Greatest disaster for Royal Navy

A couple questions regarding HMS Indomitable.

First of all, if she was off Jamaica in November, could she have made it in time to join Force Z?

Also, since she was on her first tour, how experienced was her crew, both ship-board and pilot-wise.

And lastly; it is my understanding that during November/December, she had a compliment of 12 Martlets, 22 Sea Hurricanes and 16 Albacores. How well would those have stacked up against the land-based IJN fighters and bombers?

Mad Dog said:

I would have to say the loss of Force Z because it had the biggest immediate impact. Whilst the losses of Hood and Glorious were big blows, they had relatively little impact on the immediate course of the War. In Hood's case, the Bismarck was a goner regardless, the RN's surface fleet was so dominant in the Atlantic that it was just a matter of time. Glorious was returning from the abandoned Norwegian campaign and had little part to play in the coming Battle of Britain. And the Ceylon Raid did little more than cement the IJN's overall hold of the Western Pacific caused by the loss of Force Z. The loss of Force Z, however, meant the IJN could operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia, ensuring the eventual fall of Singapore.

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I would have to disagree, the loss of Force Z does not allow the IJN to "operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia" as they could do that already. Conversly, the survival of Force Z (or even a successful interception of a Japanese convoy ) doesn't save Malaya, or even have much impact on Japanese naval operations.

The loss of Glorious has a far bigger strategic impact, with lasting effects for years.

The Basket said:

Force Z was a deterrent which never worked.
Japanese were considered weak and so their threat was vastly underestimated.
Admiral Phillips view on air power was not positive.
Fair enough it was a few bombers then yes it could survive but not wave after wave. And air power had yet to sink a fully operational battleship and PoW was as modern as it gets. So maybe hubris was not misplaced.
Oddly the air power offered was Brewster Buffaloes!

Even if not sunk the 2 ships would have faced IJN surface units such as cruisers and destroyers and 2 Kongos. So even a sea engagement would have been a tough ask.

Maybe a Kongo v PoW is a win for PoW but the destroyers would have fired long lances until empty and that would have not ended well either.

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Basket's points are correct.
Since Force Z's purpose is to dissuade Japan from attacking, once war comes the correct thing to do would be to withdraw them, or offer them as carrier escorts to the Americans.

However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?

The loss of Glorious and Courageous so early was certainly a greater loss than Hood or Royal Oak. Even if not used in the carrier role but in a aircraft transporter role then they were sorely missed.

I remember reading somewhere that after convoy HX84 met the Admiral Scheer then all convoys were cancelled for 5 days. This was a greater threat to Britain than a loss of a individual ship.

Also the fact that Royal Navy was not fully prepared for submarine warfare was a vital and biggest mistake in my opinion.

Freebird said:

Since Force Z's purpose is to dissuade Japan from attacking, once war comes the correct thing to do would be to withdraw them, or offer them as carrier escorts to the Americans.

However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?

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The answer to you last point is I believe in your first point, as they would have been valuable carrier escorts. The POW was modern with (for the time) comprehensive radar and AA weapons. The Repulse would have needed a refit before taking the front line in a similar role but even as she was, she took a lot of damage before the end.

GrauGeist said:

A couple questions regarding HMS Indomitable.

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Sure.

GrauGeist said:

First of all, if she was off Jamaica in November, could she have made it in time to join Force Z?

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Yes, absolutely.
The geniuses on Wikipedia haven't yet figured out that the Earth is spherical, in pronouncing that HMS Indomitable, even leaving Jamaica on Nov 3rd (day of accident) couldn't possibly have made it to Singapore in time. (via Durban obviously)

In fact, it's only 27 days to Singapore, via Panama and Fiji.
if she'd left Jamaica on Nov 5th or 6th, stopping for a day or two at Fiji (or Cairns, Australia) to refuel, she'd arrive at Singapore on Dec 3rd or 4th, only a day or two after the rest of Force Z.

GrauGeist said:

Also, since she was on her first tour, how experienced was her crew, both ship-board and pilot-wise.

