German Bomber design rational

The Germans had better 'delivery systems' available. They chose to persevere with the Type VIIs and develop a system to support them at longer range, rather than build more bigger and better submersibles like the Type IX.
They did finally develop the world's first true submarines, in the Types XXI and XXIII, but like so much in the German war effort, these were too little, too late.
Cheers
Steve

The bigger conventional U-boats were slower to dive, had a bigger turning circle and had a bit less range (endurance) when running on batteries (20%?). Diving depth may have been a bit shallower. the much larger torpedo storage is part illusion. a larger percentage of the extra torpedoes were stored outside the pressure hull in containers under the decking. In order to get the torpedoes into the torpedo room/s the submarine has to be surfaced with crew on deck, in some case the external storage actually required crew in the water but they may have been the type VII. In any case it was not something that could be done in all sea states and most certainly not in close proximity to the enemy. As in repeated attacks on a convoy during one night or perhaps even two nights.

I would note the British continued to build S and V class submarines until the end of the war and didn't switch over to all Ts. In part for some the same reasons the Germans persevered with the Type VII. Faster diving, better underwater maneuverability and smaller target.

But, if I rememeber well, the IXs had a better rate of sinkings per boat than the VIIs.
Of course it must be noted that the IX commanders were more seasoned, the IXs were employed in less protected areas, many of the VIIs at the end of the war were sunk at the first combat mission and so on.

Elmas said:

Of course it must be noted that the IX commanders were more seasoned,

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An important point.
1,171 U-boats were commissioned during the war and of those only 325 made successful attacks. 846 never made a successful attack, for a variety of reasons.
About 3,000 vessels were sunk, 800 by the 30 most successful commanders. Statistically 27% of sinkings were achieved by less than 3% of U-boat commanders.
There are parallels here with the Luftwaffe (and other air forces) again.

Cheers

Steve

Shortround6 said:

I would note the British continued to build S and V class submarines until the end of the war and didn't switch over to all Ts. In part for some the same reasons the Germans persevered with the Type VII. Faster diving, better underwater maneuverability and smaller target.

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The British used their submarines in a somewhat different role. We can't really compare this to the Germans. British submarines sank somewhere in the region of 1 million tons of Axis shipping, most importantly in the Mediterranean, during the entire war.
Cheers
Steve

One might note that this was not entirely unique to the Germans.
The US had to replace almost all of their pre-war submarine commanders before achieving any real level of success.
Pre-war exercises with unrealistic conditions had produced a very cautious/defensive mindset in the sub commanders. To be detected was almost automatically assumed to be sunk in the war games.

I would also note that even such details as slip length or crane capacity can mean smaller ships staying production instead of all production facilities switching to new/larger design.

Shortround6 said:

One might note that this was not entirely unique to the Germans.
The US had to replace almost all of their pre-war submarine commanders before achieving any real level of success.
Pre-war exercises with unrealistic conditions had produced a very cautious/defensive mindset in the sub commanders. To be detected was almost automatically assumed to be sunk in the war games.

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This is correct; the best example being Mush Morton.

This does not apply to the Germans. The names of the officers in training at the newly founded Submarine Training School in late 1935 contains the names of many of the men who would change the face of naval warfare. There were only 33 of them, the list includes Prien, Liebe, Winter, Schutze, Hartmann, Kunhke, Frauenheim, Stockhausen, Lemp and Schepke, all of whom later became recipients of the Knight's Cross (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuz) in various degrees. This represents nearly one in three of the initial intake back in 1935. In the early war years the award was based on tonnage sunk, so the recipients were by definition the most successful commanders.
Cheers
Steve

soulezoo said:

This is correct; the best example being Mush Morton.

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Of the top 10 U.S. Sub Commanders, all had pre-war submariner training and experience.

Cmdr. Morton ranked number 3 out of those top 10 and made the third spot because of the number of ships sunk, not tonnage.

That top ten list is:
1) Cmdr. O'Kane - USS Tang: 24 ships/93,824 tons
The Tang was lost to it's own torpedo on 25 October 1944 resulting in O'Kane being taken POW.

