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As long as Hitler remains in charge, all scenarios are doomed...The only scenario where the germans come out worse
No, please feel free to contribute.
Now shoot me down please.
Ok, I'll take a junior shot at it:
No matter what Germany produces or how much of it or whether there is lend lease or not - or whether all the forces released in the west are used in the east or demobilised. Barbarossa is doomed to fail, pretty much as in the OTL and the more forces used in the east and the further they encroach territory the worse (better) their eventual defeat becomes.
An army cannot advance beyond the rate determined by it's resupply. And resupply in Barbarossa/ the steppes is largely determined by railway capacity (because truck convoys can't operate long distance on Russian dirt roads in the autumn or winter and cant haul the heavy stuff at speed at any time).
The germans had a plan of logistic support based on rail, there were some invalid assumptions, they couldn't be compensated for, the best that could be done was done and still the offensive came up short of objectives in distance and left some red army units intact around Moscow. It had to - no other result is possible. Moeltke had a rule of thumb about combat distance from a railhead. Hitler of hubris ignored it, October rains put the frontline troops beyond the effective range of the trucks to resupply them from the railheads. Winter effectively further extended the supply distance in terms of tons delivered per hour. The Siberian armies arrived (on Russian locos : which burnt Russian brown? coal and were winter proof, german precision engineered locos, not so much...)
÷ïåîîáñ ìéôåòáôõòá --[ ÷ÏÅÎÎÁÑ ÉÓÔÏÒÉÑ ]-- Stolfi R. H. S. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted
David M. Glantz, Barbarossa de-railed (no I haven't read it all)
In summary: Technically : railways, 5' gauge, blown bridges, 'scorched earth' marshalling yards, conversion speeds, Baltic states used standard gauge, double tracking, scheduling, signalling, partisans, Luftwaffe not configured for strategic use etc. Supply lines are a bottle neck in the east throughout the period so production is less important.
Actually, tentatively: I tend to agree with Grau Geist. The reason behind the reason appears to be Hitlers arrogance /paranoid delusion borne of easy victory in the west. That plus docile tenacity turned to unexpected fury in the Soviet peoples, plus the unexpected strength in depth of the Red Army despite the worst Stalin could do ...
Now shoot me down please.
What about seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus and using Stalingrad as a defensive position to hold the flank of the Caucasian advance???On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.
If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.
Then in July, Hitler re-wrote the objectives in the campaign to include the capture of Stalingrad, making it a priority.
This was the tactical mistake that became the turning point of the eastern front. You can delve into the smaller details, such as his insistance on dividing Army Group South into two units, pulling units from the seige of Sebastopol which caused serious delays in Case Blue's start, etc etc...but the bottom line is that HAD Hitler followed the plan as laid out, Stalingrad would have been cut off entirely by Army Group South and eventually capitulated.
Instead, thanks to Hitler's ego, Stalingrad became a sucking chest wound to the Wehrmacht and the tipping point to the war in the East.
What about seizing the oil fields of the Caucasus and using Stalingrad as a defensive position to hold the flank of the Caucasian advance???On the contrary, I understand Hitler's intentions very well.
If you look at the summer (1942) campaign objectives, you will see that the intention was to take out the industrial centers and block the Volga supply route, thus limiting much needed material from reaching the Red army by way of the Caspian and creating a strong southern salient.
Then in July, Hitler re-wrote the objectives in the campaign to include the capture of Stalingrad, making it a priority.
This was the tactical mistake that became the turning point of the eastern front. You can delve into the smaller details, such as his insistance on dividing Army Group South into two units, pulling units from the seige of Sebastopol which caused serious delays in Case Blue's start, etc etc...but the bottom line is that HAD Hitler followed the plan as laid out, Stalingrad would have been cut off entirely by Army Group South and eventually capitulated.
Instead, thanks to Hitler's ego, Stalingrad became a sucking chest wound to the Wehrmacht and the tipping point to the war in the East.
i agree that Barbarossa was very unlikely to succeed, but it could have gone better than historically with more forces. Its not outside the realm of possibility for Leningrad and Murmansk to fall with greater air support and more mobile infantry (paratroopers and the Afrika Korps).
.
