parsifal
Colonel
I don't think any attack on the Tirpitz can be said to have "run riot" on the great ship. She had no fighter protection, but she was perhaps the most heavily defended target in Europe otherwise, and to boot, enjoyed massive advantages from the topography that surrounded her. Smoke effects were particaualrly useful given the enclosed nature of her anchorage, and the elevated bluffs gave the Flak gunners an enormous firing advantage. The cliffs prevented effective torpedo and any other form of low level attack. high level bombing was never really effective against ships, even stationary one, but low level skip bombing was effective. Skip bombing could not be used against the Tirpitz because of the geography.
Though no LW units were committed to either the defence or any counterattack during operation Tungsten on the RN ships delivering the attack, they still had units in the area, and the RN was forced to divert significant forces to cover such eventualities.
Lastly, the nature of the target itself dictated relatively high level bomb release altitudes, if there was to be any hope of anything other than minor damage inflicted
Planning for the raid on Kaafjord began in December 1943. Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser, the commander of the Home Fleet, was highly pessimistic on the chances of success, and had to be persuaded to undertake the operation by First Sea Lord Sir Andrew Cunningham.
The attack was originally scheduled for mid-March 1944, shortly before the time Allied intelligence believed Tirpitz would become operational. However, it was delayed by two weeks while Victorious was fitted with new radars. The British considered cancelling Operation Tungsten in February as Victorious was also needed in the Indian Ocean to counter a build-up of Japanese warships at Singapore. To enable the attack to proceed, the United States Navy agreed to temporarily transfer USS Saratoga to the Eastern Fleet so that Victorious could be retained in the North Sea.
The plans for the raid were centred around two dive-bombing attacks by Fleet Air Arm Fairey Barracuda aircraft. Each of the attacks was to involve 21 Barracudas escorted by 40 fighters, evidence of the RN concerns about LW fighter intervention, Vought F4U Corsairs flying from Victorious would provide protection against German aircraft while Grumman F4F Wildcat and F6F Hellcats operating from Furious and the escort carriers HMS Emperor, Pursuer and Searcher were to strafe anti-aircraft batteries near Tirpitz, as well as the battleship herself. Nearly 75% of the air resources allocated to the raids were therefore diverted to suppression or escort functions of one type or another. Further aircraft flying from Furious and the escort carrier HMS Fencer would protect the fleet against attack by German aircraft or submarines. While carrier aircraft had previously lacked a bomb capable of penetrating a battleship's thick deck armour, it was hoped that the recently developed 1,600-pound (730 kg) armour-piercing bomb would be able to pierce at least the first layer of Tirpitz's armour if they were dropped from an altitude of 3,500m or higher. The damage caused by such hits was expected to put the battleship out of service. Nine of the Barracudas were to be armed with 1,600-pound bombs and a further 22 would each carry three 500-pound semi-armour-piercing bombs that were capable of penetrating the lightly protected upper decks of the ship if dropped from above 2,000m . The remaining ten aircraft would be armed with 500- and 600-pound general-purpose bombs and with anti-submarine bombs intended to inflict casualties among the battleship's crew and cause underwater damage if they exploded in the water near her hull. These aircraft were cleared to come in relatively low (about 2000 ft) The aircraft carrying high-explosive bombs were to initiate the dive bombing of Tirpitz as it was hoped that these weapons would knock out at least some of the battleship's anti-aircraft guns before the main attack commenced. It was anything but an easy target, calling for a very high degree of accuracy and skill and precise timing on the part of the raids various elements
The Fleet Air Arm units selected for Operation Tungsten conducted intensive training from February 1944 but were anything but experienced CAGs. A high proportion of the airmen were inexperienced, and the captain of Victorious estimated that 85 per cent of the aircrew embarked on his ship had not previously operated at sea. The training program was centred around Loch Eriboll in northern Scotland which, like Kaafjord, was surrounded by steep hills. Flying from RNAS Hatston in the Orkney Islands, the aircrew practiced manoeuvring around this terrain to familiarise themselves with the tactics needed to avoid German anti-aircraft guns and successfully attack Tirpitz. The Royal Navy drew on intelligence on the defences of Kaafjord to make the exercise range as similar to the conditions around Tirpitz as was possible, and the aircrew were extensively briefed on the locations of German positions. An area the size of the battleship was also marked out on an island in the centre of the loch and repeatedly bombed. Results obtained during the course of training were disheartening to say the least
In addition to the forces already listed, it is untrue to say Tirpitz was not protected by airborne assets. there were around 40 fighters stationed near to the ship, which explains why the RN allocated so many resources to their suppression, fortunately for the RN, these aircraft were without fuel on the day of the attack.
