Germany -- No Battleships No Mediterranean (1 Viewer)

Admiral Beez · Apr 19, 2026

Shortround6 said:
By 1914 Germany was 2nd largest exporter in the world, 2nd only to UK. Germany had started a bit late being a largely agriculture economy in 1850 but changed over to an industrial economy faster than the other European powers. This meant both imports and exports.

Yes, but a lack of a battlefleet would not have made this impossible. By the middle of the 1880s the USA had surpassed Britain as the world's leading producer of manufactured goods and steel, and yet the country did not commission any battleships until 1895, with USS Texas and USS Maine. Germany did not need a vanity battlefleet to protect its trade, because Germany's trade was never under threat.

z42 · Apr 19, 2026

Admiral Beez said:
Yes, but a lack of a battlefleet would not have made this impossible.

And, the battlefleet did little to prevent the RN from interdicting German seaborne trade.

z42 · Apr 19, 2026

Shortround6 said:
Sort of overlooks the importance of that coastline to Germany.
With the Ems, Weser, and Elbe rivers feeding the ports of Emden, Bremerhaven/Bremen and Hamburg respectively.
Brunsbüttel is the western end of the Kiel canal.
Much of Germany's maritime trade would be through that coastline and not the eastern coastline.

Bismark's comment/s might have been important at the time they were made (18??). But.....

Kiel Canal was finished 3 years after he died. Improvements in other canals and improvements in rail transport in the late 1800s changed Germany's place in the world significantly.
By 1914 Germany was 2nd largest exporter in the world, 2nd only to UK. Germany had started a bit late being a largely agriculture economy in 1850 but changed over to an industrial economy faster than the other European powers. This meant both imports and exports.
What may have been good strategy in the 1860-70s was no longer good strategy in 1900.
Naval technology was also changing enormously in just 6 decades. From mostly wooden ships with smooth bore muzzle loaders and under 20lb boiler pressure and single expansion steam engines to through iron and then steel hulls, Breech loading rifled guns and then smokeless powder and boiler pressure going over 200lbs and the going to triple expansion engines and the start of turbines.

Germany after 1900 did spend too much on the navy but to ignore the navy or resort to the "gunboat doctrine" was not the answer. The "gunboat doctrine" (or allied doctrines) was trotted out periodically as a cheap way of dealing with a superior enemy but since it never worked it turned out to be an expensive failure. The "gunboat doctrine" dates back to at least President Jefferson in 1803 (?). It kept taxes down. It didn't do much else.

Agreed, but are you implying there's something the Germans could have done to keep that seaborne trade going if the RN says otherwise?

The approach adopted was a short victorious war. Worked a little better the second time around, at least they got to march around the Arc de Triomphe, but we all know the end result both times.

Elan Vital · Apr 19, 2026

Shortround6 said:
Starting in 1936 (?) the British (and French?) don't have to worry about any German Navy?
France builds a smaller Navy and builds another 1000 tanks before 1940, or more towed artillery. Or more AA guns.
In 1941 France may be hanging on by their toenails or maybe they lasted until Sept 1940.

For reference, a letter from April 2nd, 1940 on the steel quantities required to meet mobilized production rates for armored vehicles and the renewed Naval Program said:
- the armored vehicle program required 1400 tonnes of thicker-than-20mm rolled plates (+200 tonnes of untreated such plates) every month
- the naval program required 875 tonnes of thick rolled plates every month, and even 1000 with the new requirements
- meeting both programs presently required 300 to 325 additional tonnes of thick rolled plate per month than the industry could expect to provide

That thick rolled steel would normally go entirely to future AMX light tanks and Char B battle tanks, possibly turrets.

I don't have peacetime figures but they would probably involve a ratio skewed more towards the Navy.

So in historical WW2, if France had fewer naval requirements they could increase supply to the armored program by up to 675 tonnes per month, or about 50%.

Admiral Beez · Apr 19, 2026

z42 said:
Agreed, but are you implying there's something the Germans could have done to keep that seaborne trade going if the RN says otherwise?

The RN was never going to impede Germany's merchant trade. During the entire Pax Britannica (1815–1914) it was very rare for the Royal Navy to block any nation's trade. I can think only of the the Crimean War (1853–1856) where the RN maintained a blockade in the Baltic and Black Seas against Russian trade during this major conflict. The period was instead characterized by relative peace and relatively free trade between large parts of the world, with the exception of Anti-Slavery Patrols.

Shortround6 · Apr 19, 2026

Things changed considerably from 1850-1914, in naval strategy, naval technology, naval capability and in a number of nations' economies.

