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Most of what you see are based on the official admiralty report on the incident, which for the most part appears to be an accurate account of the events that transpired. however there are inconsistencies and gaps in these accounts that have never been satisfactorily addressed.
The culprits were the Luftwaffe codes, by far more easily broken than those of the Kriegsmarine.
True Stona but two days ago there was a report issued which said that the most popular 8 digit passwords today are 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H.
I know that it sounds simplistic but at the end of the day the German economy and its limited raw materials, meant that the Luftwaffe didn't have the choice. They could either have the tactical airforce they had, or they could have the heavy four engined bomber airforce, not both.
The Luftwaffe grew from nothing to being a formidable force in a very short space of time, to grow even further would be asking too much.
The Germans, as has been pointed out earlier, had little chance of being able to reach and target allied war production facilities even if they had an equivalent platform.
Our own experience in the pacific with flawed torpedoes shows the necessity and efficacy of improving weapons systems and components on a continuous basis. The US sink rate went up dramatically when newer torpedoes were introduced. As far as our submarines, I agree the Fleet Boat standard was only incrementally changed during WW2 all the way until 51. After that we built and launched numerous new classes. I seem to recall someone describing US WW2 subs as shoddy surface ships that could occasionally sink themselves and refloat themselves. Not knocking our sub mariner force at all, but part of the problem was the role that the BB Admirals wanted to constrain the boats to.Depends on how you look at. Somebody once said in regards to artillery. "the shell is the weapon, the artillery piece (tube) is just the delivery system."
Improvements in Torpedoes could make a substantial difference in a submarine fleet's effectiveness. As could improved sonars, snorkels, passive radar receivers, improved diving depth (stronger hull not only increases dive depth, it slightly reduces the lethal radius of depth charges.) I would note that the US built essentially the same submarine from about 1939/40 to 1951. And kept the wartime design of diesel engine (although uprated) till the last of the diesel boats were built after a new design turned out to be a dud.
Granted the Japanese never had the anti-sub capability of the RN and US Navy in late WW II.
The US produced 2,710 Liberty ships during the war. And there were other classes and types built all over so I would have to say unless U-Boat production ramped up incredibly the chance of Germany starving Britain of supplies and men was unlikely. Up until 1942 the Germans certainly caused a great deal of concern. But the advent of mass production of ships, escort carriers, convoy systems, land based bombers with increased range, radar etc. The U-Boat was doomed to failure by the sheer weight of production and advancement in our ability to both defend ships and target the wolf packs, greatly helped by cracking their communications as well. So I would have to agree with you that while the losses were horrific initially, the end result was that Germany could not effectively attack shipping on the scale necessary to win the war by denying material and man power to England.We can argue all day about how close a thing the Battle of the Atlantic was. By your estimates, a 5 million ton buffer by the end of 1941 would support the contention I made earlier that the KM had its best chance in 1940/41. After that it had lost the Battle because, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, it could not sink enough ships, consistently enough, to prevent a steady increase in the tonnage available to the Allies.
Cheers
Steve
Agreed! You clarified my point perfectly. Allied bombing of German industrial targets (spurred on by American airpower advocates) was a sustained, long term, and unrelenting operation. German bombing efforts seem concerned with immediate outcomes, based on short term operational and tactical needs. The resource requirements that sustained the Allied bombing campaign were enormous, as were the casualties. I get the impression, German leaders weren't willing to risk resources in this manner.This varied considerably depending on year and intended target.
From 1935-1939 the Luftwaffe was certainly able to reach and target most of the war production of it's intimidate potential enemies, which were pretty much it's neighbors, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland and the low countries (declared neutrals). In 1938-39 large parts of Britain could be added to the target list even without taking French territory. The Luftwaffe's reach also extended further into the Balkans should it have been needed. Hitting Russian targets was pretty much out of the question. Only a few bombers in the world could hit Russian industrial targets from German territory in in 1938-39. It is about 680 miles from the German Border to Keiv and a mere 580 miles from the German border to Minsk. It is about 940 miles from the Border to Moscow. Or roughly the distance from London to Warsaw.
German Ability to hit US targets was zero and vice versa for the entire war (American bombers operating from North America)
In 1940 The Germans could hit Northern Ireland from the low countries or Northern France. Keiv was around 400-440miles from Hungarian, Romanian or captured Polish territory. The German 2nd Generation bombers (or 3rd depending on how you count the Do-11,13,23 and Ju 52) pretty much fell on their faces and left the He 111 and JU 88 to carry the load with some help from the Do 217 (sort a generation and 1/2 aircraft).
With the relocation of some of the Russian industry to beyond the Urals ( and pre-war construction of some industry there) the Germans would have needed the equivalent of B-29s to mount an effective bombing campaign. it is around 830-850miles from Stalingrad to Chelyabinsk (Tankograd) so the use of lesser bombers would require quite the crystal ball to predict how far the German Army could penetrate into Russia and when. It is about 1100 miles from Kharkiv to Chelyabinsk for instance.
The Germans could call a program the "Ural bomber" and write all the specifications they wanted, it wasn't going to be practical.
That doesn't mean the Germans couldn't attack allied (Mostly British) War Production. They certainly did and with surprisingly good results at times given the numbers of aircraft involved. They failed to follow up very well, German target damage assessment seems to have been little different than the British target damage assessment in 1940/41 (bad to nonexistent)