How do you think France could've prevented their loss

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Konigstiger205 said:
The French didn't had the leadership nor the will to fight...they where messy and very disorganized...
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Very correct. Of course the French blamed the UK for running at Dunkirk but the national security of ones nation is directly the responsibility of the state of that nation. And the French can only blame themselves.
 
The Basket said:
I don't buy it Arsenal. To blame the US and the UK for the Rhineland is just bogus.
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Equally bogus to solely blame France, besides it's totally buy-able. Consider this from Julian Jackson's "The Fall of France", page 67:

In the 1920s the British had seen the French as the bullies of Germany; in the 1930s they became the bullies of the French, treating them with ever less ceremony. On 18 June 1935 (the anniversary of Waterloo), the British independently signed a naval agreement with Germany. When Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936, the French government initially made belligerent noises, but once it became clear that the British would not provide support, the French quietly acquiesced.

In addittion, on other issues (again pg. 67):

When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, the initial response of the French government was to send help to the Republicans, but once it became clear that the British did not approve, the French agreed to a non-intervention pact. By 1938, British bullying of the French had become somuch second nature that the Ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps, had no compunction about interfering in internal French politics. In April 1938 he let it be known that the British government was opposed to the appointment of Joseph Paul-Boncour as Foreign Minister because of his anti-appeasement views (he had notoriously once described Mussolini as a 'fairground Ceasar'). Paul-Boncour was not appointed.

Funny as it may sound, but Churchill at this time was one of the very few within British government who sided with the French, which earned him the derogatory nickname of "pro-frog" among his colleagues.

As for the US position, FDR wasn't about to jeopardize the ongoing isolationists policies in backing France over the Rhineland. The evidence is there all sides seriously goofed over the Rhineland issue, but to place all blame on the French is ludicrous without looking at the diplomatic scenes being played out.


What evidence do you have which shows the French knew of weak German forces reoccupying the Rhineland? The Germans certainly didn't tell the French how many troops were involved. Gen. Gamelin did make a mistake of wildly over-estimating German strength in the region, but this most mostly the result of faulty intellligence.


There is no way a military is going to change their entire doctrine based on a few publications which many at the time viewed as outlandish. As for Norway, that campaign is hardly seen as an example of Blitzkrieg warfare. I don't see how that can be compared with Poland and France.

The Basket said:
I'm not anti French...but the French do tend to blame others for their own mistakes. The UK has its own embarrassments with the Nazis. But we had ourselves to blame for that.
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I would strongly disagree. I think of the three (US,UK, FR), the French tend to be much more critical of themselves than anyone else. Based on what literature I've read from all 3 counties, I see an overwhelming tendency to blame the French for most things. If anything, most British sources have no qualms in blaming the French for every failure, with most American sources adopting the same line, though I see this trend slowly changing in light of better comparative research. There are a few exception however, like Julian Jackson, a British national who lives in LA and teaches European history at the university there (last I heard as of 2003).
 
Konigstiger205 said:
The French didn't had the leadership nor the will to fight...they where messy and very disorganized...
Click to expand...


The Basket said:
Very correct. Of course the French blamed the UK for running at Dunkirk but the national security of ones nation is directly the responsibility of the state of that nation. And the French can only blame themselves.
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"Messy and very disorganized"?? I find this to be a very incorrect assessment. Where do the both of you gather this? As a matter of fact, quite the opposite. French command and military infrastructure was very well organized. In fact, it so rigidly structured that it would become one of their primary weaknesses as it allowed for almost no flexibility whatsoever. It's not like the French were lackasdaisical as many would suggest, but that there was no room for individual innitiative on the part of junior officers. This was made quite clear at the kangaroo trials at Riom after the fall of France, much to the embarassment of the Petainist/Vichy officials.

As for Dunkirk, this was made into a myth of enormous proportions for propaganda reasons, naturally, but the fact remains the French rearguard stuck defending the perimeters are almost never accorded their rightful honors by outside historians. There were plenty of mistakes all around leading up to that scene, with plenty of blame to go all around, but this has already been discussed in another thread.
 
If the French had the ability to act in its best interest then why didn't it do so?

France was a world power in the 30s so I don't buy the idea that it had to ask permission.
 
Arsenal, I find your arguments informed and persuasive. My impression is that there is plenty of responsibility for the success that Hitler enjoyed in bluffing out the world's powers from the Anschluss on. The US was isolationalist and wanted nothing to do with a European war and was preoccupied with the double dip depression which was worse there than in most other countries. Britain was essentially in a pacifist mode as far as their leaders were concerned and was reluctant to rearm and of course was understandably war weary. France was all of the things you mentioned. Most unfortunate.
 

