There are a bunch of overworn myths at work in this thread I see.
Myth 1: The French invested most of their defence budgets in the Maginot Line
The French military in the interwar period lacked for nothing in terms of material. They outnumbered the germans in heavy artillery and motor vehicles matched them in tanks, and eclipsed the germans in terms of ATGs. The germans held an advantage in terms of mortars. Both armies were about equal in terms of MGs. The French lacked an effective AT mine and chose to let themselves be short of radio equipment.
The main shortage afflicting the French was a shortage of manpower. By 1940, the draft was pushing 1 in 9 Frenchmen into the colours, By comparison the Germans were running at about 1 in 20 and the British 1 in 50. There was no manpower left, though the continued deployment of nearly 20 divs to the colonies was a poor choice in my view.
Maginot was never constructed as a total barrier. The French were the foremost builders of fortifications since Vauban and knew well their limitations and their capabilities. The line was intended to allow reduced manning levels of the shared frontier so that the expected MLA….through the low countries…..could be better matched by what France considered to be her "mobile forces".
The air force had always been viewed as a secondary element to French defences, but in the panic of 1939/40, steps were being taken to address the shortages. Had the war continued after june 1940, the Germans, with their very limited reserves would have faced a world of hurt.
Some consider the navy to have been an overindulgence, but given the uncertainties about the Italians, I think they needed every ship that they had.
Myth 2: The French Army was defensive and incapable of attacking
Nope, not true. The French army believed in attacking….but in the style of a Foch or Monash. Measured, with slow build up of forces, economical in terms of manpower.
Another variation to this myth is that the French did not have mobile reserves. Sort of half true. They had mobile forces……motorised infantry, motorised Cavalry, mechanised cavalry, armoured cavalry, heavy armoured divs. They were not as versatile as guderians all arms forces, but in the right sort of battle these formations could have delivered a nasty bite to the germans. Several times during the campaign they came close to doing that
Truth 1: the French command system was archaic and slow
Absolutely. It was incapable of reacting quickly to changing situations. In many respects it was almost delusional as to its own capabilities. It was frequently dishonest. Some elements were openly disloyal. It was definitely outclassed by it german equivalent.
My ideas:
The key to the 1940 campaign was the battle at the Meuse. You have to understand how Germany won — they tried a 1–2 punch that depended on France reacting in exactly a certain way, and France just happened to react that way. France had a massive army, but got most of it surrounded through trickery. The Maginot Line had very little to do with it. France knew from day one that Germany would try to attack around the wall, via Belgium and Holland.
It was pretty simple. Germany attacked northern Belgium first, and France and Britain rushed their armies into that area (they didn't occupy Belgium before Germany attacked, b/c it was officially neutral).
The Germans let this happen for 2–3 days, then started to move large armored forces through the Ardennes forest, in southern Belgium and Luxembourg, where only relatively weak, second line formations were defending. French military planning assumed that no large army could move through these woods with any particular speed. This assumption would have been true in the past, but armored warfare changed things.
These forces got in behind the French and British troops, and cut them off from France. France had a terrific army, it was just entirely surrounded and cut off from its homeland, and couldn't be resupplied. So the trick is to not let the germans win at the Meuse…..defend it properly with dug in first line Infantry. Pull in from the colonies at least 10 divs of the colonial garrisons (which they did anyway, but far too late), Position the French mobile forces as reserves, ready to move and not beyond the fuel tankage range of their tank forces.
If the french could bloody the german armoured spearheads a weak and vulnerable force if ever there was one, and fight a judicious defensive air battle over their own territory they had a chance. Blunt the German spearheads and as the french there is a chance of holding the following main force,
The idea is fraught with risk, of course. One small screw-up, and France was done. But if they wouldn't have shot their wad so badly in trying to save Belgium, they might have had an even chance against Germany, and there would perhaps have been horrendous fighting in northern France, just as in World War I. France had good tanks and other advantages, and perhaps could have won this showdown.
Basically, the French lost so fast not because their actual forces were inferior, but because they fell into a trap. The British fell into the same trap, to be 100% fair. They were just lucky enough to be situated on an island, or they would have been out of the war just as quickly as France was.