How good was the soviet air force? (3 Viewers)

[Ernest (Russia)]

I highly recommend to get familiar with the subject first - e.g. here:

View attachment 811824
This is a very comprehensive source containing many interesting details.

I have not been interested in the fate of aces, etc; fairy tales about heroes. Only when fairy tales are brought to me as an argument about something else.
Let's discuss the Yak or the VVS weapons system. the reasons for unprecedented failures.
So far, I'm just reacting to what touches me. But I hope I can do more.
The Normandy-Neman is a ordinary Soviet regiment. There is a significant objection: quote or mention it somehow. I don't want to read this, it's not interesting. Thanks.

 

[bf109xxl]

Stepanov's systematic error in his sources: they all avoid discussing anything above the level of the chief of the design bureau. Even factory directors are not considered, not to mention glavks, narcoms and Stalin. For me personally, these are fairy tales with hints. The phenomenon in question is arranged in a different way.
And the selection criteria at that time were clearly not the same, as they say almost everywhere. They are visible in the transcripts of the discussions at that time.

I strongly disagree with your assessment of the Stepanov's work. This is a solid historical study based on archival materials. It was published at a time of relative freedom of historical research in Russia, which ended around 2014. Since then, the mainstream in Russian historical science has become simply a part of the propaganda machine. Unfortunately, the quality of publications by those who oppose the official versions is often not better than that of pro-government historians.
In Russia, several well-known authors who worked with archival materials have passed away in recent years. This has created a vacuum that is almost never filled.
If you have any specific objections to Stepanov's figures or conclusions supported by any reliable sources, I would be interested to read them.

 

[bf109xxl]

I have not been interested in the fate of aces, etc; fairy tales about heroes. Only when fairy tales are brought to me as an argument about something else.
...
The Normandy-Neman is a ordinary Soviet regiment. There is a significant objection: quote or mention it somehow. I don't want to read this, it's not interesting. Thanks.

Okay, you've never opened this book. Try to read the content prior to criticize it.

 

[Frog]

I have not been interested in the fate of aces, etc; fairy tales about heroes. Only when fairy tales are brought to me as an argument about something else.
Let's discuss the Yak or the VVS weapons system. the reasons for unprecedented failures.
So far, I'm just reacting to what touches me. But I hope I can do more.
The Normandy-Neman is a ordinary Soviet regiment. There is a significant objection: quote or mention it somehow. I don't want to read this, it's not interesting. Thanks.

It was not an ordinary Soviet regiment.

It was a squadron from the Free French Air Forces (Groupe de Chasse n° 3, later raised to regiment status) that the Free French offered to the Soviet authorites as a contribution to the Eastern Front, that said authorities gladly accepted for political reasons.

Now, that it was used as an ordinary regiment, I do not contradict, as its severe losses can confirm.

 

[Ernest (Russia)]

Okay, you've never opened this book. Try to read the content prior to criticize it.

I'm not criticizing the book. I mean, you didn't find anything about the topic in the book, apparently, otherwise, the objections would have been quoted or mentioned.
What can the French have to do with the quality of VVS or the evaluation of their aircraft? Who else are we going to discuss, by the way, and not directly about the issue under discussion? You are forcing me to discuss a fairy tale, to read beautiful thick books not about the subject. I have read the advice and I do not accept it with gratitude.

 

[Luft.4]

Idk if the 93 Tb-7/Pe-8 (91 serial and 2 prototype) would qualify as a mass produced aircraft in the normal sense, but for Soviet 4 engine aircraft maybe.
I would also tend to think production quality at the end of the war for Germany was no better than what the Soviets could produce. Too many documented instances of bad workmanship and faulty design. Difficult to say which was worse.
What can be said is in the east, the Soviets beat the Reich so they did something right. The big Q is "what" and "at what cost".

 

[NevadaK]

Idk if the 93 Tb-7/Pe-8 (91 serial and 2 prototype) would qualify as a mass produced aircraft in the normal sense, but for Soviet 4 engine aircraft maybe.
I would also tend to think production quality at the end of the war for Germany was no better than what the Soviets could produce. Too many documented instances of bad workmanship and faulty design. Difficult to say which was worse.
What can be said is in the east, the Soviets beat the Reich so they did something right. The big Q is "what" and "at what cost".

The Big Q - There are so many ways to try and sort this out which is why I believe this thread has so staying power. First, I think we need to recognize how the Eastern front was different from the West and Mediterranean fronts. In the west, the major allies were largely waging war from the safety of unoccupied land. It is true that the UK suffered through the blitz, but after the invasion of the USSR, that threat was gone. The US and Canada of course were safe havens for the production of war material and that safety led to better quality factories, better war material, and better training. That luxury led to the Western Allies approach to wage war when they were ready. This is not how the war in the East was fought. The USSR was fighting to maintain their land. The war was not dictated by the USSR until very late in the war. This graph is quite informative as to what this meant in terms of Soviets ability to muster a resistance.

