much less carrier aircraft, were, frankly, laughable in retrospect.
Graf Zeppelin was, in theory, anyway, to have incorporated the best features of IJN, USN and RN carriers (circa 1936, remember), but managed to end up a glopping together of some of the worst carrier ideas that had already been discarded by those services.
All you have to do is look at the main guns and their placement aboard Graf Zeppelin and it's obvious that the Kreigsmarine considered surface vessels as the major threat to their carrier. Imagine, eight 5.9 inch guns in hull mounted barbettes. Probably great for banging away at some British destroyers as they come boiling over the horizon, but since that was a bit unlikely, here was wasted ordnance (read: weight penalty) for no apparent gain. Even pre-war, the RN, IJN, and USN could have told them that that was a waste of time and effort; that the real threat to the ship was in the air. The other eight 5.9 inch guns were to be mounted in twin turrets, fore and aft of the island, not unlike the US Essex class type. There was a problem though. Unlike the dual-purpose 5 inchers on the Essex types (and they were, in the reality of their usage, single purpose AA guns) the Graf Zeppelins 5.9's were not optimized for antiaircraft defense and would have been essentially worthless for that purpose. The USN went down that road with Lexington class and their 8" turrets. By the mid 1930's it was recognized that those guns were so much dead weight. Note that as soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl the 8-inchers were removed and replaced on Saratoga with 5-inch dual purpose and on Lexington with temporary 1.1 in AAA mounts (Lexington was scheduled to receive 5-inch mounts, but she was sunk at Coral Sea before that could happen).
Another major failing in the Graf Zeppelin design was in an incomprehensibly low avgas storage capacity. The smallest and oldest carrier in the IJN, Hosho, had a capacity of 98,000 gallons and carried but 22 planes. Essex class carrier contemporaries of Graf Zeppelin had up to 240,000 gallons avgas capacity and, in practice, were replenished every three to four days during combat operations. And Graf Zeppelin . . . carried a paltry 65,000 gallons. How do you suppose they were planning on replenishing their avgas supply, not to mention their bunker fuel? Yes, yes, I know, the Germans had successfully experimented with underway replenishment, but I'd suggest they never experimented on the scale necessary to maintain carrier operations and especially in the face of some very aggressive enemy carriers looking to put that scalp on their lodge pole. Ideally, one likes to pull off to some out of the way corner of the ocean for such evolutions . . . once Graf Zeppelin hits the Atlantic, there would be no out of the way corners.
Further, how many pilots, crew, and aircraft was Germany prepared to sacrifice to bring their carrier into operational being? Carrier aviation, though somewhat safer today, and "safer" is an extremely subjective term, in the 1930's, 40's and 50's was an extremely dangerous profession. Where were the Germans planning on training their folks to operate their hybrid craft off carriers? In the Baltic? How nice for them, nice enclosed seas with, compared to the reaches of the North Atlantic, nice calm waters. What's going to happen when a pilot who has trained in calm waters is suddenly faced with crappy North Atlantic weather with the horizon a short 5 miles away and a flight deck that rises and falls 25 to 30 feet as he attempts to land. Did the Kreigsmarine have a plan for training LSOs to deal with this problem as they coaxed the pilots aboard? Were there flight deck officers who knew by feel just when to launch a plane so that it doesn't just "thuup" into a wave? News flash, the folks doing these jobs in the USN, RN, and IJN had had a lot of practice at this and even they made mistakes. And what of the poor pilots? Do you suppose their training included flying their craft to their extremes of range; fighting an action; making their way back to where they think their carrier is going to be; if they're lucky, finding it; and then trying to land in the dark on a pitching deck with their engine running on fumes?
The development of carrier aviation in the "big three" over the years pushed operational limits such as these. Leaders in carrier operations knew that conditions would never be perfect and would probably be the worst imaginable. USN fleet exercises in the 1920s and 30's often had admirals such as Reeves and King wondering if they'd ever see their planes again as they were sent off on long missions to attack the make-believe "enemy." Even so, non-combat aircraft losses combined with combat operational losses, i.e., aircraft lost through accident not related to combat damage, but on combat missions, were high.