Tirpitz's crew suffered heavy casualties in the attack, but the battleship suffered only moderate damage. Overall, 438 crew were killed or injured representing 15 percent of the battleship's crew. Many of the casualties were anti-aircraft gunners who were killed or wounded by machine-gun fire from the British fighters. While two bombs that exploded in the water near Tirpitz opened holes in her hull and caused flooding, none of the 15 bombs that struck the battleship penetrated her main deck armour belt, mostly because the bombs were dropped at too low altitude. . As a result, her guns, magazines, and machinery did not suffer serious damage. Most of the damaged areas of the battleship were located in her superstructure and between her armoured decks. The starboard aircraft catapult and crane were destroyed, as were both Tirpitz's Arado floatplanes. The number two starboard 150-millimetre (5.9 in) gun turret was destroyede, and the number three port 150 mm turret knocked out and incurred significant damage. The officers' mess and several galleys were wrecked, and the ship was filled with smoke. Tirpitz's funnel was also struck by bomb fragments that badly damaged all of the boiler intakes. While the starboard turbine was knocked out by shock damage and two of the boilers were disabled after being contaminated by salt water used for firefighting, the battleship was still capable of steaming within Kaafjord.
The British fighters also damaged four patrol craft and a large repair ship; the captain of an armed trawler died and 13 other sailors on board these vessels suffered wounds. Torstein Raaby of the Allied Secret Intelligence Service group in Alta reported a few hours after the raid, that no civilian casualties had resulted from the attack, and that the local population was "... extremely impressed by the bombing." A further report six days after the operation relayed that the Germans estimated that it would take months to repair the damage inflicted on Tirpitz.
Though no LW units were committed to either the defence or any counterattack during operation Tungsten on the RN ships delivering the attack, they still had units in the area, and the RN was forced to divert significant forces to cover such eventualities.
Lastly, the nature of the target itself dictated relatively high level bomb release altitudes, if there was to be any hope of anything other than minor damage inflicted
Planning for the raid on Kaafjord began in December 1943. Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser, the commander of the Home Fleet, was highly pessimistic on the chances of success, and had to be persuaded to undertake the operation by First Sea Lord Sir Andrew Cunningham.
The attack was originally scheduled for mid-March 1944, shortly before the time Allied intelligence believed Tirpitz would become operational. However, it was delayed by two weeks while Victorious was fitted with new radars. The British considered cancelling Operation Tungsten in February as Victorious was also needed in the Indian Ocean to counter a build-up of Japanese warships at Singapore. To enable the attack to proceed, the United States Navy agreed to temporarily transfer USS Saratoga to the Eastern Fleet so that Victorious could be retained in the North Sea.