<a href="USSR: occupied territory during WWII 1941-1944 | Statista" rel="nofollow"><img src="https://www.statista.com/graphic/1/1260027/occupied-territory-and-population-during-wwii.jpg" alt="Statistic: Share of the Soviet Union's population and territory occupied by foreign forces during the Second World War between June 1941 and August 1944 | Statista" style="width: 100%; height: auto !important; max-width:1000px;-ms-interpolation-mode: bicubic;"/></a><br />Find more statistics at <a href="Statista - The Statistics Portal" rel="nofollow">Statista</a>

What it shows is that in 1942 at least 40% of the Soviet population was under the control of the Germans. This isn't just a raw number. That population also includes the USSR's overall best educated and skilled workforce. It's not just that the USSR has to rebuild its industrial base on a war footing, it had to replace the people who are now under the enemy's control. It is no wonder that under these circumstances the USSR's level of quality could not match the West's in material quality or pilot training. The war in the East was a desperate affair. To the USSR's credit it did not fail and ultimately prevailed. The question about "at what cost" is misleading because there is tendency to look at casualty rates in the eyes of the West. The West, however, was not fighting to save or reclaim its own ground which the USSR was. Countries will always accept higher casualty rates when the are fighting to save themselves. Think of the American Civil War and the horrendous casualty rates in that war. The country accepted the toll of that war because it was about self-preservation and existence of the nation.

When we talk about how good was the VVS, I think we need to recognize the limitations it fought under. For me, its achievements are noteworthy given the circumstances it fought under. Could it do what the RAF or USAAF were capable of? No. But then again, under similar circumstances could the RAF or USAAF do what the VVS did? No. Highly limited production ability, lack of raw materials, lack of skilled labor, lack of skilled pilots, production barely able to keep up with losses, and so forth. How could was the VVS? It was good enough to not lose, to persevere, and ultimately prevail.

 

[tomo pauk]

When we talk about how good was the VVS, I think we need to recognize the limitations it fought under. For me, its achievements are noteworthy given the circumstances it fought under. Could it do what the RAF or USAAF were capable of? No. But then again, under similar circumstances could the RAF or USAAF do what the VVS did? No. Highly limited production ability, lack of raw materials, lack of skilled labor, lack of skilled pilots, production barely able to keep up with losses, and so forth. How could was the VVS? It was good enough to not lose, to persevere, and ultimately prevail.

Soviets were out-producing Germany in any 1930's and 1940's year wrt. the aircraft; they probably out-produced the whole world in the 1930s. Their access to the stuff Germans were short (fuel, nickel, copper, chromium, rubber) was better, if not far better than what the Germans had. We also know that they accepted the Anglo-American aircraft in thousands, and for free. They also received the spare parts for these aircraft, the ammo required and a lot of high-octane fuel.
It is not only that Soviets made a lot more of aircraft, they also made far more of the tanks and artillery pieces. Unlike for Germany, there was only one front for them.

That Soviet pilots were badly led was on the high-ups that led the VVS.

 

[NevadaK]

Soviets were out-producing Germany in any 1930's and 1940's year wrt. the aircraft; they probably out-produced the whole world in the 1930s. Their access to the stuff Germans were short (fuel, nickel, copper, chromium, rubber) was better, if not far better than what the Germans had. We also know that they accepted the Anglo-American aircraft in thousands, and for free. They also received the spare parts for these aircraft, the ammo required and a lot of high-octane fuel.
It is not only that Soviets made a lot more of aircraft, they also made far more of the tanks and artillery pieces. Unlike for Germany, there was only one front for them.

That Soviet pilots were badly led was on the high-ups that led the VVS.

Greetings Tomo,

I always appreciate your thoughts. I think production numbers can be misleading. While it may be true that USSR aircraft production was greater than Germany, you also need to look at loss rates and skilled pilot availability. I don't have them available, but my sense is that during the most crucial years of the conflict in the East, VVS losses were such that the USSR had great difficulty making meaningful strides in the growth of the air force. The VVS could never take a pause to build up strength the way the 8th Air Force did in 1943. Imagine how much harder it would have been for the 8th to achieve air superiority if it had to continue with unescorted daylight raids.

Even with Lend Lease assistance, the USSR was fighting on its heels for a long time and then was fighting to expel the invaders from its homeland. To me, we can learn a lot from looking at the US Navy in the months leading up to Midway and at Midway itself. Would anyone say that the losses suffered at Coral Sea and at Midway were acceptable or sustainable? But, in the moment of desperation they can be understood as necessary.

The point I was trying to make earlier, is that the VVS operated under circumstances that were unique to that theater of operations and we need to be careful how we frame our assessment especially when comparing to the Western front where the allied air forces were able to operate from bases of relative safety and comfort. We should also not overlook the impact that losing access to 1/3 of your population has on the resource pool for skilled labor as well as pilots.