2) Cmdr. Cutter - USS Pomapano: 19 ships/72,000 tons

3) Cmdr. Morton - USS Wahoo: 19 ships/55,000 tons
Lost on 4th patrol (September 1943)

4) Cmdr. Fluckey - USS Barb: 16 ships/95,360 tons

5) Cmdr. Dealy - USS Harder: 16 ships/54,002 tons
Depth charged and lost on 24 August 1944.

6) Cmdr. Whitaker - USS Flasher: 14.5 ships/60,846 tons

7) Cmdr. Underwood - USS Spadefish: 14 ship/75,386 tons

8) Cmdr. Gross - USS Seawolf/USS Boarfish: 14 ships/65,735 tons
Boarfish landed commandos near Hue, Indochina, to sabotage rail lines earning a train as an unofficial credit.

9) Cmdr. Treibel - USS Shark: 14 ships/58,837 tons

10) Cmdr. Coye Jr. - USS Silversides: 14 ships/39,000 tons
USS Silversides is preserved and on display at Great Lakes Naval Memorial Museum.

Quoting Steve (stona)

"That the Battle of the Atlantic did not come as close to defeating Britain as has sometimes been claimed post war is a statement of fact, not trolling".

I disagree with this statement, based on the following:

The quoted shipping losses in most accounts for the Battle are consistently and massively understated. The simple facts are that most accounts only take into account shipping under direct allied control, when in fact the allied effort relied very heavily on both allied controlled and neutral shipping. Much of the British shipping at the beginning of the war was transferred to flags of convenience at the beginning of the war such as Panama, because initially the Germans were reluctant to attack neutral (particularly pan American) shipping.

Another factor is that Allied shipping total tended to include shipping controlled by neutral and France (eg Norway, Sweden, the low countries). The estimates of these neutral shipping and their contributions to the british war effort are based on pre-war shipping tallies, and put these European nations at around 9-10 million tons, and bumped up allied shipping after the entry of these nations as allies to around 25-27 million tons. In fact Allied shipping totals were nowhere near those levels. Of that 9 million tons of neutral shipping that britain gained control of after the early campaigns, about half was lost or captured (mostly lost).

In addition, the US 1938-40 suffered a net shortage of shipping. It had relied heavily for its imports on foreign shipping (particularly British and Dutch) so when war broke out there was a persistent passive demand that the allies had to meet in order to keep the world economy ticking over 9which vastly benefitted the Allies over the Axis who even by 1940 were quite isolated.


Bottom line is that far from the often quoted 3.5 million tons lost in 1940, real allied losses in 1940 were closer to 10 million tons. In 1941, the rupturing of allied shipping continued, albeit at a diminished scale, with the loss of 4.5 million tons of shipping. New construction in that pre-US entry period from all sources amounted to about 1.8 million tons 1939-41.

Captured enemy shipping (eg over 40 Italian ships were seized in british and US ports in June 1940) added about 500000 tons to the allied totals. The gross subtotals to Allied shipping after the additions of 1940 are taken into account, amount to 28million tons give or take. The net losses amount to 14 million tons, not including the 6million tons of US registered ocean going shipping.

I should also mention the demands placed on shipping on the increasingly global nature of the war. The main demands on allied shipping prior to December 1941 were the far east and the Middle East.

To keep the ME command supplied, the shipping needs went up from about 500000 tons June 1940 to over 2 million tons by the start of Crusader.

In the Pacific, to meet the needs of the pre-December 1941 garrisons, Im not sure of the actual amount, but my best gues is that it went up from about 300000 tons to maybe a million tons

Conversely, and to be fully fair, the british isles made strenuous efforts to boost home food production. Such were the extent of these economy drives that home consumption demands had been reduced to about 7 million tons by December 1941.