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Surprisingly, a very experienced crew, especially airgroup.
The silver lining in having her two sister ships disabled in the Med early in 1941, the FAA had a surplus of veteran squadrons waiting to embark on carriers.
Her 1941/42 embarkment:

800 squadron (Fulmar, formerly Skua) Formerly on Courageous, Ark Royal & Victorious, one of the most experienced squadrons, participated in the sinking of Konigsberg at Bergen, strike on Scharnhorst at Trondheim, attacked French fleet at Oran and hunted Bismarck in May 1941.
806 squadron (Skua/Fulmar/Hurricane) Formerly on Illustrious & Formidable, veterans of Norway, Dunkirk, Matapan & Crete
880 squadron (Martlet) - Formerly on Furious, participated in the raid on Petsamo
827 squadron (Albacore) Formerly on Victorious, also Channel operations.

Captain Harold Morse formerly commanded heavy cruiser HMS York (1936-39) Minesweeping command (1939-41) and Indomitable (July 1941-42)
Capt. Harold Edward Morse , DSO of the Royal Navy (RN) - Allied Warship Commanders of WWII - uboat.net

So overall, an experienced commander with a veteran air group, not at all a "green" crew

GrauGeist said:

And lastly; it is my understanding that during November/December, she had a compliment of 12 Martlets, 22 Sea Hurricanes and 16 Albacores. How well would those have stacked up against the land-based IJN fighters and bombers?

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Reasonably well, considering that any IJN mission escort would be operating from Cam Rahn bay...
The IJN long range bomber could perform search & strike unopposed, but trying to coordinate an escorted strike hundreds of miles from base is going to be tricky.
IJA air cooperation with the IJN was crap, so combined operations are unlikely.

Freebird, excellent information as ever

Good info, thanks!

PoW and Repulse even in dock would have been a powerful advesery. A bit like Tirpitz so the IJN couldn't just let them be a threat so I fully expect the IJN to attack them in any port.

The fleet in being concept so the IJN would at least need 2 Kongos and a Nagato or Fuso on 24 hour station in case they came out. Which could have been done when the American battleships were still on the bottom of Pearl Harbour in early 42.

The Indian ocean raid by the carriers in April 1942 towards Ceylon would be a dicey prospect if Nagumo knew he had 2 big gun capital ships behind him.

So based on Port Arthur and Pearl Harbour pretty obvious that they will go all in to sink them.

Repulse v Yamato? Yikes.

The Basket said:

But sending PoW and Repulse was always going to end badly. The war had left battleships behind and Pearl Harbour, Taranto, the Swordfish attack on Bismarck and even the Skua bombing and sinking the Koningsberg showed the Battleship as vulnerable.

When an airplane considered as mundane as the Skua is sinking major warships then Force Z is just folly.

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All the capital ships sunk by aircraft before Force Z were stationary in harbour, The sinking of Force Z was the first time any capital ship was sunk solely by air power while at sea.

Technically USS Nevada wasn't stationary.

HMS Nelson took an ariel torpedo which could have been worse in September 41 and as mentioned at Crete a number of cruisers were lost and even the Warspite was damaged by a bomb which put her out of action.

The Swordfish were willing to torpedo Bismarck again but this wasnt allowed. So the Bismarck could have been the first ship sank by air power.

So by December 1941 it was very clear the vulnerable nature of warships at sea. Force Z was a total disregard of everything learned in the last year.

Freebird said:

…...However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?

