German logistics, purchase programs and war booty, reality and alternatives 1935-43 (2 Viewers)

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Yes, it matches the accepted thinking (and their own assessments) that Germany did not have the breath for a long, exhausting war. Germany's war in the west was just that - short and devastating campaigns. Poland, respite, Denmark/Norway almost complete before Battle of France, rest, Yugoslavia/Greece finished almost before Barbarossa. And here we come to the USSR and USA problem. It was perfectly clear that the war in the east was inevitable, and on the other hand, Roosevelt's policy was not (excessively) hidden either (like any real politician - say "we never want to go to war" in the elections and then do everything to provoke it). The mustache assessment was that America would not have a greater influence on the war in Europe until 1942 (sorry America - he was right), that's why the decision to get rid of the USSR in 1941 was not illogical (and the declaration of war by the USA does not change the situation on the ground - it can only draw Japan into the equation of war with the Soviets).

Only the assessment (but not only Germany - let's not forget that the rest of the world during the summer and autumn of 1941 was sure of the collapse of the USSR) was faulty.

Whether better logistics (and let's say a better plan of Barbarossa than Halder's) would lead to the collapse of the USSR is a slightly bigger question. But it is not entirely impossible that the fall of Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine in 1941/2 would reduce the Soviets (at least for a while) to negligible danger and thus provide (them) time to fortify the coasts of Europe and set up air defenses and/or clear North Africa and/or neutralize the UK. That is, to prepare for the arrival in the USA.
Again how successful and what the wallies moves would be - that's up for debate.

So instead of a conclusion, if I may return to logistics.

As usual the answer is not just one magic item. But a combination of gas generators for trucks (much earlier), diesel propulsion for tanks (because it is easier to produce synthetically) steam wagons, and generally less horses for transport (and more food for people) ... would certainly solve the logistics issue.
Admittedly, for that to happen, there would have to be a visionary who would see it and an economic genius who would balance the economy between consumption and the price of oil and the alternatives, at least in the pre-war era.

And the results could deprive us of the possibility of discussing it at all (in terms of a much different world that I'm sure you wouldn't want to see).

Again, this is a conversation about technology, but ultimately it's impossible to avoid the implications of its application and what it would mean for millions of people.
 
As I recall, although I was only one year old at the time, Germany declared war on the U.S. The only time he declared war before attacking, which freed the USA.
 
As I hinted, the German declaration of war on the USA did not change anything on the ground, and what exactly was the agreement (or wishes) about Japan's actions towards the USSR in the Germany-Japan agreements, if we have not found out by now, we can only guess.
At least it is clear that Germany expected reciprocity, i.e. a Japanese declaration of war on the USSR.

The war between Germany and the USA was simply not declared. Military aid to the UK (and before that to France), convoy protection zones, Ruben James ... are not exactly a show of neutrality .
 
As I hinted, the German declaration of war on the USA did not change anything on the ground, and what exactly was the agreement (or wishes) about Japan's actions towards the USSR in the Germany-Japan agreements, if we have not found out by …..
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As I recall, although I was only one year old at the time, Germany declared war on the U.S. The only time he declared war before attacking, which freed the USA.
Germany declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941 in support of Japan, Italy followed soon after.

It was most likely in support of Japan's membership in the Axis, but a huge mistake on his behalf, since the U.S. was still officially neutral with the European Axis nations.
 
BTW - does anyone have some good data on the natural gas production and consumption in Europe and world, 1930 to 1945? TIK of the youtube fame mentioned that plans for 1943 were including the natural gas production/consumption of some 500 000 tons for that year (or it's equivalent in gasoline?).
 
BTW - does anyone have some good data on the natural gas production and consumption in Europe and world, 1930 to 1945? TIK of the youtube fame mentioned that plans for 1943 were including the natural gas production/consumption of some 500 000 tons for that year (or it's equivalent in gasoline?).
World, I do not have.
USA
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Most Gas was from Gasified Coal, aka Town Gas not Natural Gas. USA started pipelines that eventually put those plants out of business after the War.
UK didn't start phasing them out til the '60s.

Europe, I have no data, but given the lack of oil production, normally means lack of Natural Gas, as is formed in same geological processes-- while Coal was everywhere.
 
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Many thanks for the overview.
Do you have similar data for the coal types that Germany could've also used back in ww2, coming from France, Belgium, Bohemia, Poland or Ukraine?
Here are the analyses for Polish and French coal:

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Coal production of the Axis powers and the occupied countries is given in the following table (thousands of metric tons):
1737928774169.png

Data is from the following website.
Polish coal is estimated
Clearly German coal production dwarfs the contributions of the other countries
 
If you really want to understand combustion this is the industry bible:
The reference book I have is:
It was published by B&W's major rival Combustion Engineering who were kind enough to give a copy to me. The B&W book is superior but I would just borrow my boss's copy
 
Only the assessment (but not only Germany - let's not forget that the rest of the world during the summer and autumn of 1941 was sure of the collapse of the USSR) was faulty.

Whether better logistics (and let's say a better plan of Barbarossa than Halder's) would lead to the collapse of the USSR is a slightly bigger question. But it is not entirely impossible that the fall of Leningrad, Moscow and Ukraine in 1941/2 would reduce the Soviets (at least for a while) to negligible danger and thus provide (them) time to fortify the coasts of Europe and set up air defenses and/or clear North Africa and/or neutralize the UK. That is, to prepare for the arrival in the USA.
Again how successful and what the wallies moves would be - that's up for debate.