Overall, the MOWT (I think it was them) estimated their minimum needs for 1942 were about 9-10 million tons just to prevent Britain from being forced to her knees. By December 1941 there was a buffer of somewhere in the order of 5 million tons. That buffer was there because finally the RN was getting organised to fight the Uboats effectively, Hitler had allowed a large proportion of U-Boat strength to be frittered away on secondary fronts, there was in the last six months a measure of US support, finally US shipping was being used all the way across the north atlantic, and finally, most importantly, the allies had temporarily cracked the Uboat Enigma ciphers

The inescapable conclusion about this is that the battle was a very close run thing in which a measure of sheer dumb luck played its part in saving britain

Shortround6 said:

One might note that this was not entirely unique to the Germans.
The US had to replace almost all of their pre-war submarine commanders before achieving any real level of success.
Pre-war exercises with unrealistic conditions had produced a very cautious/defensive mindset in the sub commanders. To be detected was almost automatically assumed to be sunk in the war games.

I would also note that even such details as slip length or crane capacity can mean smaller ships staying production instead of all production facilities switching to new/larger design.

Click to expand...

That was the standard explanation of those who refused to consider that early WW2 USN torpedoes were deeply flawed. USN torpedoes were largely useless until late 1943:
Mark 14 torpedo - Wikipedia

We can argue all day about how close a thing the Battle of the Atlantic was. By your estimates, a 5 million ton buffer by the end of 1941 would support the contention I made earlier that the KM had its best chance in 1940/41. After that it had lost the Battle because, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, it could not sink enough ships, consistently enough, to prevent a steady increase in the tonnage available to the Allies.
Cheers
Steve

Shortround6 said:

The bigger conventional U-boats were slower to dive, had a bigger turning circle and had a bit less range (endurance) when running on batteries (20%?). Diving depth may have been a bit shallower.

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I've had a chance to dig out the relative performance of the different types. There are a lot of sub-types, but generally the shorter submerged range of the Type IX compared to the Type VII is correct. The Germans gave this figure as submerged range at 4 knots.
For the Type VIIs it is generally about 80-90 miles.
For the Type IXA, B, C is about 60-70 miles. For later Ds the figure I have is at a mere 2 knots and is not directly comparable, it varies from 121 to 245 miles.

The big advantage of the larger Type IXs, particularly operating across the Atlantic, was their much greater range. The Germans gave figures for maximum range at 10 knots.
The Type VIIs vary from 6,200 miles to 8,500 miles for the VIIA,B,C and C41, 11,200 for the VIID.
The Type IXs vary from 10,500 miles for the IXA to a more typical 12,000-13,850 for the IX B, C and C40. The IXD1 had a range of 12,500 miles but later IXDs (D2 and D42) had a range of 31,500 miles.

Maximum surface speeds for both types are similar, most in the 17-18 knot range.

Both types could dive to 100-200m.

Cheers

Steve

Dive time for the type VIIIs was 25-30 seconds with some of the boats with larger conning towers and more AA guns taking longer. Dive time for the type IX was 35 seconds. Again with more time needed by boats with larger conning towers/more additions. They tried to get the time down by using narrow foredecks.

The Type VIIID is of no account as it was a minelayer with a 10meter section of hull added behind the conning tower to hold mine tubes. With the longer hull came larger fuel tanks. only 6 were built.
Both the type VII and Type IX were rated for 150 meters although sometimes operated below that in emergencies. The Type VIIC-41 was rated for 180 meters.

The Type VII had four forward tubes with 6 spare torpedoes in the torpedo room. It had one stern tube with no spare in the VIIA and one spare in a torpedo room in the VIIIB, for a total of 12 torpedoes inside the hull . All later attack boats carried a spare torpedo in a canister under the deck both for and aft to get to the total of 14 torpedoes. Practicality of using those 2 spare torpedoes varies with area of operation and sea states.
The Type IX had four forward tubes but only four spare torpedoes in the torpedo room. The rear torpedo room had two tubes and two spare torpedoes in the torpedo room. Total of twelve torpedoes inside the pressure hull. Most type IXs carried ten torpedoes in canisters under the deck to reach the total of 22 torpedoes.

Not a procedure you want to undertake in typical North Atlantic weather conditions OR in areas with large numbers of air patrols.

Getting caught with a torpedo part way through the loading hatch was a fear that probably gave ulcers to U-boat commanders.

For operations around England or the Mid-Atlantic (lots of air patrols and lousy weather) the Type IX offered no tactical advantage over the Type VII. For operations in distant waters and/or better climates it was obviously superior.