The plans for the raid were centred around two dive-bombing attacks by Fleet Air Arm Fairey Barracuda aircraft. Each of the attacks was to involve 21 Barracudas escorted by 40 fighters, evidence of the RN concerns about LW fighter intervention, Vought F4U Corsairs flying from Victorious would provide protection against German aircraft while Grumman F4F Wildcat and F6F Hellcats operating from Furious and the escort carriers HMS Emperor, Pursuer and Searcher were to strafe anti-aircraft batteries near Tirpitz, as well as the battleship herself. Nearly 75% of the air resources allocated to the raids were therefore diverted to suppression or escort functions of one type or another. Further aircraft flying from Furious and the escort carrier HMS Fencer would protect the fleet against attack by German aircraft or submarines. While carrier aircraft had previously lacked a bomb capable of penetrating a battleship's thick deck armour, it was hoped that the recently developed 1,600-pound (730 kg) armour-piercing bomb would be able to pierce at least the first layer of Tirpitz's armour if they were dropped from an altitude of 3,500m or higher. The damage caused by such hits was expected to put the battleship out of service. Nine of the Barracudas were to be armed with 1,600-pound bombs and a further 22 would each carry three 500-pound semi-armour-piercing bombs that were capable of penetrating the lightly protected upper decks of the ship if dropped from above 2,000m . The remaining ten aircraft would be armed with 500- and 600-pound general-purpose bombs and with anti-submarine bombs intended to inflict casualties among the battleship's crew and cause underwater damage if they exploded in the water near her hull. These aircraft were cleared to come in relatively low (about 2000 ft) The aircraft carrying high-explosive bombs were to initiate the dive bombing of Tirpitz as it was hoped that these weapons would knock out at least some of the battleship's anti-aircraft guns before the main attack commenced. It was anything but an easy target, calling for a very high degree of accuracy and skill and precise timing on the part of the raids various elements
The Fleet Air Arm units selected for Operation Tungsten conducted intensive training from February 1944 but were anything but experienced CAGs. A high proportion of the airmen were inexperienced, and the captain of Victorious estimated that 85 per cent of the aircrew embarked on his ship had not previously operated at sea. The training program was centred around Loch Eriboll in northern Scotland which, like Kaafjord, was surrounded by steep hills. Flying from RNAS Hatston in the Orkney Islands, the aircrew practiced manoeuvring around this terrain to familiarise themselves with the tactics needed to avoid German anti-aircraft guns and successfully attack Tirpitz. The Royal Navy drew on intelligence on the defences of Kaafjord to make the exercise range as similar to the conditions around Tirpitz as was possible, and the aircrew were extensively briefed on the locations of German positions. An area the size of the battleship was also marked out on an island in the centre of the loch and repeatedly bombed. Results obtained during the course of training were disheartening to say the least
In addition to the forces already listed, it is untrue to say Tirpitz was not protected by airborne assets. there were around 40 fighters stationed near to the ship, which explains why the RN allocated so many resources to their suppression, fortunately for the RN, these aircraft were without fuel on the day of the attack.
Tirpitz's crew suffered heavy casualties in the attack, but the battleship suffered only moderate damage. Overall, 438 crew were killed or injured representing 15 percent of the battleship's crew. Many of the casualties were anti-aircraft gunners who were killed or wounded by machine-gun fire from the British fighters. While two bombs that exploded in the water near Tirpitz opened holes in her hull and caused flooding, none of the 15 bombs that struck the battleship penetrated her main deck armour belt, mostly because the bombs were dropped at too low altitude. . As a result, her guns, magazines, and machinery did not suffer serious damage. Most of the damaged areas of the battleship were located in her superstructure and between her armoured decks. The starboard aircraft catapult and crane were destroyed, as were both Tirpitz's Arado floatplanes. The number two starboard 150-millimetre (5.9 in) gun turret was destroyede, and the number three port 150 mm turret knocked out and incurred significant damage. The officers' mess and several galleys were wrecked, and the ship was filled with smoke. Tirpitz's funnel was also struck by bomb fragments that badly damaged all of the boiler intakes. While the starboard turbine was knocked out by shock damage and two of the boilers were disabled after being contaminated by salt water used for firefighting, the battleship was still capable of steaming within Kaafjord.
The British fighters also damaged four patrol craft and a large repair ship; the captain of an armed trawler died and 13 other sailors on board these vessels suffered wounds. Torstein Raaby of the Allied Secret Intelligence Service group in Alta reported a few hours after the raid, that no civilian casualties had resulted from the attack, and that the local population was "... extremely impressed by the bombing." A further report six days after the operation relayed that the Germans estimated that it would take months to repair the damage inflicted on Tirpitz.