For example, in the USN, for the entire war, in the course of some 388,000 plus flights (of which 147,000 plus were combat action sorties) there were 4,863 losses of carrier-based aircraft. 1,877 were directly related to in combat losses, either in combat with enemy aircraft or to enemy AAA; 1,001 were combat operational losses; and 1,985 were non- combat related. 61.4% of losses did not result from holes being poked in aircraft or pilots. What do you suppose the rates would be for a single operating aircraft carrier whose entire crew and air group has maybe six months experience in carrier operations? What do you suppose their losses would be like in just achieving that six months of operational training? And for that matter, once in action, how do you suppose this aircraft carrier is supposed to make up it's losses when, to be effective and strike the enemy it must operated outside the range of any land-base re-supply or support?
Making the comparison a little more manageable, looking again at the USN experience, in calendar year 1942, for all carriers in action, in some 6775 flights, including 2559 action sorties there were 155 combat losses, 63 combat related operational losses, and 66 non- combat flight losses.
Statistically, one can take the numbers of carriers in action per month during the period and come up with a composite carrier's operating numbers: Flights: 2755; action sorties 1043; combat losses: 61; combat operational losses: 26; non-combat related losses: 28; for a total of 115 aircraft lost in a 12 month period. For 1942, that means a US carrier, had it been in action for all 12 months, be it Lexington class, Yorktown class, Ranger or Wasp could have experienced aircraft losses in excess of an entire air group. The USN had the means and flexibility to make up such losses with new planes and pilots. How do you suppose a single German aircraft carrier could continue to operate with those kind of losses? What would be their plan for such replenishment? Where would the additional trained carrier pilots come from? Was the German navy aware that the majority of aircraft losses would be from flight deck crack-ups, launch failures, and pilots simply getting lost and never seen again? Somehow, I just don't think so.
The Germans had no tactical doctrine for carrier operations, whereas the RN, IJN, and USN had had twenty years to develop, refine, and hone the same. Actual combat led to the out and out abandonment of some cherished carrier operations doctrinal theories (the concept of deferred departure comes to mind). In the USN, development and adoption of new doctrines (compare the USF-74 of 1941 to USF-74 of 1943 and 1944) went along rather quickly, largely pushed by squadron commanders and pilots who had seen what had worked and what hadn't and were in a position to do something about it by virtue of being responsible for the Fleet doctrine re-writes. [Most of that work was done at ComFAirWest with the officers in charge of training also in charge of the re-writes. I have an original USF-74 fighter section from 1941, the actual rough drafts and notes, including original drawings and sketches, of the 1943-1944 re-writes and a final draft . . . there is a big difference between 1941 and 1944.] The Japanese reacted much slower in changing their doctrine, tactics, and air group composition. The pace of the Japanese change was largely due to organizational inertia and an unwillingness to acknowledge that change was necessary.
Okay, here's the problems with the Graff Zeppelin concept.
At the root of the problem is the plain fact that the Kriegsmarine had no naval doctrine that included carriers. Great Britain, Japan, and the US, the major players in the aircraft carrier business, had been operating pure aircraft carriers since the 1920's in case of the later two and, without looking it up, about 1918 for Great Britain. By "pure carrier" I mean carriers whose airplanes are wheeled, are recovered aboard ship by some sort of arrestor arrangement (however primitive in the early years), and could also be operated from land bases. Further, the aircraft in use (again except for the very early models) were specifically designed for carrier operations. The navies of these three nations worked out the problems and challenges of carrier operations in the 20's and 30's and became, each in their own way, the best in the business. The feeble attempts of the Germans (and the Italians) to, first of all, develop aircraft carriers, much less carrier aircraft, were, frankly, laughable in retrospect.
Graf Zeppelin was, in theory, anyway, to have incorporated the best features of IJN, USN and RN carriers (circa 1936, remember), but managed to end up a glopping together of some of the worst carrier ideas that had already been discarded by those services.