Actually I don't see how very much blame if any, can be put on the French, you are right it was the US UK that failed in this case.

Arsenal VG-33 said:
The troops that were pulled out of the line to plug the gaps were not fortress troops, but the interval troops, and where the interval troops were removed, those were the points along the Maginot Line the Germans managed to pierce.
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True, and by the time they made it there it was pretty much too late anyways...

I'm sure they knew quite a bit about it, the lessons were not heeded by thr French high command. (or the British either for that matter) The basic point that should have been noted was that with the "Blitzkrieg" the battle would move very quickly, they would not be able to rely on reserves called up after several weeks to provide a "reserve" to plug any holes. I would fault the British on this too, they did not have enough mobile forces. (The French didn't pay attention to De Gaulle's writings and the British ignored Liddell Hart others too)
 

In this we are in complete agreement. I think Belgium should have been told bluntly that if they refused to participate in preparation for conflict (during the winter 1939) that the French British would prepare defensive positions on the French/Belgian border and not move forward to protect Belgium in the event of war.

Funny as it may sound, but Churchill at this time was one of the very few within British government who sided with the French, which earned him the derogatory nickname of "pro-frog" among his colleagues.
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Churchill was always pro French....
 
Several thoughts come to mind, from a reading of this post. "Fixed fortifications are monuments to mankind's stupidity". Not sure the author of this bit of wisdom, but Patton often quoted it. The French are great at living in their past glories, but they tend to forget their mistakes. Napoleon outrunning his re-supply lines (the Achilles heel of Blitzkrieg). So, IMO, they took the WW1 trench experiences in a 4 year war of attrition, and built the Maginot line, to replace the muddy trenches and "No Man's Land" and had the fixed guns pointed towards the German border lines, just as in WW1. All the German sappers had to do was to come from behind the gun emplacements, and dynamite the gun turrets into oblivion. Even extending that line across Belgium would not have stopped the Wehrmach advance, might have slowed it down a bit, but stopped it- no!

I can't speak for the state of French politics in 1936-1941. I do believe that Churchill supported DeGaulle and his Free French group. in 1940, Hitler and the OKW staff apparently dismissed the French Army as a "Paper Tiger"-- later, however, the Maqui resistance gave the occupying German forces holy hell-and their accurate Intel aided the Normandy invasion tremendously.
 
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Might I suggest that the loss of Malaya, Singapore, Burma and Borneo resulted in the destruction of the British Empire. Empires are not just free trade zones but also protection rackets that rely on those under protection co-operating. Britain failed its subjects. The same has happened in the FSU where the western states were not protected against Nazi attack and overwhelmingly want to join the EU.
 
Kevin J said:
...The same has happened in the FSU where the western states were not protected against Nazi attack and overwhelmingly want to join the EU.
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What?

The "FSU" is "Former Soviet Union" and the EU did not exist prior to November 1993.
Many of the Balkan nations were Axis allies (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, etc.) and had been member states of the League of Nations until about 1940 when WWII was getting under way.
 
I assume you mean USN Adm. King and his policies in the Atlantic to fend off the German U-Boat Wolf Packs--could you possibly expand on this area-- it seems to me that if Hitler had some understanding of the Kreigsmarine and his capable commanders and Admirals, things might have turned out more to German's advantage, at least in the early days of the Wolf Packs on their deadly patrols-- But Hitler was a enlisted soldat from the muddy trenches of France in WW1-he never saw the "bigger picture" of both naval and air ops. in gaining the victory he sought..
 
By western states, I mean the western states in the FSU, not the states the SU overran in Eastern Europe. The EU was preceded by the EC, EEC, Common Market, its all the same thing to me.
 
More investment in training and communications prewar.
Too large a portion of the French Army relied on under trained reservists, the government had cut the training periods in the 20's as part of cost saving measures and the French army had almost no radios in its communications, relying on motor cycle couriers and the occasional land-line telephone.
The story of the French response to the German attack is units in a total state of confusion due to messages being lost or just too late
 
Kevin J said:
By western states, I mean the western states in the FSU, not the states the SU overran in Eastern Europe. The EU was preceded by the EC, EEC, Common Market, its all the same thing to me.
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"It's all the same to me" might be fine in your own mind, but others aren't psychic, so using proper terminology in a discussion promotes your point.
 