The US Civil war prompted some of them. The Confederate states fielded 7 commerce raiders and had 10 building in British and French yards.
The 7 active ships claimed 273 (?) 'prizes' and while most were small and sail powered showed that ocean trade was vulnerable. Obviously, they did not stop US trade but it did have a significate impact. One source says that 800,000 tons of shipping was transferred to foreign owners/carriers and there were increases in maritime insurance.
There were also changes in international law about lability for building such ships for warring nations. America had not signed the 1856 international treat against privateers.
These 7 ships did not really affect the Civil war itself but did influence naval thinking.
The Union did blockade the South and that did work although it took a few years.
It worked, in part, because the North had about 90% of the ships to begin with and in part because the North had a much larger ship building capacity. Also worked because the South, despite it's size, didn't have that many deep-water ports and had limited transport capabilities to and from these ports.

For the US, it ended the Civil war with a rather large navy, mostly or entirely obsolete. But the Souths economy had been destroyed and the North's economy severely strained. Some the ships were sold, some stored. US ambitions turned inward to develop the land from the Mississippi to California. One or more major recessions that lasted years affected the iron industry and while the US had squadrons on foreign stations 5 of the most powerful US ships on such stations in 1882 were wooden ships that had been launched in 1858-60.
US Steel and Iron industry had been so crippled that 3 "modern" cruisers ordered in 1883 were required to have US manufactured steel. The 4500 ton Chicago took 6 years to build.

Commerce raiding was a serious consideration for weaker navies and not so weak.
France was all over the place during this period and depending on Ministers/government they wanted a battlefleet or they wanted coast defense or???
The Jeune École theories went in and out of favor in France a number of times in 1800s. They did influence other nations to some extent. They spent a lot of money, in hindsight not wisely.
As far as Germany may have been concerned the French navy achieved very little of note from 1860 to 1913. There was a French plan to land 30,000 men in Schleswig to join 40,000 Danes but the Danes declined to join the war and the French could not get their act together in time. German Army kept 80,000 first line troops on the Baltic and Schleswig coasts for 4-8 weeks. French did blockade the German North Sea coast and for a time the German Baltic coast. French captured about 80 German merchant ships. Didn't affect the war but then the French war fighting had not been of best quality. Depending on a future opponent to be of that level would be a gamble.

The German navy of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tirpitz was a mistake but depending on the Police to arrest any invading army was not a realistic suggestion either.

Howard Gibson · Apr 20, 2026

Shortround6 said:
The German navy of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tirpitz was a mistake but depending on the Police to arrest any invading army was not a realistic suggestion either.

Bismark was joking. Regardless, the small, very professional British army was not a threat to the much larger Prussian/German army. The French, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian armies were, and they could not be stopped by navies.

Shortround6 · Apr 21, 2026

Things changed a lot over the decades. Navies take decades build. Often longer than alliances lasted in the 1800s.
German in the 2nd half of the 1800s was changing from an agriculture economy to an industrial economy with large import/export aspects. All the more remarkable considering Germanies lack of extensive colonies.
From 1880 to 1913 British trade dropped from 38.2% of world trade to 30.2% while Germany went from 17.2% to 26.6%, most of this trade was through the North Sea ports, not the Baltic ports. The US was increasing it's trade by large amounts. France and Russia and Austo-Hungary not so much.

Warfare was getting more economic vs armies marching through each other's wheat fields in the summer.
French and Russian and Austo-Hungarian industrial development was slow and compared to Germany not very large by 1914.

France, had several times, designed cruisers specifically for commerce raiding. Only capturing 80 German ships in the 1870-71 was a pretty dismal showing.
How to blockade an enemy coastline occupied many navies in the 2nd half of the 1800s. Most people knew the basic idea after hundreds of years of sail but how it could be done using steam or how blockades' could be broken using steam needed a lot of thought. From 1850 to the mid 1880s steam went from low pressure single expansion to much higher pressure (relative) boilers and triple expansion which improved range/endurance a huge amount for the same quantity of cold carried. Advantages of blockading fleet to blockadee changed back and forth.
The development of the 'locomotive torpedo' in 1868 promised a large advantage to the defending fleet/s but it took 20-30 years to actually be really useable. In the mid 1870s many navies were using 'spar' torpedoes on their small craft. It took until the late 90s for the torpedoes to really be effective weapons.

But these rapid advances meant that navies with large numbers of old wooden ships needed to start over. This offered opportunities for smaller, newer navies. Unfortunately the advances in boilers and engine construction often came almost as fast as some countries could build new ships. There were also fast advances in armor, going from rolled iron to steel or compound armor and improvements in guns. This meant that depend on exactly when a ship was designed and built it might have been sent into reserve as soon as it was built as it could no longer face a new enemy ship that have been built faster.

