Greatest military blunder of WWII

trackend said:

Its not on the list but I'll go for the defense or rather the lack of defense by the British at Singapore there was adequate men and equipment to have fought off the Japanese but the leadership and planning where appalling.

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This is true even to the extent that the Brittish were allowing Commonwealth troops to land after it was obvious that they were going to relinquish the position to the enemy. This resulted in Thousands of combat ready troops to be tortured to death either in Changi prison or building a railway to nowhere in the jungles of Burma.

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If I had to pick any other I would say Barbarossa soon as Hitler started on the Russians the whole out come of WW2 was sealed including that of the Japanese. Germany could not defeat Russia and the western powers simultaneously. [/QUOTE]

This i also have to agree with so long as the russian campaign as a whole is considered i mean the loss of 600 000 combat experienced soldiers was no small contribution to the whole downfall of the Reich.

I would however like to bring another of Hitler's monumental and numerous mistakes. This being the demand he placed on Herman Goering to flatten London rather than allowing the commander of his Air force to do what he knew was needed, destroy the RAF's capacity to field defensive A/C and remove their ability to controll the sky.

This one domino i beleive if it had fallen would of resulted in the result of WWII being very different indeed. Air Marshal Dowding himself conceded to Churchill that he only expected the Fighter command Airfields to remain operational for another three days more during the heaviest period of the bombing of the Fighter fields. The change in tactics at Hitler's behest allowed the breathing space the fighter squadrons needed to regather and face the threat streaming over from occupied France

Operation Barborossa!
I think the greatest blunder of the war, was Hitler invading and attacking Russia, and starting a two front war without winning the war in Europe first. I think that was the greatest blunder as it insured Germany's defeat. It was a blunder on many issues, Hitler underestimating Russia, not having enough foresight to plan for a winter offensive, etc. I would consider Stallingrad a part of this. It just seems to me Hitler shot himself in the foot by attacking Russia. I just cannot think of any other blunder bigger than this one, as Hitler actually thought he could win a two front war, or he would not have invaded Russia.
I do not consider Pearl Harbor a massive blunder, the high up military officials knew that Japan could not win a all out, prolonged war with the U.S. and England, they were only hoping to stagger us enough and shock us enough to take the fight out of us so they could negotiate for a peace treaty favorable to Japan.

Then again, had they gone straight to Russia in spring/summer of 1940 instead of attacking Britain it may well have gone more sucessfully. (at the same time doing all they could to keep the US and UK out of the war in Europe for as long as possible. -including cutting ties with Japan or even declaring war on them after Pearl Harbor)

They may have not only been able to push the Soviets back to the Urals, but possibly done so fast enough to minimise the implementation of the Russian scorched earth policy. (and capture much of the resourses and industry intact)

The Blitzkrieg strategy working as well here (possibly better) than it had over Western europe.


In the case of Russia's air force in particular, it wasn't until 1941 that they had any modern high performance fighters available in quantity, prior to this the best they had in mid 1940 was the I-16. (the Yak-1 MiG-1/3 entering production in 1940, and still working through the development "kinks" with the LaGG-3 not entereing service until well into 1941)

kool kitty89 said:

Then again, had they gone straight to Russia in spring/summer of 1940 instead of attacking Britain it may well have gone more sucessfully. (at the same time doing all they could to keep the US and UK out of the war in Europe for as long as possible. -including cutting ties with Japan or even declaring war on them after Pearl Harbor)

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The French would have taken the opportunity to invade Germany which would have been disastrous for the Germans. Further more, I think the German Army was not really fit for attacking Russia in 1940 either, having to cover the vast distances.

Attacking Stalingrad was the worst blunder in WWII. The Sixth Army should have attacked the Kaukuses in full strength instead of wearing itself down in the urban fighting that ensued in Stalingrad. Hitler should not have become obsessed with holding "Fortress Stalingrad" and underestimating the Soviet soldiers.
The entire Sixth Army was encircled and cut off from its supply lines but was still a formidable force. Had Hitler given the order to tactically withdraw from the kessel the Sixth Army would have been saved. Paulus often takes too much of the blame for losing an entire army but the blame should be shared between Hitler, Goerring, and Manstein also.
Had the Sixth Army been ordered to withdraw and link up with Hoths' 4th Panzer Army the outcome of the Eastern front might have been quite different.

Marcel said:

The French would have taken the opportunity to invade Germany which would have been disastrous for the Germans. Further more, I think the German Army was not really fit for attacking Russia in 1940 either, having to cover the vast distances.

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I meant after the battle of France, but before direct attacks on British territory.

And in the second case, perhaps, but the Luftwaffe would certainly be in much better shape.