All you have to do is look at the main guns and their placement aboard Graf Zeppelin and it's obvious that the Kreigsmarine considered surface vessels as the major threat to their carrier. Imagine, eight 5.9 inch guns in hull mounted barbettes. Probably great for banging away at some British destroyers as they come boiling over the horizon, but since that was a bit unlikely, here was wasted ordnance (read: weight penalty) for no apparent gain. Even pre-war, the RN, IJN, and USN could have told them that that was a waste of time and effort; that the real threat to the ship was in the air. The other eight 5.9 inch guns were to be mounted in twin turrets, fore and aft of the island, not unlike the US Essex class type. There was a problem though. Unlike the dual-purpose 5 inchers on the Essex types (and they were, in the reality of their usage, single purpose AA guns) the Graf Zeppelins 5.9's were not optimized for antiaircraft defense and would have been essentially worthless for that purpose. The USN went down that road with Lexington class and their 8" turrets. By the mid 1930's it was recognized that those guns were so much dead weight. Note that as soon after the Japanese attacked Pearl the 8-inchers were removed and replaced on Saratoga with 5-inch dual purpose and on Lexington with temporary 1.1 in AAA mounts (Lexington was scheduled to receive 5-inch mounts, but she was sunk at Coral Sea before that could happen).
Another major failing in the Graf Zeppelin design was in an incomprehensibly low avgas storage capacity. The smallest and oldest carrier in the IJN, Hosho, had a capacity of 98,000 gallons and carried but 22 planes. Essex class carrier contemporaries of Graf Zeppelin had up to 240,000 gallons avgas capacity and, in practice, were replenished every three to four days during combat operations. And Graf Zeppelin . . . carried a paltry 65,000 gallons. How do you suppose they were planning on replenishing their avgas supply, not to mention their bunker fuel? Yes, yes, I know, the Germans had successfully experimented with underway replenishment, but I'd suggest they never experimented on the scale necessary to maintain carrier operations and especially in the face of some very aggressive enemy carriers looking to put that scalp on their lodge pole. Ideally, one likes to pull off to some out of the way corner of the ocean for such evolutions . . . once Graf Zeppelin hits the Atlantic, there would be no out of the way corners.
Further, how many pilots, crew, and aircraft was Germany prepared to sacrifice to bring their carrier into operational being? Carrier aviation, though somewhat safer today, and "safer" is an extremely subjective term, in the 1930's, 40's and 50's was an extremely dangerous profession. Where were the Germans planning on training their folks to operate their hybrid craft off carriers? In the Baltic? How nice for them, nice enclosed seas with, compared to the reaches of the North Atlantic, nice calm waters. What's going to happen when a pilot who has trained in calm waters is suddenly faced with crappy North Atlantic weather with the horizon a short 5 miles away and a flight deck that rises and falls 25 to 30 feet as he attempts to land. Did the Kreigsmarine have a plan for training LSOs to deal with this problem as they coaxed the pilots aboard? Were there flight deck officers who knew by feel just when to launch a plane so that it doesn't just "thuup" into a wave? News flash, the folks doing these jobs in the USN, RN, and IJN had had a lot of practice at this and even they made mistakes. And what of the poor pilots? Do you suppose their training included flying their craft to their extremes of range; fighting an action; making their way back to where they think their carrier is going to be; if they're lucky, finding it; and then trying to land in the dark on a pitching deck with their engine running on fumes?
The development of carrier aviation in the "big three" over the years pushed operational limits such as these. Leaders in carrier operations knew that conditions would never be perfect and would probably be the worst imaginable. USN fleet exercises in the 1920s and 30's often had admirals such as Reeves and King wondering if they'd ever see their planes again as they were sent off on long missions to attack the make-believe "enemy." Even so, non-combat aircraft losses combined with combat operational losses, i.e., aircraft lost through accident not related to combat damage, but on combat missions, were high.
For example, in the USN, for the entire war, in the course of some 388,000 plus flights (of which 147,000 plus were combat action sorties) there were 4,863 losses of carrier-based aircraft. 1,877 were directly related to in combat losses, either in combat with enemy aircraft or to enemy AAA; 1,001 were combat operational losses; and 1,985 were non- combat related. 61.4% of losses did not result from holes being poked in aircraft or pilots. What do you suppose the rates would be for a single operating aircraft carrier whose entire crew and air group has maybe six months experience in carrier operations? What do you suppose their losses would be like in just achieving that six months of operational training? And for that matter, once in action, how do you suppose this aircraft carrier is supposed to make up it's losses when, to be effective and strike the enemy it must operated outside the range of any land-base re-supply or support?
Making the comparison a little more manageable, looking again at the USN experience, in calendar year 1942, for all carriers in action, in some 6775 flights, including 2559 action sorties there were 155 combat losses, 63 combat related operational losses, and 66 non- combat flight losses.