 

[Ernest (Russia)]

The Big Q - There are so many ways to try and sort this out which is why I believe this thread has so staying power. First, I think we need to recognize how the Eastern front was different from the West and Mediterranean fronts. In the west, the major allies were largely waging war from the safety of unoccupied land. It is true that the UK suffered through the blitz, but after the invasion of the USSR, that threat was gone. The US and Canada of course were safe havens for the production of war material and that safety led to better quality factories, better war material, and better training. That luxury led to the Western Allies approach to wage war when they were ready. This is not how the war in the East was fought. The USSR was fighting to maintain their land. The war was not dictated by the USSR until very late in the war. This graph is quite informative as to what this meant in terms of Soviets ability to muster a resistance.

<a href="USSR: occupied territory during WWII 1941-1944 | Statista" rel="nofollow"><img src="https://www.statista.com/graphic/1/1260027/occupied-territory-and-population-during-wwii.jpg" alt="Statistic: Share of the Soviet Union's population and territory occupied by foreign forces during the Second World War between June 1941 and August 1944 | Statista" style="width: 100%; height: auto !important; max-width:1000px;-ms-interpolation-mode: bicubic;"/></a><br />Find more statistics at <a href="Statista - The Statistics Portal" rel="nofollow">Statista</a>

What it shows is that in 1942 at least 40% of the Soviet population was under the control of the Germans. This isn't just a raw number. That population also includes the USSR's overall best educated and skilled workforce. It's not just that the USSR has to rebuild its industrial base on a war footing, it had to replace the people who are now under the enemy's control. It is no wonder that under these circumstances the USSR's level of quality could not match the West's in material quality or pilot training. The war in the East was a desperate affair. To the USSR's credit it did not fail and ultimately prevailed. The question about "at what cost" is misleading because there is tendency to look at casualty rates in the eyes of the West. The West, however, was not fighting to save or reclaim its own ground which the USSR was. Countries will always accept higher casualty rates when the are fighting to save themselves. Think of the American Civil War and the horrendous casualty rates in that war. The country accepted the toll of that war because it was about self-preservation and existence of the nation.

When we talk about how good was the VVS, I think we need to recognize the limitations it fought under. For me, its achievements are noteworthy given the circumstances it fought under. Could it do what the RAF or USAAF were capable of? No. But then again, under similar circumstances could the RAF or USAAF do what the VVS did? No. Highly limited production ability, lack of raw materials, lack of skilled labor, lack of skilled pilots, production barely able to keep up with losses, and so forth. How could was the VVS? It was good enough to not lose, to persevere, and ultimately prevail.

A very illogical long explanation with diagrams. You show the defeat of a country that was preparing for war like no other and found itself at war after a series of LW defeats in other places. And do you think that this refers to the virtues of VVS, rather than their collapse and disgrace? Why do you find losses and sacrifices more worthy of respect than victories without them? I understand that you have written a lot, but let's about this mine difficulty again.

I believe that the huge VVS turned out to be negligible against the small LW in 1941. The VVS out in six months. Is it any worse than the RAF, say? We all know how the RAF and LW relations developed by the summer of 1941. And what were their losses and sacrifices. Where there are more victims, is there more of your respect?

The USSR had to do not only without a large part of the people, but even without gunpowder. Not once because the Communists are peaceful. VVS?

You further write that the VVS has been restored. Then why were they given so many planes before 1945? Why did the infantry die from air strikes, the reconnaissance is poor, and the enemy copes with repelling short raids against a small fraction of LW? The Soviet Navy, because of the danger of raids, does not dare to leave far bases. Most of the LW turned out to be in the West precisely when you proclaim the restoration of VVS.

Let's go like your drama: when France surrendered, the US had not yet been drawn into the war, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia fell, Stalin became a friend of Hitler, Italy and Germany did not experience a shortage of raw materials, only the RAF and the navy rebuffed the LW and the Italians. In 1940, the first numerous raids on Berlin. And in the spring of 1942, the demolition of German cities began. The RAF regained supremacy over the Mediterranean and Africa during these years. Is it good or bad for VVS that the victims of the UK turned out to be incomparable with the millions of Soviet deaths?

I see that the help from the US is a Britain's victory too. The RN maintained control of the Atlantic. And Soviet aid until the end of 1943. The RAF and RN somehow helped the USSR and their VVS survive, but you attribute this to the virtues of the VVS. The VVS performed very poorly on the tasks that the RAF and USAAC performed on Germany.

As for Pe-8, their role was filled by the shuttle raids of the RAF and USAAC. It is possible to evaluate the design of a combat aircraft based on its success in operations. Do you know the resounding success of the Pe-8? What would 40 RAF heavy bombers have been worth by 1943? Would you have learned at least something? The number of their flights is negligible, I suppose.

