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Hitler's annoyance at a raid on Berlin, itself caused by stray bombs on Croydon played a part in shifting LW attcks from airfields to London inn the Battle of Britain.
Attacking London was a tactic that Adolf held to his domain. He had to give permission for London to be bombed specifically as a target. I posted "played a part" I didnt say it was 100% of the cause.This is largely a myth. The shift from airfields to London was prompted by intelligence estimates that had the RAF down to its last hundred or so fighters. It was argued that the best way to force that small remaining remnant into the air where it could be destroyed was by attacking London. (Others argued for continuing the raids on airfields but were ultimately overruled.)
We have only one example for that, Hitler had to be surrounded in his bunker before he killed himself, he didnt fight to the end as he demanded his subordinates should do. If Japan had a leader as nutty as the daft corporal was, then the USA could have been dropping nukes on all the Japanese cities and islands for years.The bomber barons were wrong in that era. They didn't have the power to destroy the life of a nation until nukes came about.
We have only one example for that, Hitler had to be surrounded in his bunker before he killed himself, he didnt fight to the end as he demanded his subordinates should do. If Japan had a leader as nutty as the daft corporal was, then the USA could have been dropping nukes on all the Japanese cities and islands for years.
Strategic bombing had some value. The simple fact that it tied up a few thousand 88s that would otherwise perhaps be on the frontlines was in itself useful. It also forced the dispersion of production, which in itself hampers production, and of course there's the civilian toll -- dead, wounded, sleepless and making mistakes on the production floors -- to account for.
Of much greater significance . . . was the extent to which the bomber offensive against Germany constituted a 'Second Front' long before the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe, and even only when Bomber Command was heavily involved in it. In terms of manpower alone, the Germans used between 500,000 to 800,000 workers to repair bomb damage and organize the dispersal of vital industries, labourers who could otherwise have been involved in the direct production of war materiel, while the Flak arm required some 900,000 men in 1943 and was still 656,000 strong in April 1945 --- many of who might otherwise have played a significant part in the ground war.
The enemy was also forced to allocate considerable equipment to air defence. In March 1942, as the Germany army was fighting crucial battles in Russia and Bomber Command had not yet launched its first 'thousand' or its initial battle of the Ruhr, there were already 3970 heavy Flak guns deployed around German cities.which could have been made into mobile artillery or bolstered anti-tank defences in the east. By September 1944 that number had grown to 10,225. Indeed, according to Albert Speer, of the 19,713 88-millimetre and 128-millimetre dual-purpose Flak/anti-tank artillery pieces produced between 1942 and 1944, only 3172 could be allocated to the army for use in the anti-armour role because of the pressure of air attack. Similarly, the threat posed by Bomber Command's night raids meant that the German night-fighter force accounted for a consistently increasing percentage of Luftwaffe front-line strength --- more than 20 per cent of the total by December 1944. Several hundred of those on strength in late 1943 and 1944 were machines which could have been used to great advantage in other roles on other fronts.
It is dark comedy that talks of a second front, that is harking back to the days of Napoleon when battles were on land fronts, and even Napoleon had a massive battle at sea. Adolf had fronts in the east and the west and in Africa, in the air and in the Atlantic and many others like Greece and Crete, all of these battles drained his strength.Quoting from The Crucible of War 1939-45 (p.867):
Of much greater significance . . . was the extent to which the bomber offensive against Germany constituted a 'Second Front' long before the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe, and even only when Bomber Command was heavily involved in it. In terms of manpower alone, the Germans used between 500,000 to 800,000 workers to repair bomb damage and organize the dispersal of vital industries, labourers who could otherwise have been involved in the direct production of war materiel, while the Flak arm required some 900,000 men in 1943 and was still 656,000 strong in April 1945 --- many of who might otherwise have played a significant part in the ground war.
The enemy was also forced to allocate considerable equipment to air defence. In March 1942, as the Germany army was fighting crucial battles in Russia and Bomber Command had not yet launched its first 'thousand' or its initial battle of the Ruhr, there were already 3970 heavy Flak guns deployed around German cities.which could have been made into mobile artillery or bolstered anti-tank defences in the east. By September 1944 that number had grown to 10,225. Indeed, according to Albert Speer, of the 19,713 88-millimetre and 128-millimetre dual-purpose Flak/anti-tank artillery pieces produced between 1942 and 1944, only 3172 could be allocated to the army for use in the anti-armour role because of the pressure of air attack. Similarly, the threat posed by Bomber Command's night raids meant that the German night-fighter force accounted for a consistently increasing percentage of Luftwaffe front-line strength --- more than 20 per cent of the total by December 1944. Several hundred of those on strength in late 1943 and 1944 were machines which could have been used to great advantage in other roles on other fronts.