Statistically, one can take the numbers of carriers in action per month during the period and come up with a composite carrier's operating numbers: Flights: 2755; action sorties 1043; combat losses: 61; combat operational losses: 26; non-combat related losses: 28; for a total of 115 aircraft lost in a 12 month period. For 1942, that means a US carrier, had it been in action for all 12 months, be it Lexington class, Yorktown class, Ranger or Wasp could have experienced aircraft losses in excess of an entire air group. The USN had the means and flexibility to make up such losses with new planes and pilots. How do you suppose a single German aircraft carrier could continue to operate with those kind of losses? What would be their plan for such replenishment? Where would the additional trained carrier pilots come from? Was the German navy aware that the majority of aircraft losses would be from flight deck crack-ups, launch failures, and pilots simply getting lost and never seen again? Somehow, I just don't think so.
The Germans had no tactical doctrine for carrier operations, whereas the RN, IJN, and USN had had twenty years to develop, refine, and hone the same. Actual combat led to the out and out abandonment of some cherished carrier operations doctrinal theories (the concept of deferred departure comes to mind). In the USN, development and adoption of new doctrines (compare the USF-74 of 1941 to USF-74 of 1943 and 1944) went along rather quickly, largely pushed by squadron commanders and pilots who had seen what had worked and what hadn't and were in a position to do something about it by virtue of being responsible for the Fleet doctrine re-writes. [Most of that work was done at ComFAirWest with the officers in charge of training also in charge of the re-writes. I have an original USF-74 fighter section from 1941, the actual rough drafts and notes, including original drawings and sketches, of the 1943-1944 re-writes and a final draft . . . there is a big difference between 1941 and 1944.] The Japanese reacted much slower in changing their doctrine, tactics, and air group composition. The pace of the Japanese change was largely due to organizational inertia and an unwillingness to acknowledge that change was necessary.
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
Germany had no plan that I'm aware of for underway replenishment of flight stores (ordnance, avgas, etc) or aircraft. And there appears to be little thought as to how many vessels could be committed to any underway replenishment and how were they to make their rendezvous with the Graf Zeppelin task group? Who was going to protect them? How were they to get past a now energized RN or combined RN USN search and destroy operation? And just how were they intending to get replacement aircraft aboard Graf Zeppelin? In any case, they apparently had no sufficient inventory of replacement aircraft. Anyone want to guess how many escort carriers, on average, were devoted to aircraft replenishment in the Pacific, say, in the summer of 1945? Never mind, I'll tell you . . . twenty five (want a list?). So, that's somewhat more than one and a half CVEs dedicated to aircraft and pilot replenishment for each CV or CVL operating off the coast of Japan. The Germans were apparently not really aware, or at least refused to recognize, of all the pitfalls in developing a carrier arm. This especially obvious in their building/conversion programs; they simply didn't plan for enough carriers, nor screening vessels. One or two carriers, committed piecemeal, won't do it. They'd be attacked and sunk, either together or in detail.
Much of the sort of thinking about how successful a Kreigsmarine carrier would be IMO goes along with the "what-if" scenarios where the guys who never did XYZ suddenly have perfect knowledge and are able to pull off XYZ event whilst the other side is securely tied to their historic ABC position.
Doesn't work that way. If Graf Zeppelin had ever ventured out into the Atlantic it would have lasted less time than Bismarck. An untried, unrealistically trained, understrengthed, and hybrid aircraft equipped air group, with no operational doctrine, flying off an equally untried aircraft carrier, and undoubtedly insufficiently screened (look at Kriegsmarine destroyer losses), facing two, three, or even four RN carriers with air groups having all the advantages the Germans would not. If they don't come out until 1942 maybe even a couple of USN carriers would get into the act as well. Remember all the US Essex class CV's were built on the east coast and did their pre-commissioning and shake down cruises in the Atlantic. They would have the same advantages as the RN (exception being that USN air groups might tend to have a higher percentage of nuggets, but their leadership in squadrons were generally combat experienced or naval aviators with 8 to 10 years experience behind them. And even the old USS Ranger, all by itself, was more than a match for Graf Zeppelin and had the experience pool to do the job. This is a no-brainer and in short order . . . score Allies 1 Axis 0.