Russia was naval power, at least up until 1905. and such was the state of Russian transportation that in 1862 it was cheaper to send supplies from St. Petersburg to the Black Sea by sending them to London first and then tranship them to the Black Sea. Later construction of Russian Rail roads helped but movement of supplies inside of Russia was very weather dependent. Russian also had to contented with the geography problem as shown by the Russio-Japanese war and needed 3 separate fleets. In 1905 Germany got a large gift when the Japanese took out 14 battleships, 3 coast defence battleships, 5 armoured cruisers, 6 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 14 other ships. Germans could have made the Baltic a German lake from then to the end of WW I without much trouble, at least when it wasn't frozen. Perhaps they were unwilling to risk ships while they were concentrating on the British?

Howard Gibson · Apr 21, 2026

Shortround6 said:
Things changed a lot over the decades. Navies take decades build. Often longer than alliances lasted in the 1800s.
German in the 2nd half of the 1800s was changing from an agriculture economy to an industrial economy with large import/export aspects. All the more remarkable considering Germanies lack of extensive colonies.
From 1880 to 1913 British trade dropped from 38.2% of world trade to 30.2% while Germany went from 17.2% to 26.6%, most of this trade was through the North Sea ports, not the Baltic ports. The US was increasing it's trade by large amounts. France and Russia and Austo-Hungary not so much.

Warfare was getting more economic vs armies marching through each other's wheat fields in the summer.
French and Russian and Austo-Hungarian industrial development was slow and compared to Germany not very large by 1914.

Commerce raiding is only useful if somebody starts a war. This was something Bismark was determined to not do after 1871. A commerce raiding fleet means pulling resources off the battlefield that could help stop the German army in case of another invasion. Commerce raiding stops when the French surrender again. On the continent, troops on the ground are what matters.

Shortround6 · Apr 21, 2026

Supplies also matter.
Germany's supply situation changed a lot over 50-60 years. German steel production expanded much faster than other European nation, in part because of access to Swedish iron ore in the late 1880s. it took around 4 years to build the first railroad from the mine/s to Luleå. The complete railroad from Luleå to Narvik was completed in 1903. Russian navy, that could have interrupted Baltic ore shipments in the summers was pretty much wiped out by the Japanese in the next few years. Depending on such a stroke of luck would not be good planning.
Even more important than Steel (iron) production was the German chemical industry. Just before WW I Germany had about 90% of the international chemical trade.
In addition to dyes (textiles) Germany was importing a lot of Chilean nitrates for use in fertilizer and other things (explosives). During WW I Germany managed to syntheses the needed nitrates for explosives. I don't know when they got that process up and running. But the Germans had no excess capacity for fertilizer and German agriculture was not able to keep demand for food for the German army and workers in WW I. What the Germans needed to import changed during the decades, but German wealth was increasingly tied to trade.
For Germany to go head to head with the British navy was not smart. Depending on the French and Russians to be dumb was also not smart.

EwenS · Apr 25, 2026

Geoffrey Sinclair said:
Cutting the links would have hurt, not necessarily the Germans.

I have no good idea what the French colonial internal transport links were like, how big the rail and river transport systems were. I do know places like the Congo had pressure put on them for rubber at least, resulting in more people being killed by leopards as they went deeper into the jungle. Add uranium. You would expect pre war export levels to be maintained.

Geoffrey
Map of French North African rail network is here.

Trans-Saharan Railway - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

One problem was the variety of rail gauges across Morocco, Algeria & Tunisia.

You might also find these pages of interest.

In Northern Africa - Railway Wonders of the World

The railways of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria

www.railwaywondersoftheworld.com

Across Africa by Rail - Railway Wonders of the World

Across Afric by rail - developing the mineral resources of the Congo via the Benguela Railway.

www.railwaywondersoftheworld.com

In the Nile Valley - Railway Wonders of the World

In the Nile Valley - train operation in modern egypt

www.railwaywondersoftheworld.com

Ewen

Geoffrey Sinclair · May 1, 2026

Thanks for the references, it is a common conclusion colonial powers developed what they needed to extract the resources they wanted, not what the colony needed for general economic development. Interesting the line Morocco to Tunisia followed the coast, effectively duplicating the shipping route, then again further south was the Sahara and the Trans Sahara line was never completed.

Other rail notes,

In 1940 there were around 20,000 miles of track in the UK. Appendix X of "UK Inland War Transport" by C.I. Savage gives a detailed list of improvements done to UK rail lines during the war. It covers 5 pages, dates, company, cost and basic description of work. Costs vary from 1,000 to 257,000 pounds in the 3 pages devoted to projects started in 1939, 1940 and 1941. Almost all of these are marked as "Insurance", to provide emergency routes, bypasses in effect. They include lots of improvements to signals, passing loops, junctions, sidings and marshalling yard extensions.