 

[Ernest (Russia)]

Greetings Tomo,

I always appreciate your thoughts. I think production numbers can be misleading. While it may be true that USSR aircraft production was greater than Germany, you also need to look at loss rates and skilled pilot availability. I don't have them available, but my sense is that during the most crucial years of the conflict in the East, VVS losses were such that the USSR had great difficulty making meaningful strides in the growth of the air force. The VVS could never take a pause to build up strength the way the 8th Air Force did in 1943. Imagine how much harder it would have been for the 8th to achieve air superiority if it had to continue with unescorted daylight raids.

Even with Lend Lease assistance, the USSR was fighting on its heels for a long time and then was fighting to expel the invaders from its homeland. To me, we can learn a lot from looking at the US Navy in the months leading up to Midway and at Midway itself. Would anyone say that the losses suffered at Coral Sea and at Midway were acceptable or sustainable? But, in the moment of desperation they can be understood as necessary.

The point I was trying to make earlier, is that the VVS operated under circumstances that were unique to that theater of operations and we need to be careful how we frame our assessment especially when comparing to the Western front where the allied air forces were able to operate from bases of relative safety and comfort. We should also not overlook the impact that losing access to 1/3 of your population has on the resource pool for skilled labor as well as pilots.

Hello Nevadak.
VVS had a small number of flights per plane. Poor maintenance and repair services, management and tactics. Soviet aircraft worsened the situation: weaker, low resource, poorly diving, poor visibility, insufficient altitude and range, dangerous.
And the worst training of pilots and commanders. Please note the small number of highly training aircraft. Yak-7 was imagine as a training aircraft, but it became almost the main combat aircraft. Yak-1 training (UTI) >> Yak-7 >> Yak-9. Yak-7 with better mass center and a strong chassis. There were few requests for training aircraft in the US and UK. But where are the training planes with 1100 hp engines like Yak-1 UTI? By the way, artillery observation also occupied little.
The US Navy already had losses comparable to the enemy in Midway, with a smaller number. This is reverse to the VVS-LW picture. If you're so supportive of VVS estimation, then it's strange. Yes, Soviet pilots, even if they didn't fly as often as the Germans, did heavy duty. But it's not about quality.
By the way, the USA flew during the day because it is more difficult at night. Only the RAF achieved anything at night.
The same Hurricanes have already been delivered from the UK to the USSR since the end of the summer 1941, which were used to smash up LW. A number comparable to the Battle of Britain. They supplied radars, AA guns, and radio equipment. The USSR had its own planes and many pilots with pre-war skills. There was no VVS quality.
The situation of 1942 did not arise by themselves, but were produce by the bad VVS too. The VVS fiasco is unique. It was also bad in Finland in 1940. These are bad VVS.
Comfort in Africa? In the North Atlantic? LW comfort in the burnt-out part of the USSR? I believe that pilots should be prevent, given experience, and not used as raw.
Before the war, VVS was put on numbers and sacrifices. The bet was not played. And he won't play after the war. Where did VVS (or derivatives) achieve significant success after the war? It's not about justice for those people, but about estimate the system.

 

[bf109xxl]

I'm not criticizing the book. I mean, you didn't find anything about the topic in the book, apparently, otherwise, the objections would have been quoted or mentioned.

1. The book does contain relevant information on the topic. I see no necessity to quote text in Russian here. The translation is too tiresome.
2. Initially Normandie Group was a squadron (14 Yak-1 in the 204th Bomber Air Division, later - in the 18th GIAP in the same division) as it was mentioned previously.
3. It became a 2-squadron regiment in July, 1943.
4. It was not a typical Soviet regiment - since January, 1944 it had four squadrons.
5. The pilots did not make the decision on the choice of aircraft - it was made before they arrived in the USSR, but the Soviets were ready to provide aircraft received under lend-lease.

What can the French have to do with the quality of VVS or the evaluation of their aircraft?

They fought as part of the Soviet Air Force and partly determined the quality of combat operations. Many of them participated in combat before. They could quite correctly compare different airplanes.

Who else are we going to discuss, by the way, and not directly about the issue under discussion?

If you hadn't written the nonsense about the N-N, I wouldn't suggest a source on the topic.

You are forcing me to discuss a fairy tale

That's a lie. You are not familiar enough with the subject.

to read beautiful thick books not about the subject. I have read the advice and I do not accept it with gratitude.

You wrote about the N-N, so the book is absolutely relevant to the discussion. Moreover, it is relevant to the topic generally - for example, you can find therein some of the reasons for N-N's ineffective actions in 1943.

 

[bf109xxl]

Idk if the 93 Tb-7/Pe-8 (91 serial and 2 prototype) would qualify as a mass produced aircraft in the normal sense, but for Soviet 4 engine aircraft maybe.

It was a useless effort to produce an extremely difficult to manufacture (and already obsolete) airplane in homeopathic quantities. A pointless waste of metal that lacked for fighter planes.

I would also tend to think production quality at the end of the war for Germany was no better than what the Soviets could produce.