The Type VII could still play an important role near the end of the war and was not simply a "left over" compared to the type IX that showed the Germans were not trying to introduce new weapons/tactics.

stona said:

We can argue all day about how close a thing the Battle of the Atlantic was. By your estimates, a 5 million ton buffer by the end of 1941 would support the contention I made earlier that the KM had its best chance in 1940/41. After that it had lost the Battle because, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, it could not sink enough ships, consistently enough, to prevent a steady increase in the tonnage available to the Allies.
Cheers
Steve

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I agree that the chances of German outright victory took a dive for the worse after the entry of the US, but in 1942 it was still dependent on luck and intelligent use of resources for the allies to survive. one of the biggest shake ups was in the allocation, deployment and use of the airborne assets.

For Germany to win in 1942 they had to be in a far better shape than they were historically. By the end of 1941, the numbers of boats available and at sea were still below the 50 mark. They needed 3 or 4 times that number, and could have done but for hitlers stupid decisions. They needed every boat they could get in the main TO and they needed to hit the Americans from day 1. . A loss of around 10 million tons, quickly, would have forced the allies to the negotiating table despite their industrial advantages.

It was a lost opportunity for the Germans, and certainly not beyond the imppossible.

I don't disagree with any of that. Luck always plays a part, but the reaction of the Allies to the 'U-boat menace' was obviously not all fortuitous. As Churchill said.
"Men may make mistakes, and learn from their mistakes. Men may have bad luck, and their luck may change."
The Allies made organisational and technological advances that left the Germans almost literally foundering in their wakes. The deployment of air power (and its new technologies) was just one aspect of this.

I still maintain that the Battle of the Atlantic was not as close as popular history generally would have us believe. At the very time the U-boats were sinking the largest tonnage of Allied shipping they had already lost the Battle. I don't believe that this was obvious at the time, but with 70+ years of hindsight it is.
A missed opportunity for Germany? Given the historical assets available to them I don't think so. In not very different circumstances? I agree that the outcome could have been different.

Some smart person once said that war is a series of mistakes and the side that makes the fewest wins, or words to that effect. The Germans made far too many!
"War is mainly a catalogue of blunders."
Churchill again.

Cheers

Steve

One of the contributing factors to Germany's loss of any advantage from the onset, was that they never put their industry into a real wartime emphasis until much later in the war when the reality set in that things were going very bad for them. This can be applied all across the board, from AFV and aircraft production, all the way through the submarine construction.
In the year or so leading up to the war and even by early 1942, they had the opportunity to maximize production relatively unmolested - so this in itself was huge contribution to their downfall.

GrauGeist said:

Of the top 10 U.S. Sub Commanders, all had pre-war submariner training and experience.

Cmdr. Morton ranked number 3 out of those top 10 and made the third spot because of the number of ships sunk, not tonnage.

That top ten list is:
1) Cmdr. O'Kane - USS Tang: 24 ships/93,824 tons
The Tang was lost to it's own torpedo on 25 October 1944 resulting in O'Kane being taken POW.

2) Cmdr. Cutter - USS Pomapano: 19 ships/72,000 tons

3) Cmdr. Morton - USS Wahoo: 19 ships/55,000 tons
Lost on 4th patrol (September 1943)

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The Royal Navys most sucessful commander in terms of number of vessels sunk (27 in 29 patrols) was
Benjamin Bryant https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Bryant
he wasborn in 1905 so it shows Old uns can still be Good uns

stona said:

"War is mainly a catalogue of blunders."
Churchill again.

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According to Jonathan Dimbleby (The Battle of the Atlantic - pp 444) - this was Churchill's biggest blunder of WW2...

Was it just a lack of shipping?
How was NW Europe going to be invaded before the Luftwaffe was reduced or destroyed for example.
I do not disagree with the sentiment, but the statistics clearly show an ever increasing tonnage available from 1942 onward. You can never have enough shipping to satisfy every demand and keep everyone satisfied in war time, and obviously the 14 million tons lost must have had an impact. The losses may have delayed Allied operations, but my argument is that they were not enough to come close to winning the war for Germany, which is quite a different thing.
Cheers
Steve