I think folks tend to give the German's far too much credit or benefit of the doubt. In this case, I'm sorry, but for all their technology, know-how, and all their supposed skill, it would make absolutely no difference what-so-ever. Here is a ship type they have never before operated. Here's a ship that is already a less than optimal design, carrying an insufficiently sized air group. Here are planes that are, perhaps somewhat hastily, modified from land-based types to operate in a carrier-based environment. Here is a command structure where the Kreigsmarine commands the ship and the planes are commanded and flown by the Luftwaffe. (The RN experience of the FAA being part and parcel of the RAF for so many years was ample evidence that that particular arrangement is a logistical disaster looking for a place to happen. Looks like the Germans didn't get the memo.) And here's an operating environment that is totally alien to anything done before by the Luftwaffe. Do you really think the good Reich's Air Marshal Fatty is going to send his best and brightest? I suspect he already saw the writing on the wall and did as little as possible to encourage the project.
To expect either the Kreigsmarine or the Luftwaffe to absorb the lessons of a generation of institutional knowledge in carrier operations as acquired, the hard way, by the RN, USN and IJN, to, in a blinding flash of insight, foresee all the potential problems, I think, is asking a bit too much, even for the Germans. Not that the RN or USN were likely to provide them any short cuts. And do you really think they'd really, I mean, really, listen to the advice from the Japanese . . . remember this is Nazi Germany here.
And folks can talk until you're blue in the face about how good the Me 109Ts, Fi 167s and the Ju 87Cs were, but, I'm sorry, the 87's and the 167s would be hopelessly outclassed and the 109s would be in for the fight of their lives. By the time Graf Zeppelin could have put to sea it would probably be late 1942. RN carriers were already carrying F4Fs. The Seafires were coming on line, but suffered throughout the war with severe structural problems resultant from the repeated bruising of carrier landings (see Brown, The Forgotten Fleet). Gee, do you suppose the Me 109T might suffer the same problem? Not to mention it's overall unsat ergonomics in terms of carrier operations. Its one thing for the German's to structurally reinforce a design and test it a couple of times; repeated violent exposures are another matter all together. Just how many landings do you think these hybrid aircraft would be able to withstand? Sure would be embarrassing to have them start pulling apart when operating under at-sea combat conditions and not from their nice safe test site landing field. And don't even talk about using FW 190's because that was never part of the plan . . . just another silly "what if" dragged out to try to make the concept work. And, yes, I know that the Germans successfully strapped a torpedo to an FW 190 and dropped same. Well, golly gee whiz that's really cool, but then again, so did the USN do the same with an F6F. Just think what a great target an FW 190 or an F6F hauling a torpedo would make. In both cases it does not mean the experiment was a good idea, it merely proved it could be done. The USN proved it could land and launch PBJ's (that a B-25 for you land oriented types) from a carrier; that did not mean it was a good idea. Does that feat mean the Germans should have considered operating the Ju 88 from the Graf Zeppelin?
Much of the sort of thinking about how successful a Kreigsmarine carrier would be IMO goes along with the "what-if" scenarios where the guys who never did XYZ suddenly have perfect knowledge and are able to pull off XYZ event whilst the other side is securely tied to their historic ABC position.
Doesn't work that way. If Graf Zeppelin had ever ventured out into the Atlantic it would have lasted less time than Bismarck. An untried, unrealistically trained, understrengthed, and hybrid aircraft equipped air group, with no operational doctrine, flying off an equally untried aircraft carrier, and undoubtedly insufficiently screened (look at Kriegsmarine destroyer losses), facing two, three, or even four RN carriers with air groups having all the advantages the Germans would not. If they don't come out until 1942 maybe even a couple of USN carriers would get into the act as well. Remember all the US Essex class CV's were built on the east coast and did their pre-commissioning and shake down cruises in the Atlantic. They would have the same advantages as the RN (exception being that USN air groups might tend to have a higher percentage of nuggets, but their leadership in squadrons were generally combat experienced or naval aviators with 8 to 10 years experience behind them. And even the old USS Ranger, all by itself, was more than a match for Graf Zeppelin and had the experience pool to do the job. This is a no-brainer and in short order . . . score Allies 1 Axis 0.