India,

[IRFCA] Narrow Gauge Routes in 1948

www.irfca.org

[IRFCA] Indian Railways FAQ - IR History - 1900 - 1946

irfca.org

Capital Movement and Transportation: Great Britain and the Development of India's Railways Daniel Thorner The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn, 1951), pp. 389-402

The Pattern of Railway Development in India Daniel Thorner The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Feb., 1955), pp. 201-216

The first article indicates the following Indian rail track mileage, first line main track, year, miles,

1850 4,000
1862 10,000+
1902 25,000+
1924/25 38,000+
1929 41,000

"Since then there has been little change in the mileage for the sub continent" (page 391), 1947 40,500 first line main track, or 57,000 miles counting all tracks. Note Burma was part of India for statistics purposes until the 20th century,

Railways in India by J N Westwood says 1,000 miles of Indian branch line was dismantled during WWII. He also notes Burma had 2,060 miles of metre gauge lines.

Transport Development in India by S K Srivastava notes there was almost no track laid in the period 1930 to 1936 thanks to the depression. However 1,300 miles was laid from 1937 until sometime in 1939 or 1940 but that 2,000 miles of track in Burma was officially Indian until Burma was separated in 1937. So it would seem some track was laid but the definition of "India" was changed leaving the total about the same if you do not account for the Burma track. He claims total route mileage in India in 1939 was 41,156 miles, presumably main line track.

It was one of the big sources of friction pre war that the railways were giving poor service and largely owned by the British. Protests actually destroyed marshalling yards. The British largely reserved senior positions for non Indians, and most capital goods were purchased in England, meaning India missed out on the chance to develop the relevant manufacturing capabilities.

NW India,

Transportation Corps, Operations Overseas page 575, referring to the 1 metre parts of the Calcutta-Dimapur line,

"Railway construction further developed the line's capacity. By the end of 1944, approximately 20 percent of the railroad had been double-tracked, passing tracks were being extended, and the main railway yards enlarged. The work was performed by the British, often with the assistance of American bulldozers and earth-moving equipment."

US history, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, page 331

"Before the Anglo-Soviet occupation the railway could haul 200 tons a day. During the period of all-British operation for which figures are available the daily average haul of Russian-aid freight was 661 long tons. The daily average haul in the peak month of British operation (September 1942) was 790 long tons of Russian-aid cargoes. In the period of interim Anglo- American operation (January through March 1943) the daily average of Russian-aid cargo hauled climbed to 921 long tons. The daily aver- age for the whole period of American operation (April 1943 through May 1945) was 3,397 long tons of Russian-aid freight. Nor was this the full measure of the capacity to which the ISR was brought. In the last five months of British operation, August through December 1942, the daily average of all freight hauled was approximately 1,530 long tons, a notable improvement over the capacity inherited by the British in 1941. For the whole period of American operation this figure rose to 5,336, an average which reflects not only the limited accomplishments at the beginning, but also the peak performance of 1944. The daily average for that year was 6,489 long tons, and for July, the top month of 1944, 7,520.2"

yulzari · May 1, 2026

Geoffrey Sinclair said:
In 1940 there were around 20,000 miles of track in the UK. Appendix X of "UK Inland War Transport" by C.I. Savage gives a detailed list of improvements done to UK rail lines during the war. It covers 5 pages, dates, company, cost and basic description of work. Costs vary from 1,000 to 257,000 pounds in the 3 pages devoted to projects started in 1939, 1940 and 1941. Almost all of these are marked as "Insurance", to provide emergency routes, bypasses in effect. They include lots of improvements to signals, passing loops, junctions, sidings and marshalling yard extensions.

This demonstrates how stretched the railways were in Britain during the war, being largely attempts to squeeze more from what there was without shutting anything down for any extended period. Hence the continuation of coastal shipping convoys around the south east despite them passing within less than 30km of the German occupied Continent and within the range of coastal German guns never mind air attack and coastal S-Boats etc. and the continuing use of the Port of London and the Thames estuary for shipping. The railways could not cope alone and the pressure produced damages which were not rectified for nearly 20 years afterwards.

EwenS · May 1, 2026

During WW2 two new ports were constructed on the West Coast of Scotland just in case regular ports were too extensively damaged by Luftwaffe bombing. These needed their own rail sidings and links to the existing main rail system.

Military Port No. 1 at Faslane (now HM Naval Base Clyde, home to the RN submarine force)

https://www.railscot.co.uk/companies/M/Military_Port_Number_1_Railway/