It's possible that the USSR would have collapsed with the fall of Moscow. But I think it's more likely that trying to capture Moscow would have resulted in another Stalingrad-esque meat grinder that the Wehrmacht could ill afford. Similarly, winning in NA would have taken huge resources (and what does winning NA constitute? Capture Cairo? Or Palestine, and the Iraq oil fields?), and with the RN roaming in the Med, how to keep your troops supplied?

As usual the answer is not just one magic item. But a combination of gas generators for trucks (much earlier), diesel propulsion for tanks (because it is easier to produce synthetically) steam wagons, and generally less horses for transport (and more food for people) ... would certainly solve the logistics issue.
Admittedly, for that to happen, there would have to be a visionary who would see it and an economic genius who would balance the economy between consumption and the price of oil and the alternatives, at least in the pre-war era.

Yes, maybe. But the German economy was already going full bore with rearmament; if you do more of X you have to do less of Y. Better logistics and more alternative fuels would likely have been useful, but what to sacrifice in order to get those? Sacrifice a couple of the surface warships might have helped a little? And would the army be better if it was motorized but smaller than historical?

As for earlier introduction of gas generators, I think one of the big advantages of gas generators is that you can quickly switch an existing vehicle over to it. So while international trade is still possible, maybe keep using imported petroleum and reap the benefits of cheap and convenient fuel as long as possible. That of course doesn't prevent manufacturing and stockpiling gas generators so they can quickly be taken into use once the foreign fuel taps are cut off.

German industrialists were actually quite opposed to the synthetic fuels program, as they saw that it would never be economical, particularly considering the depressed price of oil on the international market in the 1930'ies. Well, except those industrialists involved in the production of the synthetic fuels, that is. But there's also the foreign exchange situation, which was in quite a critical state already before Hitler took power. The synthetic fuels program was not only in order to insulate the nation from a blockade in case of war, but it was also intended to help with the foreign exchange crisis.
 
Higher taxes and speed limits than what gasoline had.
Steam wagon
Steam wagons were already going the way of the Dodo before the Salter Act of 1934 and before the taxation laws. By 1930 there were only two major manufactures left in the game, Foden and Sentinel. The death knell was sounded when an enterprising bus company, Barton Transport, installed one of the just developed Gardner L2 diesels into a Lancia bus in February 1930. Foden quickly saw the light and started switching to the improved Gardner LW as soon as it came out in August 1931 and had phased out steam by 1934.
Here is an interesting article from The Commercial Motor in 1934 pleading the case for steam but what is does nicely is enumerate it problems.
Note the steam wagon was favored with a special allowance of an extra ton in gross weight, which considering the size of the lorries at that time, was a substantial concession but that that was not considered to be enough and 2 tons was proposed.
 
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Steam wagons were already going the way of the Dodo before the Salter Act of 1934 and before the taxation laws. By 1930 there were only two major manufactures left in the game, Foden and Sentinel. The death knell was sounded when an enterprising bus company, Barton Transport, installed one of the just developed Gardner L2 diesels into a Lancia bus in February 1930. Foden quickly saw the light and started switching to the improved Gardner LW as soon as it came out in August 1931 and had phased out steam by 1934.
Here is an interesting article from The Commercial Motor in 1934 pleading the case for steam but what is does nicely is enumerate it problems.
If there was ever the opportunity for the Germans to buy cheap, that was it.
 
If you really want to understand combustion this is the industry bible:
The reference book I have is:
It was published by B&W's major rival Combustion Engineering who were kind enough to give a copy to me. The B&W book is superior but I would just borrow my boss's copy
1919 era book, out of copyright
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/22657/22657-h/22657-h.htm
 
Yes, maybe. But the German economy was already going full bore with rearmament;
Greater Germany famously didn't go to full War Economy til 1942, when Speer became Armaments Minister after Todt died in another of those frequent Nazi aircraft accidents.

This is because the Nazis knew full what happened at the end of the Great War, with consumer production of Goods not even able to provide Starvation levels of Food. Keep the Volk happy with full bellies.

Also, after Schacht was moved aside for Göring to do economic planning, those 4 year plans hardly worked any better than Stalin's.

If Hitler like the idea of increasing farm productivity via Steam Tractors, it would have happened 1936-1940
 
Note the steam wagon was favored with a special allowance of an extra ton in gross weight, which considering the size of the lorries at that time, was a substantial concession but that that was not considered to be enough and 2 tons was proposed.
So why were there such low road limits in the first place?
To make sure freight traveled by rail, not road.
Gasoline vehicles in the UK were not a threat, as none had the load capacity of the Steamers at this point.

Over in the USA Mack was making the 7.5 ton AC
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and 10 ton Mack AP

Now these would have been great in Europe for moving big loads, but they did not 'Think Big' enough.
In defense of the UK, they did have inexpensive Oil before the War, and liquid fuel with ICE is far less expensive than Steam.


Germany didn't have cheap liquid hydrocarbon fuels available.

Yes, end was in sight for UK Steam, but it was euthanized rather than by normal economic methods. Tax things to limit use, subsidize to increase. UK subsidized Steam on the Rails, taxed on the roads.
 
So why were there such low road limits in the first place?
To make sure freight traveled by rail, not road.
Gasoline vehicles in the UK were not a threat, as none had the load capacity of the Steamers at this point.

Over in the USA Mack was making the 7.5 ton AC
View attachment 815833
View attachment 815834
and 10 ton Mack AP

Now these would have been great in Europe for moving big loads, but they did not 'Think Big' enough.
In defense of the UK, they did have inexpensive Oil before the War, and liquid fuel with ICE is far less expensive than Steam.


Germany didn't have cheap liquid hydrocarbon fuels available.

Yes, end was in sight for UK Steam, but it was euthanized rather than by normal economic methods. Tax things to limit use, subsidize to increase. UK subsidized Steam on the Rails, taxed on the roads.
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