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At what point after May 1942 was the USN ever shoirt of F4Fs. At what point did the Avenger become an effective torpedo bomber. The latter was a very effective aircraft but it was not effective in its allotted role until well after 1943. There were no shortages of F4Fs after Coral Sea that I know of. The factory was NOT essential to the American war effort, or at least, not as essential as securing a better supply of carriers.
Its not my explanation either. You are arguing with the author of a pretty solid reference. good luck with that. I notice not a shred of evidence to support your claims incidentally. funny that....
Another source for you to have an argument with........
Admittedly production did not get underway until the end of August, but its what it doesnt say that is interesting. Negotiations did not start until January 1942...if factory 3 had not been expanded and orders received pre-war , there is no reason not to expect grumman to have entered into a licence agreement with eastern before January/ April. It could just as well have been january/April 1940 or january April 1941. We are back to where we stsrted...factory number 3 was expanded to meet the expoected demands of the new fighter project, which is exactly what it did.
Maybe it wasn't short of F4Fs because Grumman was making 90 or more a month in that factory you claim wasn't needed?
Factory had it's opening day ceremony Dec 7 1941, Prior peak F4F production was 47 planes back in April of 1941. Production topped only 30 planes a month in 3 other months until Jan 1942.
?It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become an effective torpedo bomber but what was the alternative in the summer/fall/winter of 1942
and by alternative the Devasator had been out of production for a couple of years so there are NO REPLACEMENTS and NO NEW AIRCRAFT to equip squadrons with.
Your idea is now to use LOTS of carriers with F4Fs and Dauntless's and nothing else? It may have taken a while for the Avenger to become effective in it's "allotted role" but that is more of a problem with the torpedo than the aircraft isn't it?
What kind of proof do you want?
Some production figures are from Grumman Aircraft since 1929 by Rene Francillon (dates for production by Grumman and Eastern Aircraft)
Some are from America's Hundred Thousand.
Some are from here, Exhibit 6.
Funny that, but I guess they are not good enough for you.
Bethpage, N.Y. -- The carrier-based fighter program required several expansions to the Grumman plant facilities at Bethpage, Long Island, N.Y. The first of these additions was begun on March 8, 1942. Included in the project was a wood-frame, two-story, 60-by-270-foot office building, on concrete footings and piers; also a U-shaped, 481-by-343-foot hangar, with brick walls and timber roof trusses.
In September 1942, a 480-by-840-foot additionwas started for the wing-assembly plant. This extension was erected with brick walls on structural-steel framing. Columns of steel, salvaged from the New York World's Fair, were spaced to form 20-by-40-foot bays. The roof was supported by 40-foot, laminated wood beams. The building was windowless. Open areas around three storehouses were enclosed to provide two sections, 230 feet long and 120 feet wide. The plant addition was occupied on October 5, 1942, and the warehouses were in use by the end of the year, although construction on the projects was not complete until July 1943.
In march 1943, construction was begun on another project, to provide a similar addition to the assembly shop. This extension was 420 feet wide and 502 feet long and was divided into assembly area and shops. Steel girders were used instead of laminated wood beams. Six, 100-by-320-foot warehouses, with cinder-block walls and structural-steel framing, were erected. On July 4, 1943, airplane production was begun in the assembly area of this addition. The warehouses had been put in use the previous May.
In November 1943, construction commenced on a building to house engineering and experimental work. The structure, 400 by 780 feet, had steel framing and 8-inch brick walls with 4-inch cinder-block lining. Most of the building was windowless. Its main portion was put in service by July 15, 1944.
By these wartime additions the Navy doubled the manufacturing facilities of the plant."
Now these additions are not described by Number (plant 2 or 3) but in Francillon's book (page 14) under 1940 it says " Construction of Plant 2, the main production facility during the war, was begun."
In 1941 number of employees tripled. (page 15)
Page 16, " As the Navy and Allies needed more Grumman designed aircraft than could be produced in the company's fast growing facilities at Bethpage (Plant 3 was opened in March), the Navy Dept instructed Grumman to transfer production of Wildcats and Avengers to the Eastern Aircraft Division of the General Motors Corporation and that of Ducks to Columbia Aircraft Corporation...........As a result of this programme, the last Grumman built Duck, Wildcat, and Avenger were delivered respectively in March 1942, May 1943 and December 1943."