KK
with armistice going into effect on 25 june 40 it would have been too late in that summer before WM would have been be ready to attack SU. And they didn't even have plans for the attack at that time.
If you think all the maintenance, integrating the replacements into their units etc needed after 6 weeks of intensive fighting and then all the troop transfers to the east you see that most of the summer would have gone before attack would have been possible.

Juha

This is the sort of thread that calls for long and informed posts.

What most people who study WW II don't fully appreciate is the Stalin and the Red Army had their backs to the wall in 1942. The tremendous production rate of the T-34 and Il-2 was not yet there in mid 42, much of the Red Army had shortages of equipment even down to the humble rifle, and Stalin's prestige in the Red Army and Communist Party had taken a tremendous whack.

A stunning German victory in 1942 could well and plausibly have triggered the collapse of both the Red Army and the Communist Party. And, despite the logistical nightmare that was Russia, it was possible for Hitler to have achieved his war aims in 1942 - if only he could make up his mind.

Caucasus? Or Stalingrad?

He should have gone for Stalingrad first. With Stalingrad taken, the physical and moral shock would have shattered the communist regime.

Burmese Bandit said:

This is the sort of thread that calls for long and informed posts.

What most people who study WW II don't fully appreciate is the Stalin and the Red Army had their backs to the wall in 1942. The tremendous production rate of the T-34 and Il-2 was not yet there in mid 42, much of the Red Army had shortages of equipment even down to the humble rifle, and Stalin's prestige in the Red Army and Communist Party had taken a tremendous whack.

A stunning German victory in 1942 could well and plausibly have triggered the collapse of both the Red Army and the Communist Party. And, despite the logistical nightmare that was Russia, it was possible for Hitler to have achieved his war aims in 1942 - if only he could make up his mind.

Caucasus? Or Stalingrad?

He should have gone for Stalingrad first. With Stalingrad taken, the physical and moral shock would have shattered the communist regime.

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but he did try and take Stalingrad though and it failed miserably???

He would of been better off fully focussing on the Caucasus ,if that was done then securing the area's natural resources would of put Germany in a better position to take Russia

109, there's a large problem with the idea you posted...

Russia's Geography, and the strategic implications thereof.

Conquering the Caucasus in 1942 would have availed the Germans little if their lines of communication were cut at Stalingrad ( and indeed this is what nearly happened in 1942 - they were on the verge of winning the oil fields of Baku when they had to turn tail and run like hell before the Red Army pincers strangled their neck!)

Not to mention that the Russians had demolished what installations the Germans were able to capture so thoroughly that it would have taken about half to one year before the Germans could be able to exploit those oil wells...

WHEREAS, if they had decided to take Stalingrad, and disregard the Caucasus for the time being, they would have

(a) struck a terrible blow against the morale of the Red Army and especially against Stalin's prestige (Losing the city named after you is as low as you can go!)

(b) from the strategic point of view, the fall of Stalingrad would have led to a rupture of communications between the rest of the Russian Front and the Caucasus Front, which in time would have left the armies of that Front to "wither along the vine" in the same way as the isolated garrisons of the Japanese held islands of the Pacific in 1944.

righto,if you say so

I'm not convinced though

That is what happens when you let a corporal run one of the best armies in the history of the world. Blunder after blunder. In my opinion Stalingrad was not important enough strategically to lose over a million well trained and motivated troops. By splitting the Sixth Army the "little corporal" ensured if not defeat, a drawn out battle in urban settings. we know today from recent experience that this is worst type of terrain to assault and occupy. The Panzers and Stukas had no advantage in Stalingrad.

The Red's made a wise tactical decision and used barely enough resources to hold the Werhmacht in place while they built a huge battle group to encircle and starve out the Germans.

Paulus seemed shocked and indecisive about the encirclement. In my opinion he should have disobeyed orders and withdrwn to the southwest before December. Hauser did the same thing in Kharkov and saved his battle group and even won Kharkov back. Hauser had to endure the wrath of Hitler but his victory saved him.

Regarding the Red's so-called wise tactical decision, Amsel...

Actually it was more luck than anything else.

Both Stalin and Hitler made blunder after blunder by micromanaging their wars, but while Stalin slowly learned later to trust his generals, especially Zhukov, Hitler only increased his meddling as the War went on.

In the beginning of 1942 Stalin was absolutely convinced, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the Wehrmacht would attack towards Moscow, and he grouped all his reserves there and refused to release any towards the southern attack. He believed that the southern attack was only a clever trick designed to lure his reserves away from the capital.

