How good was the soviet air force?

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The armor did not provide the IL-2 a reliable protection against neither large-caliber bullets nor anti-aircraft artillery shells. The only advantage of armor was better pilot survivability during emergency landings.
The distribution of armor thickness was not optimal, there were areas where there were no hits at all and vice versa, areas with a high percentage of hits had insufficient armor. Nearly every penetration of the cowl armor resulted in engine damage. Only the lower cowl armor provided sufficient protection.
In general, the IL-2 concept was very controversial - it was a bad idea to use a liquid-cooled engine on an attack aircraft. The result was a heavy, poorly maneuverable and rather vulnerable aircraft. I have to repeat: under the same conditions, obsolete fighters without armor used for ground attack suffered many times fewer losses. Yes, they were not as well armed as the Il, but nevertheless they could be very effective (for example, the I-207, which was not built in series, was highly appreciated). They also did not use the high-octane gasoline that the IL-2 required. There were other alternatives, starting with the very promising Vultee A-11.
The whole story of Soviet attack aircraft development is a clear illustration of the total inefficiency of the Soviet system.
 
Interesting. I have read that the Su-2 could have been a good plane. IIRC it had the lowest loss rate per average missions. (IL-2, Su-2, Pe-2/3)
It's from Wikipedia, I know, but it does come from a source "Soviet combat aircraft of the Second World War".
It's ~halfway down the page.
 
The Su-2 was, in general, a quite successful versatile airplane. It was mainly used during the initial period of the war, when Soviet aviation was in crisis after the shock of the first days of the war. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the Su-2 was quite high. There were several reasons for this. The Su-2 was simple to operate and easily mastered by the crews. This increased the pilots' chances of gaining sufficient combat experience. The airplane was robust and was able to resist enemy hits. The Su-2 was conceived as a pure bomber and had no cannons - this, in fact, was its main disadvantage compared to the Il-2. But it could lift up to 600 kg of bomb load (up to 700 kg on tests) - the same amount was usually lifted by the twin-engined Pe-2! The Su-2 could not bomb from dive, however the Pe-2 was also used mainly as a level bomber until mid-1943 at least. In addition, a significant number of Su-2s were located on the southern sector of the front, where the activity of enemy fighters was lower, and the operating conditions corresponded exactly to the ideas according to which the airplane was designed. In 1942 Su-2 regiments had on average more experienced pilots than Il-2 and Pe-2 regiments, apparently this is the main reason for the lower losses, both combat and non-combat. In the same air division, Su-2 losses could be many times lower than Pe-2 losses (see the book by Dmitry Khazanov, unfortunately, only in Russian). This does not mean that the Su-2 had any outstanding qualities and could replace the Pe-2, but rather that the Pe-2 was insufficiently effective.
Although the regiment commanders and Su-2 crews were against the termination of serial production of the aircraft in 1942, the plant was decided to transfer to the production of the Il-2 M-82 despite the poor performance of the latter. Stalin did not like Pavel Sukhoi. The Soviet system in action...
Before the war, Sukhoi designed a very promising ShB (attack bomber) with four wing-mounted ShKAS and 600 kg of bomb load. If two ShKAS were replaced by 23-mm VYa, the installation of the M-82 allowed to get an airplane with the same armament as IL-2, but very probably with much better flight performance. The question of the necessity of armor for an aircraft with an air-cooled engine remains open. From my point of view, armor only deteriorated flight performance, providing no real protection for the crew. It is necessary to analyze statistical data - in particular, they are mentioned by Rastrenin in his books.

PS. The topic has been already discussed earlier (IL-2 doesn't suck as bad as the SU-2). I generally agree with Dimlee's opinion - seems that we read the same books about the Il-2 and Su-2.
 
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Don't forget the Polikarpov - still active as a second line fighter in 1942, they acted as hornets protecting parachuting airmen. When the Old Man was in Severomorsk with the RAAF, there was an Yak on standing patrol - he was jumped by a Bf109. The Russian did a violent loop and came out of it with guns blazing and got the 109. Separately the Australians coached the Ruskis to maintain a standing patrol overhead. A raid started and up went the AA. The Yak on patrol immediately had its tail shot of by "Friendly AA; the pilot abandoned and the Yak did a vertical dive going through the roof of the Australian barracks - through 4 floors and ended up in the basement. A few parts of that Yak are in Australia.
 
