Fw-191C

[Shortround6]

What makes you think Goering had absolute control over all aspects of the German military budget during 1935?

Admiral Raeder appealed directly to Hitler for funding of German capital ship construction. If he desires a naval air service ILO battleships Admiral Raeder would appeal directly to Hitler for funding of that also.

Goring didn't have " absolute control over all aspects of the German military budget during 1935".

What he had was "absolute control" over anything that had to do with with the air. Airplanes, air attack, air defense, airborne troops, AA guns, what ever.

Raeder could ask for ships and Goring couldn't say boo, except to argue that HIS force should get the money. Once the decision was made to give the Navy money or a ship program Goring was out of it.
Raeder asking for airplanes was a different story. Goring would view it as Raeder trying to set up a rival air force with rival procurement. We know the bickering that went on in other countries between land based air forces and navy Air forces. Does anybody really believe Goring would have allowed a rival air force to be set up in 1930s Germany?

 

[The Basket]

Not true.

Goering as head of the Luftwaffe could not stop battleships.

But Goering as Deputy to Hitler and as Lord of the 4 year plan could do what he liked.

 

[davebender]

Business as usual. The SS and Luftwaffe both funded division size ground combat units despite Heer protests. If Admiral Raeder decides to fund a naval air service it is no different.

 

[Shortround6]

Only if Raeder can replace Goring as Hitler's right hand man, confidant and major toady.

See:

Feldgrau :: Kriegsmarine Naval Aviation

even the Float planes on the Cruisers were Luftwaffe owned and flown. Only the back seaters were navy.

 

[Gixxerman]

But Goering as Deputy to Hitler and as Lord of the 4 year plan could do what he liked.

That's pretty much my understanding too, Goering ran the wider economy for much of the war.

(and the protracted bickering, the view of various branches of the German state as personal fiefdoms the usual inter-service rivalry is widely documented)

 

[davebender]

This command arrangement does not prevent the German Navy from operating land based patrol bombers.

Look at it from Goering's point of view. During the mid to late 1930s Germany was spending more money to procure capital ships then they were spending to procure Luftwaffe aircraft. So why shouldn't the German Navy be required to fund their own maritime patrol bomber program?

 

[Milosh]

It still doesn't get the late war four engined Fw191C in the late '30s or early '40s.

 

[The Basket]

Goering once said that Hitler only asks how many bombers we have...not engines not range not bombload.

Making a small number of aircraft is not a good plan and Goering wanted power...not to give power away.

One could say that it made sense to give Raeder his air arm but Goering and sense dont mix.

 

[Shortround6]

During the mid to late 1930s Germany was spending more money to procure capital ships then they were spending to procure Luftwaffe aircraft. So why shouldn't the German Navy be required to fund their own maritime patrol bomber program?

Did they actually spend more money or were they planning on spending more money?

With Plan Z effectively scrapped in Sept 1939 with many ships upstarted except for design work, how much money was available for transfer?

Any money transfered after Sept 1939 comes at the expense of the U-boat program.

Money transfered back in 1935-36 resulting in the canceling of the Bismarck and Tirpitz may mean the last two or three KG Vs are not built and/or work on the Lions is not done (2 of them laid down in 1939) freeing up resources for the British over and above the freedom from worry and planning to contain the two battleships and provision of heavy convoy escorts.

 

[davebender]

The Ju-88 program comprised over half of the total German airframe production effort during 1939. Fortunately we have historical data for that program.

110.6 million RM. Fixed asset value. Junkers Flugzeug und Motorwerke, Dessau.
54 million RM. Arado Flugzeugwerke, Potsdam.
30.1 million RM. Henschel Flugzeugwerke Schonefeld.
21.5 million RM. Heinkel Werke, Oranienburg.
6.5 million RM. ATG Allgemeine Transportanlagen Gesellschaft, Leipzig.
5.9 million RM. Siebel Flugzeugwerke, Halle.
------------------------------------------------------
228.6 million RM. 1939 total capital assigned to Ju-88 airframe production.
Since this is over half I am going to assume total capital assigned to German airframe production during 1939 amounts to about 400 million marks.

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/index.html
197 million RM. KM Bismarck.
181 million RM. KM Tirpitz.
146 million RM. KM Gneisenau.
143 million RM. KM Scharnhorst.
92.7 million RM. KM Graf Zeppelin.
92.4 million RM. KM Peter Strasser.
85.8 million RM. KM Hipper.
87.8 million RM. KM Blucher.
104.5 million RM. KM Prinz Eugen.
84.1 million RM. KM Seydlitz.
83.6 million RM. KM Lutzow.

It appears to me that Admiral Raeder's capital ship construction budget was considerably larger then Goering's aircraft construction budget even before we consider the massive January 1939 Z Plan.

 

[Shortround6]

A little creative accounting I see.

If I have added correctly that is 1298 million Rm from 1934 to 1940, 7 years. Or about 185 RM per year.
Gee, a bit under your 1/2 of total airframe construction budget.
A few of the ships were not completed so that the sums shown may not have been the amount actually spent.

Your Figures say for "airframe" construction. Do those sums include engines? or radios? or armament?

BTW the Luftwaffe spent approximately 54,995,000 RM on Bf 109Cs&Ds

 

[skeeter]

A good book to read about Nazi bombers is entitled: Luftwaffe Over America, subtitled, The Secret Plans to Bomb the United States in World War II. Written by Manfred Griehl.