Thankyou, I'm not the only one that was scratching his head...
 
The writing was on the wall before that, the war intervened in the process of Indian independence. It was a racket in many ways, while some made fortunes in foreign climes they relied on the British taxpayer for protection via military spending which was up to 30% of GDP.
 
There are a bunch of overworn myths at work in this thread I see.


Myth 1: The French invested most of their defence budgets in the Maginot Line
The French military in the interwar period lacked for nothing in terms of material. They outnumbered the germans in heavy artillery and motor vehicles matched them in tanks, and eclipsed the germans in terms of ATGs. The germans held an advantage in terms of mortars. Both armies were about equal in terms of MGs. The French lacked an effective AT mine and chose to let themselves be short of radio equipment.

The main shortage afflicting the French was a shortage of manpower. By 1940, the draft was pushing 1 in 9 Frenchmen into the colours, By comparison the Germans were running at about 1 in 20 and the British 1 in 50. There was no manpower left, though the continued deployment of nearly 20 divs to the colonies was a poor choice in my view.

Maginot was never constructed as a total barrier. The French were the foremost builders of fortifications since Vauban and knew well their limitations and their capabilities. The line was intended to allow reduced manning levels of the shared frontier so that the expected MLA….through the low countries…..could be better matched by what France considered to be her "mobile forces".

The air force had always been viewed as a secondary element to French defences, but in the panic of 1939/40, steps were being taken to address the shortages. Had the war continued after june 1940, the Germans, with their very limited reserves would have faced a world of hurt.

Some consider the navy to have been an overindulgence, but given the uncertainties about the Italians, I think they needed every ship that they had.

Myth 2: The French Army was defensive and incapable of attacking
Nope, not true. The French army believed in attacking….but in the style of a Foch or Monash. Measured, with slow build up of forces, economical in terms of manpower.

Another variation to this myth is that the French did not have mobile reserves. Sort of half true. They had mobile forces……motorised infantry, motorised Cavalry, mechanised cavalry, armoured cavalry, heavy armoured divs. They were not as versatile as guderians all arms forces, but in the right sort of battle these formations could have delivered a nasty bite to the germans. Several times during the campaign they came close to doing that

Truth 1: the French command system was archaic and slow
Absolutely. It was incapable of reacting quickly to changing situations. In many respects it was almost delusional as to its own capabilities. It was frequently dishonest. Some elements were openly disloyal. It was definitely outclassed by it german equivalent.

My ideas:
The key to the 1940 campaign was the battle at the Meuse. You have to understand how Germany won — they tried a 1–2 punch that depended on France reacting in exactly a certain way, and France just happened to react that way. France had a massive army, but got most of it surrounded through trickery. The Maginot Line had very little to do with it. France knew from day one that Germany would try to attack around the wall, via Belgium and Holland.

It was pretty simple. Germany attacked northern Belgium first, and France and Britain rushed their armies into that area (they didn't occupy Belgium before Germany attacked, b/c it was officially neutral).

The Germans let this happen for 2–3 days, then started to move large armored forces through the Ardennes forest, in southern Belgium and Luxembourg, where only relatively weak, second line formations were defending. French military planning assumed that no large army could move through these woods with any particular speed. This assumption would have been true in the past, but armored warfare changed things.

These forces got in behind the French and British troops, and cut them off from France. France had a terrific army, it was just entirely surrounded and cut off from its homeland, and couldn't be resupplied. So the trick is to not let the germans win at the Meuse…..defend it properly with dug in first line Infantry. Pull in from the colonies at least 10 divs of the colonial garrisons (which they did anyway, but far too late), Position the French mobile forces as reserves, ready to move and not beyond the fuel tankage range of their tank forces.

If the french could bloody the german armoured spearheads a weak and vulnerable force if ever there was one, and fight a judicious defensive air battle over their own territory they had a chance. Blunt the German spearheads and as the french there is a chance of holding the following main force,

The idea is fraught with risk, of course. One small screw-up, and France was done. But if they wouldn't have shot their wad so badly in trying to save Belgium, they might have had an even chance against Germany, and there would perhaps have been horrendous fighting in northern France, just as in World War I. France had good tanks and other advantages, and perhaps could have won this showdown.

Basically, the French lost so fast not because their actual forces were inferior, but because they fell into a trap. The British fell into the same trap, to be 100% fair. They were just lucky enough to be situated on an island, or they would have been out of the war just as quickly as France was.
 
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