I think folks tend to give the German's far too much credit or benefit of the doubt. In this case, I'm sorry, but for all their technology, know-how, and all their supposed skill, it would make absolutely no difference what-so-ever. Here is a ship type they have never before operated. Here's a ship that is already a less than optimal design, carrying an insufficiently sized air group. Here are planes that are, perhaps somewhat hastily, modified from land-based types to operate in a carrier-based environment. Here is a command structure where the Kreigsmarine commands the ship and the planes are commanded and flown by the Luftwaffe. (The RN experience of the FAA being part and parcel of the RAF for so many years was ample evidence that that particular arrangement is a logistical disaster looking for a place to happen. Looks like the Germans didn't get the memo.) And here's an operating environment that is totally alien to anything done before by the Luftwaffe. Do you really think the good Reich's Air Marshal Fatty is going to send his best and brightest? I suspect he already saw the writing on the wall and did as little as possible to encourage the project.
To expect either the Kreigsmarine or the Luftwaffe to absorb the lessons of a generation of institutional knowledge in carrier operations as acquired, the hard way, by the RN, USN and IJN, to, in a blinding flash of insight, foresee all the potential problems, I think, is asking a bit too much, even for the Germans. Not that the RN or USN were likely to provide them any short cuts. And do you really think they'd really, I mean, really, listen to the advice from the Japanese . . . remember this is Nazi Germany here.
And folks can talk until you're blue in the face about how good the Me 109Ts, Fi 167s and the Ju 87Cs were, but, I'm sorry, the 87's and the 167s would be hopelessly outclassed and the 109s would be in for the fight of their lives. By the time Graf Zeppelin could have put to sea it would probably be late 1942. RN carriers were already carrying F4Fs. The Seafires were coming on line, but suffered throughout the war with severe structural problems resultant from the repeated bruising of carrier landings (see Brown, The Forgotten Fleet). Gee, do you suppose the Me 109T might suffer the same problem? Not to mention it's overall unsat ergonomics in terms of carrier operations. Its one thing for the German's to structurally reinforce a design and test it a couple of times; repeated violent exposures are another matter all together. Just how many landings do you think these hybrid aircraft would be able to withstand? Sure would be embarrassing to have them start pulling apart when operating under at-sea combat conditions and not from their nice safe test site landing field. And don't even talk about using FW 190's because that was never part of the plan . . . just another silly "what if" dragged out to try to make the concept work. And, yes, I know that the Germans successfully strapped a torpedo to an FW 190 and dropped same. Well, golly gee whiz that's really cool, but then again, so did the USN do the same with an F6F. Just think what a great target an FW 190 or an F6F hauling a torpedo would make. In both cases it does not mean the experiment was a good idea, it merely proved it could be done. The USN proved it could land and launch PBJ's (that a B-25 for you land oriented types) from a carrier; that did not mean it was a good idea. Does that feat mean the Germans should have considered operating the Ju 88 from the Graf Zeppelin?
R Leonard
Staff Sergeant
And what about this Graf Zeppelin air group? Some 40 airplanes comprised of, roughly, ten 109s, thirteen 87s, and twenty 167s. The performance statistics for the 109s, on paper, weren't too bad, but the 87s and the 167s look like a top end of somewhat more than 175 knots … sitting ducks for FM-2s. And only 10 (!!) fighters … oh, please! Let's see, that's 5 to protect the ship and 5 to escort strikes … oh, boy, that will work real good won't it? How are they planning cycling up a fresh CAP? Just where are any freshly fueled fighters going to come from? I can tell you, anybody in World War II who thought they could adequately defend a carrier with only five fighters or adequately escort a strike with five fighters was dreaming or desperate. The USN and the RN put more fighters that that on their CVEs! And the first time you lose one of these 109Ts, be it a combat or not-combat loss, you've cut your fighter strength by 10%; that's what we call 'decimate'. Lose another and you're down 20%, the traditional cut off for unit capability. How long do you think that could go on? And all this great thinking on air group composition during a period when fighting squadrons on USN fleet carriers were going from 18 to 28 to 36 aircraft as a regular complement.