The armor did not provide the IL-2 a reliable protection against neither large-caliber bullets nor anti-aircraft artillery shells. The only advantage of armor was better pilot survivability during emergency landings.
and the germans with their mineshell design concentrated more on destroying the airframe itself and make the plane unflyable in that sense circumventing armour.

regarding success of the IL-2 when opposition was relatively low:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=td1jRKKGvNw&ab_channel=Milit%C3%A4r.Technik.Geschichte.-JensWehner
 
Most ground attack/CAS aircraft were easy to shoot down unless the forces using them had air superiority or air supremacy. The Stuka became a victim of this during the Battle of Britain. Even planes like the A-36 or Hawker Typhoon (and other fighters that were converted into CAS/attack aircraft) were often vulnerable during attack runs because of the need to slow down to make bombing/rocket/strafing runs with any accuracy. For the most part during World War II, in essence, speed was life. Yes, things like the Typhoon, P-47 and especially the A-36 could easily be maneuvered like fighters (which essentially they were, since the P-47 and Typhoon were outright converted fighters and the A-36 was an Allison powered P-51 converted for the attack fighter/dive bomber/CAS role) helped with survivability, but anytime you fly slow, you do make an easier target for AA or fighters attempting to intercept.

The Il-2 was far from alone in this (see also the Stuka and the Hs-129), though the Il-2 and the Hs-129's armor did provide some margin of protection for the pilots and some systems. IE, some guy with a MG-34 or MG-42 or a Maxim wasn't going to do much against a Il-2 or Hs-129. Hence one reason why so many 20mm and larger AA guns were commonly in use for the Germans and the Soviets, and even the Americans and the British/Commonwealth.
 
Yeah, cannons were the way to go, instead of solid projectiles that more often than not left an entry hole and an exit - if it didn't hit anything vital it just left holes - that said a 0.5" would be an awful shock to the system! I read somewhere an RAF report of 2 pilots who got to test the A36 Apache at the AAE Unit decided to do an end of day excursion to France and back shooting up a lot of stuff - they were really impressed!
Shoots up my first argument! But a 0.5 projectile is so much heavier than a 0.303" Hampdemon
 
When it comes to the Il-2 Sturmovik, just looking at the cowl armor which was 6 mm thick and basically enveloped the engine, this does seems to provide quite decent protection:

Because at 600 m range even MG17 7.92 mm AP does not penetrate 6 mm armor according to the German's own analysis. So given that most German small arms fire was with "ordinary" (non AP) infantry rounds, Wehrmacht soldiers firing rifles and MG's at a low flying Il-2 would have little impact on the Il-2's engine.

But looking at German aircraft ammunition instead, and beginning with the MG131 13 mm, HE is not even listed so would have no effect independent of range and angle I assume. Same goes for 13 mm AP at 600 m which will not penetrate even at 90 deg. 13 mm AP at 300 m will only penetrate at angles bigger than 60 deg, meaning this can only be done in side attacks rendering hits from rear quarter ineffective.

The MG17 7.92 mm will not as previously pointed out penetrate at any angle at a range greater than 600 m. However, at 300 m it will penetrate at an angle of more than 60 deg and at 300 at an angle of more than 50 deg.

Then looking at the MG151 20 mm, AP will penetrate at 300 m at angles larger than 30 deg, but only at an angle greater than 40 deg at 600 m which again makes the engine cowling impregnable when it comes to rear quarter attacks. And interestingly enough it seems that HEAP will also penetrate 6 mm armor at an angle of more than 30 deg at 300 m. Maybe due to the combination of kinetic and the explosive effect of the HE filling forcing shrapnel through the plate?

However, none of the figures in the data compilation show any data for angles below 30 deg. My guess is that this is because at such small angles the rounds will simply ricochet off but that is of course supposition but seems likely to me.

However, in summary, if I have interpreted the German data correctly (Handbuch der Flugzeug Bordwaffenmunition 1936-1945), then it does seem like the 6 mm engine cowl armor on the Il-2 will protect the engine quite well from infantry small arms fire and from German fighter attacks (even 13 and 20 mm cannon fire) from the rear quarter.
 
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The problem is that the armor stopped completely aft of the cockpit. In early IL-2 seaters the gunner did not get armor (?). '
Granted a few dozen hits of 7.9mm in the rear fuselage and tail was usually not enough to bring down a plane unless control cables/push rods were cut.
Wings were unarmored and again, a few dozen holes seldom brought down a plane, it probably wasn't going to come back tomorrow. Took a while to inspect/patch.

Things change a bit with 20mm hits. Yes the IL-2 was strong but 20mm hits in rear fuselage/tail and wing had a much better chance of damaging/breaking structural components or damaging control surfaces. Some planes with good pilots made it home with large parts of the control surfaces missing. We don't hear about the pilots who didn't make it home with a large part of a control surface missing.

The IL-2 has been described as a flying tank but only the drive system and crew were armored. The suspension and track system (wings and flight controls) were not.
A tank with a broken track can still fight (poorly) but a plane with broken wing cannot fly.
 

I agree that calling it a flying tank is a bit of an exaggeration. But one has to say it was quite well protected: I don't have any picture of the 2-seat version but in the single-seater the pilot basically sits in a 6 mm armor cocoon with a hefty 13 mm back plate behind him (See attached picture from 1944 Luftwissen magazine).