. yep probably, but also probably not in the exapanded area set aside for the F6F, which appears to have been built progressively from 1940-43I hardly think that the Grumman stopped production of the Wildcat in Sept or Oct of 1942 when Eastern first started and then waited until April/May to pop out 20 F4F-7s.
.Avengers were being made by both Grumman and Eastern Aircraft for just over a year.
Grumman got their First contract for Avengers Dec 30 1940, 285 TBF-1s and 1 XTBF-2.
First Production Avenger (from Plant 2) was rolled out Jan 3 1942, Production hit 60 planes per month in June 1942, Production peak FOR Grumman was 163 planes delivered in August 1943
.Now Plant 3 may or may not have wound up as Grumman's largest plant. It may have wound up dedicated to F6F production ( as Plant 2 may have after Avenger production shut down). But it sure doesn't look like like "Plant 3" was "planed" in 1940 to be the future plant for the F6F to the extent that if it had not been built the US could have built another carrier for service in 1943/43
Grumman paid for Plant 2 themselves I believe, unless you can show proof other wise.
Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.
which confirms thay already had considerable capacity, but needed more for the f6F, which they built....but at what cost in other production priorities. And TBF was another unecessary aircraft until it had a weapon that would actually work.
I dont think it was planned that way either. But gruman I think undertook exapansion of its production facilities to grab a bigger slice of the pie for the replacement fighter that they, and a lot of other people, knew was comiing. It may have been F4F, it may have been F5F, or it may have been F6F (it may have been something else entirely. As it traspired, it was the f6F that was built at bethpage, and it was Bethpade that was being greatly expanded from 1940, to build fighters and TBFs that had next to no impact on the early fighting through to late 1943. The Navy could have re-rdered its priorities, survived on existing production faciltiers and had its decisive carriers by early to mid'43.
Ruggedness over rated for air superiority fighter - otherwise you should take P-61 over Hellcat.
P-47D very rugged - but took backseat to Mustang as air superiority fighter.
Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.
Overrated, no. And P-61 does not perform like a Hellcat its not an absolute... aside from the question was Hellcat or Spit.
I was addressing your statement regarding the importance of Rugged in air superiority. The Zero kicked the living crap out of Allied Fighters in 1941-1943 with not much to say about it. Rugged is very important if the other guy is on your ass and won't let go... but if the other guy has more firepower, is faster and more manueverable (Spit) usually one of those will work for you in combat. Hellcat had range, and could fold its wings, could carry an external ordnance load and was 'tougher' - and it was painted an impressive Blue.
Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited.
You need to get a time line figured out, look at the LW massive transfers from Ost and Sud fronts starting mid 1943 into the defense of Germany, and recalculate your statements.
I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.
You are incorrect, again.
There was a HUGE doubt that the Allies would have air superiority over the Invasion Beach by June. Read a littel bit about the background of the 8th AF and how close it came to joining the RAF at night in the Fall of 1943. At that time only one P-38 Group was operational and the one P-51B Group in England but Not operational belonged to the 9th AF. The heat from Arnold, passed from Roosevelt via Marshall - resulted in Eaker getting fired and replaced by Spaatz/Doolittle.
Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.
Mustang took over when most of the Good German Aces were dead, there were grossly outnumber in most cases and fuel was very limited. I am not knocking what the P-51 contributed merely pointing out by the time the P-51 had numbers there was little doubt in the outcome.
Also the P-51 was pushed into service in part due to low cost vs the P-47 and P-38.
I know an opportunity when I see it...So why bother? Why need a long range fighter? Why anything. Germany was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, the planes were just "modest successes" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.
So why bother? Why need a better bomber-fighter? Why anything? Japan was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, they were "losing air superiority" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.The idea that hellcat "won the air battle" is one of those urban myths. They did a lot of excellent work, but by the time they arrived on the scene in Septemeber, the Japanese were already on the canvas as far as losing air superiority was concerned.