Just got done reading this.I'm not entirely sure what moles BC was in a position to whack from 1939-1942. If BC aircraft couldn't survive in daylight, then they aren't much use operating against defended airspace, which potentially would include North Africa and other nearby theatres....and if they can't hit a city at night, what chance of them hitting anything at the tactical end of the fight?
I suspect the operational results from switching to support tactical operations in the first 2-3 years of the war wouldn't have done much, if anything, to shorten the war. Losses would likely have been just as bad and it's not entirely clear what operational benefits would have accrued..
The argument about diverting aircraft to CC has some validity but, again, there's no such thing as a free lunch. Would such a move have further delayed development of bombing aids to improve BC's performance from the summer of 1942 onwards?
It seems nowhere else in the world can grow that particular flavor combination.
Now the damning part is that this was NOT the way the RAF had conducted trench strafing or interdiction missions in 1917-18.
Quoting from The Crucible of War 1939-45 (p.867):
Well, the Germans shrugged off Hamburg, Cologne, Dresden, the RAF Ruhr program, and so on. -109 production rose in 1944 despite our specific targeting of that.
Such were the scale of suffering and the length of the casualty lists on this single night that it was known immediately as Die Katastrophie, and the psychological impact on all of Germany was enormous. Feldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, Chef der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, told his wife to 'leave Berlin as soon as possible' since Hamburg-like raids could be expected there once 'the nights are long enough. I am afraid of vast conflagrations consuming whole districts, streams of burning oil flowing into basements and shelters, phosphorous, and the like.'
The industrial damage, too, seemed spectacular. Production at several chemical works, engineering firms, and shipyards was halted altogether; 'the entire tram and Underground system was brought to a standstill'; all the large gas works were put out of action; electrical supplies were interrupted; and some 250,000 of the city's 450,000 flats and apartments had been 'completely destroyed.' Indeed, Albert Speer informed the Fuhrer that raids of similar intensity on six other cities 'would bring Germany's armaments production to a total halt.' Josef Kammhuber was profoundly disturbed by the thought that his crews would have to stand by 'helplessly' and 'watch the great cities of their country go up in flames one after the other' if the results of this raid could be replicated elsewhere.
In a few nights and days of intensive aerial operations, Europe's largest port and Germany's second largest city had suffered a catastrophe. Five hundred public buildings destroyed. More than two thousand commercial enterprises wrecked. Half the residences in the city eliminated; most of the rest damaged. Some 45,000 people dead. Nearly a million made homeless. Four big shipbuilding yards heavily damaged. Dock installations a shambles. Approximately 180,000 tons of shipping sunk in the harbour. General of the Air Force Erhard Milch, state secretary at the German Air Ministry, wailed: "If we get just five or six more attacks like these on Hamburg, the German people will just lay down their tools, however great their willpower . . . What the home front is suffering now cannot be suffered much longer." Albert Speer, Hitler's armaments minister, wrote that the Hamburg disaster put the "fear of God" in him; like Milch, he believed that the same treatment meted to half a dozen more cities would put an end to the war. Goebbels termed the firestorm a catastrophe that "staggers the imagination"; the city had been "destroyed in a manner unparalleled in history." He saw the problems of food shelter, and evacuation as "almost impossible" to solve. Worried about an immediate collapse of civilian morale, the Nazis sent truckloads of SS troops to patrol the streets of the shattered city and to put a speed stop to defeatist talk.
The problem was it was impossible to replicate those results on other German cities in short order. Firestorms were the result of rare conditions and could not be created on command.
What I'm saying is that strategic bombing did not win the war, and lacked the means to do so in that era.
Win it by itself? No. Boots on the ground, standing in the nation's capital, would always be necessary. But the effect of the Bomber Offensive made getting those troops into Germany a lot easier that it would have otherwise been.
The Oil and Transportation Plans were critical elements in crippling the German war economy. The Ruhr campaign, had it been continued, could have as well (assuming losses could be kept to an acceptable level, which might not be the case given the region's heavy defences).
Well, the Germans shrugged off Hamburg, Cologne, Dresden, the RAF Ruhr program, and so on. -109 production rose in 1944 despite our specific targeting of that.
If I recall right, the RAF sent in lead bombers with conventional HE bombs ahead of the bombers carrying incendiary bombs in order to knock the slate off the rooftops.
If I recall right, the RAF sent in lead bombers with conventional HE bombs ahead of the bombers carrying incendiary bombs in order to knock the slate off the rooftops.
If you grant the Allies in early to mid 1943 the benefit of 1944 electronic navigation and bombing aids and force size, and get Bomber Command and the USAAF to coordinate their efforts and focus on oil and transportation, the results would be quite different.