No (smile), more forces do no good unless you can resupply them. And with an inherited Soviet rail system, with only steppe sandy soil to bear weight, under reconstruction in 1941 or under partisan attack there after, feeding a dirt road system or any distance in a bombed out city you cannot shift enough tons in winter to keep your elite high tech forces supplied at any distance from a railway. The more you use motorised divisions the worse it gets, because they need fuel and spare parts. Horse fodder and man food on the other hand can be obtained locally.
Look at the casualty statistics, every winter when german forces are perforce immobile and defensive - casualties go up - just an eyeball impression you understand.
A lesson hard learned in WW1, thrown away in WW2: no matter how grand your breakout may be it will fizzle out and be vulnerable to counter attack if you cannot supply it. Barbarossa had to stall before Moscow, the Archangel - Astrakhan objective was impossible.
No matter what promising or crucial stage the offensive is at in the end of August if you don't spend September falling back on whatever rail head there may be to establish a well supplied defensive line before the first big rains of autumn your hi-tech, resource hungry, elite forces are vulnerable and likely to become more so as winter sets in the more forces you field the more resupply they need the more vulnerable they become.
Red Army peasants with terrible locos and tough little ponies on the other hand can keep an offensive of sorts supplied right through the winter, and shove 100 miles forward from Moscow in winter 1941/42 for example. If my memory and reading materials serve me well.
#Yeah, we've strayed very far OT. The thread is about production, not even the outcome of a potential Axis vs. USSR showdown. Unlike Dave Bender, I think the campaign would be a long one, so long term production comes into play; what could Germany produce without the pressures of wars on other fronts? That means no Uboat war, no need for home aerial defense production (beyond the minimum), no diversion of resources to other theaters like Africa (does anyone have information about what equipment and how many men were sent to Africa from 1941-43?), and no bombing campaign disrupting production. There are of course political issues in this, like whether Germany would have enough money to purchase from abroad and how the West would react. But fundamentally this thread is about production output at its core, not politics.
#
Looks like we have strayed off thread again.
I think the question should really have been, would not having to fight a war in the west have given Germany victory in 1941?
but the implicit assumption for this thread is that the Germans don't knock out the Soviets in 1941, so the war drags on and production numbers become relevant.
Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve
Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve
Isn't the point of Stalingrad, however misguided badly done, that Germany thought it would be one way (perhaps the one way) of forcing Stalin to fight at a time when Germany knew (despite the losses to date) that the Russians had become quite skilled at withdrawing too quickly for the German forces to decisively defeat destroy?
Without a war in the west the primary point (to me at least) still stands; Germany is still simply not equipped to tackle the Russian war and as history shows even some fast heavy defeats did not knock Russia out of the war.
The delusion that it could be done quickly was proved to be so.
I'd also say that without a war in the west Germany would most likely go to war with Russia even worse equipped (in terms of armour especially) than it was.
In my view the most likely outcome is similar to what happened with perhaps Moscow and/or Leningrad taken, Stalin his gang deposed probably shot with an emergency Russian nationalist, probably military, Gov coming into being Russia still recovers comes together to grind down (although over more time) German arms.
The most significant parts of Russia's industrial base are simply out of the LW's reach they have nothing (credible) to do much about it, nor are they likely to for a long time.
Germany is still likely to think it is all over (given the crazy proven hubris of the leadership) with some fast and impressive victories so I do not see wonder-weapons coming on any quicker time-table....and when they do, eventually, it is likely to be much the same story with much wasted effort gross duplication, a badly run affair encouraged by the nature of the German state's leadership of the time.
Similarly I do not see the Hitler gang prepared to consolidate when supply lines become over-stretched in my opinion they are most likely to go repeating the same mistakes, just at places with different names.
Most of all neither can I see any way that the USA and British (inc Empire) just stand idly by whilst this happens without assisting the Russians.
A cold-war with the west being highly probable in my view.
But we all have our opinions.
Of course with no need to fight the West in 1940, if we run with that scenario, then the Germans can invade in 1940, which is prior to the T-34 and the German tanks of 1940 were a match for the Soviet models prior to the T-34.
I didn't read it that way either, my assumption was the same as yours.Not for me. If the Germans have not fought a war in the West where they sustained substantial and often under estimated losses in men and materiel, particularly in the Battle of France, then I think that their is every chance that the Soviet Union could have been defeated in 1941. Wermacht officers could have enjoyed their dinner invitations to restaurants in Leningrad and Moscow
Cheers
Steve