That's wrong. Both flight characteristics and workmanship of German airplanes were superior to Soviet airplanes until the very end of the war. German pilot training and Luftwaffe numbers on the Eastern Front had deteriorated - thanks to thousands of four-engine Allied bombers, Soviet air force losses were reduced, though still remained inadequately high.

Too many documented instances of bad workmanship and faulty design. Difficult to say which was worse.

I have cited some documents here about the terrible quality of Soviet airplane manufacturing during the war. The Germans had some unsuccessful designs, but in general their technical and technological levels were higher.

What can be said is in the east, the Soviets beat the Reich so they did something right. The big Q is "what" and "at what cost".

The Soviets won because they were ready to pay a high price in the form of huge losses, and because of the help of the Allies. They were not better - neither economically nor technologically.

 

[Luft.4]

That's wrong. Both flight characteristics and workmanship of German airplanes were superior to Soviet airplanes until the very end of the war. German pilot training and Luftwaffe numbers on the Eastern Front had deteriorated - thanks to thousands of four-engine Allied bombers, Soviet air force losses were reduced, though still remained inadequately high.

You're welcome to think that.
I have read too many first hand accounts, ULTRA documents (about 80 volumes of HW-5 this year alone) Chef TLR docs, and many others repeatedly point out poor manufacturing by German air industry in the late war period to think otherwise. One of my favourites is installing wooden wing farrings on bf 109s which then simply burnt off the aircraft during operation, or the return to constructing ever larger percentages of aircraft from wood again while the other airforces, including the VVS, did the opposite, or poor quality control of super charger balancing affecting Jumo 213 A1 engines which could not be linked to serial numbers thus requiring all units to be recalibrated, or incorrect screw lengths for canopies resulting in them flying off in turns (examples found with JG 2), or incorrect cabling for Bf 109 landing gear which did not allow for the retraction of the gear, oh so many examples of bf 109 long tail wheel units either failing to retract thus many pilots did not even bothering to retract them (so much for technical advancement in this case) or the units collapsing upon landings, sabotage at factories, the list never ends.
Too many personal accounts comparing German/Soviet fighters from Hungarian units, JGs 6, 52, 53, 77 etc in the late war period to agree. Major Jurgen Harder of JG 53 even said this to Göring's face in late 1944. In Feb 1945 Harder would loose his life to … mechanical troubles with his aircraft. Oh the irony!
Then there are all the production inefficiencies such as pausing K-4 production at some plants in favour of G-14/AS aircraft in Feb 1945 (!) to catch up on the later's backlog to name but one. Where is the tech advancement in that example?
Both the VVS and the Luftwaffe's production quality by wars end was not the best.

 

[bf109xxl]

You're welcome to think that.
I have read too many first hand accounts, ULTRA documents (about 80 volumes this year alone) Chef TLR docs, and many others repeatedly point out poor manufacturing by German air industry in the late war period to think otherwise. One of my favourites is installing wooden wing farrings on bf 109s which then simply burnt off the aircraft during operation, or the return to constructing ever larger percentages of aircraft from wood again while the other airforces, including the VVS, did the opposite, or poor quality control of super charger balancing affecting Jumo 213 A1 engines which could not be linked to serial numbers thus requiring all units to be recalibrated, or incorrect screw lengths for canopies resulting in them flying off in turns (examples found with JG 2), or incorrect cabling for Bf 109 landing gear which did not allow for the retraction of the gear, oh so many examples of bf 109 long tail wheel units either failing to retract thus many pilots did not even bothering to retract them (so much for technical advancement in this case) or the units collapsing upon landings, sabotage at factories, the list never ends.
Too many personal accounts comparing German/Soviet fighters from Hungarian units, JGs 6, 52, 53, 77 etc in the late war period to agree. Major Jurgen Harder of JG 53 even said this to Göring's face in late 1944.
Both the VVS and the Luftwaffe's production quality by wars end was not the best.

I have no doubt that the quality of German airplanes deteriorated in the last months of the war. But that does not mean that it became worse than that of the Soviets. If Major Jürgen Harder had a chance to fly an early La-5, he would hardly have written tearful letters to Göring. Yes, the La-7 had a metal wing spar, and the metal content in the structure increased significantly - it became 30% instead of 20%. And in the German planes it was significantly reduced - from 100% to 95%. You are talking about the problems of the Jumo 213, so compare it to the problems of the M-107. Did the 109s or 190s lose their wings when diving? Yak's sometimes did. Did the wings of German airplanes lose their skin in flight because of poor quality of paint materials that made hundreds of Soviet fighters unusable in the spring of 1943?
Once again: bad German quality was superior to good Soviet quality.

 

[yulzari]

It is true that the UK suffered through the blitz, but after the invasion of the USSR, that threat was gone.