The German "Handbuch" data on ammo indicates that that Il-2 back plate would with the help of the aluminum fuselage shell be just enough to stop a 20 mm MG151 AP at around 100 m. What's weird though, is that the German data indicates that the HEAP would penetrate 14 mm at right angles and 13 mm under the same conditions up to a slant angle of 80 deg which I would not have guessed had I not seen the data.

Then about the other structure like wings and empennage etc: For sure: That would be susceptible to HE and "Mine" shells but to knock out enough monocoque structure to make the aircraft unflyable would take quite a few 20 mm hits since there are so many alternative load paths. Somewhere I've seen a P-51 that made it back home with basically half the rear fuselage blown away so monocoque structures are really damage tolerant.

 
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The problems were the wooden outer wings (up to very early 1944?) and wooden rear fuselage and tail. The tactic was first to eliminate the rear gunner and then disintegrate outer wing or tail. Wooden structures were more vulnerable to minen ammo than metal ones. This tactic suited especially for Fw 190s and Bf 109G? R/6s which had 4 or 3 20 mm cannons. Another way was to approach from the side a little higher and aim at the junction of the fuselage and the wing. IIRC the idea was to hit the fuel tank under the pilot but this tactic required deflection shooting skills.
 
Sorry, I read with delay.
About those guys from the Soviet Air Force of 1970s-1980s. Believe it or not, most of the Soviet officers in all branches were ignorant of the history of WWII, even of the German-Soviet(Great Patriotic) war. Their historical education was limited to the number of books approved by GlavPUR and studied in the military colleges, a number classified documents, but mostly - movies, and fiction literature. There was a short period in the 1960s and early 1970s when foreign military studies and memoirs became available in military libraries but it didn't last long.
Lend-leased equipment was usually described derogatively in the popular literature. "Slow and heavy" Hurricanes, "second-hand Tomahawks", "highly flammable" gasoline engines of foreign tanks, etc. As for the P-39, it was a mysterious aircraft for quite a long period. On one hand, the older generation (not just veterans) remembered the name "Aerokobra" because it was flown by Pokryshkin himself and it appeared in many wartime photos. On the other hand, P-39 was hardly mentioned in the post-war history books.
 
Yes, I belong to the same school of thought, so to speak. Just to add one more good feature of Su-2 - dual controls.
 
I take any information from the former USSR about WW2 with skepticism. It was a closed society. When you look at the numbers of tanks supplied via Lend Lease, about 1 in 5 tanks on the battle field would have been Western, but its rare to see photos.

the old Soviet saying about Pravda and Tass, there's no news in the truth and no truth in the news.
 
The Official Soviet History of the Second World War, published sometime in the 60's or 70's, devoted a single line of text to the entire Lend Lease effort. Apparently it was 'minor', and almost unworthy of mentioning
 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the air war is apparently the subject of one of their more persistent propaganda efforts. It impacts aircraft performance data, admitted losses, and kill claims. Interesting treatment by Chris Lawrence in Aces at Kursk (from Dupuy Institute blog):


Summary: Soviets overclaimed by a factor greater than 8, German claims overall were equal to Soviet losses (though not necessarily on each date).

Adding in the recent re-blocking of the military archives, and the only reasonable conclusion is that any data allowed to leak out is unreliable (and likely designed to support the propaganda narrative).
 
In Collage I had a Statistics Professor that pointed to an Tass Article from the 1930's to show how at times the Soviet Propaganda did not outright lie, they just highlighted the facts in a way that showed the Soviet System in the best possible light.
The article was about the new Soviet designed and built car and how it stacked up to the competition. They held a race from the eastern part of the USSR, and ended in Moscow. At the time they were also making a License built Ford Model A Sedan and the race included a Ford and The new Soviet GAZ car. The Article stated that the Promoters were anticipating Dozens of entries in the race.
They Posted the Final Results that the GAZ placed in 2nd, and the Ford Finished 2nd from Last. Only if you did research and could come up with the Starting and Finishing lineups could you see that there where in fact only 2 cars entered in the race, they Finished Ford #1, GAZ #2. So in fact the GAZ entry did finish in 2nd place (behind the Ford) And the Ford did finish 2nd from Last in front of the only other entry the 2nd place finishing GAZ!
So he pointed out that the only real stretching of the truth was that the race promoters expected "Dozens" of entries. And that the other statements while technically Factual, made the reader think that the GAZ greatly outperformed the Ford. But they did not actually say that it did. I found his class very interesting, and always made me question everything a read in a for profit newspaper, where getting the story out 1st was more important than actually getting the facts correct.
 
Once again, we bump up against the notion that there are any number of circumstance when an aircraft gets shot out of a fight only to be recovered later, and so will NOT generate a reported loss.

So, I must strongly disagree with the notion that an aerial victory is only if a total loss happens.
 
The press these days is all about sensationalism rather than facts. I find their reporting to be spectacularly bad and biased most of the time, except in aviation, where it is ALWAYS largely wrong. They get a few facts right and make up the rest
 

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