It was only when the germans were on the verge of capturing both the oilfields and Stalingrad that Stalin conceded - grudgingly - that he might have been wrong after all, and ordered Stavka to release the reserves that led to the pincer movement against Stalingrad.

If during the time of Stalin's obstinacy, a decision to capture Stalingrad and not split the Sixth Army had been made....it would have succeeded.

Amsel said:

That is what happens when you let a corporal run one of the best armies in the history of the world. Blunder after blunder. In my opinion Stalingrad was not important enough strategically to lose over a million well trained and motivated troops. By splitting the Sixth Army the "little corporal" ensured if not defeat, a drawn out battle in urban settings. we know today from recent experience that this is worst type of terrain to assault and occupy. The Panzers and Stukas had no advantage in Stalingrad.

The Red's made a wise tactical decision and used barely enough resources to hold the Werhmacht in place while they built a huge battle group to encircle and starve out the Germans.

Paulus seemed shocked and indecisive about the encirclement. In my opinion he should have disobeyed orders and withdrwn to the southwest before December. Hauser did the same thing in Kharkov and saved his battle group and even won Kharkov back. Hauser had to endure the wrath of Hitler but his victory saved him.

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True Amsel, but it also didn't help that Paulus had the reservist divisions protecting his flanks, which caved in quickly during the Russian's offensive.

Actually blaming Hitler or Stalin for the failures is one of the the great lies of the war. Sure, these men wielded a huge influence on the conduct of operations, but their respective staffs supported many of these decisions, and only after the war were they suddenly emboldened to say "I told him but he didnt listen" In fact many of these detractors were actually ardent supporters of the fateful decisions at the time.

Dont get me wrong, I am not trying to defend either Hitler or Stalin, but it is just untrue that both of them single handedly lost battles or the war.

The truth, if you really want to look at the german situation objectively, was that the 1942 offensives should never have gone ahead at all. The Germans simply lacked the logistic tail, or the reserves to continue like they did. The biggest single loss that the Germans had suffered in the 1941 campaign was in trucks, followed closely by horses. They had started the Barbarossa campaign with roughly 500000 trucks. By December they had written off more than 60000 outright, with a further 275000 in the repair shops. the average return rate of these damaged vehicles was only 5000 per month, and once mobile operations commenced again in the Summer, the nett deficit effect started allover again. In terms of horses the Germans had lost about 180000 in the previous summer campaign, and over the winter, mostly to exposure and overwork. Replacements were trickling in, but only at the rate of about 3-5000 per month....less than the number needed to re-equip a division...

Logistically, the german army was bankrupt in 1942. The sweeping advances envisioned and supported by OKH could not be sustained. Halder knerw this....but did nothing other than whinge to his diary.

In fact the war had been lost in the terrible winter of 1941-2, although nobody knew it at that time. that is not to say that the Germans could not achieve a negotiated peace with the Russians. The Russians were certainly considering it, although they wanted a return to the 1941 boundaries, and never intended to allow the ceasefire last longer than about 1 year at most.

But a series of defensive victories would have provided the Heer with the much needed rest that it required, not overstreteched the logistic services of the army, and had more effect on the Russians than the pointless advances into the Steppes that the Fall Blau called for....The advance into the Kaukasus was a waste of time....the Russians had undertaken such thorough demolitions of those wells captured by the germans that it would have been at least mid 1944 before any of them would make a reasonable return of oil for the Germans. If Stalingrad was not properly covered, the Russians would simply attack where the Germans were weak. If Stalingrad was covered, the germans had not the resources to do this and provide adequate forces for the advnace into the Kaukasus region as well....it was a no brainer, but the General Staff, and Hitler, simply refused to see the issues sensibly....

You know, parsifal, I'd like to take you up on one or two points on that, but I suspect that once again you've done your homework much more thoroughly than I have. But you mentioned logistics, and a thought suddenly popped into my head.

Was it possible that the greatest blunder of WW II was not any battle at all, but the mind-boggling decision by Hitler to cut back on production of tanks and aircraft immediately after Dunkirk??!!??

Burmese, you may be right on your post. Didn't Germany not gear up for total war until 1943?

Yep - and LATE 1943 at that!!!!

Like how late are we talking Burmese, November, October?

Another point, Germany should have spent more resources building the Panzer IV's then Tigers. Don't get me wrong, the Tiger was more armed and armored then the Panzer IV, but they only made 1300 of them.

See Albert Speer's illuminating postwar book on WW II for exactly HOW late. And as for Panzer production in WW II, there are many excellent persons on this forum with great knowledge on that....like...say, Parsifal!
I think the "Achtung Panzer" site has a good section on production rates...and there's another site which gives the exact costs of production for each mark of panzer. I'll see if I can find it.