I do not dispute that there was a huge difference between the suffering of the home populations of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom but the threat of attacks on the United Kingdom was very real right up to the last month of the war. There was bombing into 1945, shelling for four whole years, cruise missile attacks and ballistic rocket attacks. Patience Ramsey died in an artillery shelling of Dover on September 26th 1944, Maud Howard died in a Luftwaffe raid on Hull on March 17th 1945, George Anstey was killed by a V1 cruise missile on June 27th 1944, 4 year old Brian Ainsbury died on Christmas Eve 1944 in Worsley near Manchester by a V1 and 27 died in Oldham the same day, with the last V1 strike on the 29th of March 1945 and the last V2 strike on the 27th of March 1945.

I can look out of my window and see replacement houses scattered amongst the repaired ones all around my district and my entire city centre destroyed and newly rebuilt. Which rebuilding was only completed in the 1960s. There was a lot more to British home war suffering than just the Blitz and many more cities and towns than just the popular images of early war London. My previous home, not far away, retains its cellar reinforcing as an air raid shelter and the city's last air raid was on the 30th April 1944.

 

[NevadaK]

I do not dispute that there was a huge difference between the suffering of the home populations of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom but the threat of attacks on the United Kingdom was very real right up to the last month of the war. There was bombing into 1945, shelling for four whole years, cruise missile attacks and ballistic rocket attacks. Patience Ramsey died in an artillery shelling of Dover on September 26th 1944, Maud Howard died in a Luftwaffe raid on Hull on March 17th 1945, George Anstey was killed by a V1 cruise missile on June 27th 1944, 4 year old Brian Ainsbury died on Christmas Eve 1944 in Worsley near Manchester by a V1 and 27 died in Oldham the same day, with the last V1 strike on the 29th of March 1945 and the last V2 strike on the 27th of March 1945.

I can look out of my window and see replacement houses scattered amongst the repaired ones all around my district and my entire city centre destroyed and newly rebuilt. Which rebuilding was only completed in the 1960s. There was a lot more to British home war suffering than just the Blitz and many more cities and towns than just the popular images of early war London. My previous home, not far away, retains its cellar reinforcing as an air raid shelter and the city's last air raid was on the 30th April 1944.

Greetings Yulzari, I'm afraid I over simplified. Agree 100% that the UK was under threat of some sort of attack throughout the war and that there was a very human cost. I meant in no way to minimize that. What I was intending to say was that after the cessation of the Blitz, war production and overall general operations in the UK were largely unaffected. I have been fortunate to live and travel in the UK for a few months and could see the lasting impact of the war.

 

[NevadaK]

Hello Nevadak.
VVS had a small number of flights per plane. Poor maintenance and repair services, management and tactics. Soviet aircraft worsened the situation: weaker, low resource, poorly diving, poor visibility, insufficient altitude and range, dangerous.
And the worst training of pilots and commanders. Please note the small number of highly training aircraft. Yak-7 was imagine as a training aircraft, but it became almost the main combat aircraft. Yak-1 training (UTI) >> Yak-7 >> Yak-9. Yak-7 with better mass center and a strong chassis. There were few requests for training aircraft in the US and UK. But where are the training planes with 1100 hp engines like Yak-1 UTI? By the way, artillery observation also occupied little.
The US Navy already had losses comparable to the enemy in Midway, with a smaller number. This is reverse to the VVS-LW picture. If you're so supportive of VVS estimation, then it's strange. Yes, Soviet pilots, even if they didn't fly as often as the Germans, did heavy duty. But it's not about quality.
By the way, the USA flew during the day because it is more difficult at night. Only the RAF achieved anything at night.
The same Hurricanes have already been delivered from the UK to the USSR since the end of the summer 1941, which were used to smash up LW. A number comparable to the Battle of Britain. They supplied radars, AA guns, and radio equipment. The USSR had its own planes and many pilots with pre-war skills. There was no VVS quality.
The situation of 1942 did not arise by themselves, but were produce by the bad VVS too. The VVS fiasco is unique. It was also bad in Finland in 1940. These are bad VVS.
Comfort in Africa? In the North Atlantic? LW comfort in the burnt-out part of the USSR? I believe that pilots should be prevent, given experience, and not used as raw.
Before the war, VVS was put on numbers and sacrifices. The bet was not played. And he won't play after the war. Where did VVS (or derivatives) achieve significant success after the war? It's not about justice for those people, but about estimate the system.

Greetings Ernest,

A couple comments:

First, the RAF's decision to bomb at night was directly related to the losses it suffered during daylight raids. You have it backwards, it was harder to bomb during the day. RAF Bomber Command also lacked the type of aircraft and sufficient numbers to wage a meaningful campaign until 1943. This is a decent overview for understanding both RAF and USAAF bombing campaigns:

https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/12/2001330115/-1/-1/0/case_studies_strategic_bombardment%202.pdf

Second, regarding the Battle of Midway there are two kinds of aircraft losses: aircraft shot down, aircraft lost due to the loss of aircraft carriers. The US lost something like 150 planes in the battle, almost all of them were shot down in air to air combat or AA fire. The Japanese lost something like 230 aircraft, almost all due to the sinking of the carriers. These losses are not the same. Critics of the US strategy at Midway point out that the decision to send US carrier aircraft into combat in a disorganized manner was more likely to end in disaster than success. As the battle played out, the US suffered near total losses until the late arriving dive bombers struck and sank or disabled the first three Japanese carriers. Had the dive bombers missed finding the Japanese, Midway would be looked at as an epic disaster and major error in leadership.