Hellcat over Spit. Range and ruggedness. The rest of the factors the pilots would try to control to his benefit. Range lets you follow the Spit back to land and then destroy ala ME262.
Ruggedness lets you take some hits and keep going, something the Spit was NOT known for.
I know an opportunity when I see it...
So why bother? Why need a better bomber-fighter? Why anything? Japan was done, beat, fried, wasted in 1943. No aces, they were "losing air superiority" - just a cool laid-back war. Just sit back and wait for the end.
A number of air forces had already tried this including both the RAF and Luftwaffe. They found, contrary to Douhet's thesis, that the single engine fighters were more than able to catch a multi-engine bomber and outgun it easily. The RAF had worried about this before the start of the war and had decided in the mid-1930s to produce an all night-bomber force, but when the war started they had these planes operate during the day. Both forces lost so many planes during initial operations that they quickly switched to night operations.
The USAAF reasoned that their bombers' higher altitudes and more powerful defensive gun load would be enough to turn the tide in favour of the bomber. The limited numbers of B-17's made large scale operations impossible until late 1943, with only small, well-escorted raids being made in the meantime over France to shake out the crews and planes.
The numbers had improved enough by late summer of 1943, that the USAAF decided to attempt large scale operations. Picking the German ball-bearing industry as a vital choke point of aircraft production, they launched several massive raids in October that flew deep into Germany. The results were disastrous with over 10% of the planes failing to return to England from each mission and many more written off due to heavy damage. A few more raids and there would be no bombers left.
It was clear that the bombers required fighter escort, but no fighter had anywhere near the range of the bombers. The Lockheed P-38 Lightning came close, but this was a very expensive plane to construct and maintain. The Mustang changed all that. In general terms, the Mustang was as simple or simpler than other aircraft of its era. It used a single well-understood and reliable engine, and had internal space for a huge fuel load. With the addition of external fuel tanks it could protect the bombers all the way to Germany and back.
Numbers were available when the 8th and 9th Air Forces had re-grouped over the winter of 1943/44, and when the raids recommenced in February, 1944, things changed dramatically. Bomber losses prior to that point had been primarily (in percentages at least) from rocket-firing twin-engine designs, and these were chased from the skies.
However the Luftwaffe pilots learned how to avoid the US fighters by grouping in huge numbers well in front of the bombers, then attacking in a single pass and leaving. This gave the escorting fighters little time to react. But in May a new policy was instituted which allowed the fighters to roam away from the bombers and attack the German planes wherever they were found. The numerical superiority of the USAAF fighters and the flying qualities of the P-51 made this policy highly effective, and after the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses both in defense of the Reich and in the failed attempt to fight off the Allied invasion in France, the US, and later British, bombers had little to fear from German day fighters after the summer of 1944.
Do you have anything to support your belief?So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west. The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.
Because in 1940-41, when the f6f was being designed and developed, nobody knew what the next generation of Japanese aircraft were going to be like. Total obsolescence does make a difference, but the f4F for the entire duration was never outclassed to that extent. moreover, my position is not that better technology is uneeded or undesirable. but the thing the US needed the most in 1943 was extra carriers. not a new fighter (which did not appear in numbers until November). That could have come later, and no impact on US progress would have occurred. Give the US additional 3 or 4 carriers in early 1943, and big changes to the war are likely.
If the US had taken a risk, and just relied on the Corsair for its 1944 (late) and 1945 frontline operations (not that 1945 operations would have arisen), would not have suffered because of the absence of the hellcat in the inventory....provided the numbers are there. Shortround has presented some information that does make me think twice about that second assumption, I will grant you.
parsifal said:Arguing that it was expenditure being absorbed by the company is another furphy that i have been waiting for someone to raise. Whether or not the expenditure was company funds or government funds is irelevant, as irrelevant as saying research not bearing the label F6F but eventually used as a critical element of the F6F, is not a cost that can be laid at the feet of the F6F. if it was used in the design and development of the F6F and its production, its a cost that needs to be acknowledged. if the money was private or public, it was national wealth still spent in a certain direction, and in a controlled wartime economy, like the US economy of 1940, every dollar counts.