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OK, suppose Phillips decided not to sortie without air-cover, and the Buffalos of 435Sq RAAF and 488Sq RNZAF have an early Christmas amongst the unescorted Japanese level- and torpedo-bombers. Remember, the Japanese bombers were all low on fuel when the made their attacks, attacked in several small waves, and none above 11,500ft, so even the Buffalos would have been able to shoot them down or drive them off. Then Force Z scarpers back to Singapore intact.
At that point, it's highly likely they would have been withdrawn from Singapore pretty soon after, either to Ceylon or Darwin. One option is to consider what would have happened in the defence of Java if Phillips and Force Z are still around. Instead of the Battle of the Java Sea being fought by a mix of Allied cruisers under Dutch command, we'd have a battleship and a battlecruiser to add to the party. If HMS Hermes has been attached then we also have some carrier support, though it's more likely that HMS Indomitable would have joined Force Z by then, as originally planned.
That also makes it unlikely that the Dutch Admiral Doorman would have been leading the ABDA Command cruisers into action. Doorman had no naval combat experience and made a series of bad decisions in assuming what the Japanese would do. The USN's 59th Destroyer Division won at the Battle of Balikpapan because they acted under US orders without the distraction of the ABDACOM structure/interference.
So we have Indomitable's Sea Hurricanes for air-cover during the Battle of Makassar Strait, preventing the cruiser fleet being forced to retreat, leading to the Japanese invasion force being attacked by a fleet with two big-gun ships plus torpedo-bombers form Indomitable. The presence of Force Z would have given the Japanese a headache as they were still busy defeating the Americans in the Philippines.
If the IJN are held off Java then there is no invasion of New Guinea, no subsequent attacks on Darwin, and thus Darwin remains an effective naval base. Better resupply to the Dutch East Indies is possible and, instead of sending P-40s to Australia, the USAAF sends P-40s to help the Dutch. P-40s with Hurricane II top-cover would have been a much better defence against the IJN's Zeros.
Even if they do little more than delay the Japanese on Java for a few months, come May we have the Battle of the Coral Sea possibly replaced by the Second Battle of the Java Sea, as the Japanese try to bring their carrier fleet to bear on the Java problem. The USN would still be able to break the code protecting the Japanese radio orders and could send their Task Force 11 carriers (which only had cruisers in support), now with Force Z's big-gun support plus Indomitable, to attack the IJN carriers and mop up the Japanese transports.
So, yes, it is possible to theorise a quite big part for Force Z if Phillips had accepted air-cover.

HMS Indomitable also had Martlets (Wildcats)

The Basket said:

Repulse v Yamato? Yikes.

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Obviously I agree, but Repulse against a Kongo is close, with advantage to Repulse as it did have radar which depending on the weather, could be a good advantage. What is clear is that two x Kongo vs POW and Repulse is a mismatch.

Freebird said:

I would have to disagree, the loss of Force Z does not allow the IJN to "operate with virtual impunity off Malaysia" as they could do that already. Conversly, the survival of Force Z (or even a successful interception of a Japanese convoy ) doesn't save Malaya, or even have much impact on Japanese naval operations.

The loss of Glorious has a far bigger strategic impact, with lasting effects for years.



Basket's points are correct.
Since Force Z's purpose is to dissuade Japan from attacking, once war comes the correct thing to do would be to withdraw them, or offer them as carrier escorts to the Americans.

However, suppose they'd survived, what offensive role could they have played in the Far East?

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There are a number of potential roles for Force Z particularly if it included organic air power from a carrier. One big item would be interdicting Japanese resupply efforts. As it was, the IJA ran perilously low on ammunition and other key supplies. Even the loss of a few logistics vessels could have seriously hampered Yamashita's ability to continue fighting.

The big guns of Repulse and PoW could have had a really big impact on Japanese-held airfields in southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Several of the airfields were very close to the coast, and hence would have been vulnerable to long-range shelling. That said, it would probably have required a change of thinking by Far East Command and RN leadership in Singapore to even countenance such an idea.

Another squadron's worth (plus) of aircraft could have significantly helped with airpower resources. As things stood, the 4 Buffalo squadrons had to conduct multiple roles: convoy escort, air defence, bomber escort, tactical reconnaissance and close-air support. That's a lot of tasks for 4 squadrons. Having a moveable airfield could have greatly helped with burden-sharing of some of these tasks. RAF strafing attacks against IJA troops and convoys proved particularly effective. Tsuji's "Japan's Greatest Victory, Britain's Worst Defeat" specifically calls out Hurricane strafing attacks although this is almost certainly a mis-identification of the poor old Buffalo since it was the latter that conducted virtually all strafing missions (a case of Hurricane envy perhaps?). Additional resources to help with strafing missions, particularly further north up the Malay peninsula, would almost certainly have had a big impact on Japanese logistics. Switching their truck convoys to night-time (as the Japanese eventually did) might have hidden them from aircraft but then, again, the big guns of Force Z could have been ranged on the main roads (there was only one main road along the west coast from Thailand to Singapore) to disrupt night-time movements.