Third, I believe that many of the things you describe like the shortage of training and artillery spotting aircraft are not issues of leadership but due to the circumstances of the war that the USSR and VVS were operating under. In a crisis, you are going to make the thing you need the most. If I'm short of both fighters and training aircraft and the enemy is controlling the combat zone which aircraft will I build first? Shortages of all kinds affected the USSR war effort. There are a ton of posts in this thread about how the USSR needed better aircraft and the lack of quality of existing aircraft. But, where is the time to design, test, and develop these aircraft? Where are there factories that are capable of sophisticated construction for these aircraft? The United States, which did not operate face the pressure of an invading force made several decisions to NOT introduce design changes to aircraft because it would interrupt production for months to retool factories. In some cases, such as the B-24 and B-29, the US simply built a second factory to rebuild new aircraft to maintain production. There is no way the USSR had that kind of capacity during the war.

Fourth, friendly fire incidents happened to everyone throughout the war. Given 1940's technology, close air operations come with such a risk. This is not a sign of incompetence.

The VVS is not the RAF or USAAF. It operated in a much more challenging environment and its pilots exhibited great courage fighting an uphill battle. As I've stated earlier, comparing the VVS to either the RAF or USAAF does the VVS a disservice.

 

[Luft.4]

I have no doubt that the quality of German airplanes deteriorated in the last months of the war. But that does not mean that it became worse than that of the Soviets. If Major Jürgen Harder had a chance to fly an early La-5, he would hardly have written tearful letters to Göring. Yes, the La-7 had a metal wing spar, and the metal content in the structure increased significantly - it became 30% instead of 20%. And in the German planes it was significantly reduced - from 100% to 95%. You are talking about the problems of the Jumo 213, so compare it to the problems of the M-107. Did the 109s or 190s lose their wings when diving? Yak's sometimes did. Did the wings of German airplanes lose their skin in flight because of poor quality of paint materials that made hundreds of Soviet fighters unusable in the spring of 1943?
Once again: bad German quality was superior to good Soviet quality.

I'm sorry but your block of text is difficult to understand because it's neither here nor there.
Early La-5 came on line in 1942. Would you classify 1942 as late war?

If no, then what does that have to do with my post and Harder? Late war La-5F were very different by the time they stopped production in april 1944 than when they first came on line, similar with the La-5FN when they ceased production in October 1944. It would be silly to assume similar performance of a batch 1 to a batch 54 La-5F.
Harder did not write a letter, he spoke to Göring personally. As a result Göring had a fit (not surprised) and refused to give an award to Harder (which was the reason he came to Göring in the first place).
Rather Harder was complaining about the Soviet fighters he was facing in late 1944 (late war) because… they were, in his opinion, very dangerous opponents his command was having troubles dealing with.

In your opinion is that because of poor manufacturing or quality? That would be a funny way of looking at the situation.

Agreed that Soviet aircraft began to be built with much less wood, beyond La-7 you have a host of Yaks, the Type 45 La-5FNs and many late war Type 39 FNs as well (as proven by wreck recoveries), the il-10 just to name a few more. Meanwhile the LW started to load up the Bf 109 with a bunch of wooden components, built aircraft about of wood (He 162), etc.
To your words on aircraft loosing their wings in a dive, yes the Germans suffered from the same troubles. In addition, wing farrings were burnt off mid flight.
Yes, they too had large scale concerns about poor glueing and it grounded many flights. ULTRA backs this up. The reason? Because they began resorting to more wooden components. Tail units were falling apart. Hard to fly a plane without a tail.
On the engine front, yes the VK-107 was premature. And how many aircraft flew with that engine exactly during the war vs the German ones? Jumo 213 had poor quality check as point out above (again via ULTRA). The DB 605 was a troubled engine that caused the death of too many pilots. The "star of Africa"'s death is yet another example (mid war). Harder being a late war example.
So no, by late war production was not "superior". A brief glance into books dedicated to specific German aircraft should be ample to let the reader know production went amuck.
One would be surprised how riff German enigma traffic was with complaints about their machines.
In case anyone will try to flip my text above into me stating Soviet aircraft were of great quality and tech advancement by late war, they were not of great quality or tech advancement. Rather the playing field had become level due to the reduction in LW quality.

 

[bf109xxl]

Early La-5 came on line in 1942. Would you classify 1942 as late war?

The quality of the early La-5 was terrible. The situation was changed rather to autumn 1944, but it does not mean that all shortcomings and manufacture defects were removed. E.g., until the very end of the war, La-5 pilots had to suffer from high air temperatures in the cockpit.