parsifal said:So I dont think it is misleading to say the factory was built for the Hellcat. maybe a little incorrect, since it might well have been used to build the f5F instead, had that fighter been adopted, but good enough. If the choice on the navy fighter had been XF5F, instead of the Hellcat, we'd be sitting here arguing about the F5f rather than the F6F. but that isnt how things panned out. It was the hellcat that was selected (for good reason), the design and research for the hellcat began well before 1941 (Source: "F6F Hellcat" by Hal Andrews, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f6f-5.pdf). It doesnt matter that the new fighter was the Hellcat. The Navy already had a new fighter in the XF4U under design. They decided that was too risky and embarked on the development of at least two other prototype designs that i know of....the F6F and the F5F, both of which i think were done at the expense of carrier construction. I think a better priority would have been to continue development of the F4U, delay development of the F6F until FY42 increase production of F4f (which was done in existing factory space from the summer of 1941 anyway) abandon Essex production in FY 41, and instead build 4 Yorktowns instead of the measely 1 Essex they actually authorised.
So from Feb 1944 to summer (D DAY from other sources) I do not believe the P51 laid waste to all of the Luftwaffe in the west.
They didn't, nor did I say that they did. What I said is that the P-51B, (with a force that started in Devember 1943 with one FG, the 354th, built up to six operational Mustang Groups by the 1st week of May, 1944 and to seven by D-Day 6th of June, 1944) destroyed more German fighters in the air than ALL of the P-47C and P-47D's that flew air combat against the Luftwaffe for the 8 months preceeding P-51 Operation and the siz months after initiation of P-51 Operations.
That is what I say.
The P-38 and P-47 had more experienced pilots (in general) and were more numerous till around Aug-Oct 1944. That means (to me) the majority of the fighter aircraft between Feb 1944 - Jun 1944 were not from P51's. If you have data to the contrary please present it.
I agree with you (in General) - which makes the combat record of the P-51B even more remarkable.. In February 1944 there were two P-38 and two Mustang FG's operational in the 8th and 9th AF combined. There were 11 P-47D FG's.
With that same exact mix for operations during Big Week (2/20-2/25/1944), the score for air victory credits was; P-47 (78), P-51 (64.5) P-38 (10)..
Extended further
Total P-47 air victory credits - 8/9th AF from beginning ops in March 1944 through June 30, 1944 (1370)
Total P-51 air victory credits - 8/9th AF from beginning ops in December 1943 through June 30,1944 (1370)
Total P-38 air victory credits - 8/9th AF from beginning ops October 1943 through June 30, 1944 (205)
At the end of June 1944 the total number of 8th/9th AF Fighter Groups
P-47 - 13
P-51 - 9
P-38 - 6
Again - through 9/30/1944
P-47 - 1870
P-51 - 2402
P-38 - 352
Note - the 9th AF quit escorting 8th AF bombers but did continue escort duties for 9th AF Mediums as well as CAS starting in June so the engagement with LW in Germany dropped off somewhat for P-47s.
At the end of September the TOE looked like this for 8th/9th AF Fighter Command Fighter Groups
P-47 - 15
P-51 - 10
P-38 - 3
Are you beginning to see a pattern of Mustang effectiveness - air to air? And this does not include the large advantage the Mustang had for Ground destruction of LW aircraft. Very few Mustangs to guard very many bombers along an 80-100 mile stream bombing as many as six different targets - deep in Germany beyond P-38 range and well beyond P-47 range.
End of War total air victory credits for ETO
P-47 2658
P-51 4179
P-38 452
It was only in December 1944 when the 78th FG converted to Mustangs that the number of USAAF Mustang Fighter Groups matched the number of Thunderbolt Fighter Groups in the ETO.
As to 'experienced pilots'?? Well many P-47 and P-38 experienced pilots became 'experienced Mustang pilots" when they converted in Spring/Summer anf Fall 1944.
They did not know then but we know now the air raids on Germany did only a modest affect on the production of necessary material, aside from keeping troops home as anti-aircraft units which was a significant factor. It was in Oct 1944 when we went after transportation and fuel that shut Germany down. However US, English And Russian production ramped up so high by late 1943 we all were outproducing our losses so yes the fate of Germany was sealed although what people thought back then was not so accepting.