Finally, there's a coastal interdiction role that was desperately needed. I'm not suggesting the Repulse or PoW would have engaged in this directly, but having a sizeable task force, particularly if Force Z became the command hub for an integrated ABDA naval force. Positioning Force Z to the west of the Malay peninsula, augmented with Dutch cruisers and destroyers, would have made a powerful force to interdict Japanese coastal movements down the peninsula.

All the above would have drawn responses from Japanese forces but I think it's a mistake to believe that Force Z couldn't have had at least some impact on the outcome of the Campaign. I'm not suggesting it would change the result but it's not unreasonable to propose that the Japanese forces would have had a harder time of things.

Freebird said:

The IJN long range bomber could perform search & strike unopposed, but trying to coordinate an escorted strike hundreds of miles from base is going to be tricky.

IJA air cooperation with the IJN was crap, so combined operations are unlikely.

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Don't disagree on the challenges of such long-range escort. Also agree that coordination between the IJA and IJN was non-existent: they were virtually fighting separate wars. However, remember that the IJNAF's 22nd Air Flotilla had around 25 A6Ms at its disposal, based at Soc Trang in Indochina. I can easily imagine those aircraft being used as escorts for the IJNAF bombers. There were also a similar number of A5Ms but I think they would be less well suited to such a long-range escort mission.

Had the Royal Navy lost the Battle of the Atlantic then that's the big disaster. That's the money shot.
That's was the only naval battle that really could defeat the UK.
That's why Vanguard was constantly delayed and stop started. Gotta build them corvettes and destroyers.

Was reading somewhere recently about this (PoW & Repulse)....

Two things I remember about it.
1] The RAF failed to provide air cover (?)
2] No tracer ammunition for the AA guns on one or both ships which would have helped with target correction (?)

[Unverified source, as I can't remember where I read about it].

Sid327 said:

Was reading somewhere recently about this (PoW & Repulse)....

Two things I remember about it.
1] The RAF failed to provide air cover (?)
2] No tracer ammunition for the AA guns on one or both ships which would have helped with target correction (?)

[Unverified source, as I can't remember where I read about it].

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Your #1 isn't accurate. The RAF leadership in Singapore informed Admiral Phillips that sustained fighter protection over northern Malaya was impossible because the northern airfields had been, or were being, evacuated. However, a squadron of Buffalos was placed on dedicated alert to respond if called for by Force Z. Unfortunately, it seems that Admiral Phillips just heard "no RAF fighter cover" and so he didn't even call for fighter support when the first Japanese aircraft was sighted as Force Z retired back to Singapore. By the time the call was made, it was too late and the fate of Repulse and PoW was sealed despite the engagement taking place well within the range of the fighters sitting at Singapore.

The RAF did not fail to provide air cover. The RN failed to ask for the cover that was available.

buffnut453 said:

Your #1 isn't accurate. The RAF leadership in Singapore informed Admiral Phillips that sustained fighter protection over northern Malaya was impossible because the northern airfields had been, or were being, evacuated. However, a squadron of Buffalos was placed on dedicated alert to respond if called for by Force Z. Unfortunately, it seems that Admiral Phillips just heard "no RAF fighter cover" and so he didn't even call for fighter support when the first Japanese aircraft was sighted as Force Z retired back to Singapore. By the time the call was made, it was too late and the fate of Repulse and PoW was sealed despite the engagement taking place well within the range of the fighters sitting at Singapore.

The RAF did not fail to provide air cover. The RN failed to ask for the cover that was available.

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Thanks for that.
Shows different writers seem to have their own interpretation with what actually happened.
I went from memory, but gladly accept your information.

I be thinking about this. Prince of Wales was RN top of the line and the 14 inch guns did Bismarck and Scharnhorst no good.

So I is thinking purely naval engagement that the Repulse and PoW are in a very strong position. And maybe against a Kongo or Nagato the PoW and Repulse would have been nicely placed.

Maybe.