If no, then what does that have to do with my post and Harder?

Harder could get a better imagine of a worse aircraft. He just never experienced a really bad quality.

Late war La-5F were very different by the time they stopped production in april 1944 than when they first came on line, similar with the La-5FN when they ceased production in October 1944. It would be silly to assume similar performance of a batch 1 to a batch 54 La-5F.

The performance was not really better than that of the Bf.109G. The performance of the La-5 became acceptable rather in the late 1944 (FN model). All carbureted M-82 were unreliable on the La-5. The early La-7s had troubles with the engine as well - it was necessary to change the cylinder profile in order to achieve acceptable life time of the engine. But we talk about the manufacturing quality. It was low during the whole period of war - it increased steadily, however it remained insufficient. Minister (People's Commissar) of Aviation Industry Shakhurin was convicted for producing low-quality airplanes during the war years after the war ended.

Harder did not write a letter, he spoke to Göring personally. As a result Göring had a fit (not surprised) and refused to give an award to Harder (which was the reason he came to Göring in the first place).
Rather Harder was complaining about the Soviet fighters he was facing in late 1944 (late war) because… they were, in his opinion, very dangerous opponents his command was having troubles dealing with.

It doesn't matter. Harder's complaints about the quality of the planes would not have happened if he had had the opportunity to fly Soviet ones. Yes, the performance of Soviet airplanes was improving. But Soviet Air Force losses remained high - lower than before, but still, high compared to the Luftwaffe. Most importantly, the Soviets had achieved a gigantic quantitative superiority. The Germans banally lacked airplanes, not their qualities.

In your opinion is that because of poor manufacturing or quality? That would be a funny way of looking at the situation.

Quality was less important than quantity. The Germans could not provide sufficient quantity, and what was available - even with high efficiency of use! - could not meet the growing strength of the Soviet Air Force.

Agreed that Soviet aircraft began to be built with much less wood, beyond La-7 you have a host of Yaks, the Type 45 La-5FNs and many late war Type 39 FNs as well (as proven by wreck recoveries), the il-10 just to name a few more. Meanwhile the LW started to load up the Bf 109 with a bunch of wooden components, built aircraft about of wood (He 162), etc.

Not "much less wood", just "a bit more metal". The airplanes remained wooden with a slight increase in the proportion of metal in the structure. All-metal fighters were mass produced only after the war. And in 1945 it suddenly became clear that THOUSANDS of produced Yaks were unsuitable for further operation due to deterioration of wood and canvas parts. Wooden La's also went off the scene very quickly. I have already given the exact figures in one of the forum discussions.

To your words on aircraft loosing their wings in a dive, yes the Germans suffered from the same troubles. In addition, wing farrings were burnt off mid flight.

How often? I would appreciate any reference or your own estimation - I either missed it or wasn't interested enough in the subject.

Yes, they too had large scale concerns about poor glueing and it grounded many flights. ULTRA backs this up. The reason? Because they began resorting to more wooden components. Tail units were falling apart. Hard to fly a plane without a tail.

The Yak-9 suffered from gasoline leakages in the fuel system, which cost the lives of many pilots - the aircraft would catch fire in flight without enemy impact. Even in the history of the Normandie-Niemen squadron/regiment there were cases of non-combat losses of pilots from this defect due to poor assembly.
The increase in the Luftwaffe's accident rate since the fall of 1944 can be attributed to both a decline in the quality of assembly, which was distributed to small factories, and a sharp drop in pilot training. Can you separate these factors? What was the Luftwaffe's level of non-combat losses due to assembly defects? These are complex questions and I don't demand immediate answers - I would appreciate any references or estimates, I'm just curious and my knowledge here is clearly insufficient. When analyzing the accident rate in the Soviet Air Force, I would suggest that the pilot training factor was more important, but the accident rate was so high that poor assembly was still the cause of very high losses.

On the engine front, yes the VK-107 was premature. And how many aircraft flew with that engine exactly during the war vs the German ones?

Ca. 2500.

Jumo 213 had poor quality check as point out above (again via ULTRA). The DB 605 was a troubled engine that caused the death of too many pilots. The "star of Africa"'s death is yet another example (mid war). Harder being a late war example.

"Too many" - could you please estimate the rate?

So no, by late war production was not "superior". A brief glance into books dedicated to specific German aircraft should be ample to let the reader know production went amuck.

...but the Soviet Air Force still suffered high losses. Even with the deterioration of airplane quality and pilot training, the Luftwaffe was still a very effective war machine.

One would be surprised how riff German enigma traffic was with complaints about their machines.

From personal (very rich) experience, the Germans in general love to whine and complain - it is just a consequence of traditional perfectionism.

In case anyone will try to flip my text above into me stating Soviet aircraft were of great quality and tech advancement by late war, they were not of great quality or tech advancement. Rather the playing field had become level due to the reduction in LW quality.

I would almost agree, but with the phrase "the quality gap has narrowed". They haven't become equal.