It is fairly dryly written but quite detailed chronologically as to the bomber types on the drawing board and a few of the test beds they actually built, and the BV 222 flying boat which could have easily reached New York on a one way mission had the Nazis been able to develop the atomic bomb instead of being so busy killing or driving off all the Jewish intelligentsia.

There are several good photographs in the book but I do not want to publish them in here and risk getting myself or anyone in trouble. Just search for the book online. Amazon or eBay would be a good place to look.

 

[skeeter]

Thought I would direct bomber fans to a url I found. Down at the bottom of the link they get into the real dreamy stuff

Messerschmitt Me 264 Luft '46 Entry

 

[davebender]

1,298 million RM from 1934 through 1938. And that includes only capital warships. The German Navy also ordered dozens of new destroyers @ 13.7 million RM each.

The massive Z Plan was approved during January 1939. If we include the Z Plan budget then the German Navy probably received more money for new equipment then the Heer and Luftwaffe combined during 1934 to 1940.

 

[Shortround6]

1,298 million RM from 1934 through 1938. And that includes only capital warships. The German Navy also ordered dozens of new destroyers @ 13.7 million RM each.

The massive Z Plan was approved during January 1939. If we include the Z Plan budget then the German Navy probably received more money for new equipment then the Heer and Luftwaffe combined during 1934 to 1940.

Sources for this please? I have just shown you that the Luftwaffe was spending double (at a minimum) in 1939 what the KM was spending for big ships on average during those years.
as for your " dozens of new destroyers" you technically correct. Two dozen destroyers (24) laid down by the beginning of 1939, with #24 not commissioning into service until October of 1940. Not quite the impression you were trying to make is it?

Money may have been approved in those years but that doesn't mean it was spent in those years. Were companies paid upon the placement of the orders or upon delivery of parts/ materials. Were the workmen paid up front for the next four years work ?

Tirpitz wasn't even launched until 1939 let alone completed, they paid all the money up front by 1938?

Now you want the navy to give up the destroyers too?

Aircraft are fine but with nobody KNEW in the late 30s that aircraft could do what they did later and in fact the aircraft available COULD NOT DO what was done later, say 1942 and after.

Your version of WWII would be much different. No German surface fleet means no invasion of Norway. This means much better supply of the Russians through Murmansk at the very least and a blockade or stoppage of the Swedish iron ore shipments at worst. the latter means a quick end to the war.

 

[zoomar]

Why didn't they fund the Fw-191C or something similiar rather then piddling around with aircraft like the Ju-290 and Do-217?

I may be missing something, but weren't the Ju-290 and D0-217 relatively easy adaptations of successful aircraft that were already in existence? The Fw-191C was a modification of the unsuccessful and overcomplex Fw-191, probably even less likely to be successful that the He-177B/He277. But I agree with the basic observation that Germany would have benefited greatly from a good, long range maritime bomber

 

[davebender]

The Do-217 was an entirely new design that was based loosely on the smaller Do-17. Rather like the Me-109 being loosely based on the Me-108.

The Ju-290 had a convoluted history.
Ju-89. Heavy bomber.
Ju-90. Long range wide body airliner.
Ju-290. Heavy bomber version of the Ju-90 airliner.

It's possible that a purpose built maritime patrol bomber could be based on the highly successful Do-217 airframe. However I want 4 reliable Jumo 211 V12s rather then 2 unreliable (and scarce) BMW801 radial engines.

 

[Just Schmidt]

I basically agree, it is difficult to see how any realistic maritime bomber would be able to stand up to the the allied 'maritime' two-engined fighters or escort carriers. Larger numbers og existing types under control of the Kriegsmarine in the early war years might have been a different matter, but the jalusies of Göring (plus the strategic positioning of Germany which hardly makes naval consideration the most acute priority) makes that highly improbable.

But as to the invasion of Norway I belong to those who question the benefits Germany gained. With the fall of France Germany got another secure supply of iron ore and exellent bases for tonnage-warfare in the atlantics, which was always far more important than the arctic convoys. Without too much inconvenience these conwoys could to a large degree have been diverted over Persia or the Pasific (which anyway was the most important, if not shortest routesw).

With Norway in the allied camp the tonnage-warfare was set back considerably because of the norwegian merchant fleet. Finally (if not by nessecity) Norway proved a considerable distraction for Germany with far larger amounts of troops and resources stationed than justified by the strategic situation, but Hitler expected an invasion of Norway for most of the war (ironically that finally happened from the east).

Actually the bases here (and the possibility for gathering of meteriological data) for maritime warfare was arguably the biggest plus for Germany by the conquest of Norway, and that not only involved, but in the short run also cost, most of the German surface fleet as of early 1940.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Good points Schmidt.

I wonder if the He 177 would have been a good substitute. I know they had a version that packed a 75mm and could carry torpedoes/guided missiles.

 

[davebender]

I'm under the impression the He-177 was a good airframe. However I don't like coupled engines for heavy bombers.

WIth a normal 4 engine bomber the loss of 1 engine is not normally fatal. You still have 75% of engine power remaining. Lots of 4 engine bombers made it back to base with one engine shot out.

With coupled engines the loss of 1 engine reduces total engine power to 50%. To make matters worse that 50% is all on one wing. You will be lucky to remain airborne, much less take evasive action against the enemy attack.

And that's before we consider technical problems designing proper engine cowlings for the He-177. Apparently coupled engines cowlings are more difficult to get right.