And what about pilot training? Sure, fighter pilots can fly fighters and dive bomber pilots can dive bomb, and torpedo plane pilots can drop torpedoes or even glide bomb, but how do they get where they need to go and, more importantly how do they get back? I strongly suspect, largely because they never had to, the Germans never thought that one through, either. Navigation over water was, in those days, pretty much a matter of a plotting board, a compass, a clock, and knowledge of how fast the plane is flying. The FAA, for a long time, held that even fighters had to be two-seaters so that that one fellow could handle the navigation while the other fellow drove the plane. In USN practice, individual pilots did their own navigation; of course, some were better than others. And what was to be the German doctrine? Were individual pilots responsible for their own navigation? Were the fighter pilots to use one of the 87C or 167 pilots as a guide? What if he gets shot down? What was to be their scout doctrine? How many of the, oh, so few, 167s would be delegated for scouting as opposed to strikes? And how were they to find their point option (the place where the carrier is supposed to be when a mission is over)? Had they worked all that out? What if the carrier wasn't where they thought it would be? Did they have a standardized search pattern? Did they have a homing signal system? There's no railroad tracks or roads to follow. There's no "just head east until you see land" method … there'd be no land, just miles and miles of an empty ocean.
Finally, in the real world, in their only encounter with Luftwaffe fighters, FM pilots (FM's being a slightly souped up F4F) from HMS Searcher's 882 squadron were credited with 4 land based Me 109s to one loss (26 March 1945). The FMs were dealing with German fighters that were attacking strike planes they were escorting … i.e, they were on the receiving end of an attack, a decided disadvantage in the fighter world, yet, they seemed to do alright anyway.
Lambs to the slaughter. The Germans, and folks not exactly attuned to carrier operations, may have dreamed of the Graf Zeppelin doing well as a convoy killer, but the reality would have been that as soon as she had set to sea, the RN carriers would be all over her. If she comes out any time in 1942 or later, then it would be the RN and the USN finishing her off in short order.
Regards,
Rich
NB: a great chance to review and revise the original . . . thanks!
And what about pilot training? Sure, fighter pilots can fly fighters and dive bomber pilots can dive bomb, and torpedo plane pilots can drop torpedoes or even glide bomb, but how do they get where they need to go and, more importantly how do they get back? I strongly suspect, largely because they never had to, the Germans never thought that one through, either. Navigation over water was, in those days, pretty much a matter of a plotting board, a compass, a clock, and knowledge of how fast the plane is flying. The FAA, for a long time, held that even fighters had to be two-seaters so that that one fellow could handle the navigation while the other fellow drove the plane. In USN practice, individual pilots did their own navigation; of course, some were better than others. And what was to be the German doctrine? Were individual pilots responsible for their own navigation? Were the fighter pilots to use one of the 87C or 167 pilots as a guide? What if he gets shot down? What was to be their scout doctrine? How many of the, oh, so few, 167s would be delegated for scouting as opposed to strikes? And how were they to find their point option (the place where the carrier is supposed to be when a mission is over)? Had they worked all that out? What if the carrier wasn't where they thought it would be? Did they have a standardized search pattern? Did they have a homing signal system? There's no railroad tracks or roads to follow. There's no "just head east until you see land" method … there'd be no land, just miles and miles of an empty ocean.
Finally, in the real world, in their only encounter with Luftwaffe fighters, FM pilots (FM's being a slightly souped up F4F) from HMS Searcher's 882 squadron were credited with 4 land based Me 109s to one loss (26 March 1945). The FMs were dealing with German fighters that were attacking strike planes they were escorting … i.e, they were on the receiving end of an attack, a decided disadvantage in the fighter world, yet, they seemed to do alright anyway.
Lambs to the slaughter. The Germans, and folks not exactly attuned to carrier operations, may have dreamed of the Graf Zeppelin doing well as a convoy killer, but the reality would have been that as soon as she had set to sea, the RN carriers would be all over her. If she comes out any time in 1942 or later, then it would be the RN and the USN finishing her off in short order.
Regards,
Rich
NB: a great chance to review and revise the original . . . thanks!
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Great Post!
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Ditto!
Excellent stuff Rich!
grumman-cats
Airman 1st Class
That was a great short novel that you wrote there. I would have to agree with you on most cases.
I will say this again. I have requested this from you all but you seem to ignore me, which I do not like.
If you wish to trash the GZ and discuss it, do so by all means but not in this thread. There is a dedicated GZ thread.
Please dont have me ask you again.
If you wish to trash the GZ and discuss it, do so by all means but not in this thread. There is a dedicated GZ thread.
Please dont have me ask you again.
