Snautzer01
Honourably banned
- 43,328
- Mar 26, 2007
He forgets to mention that not only the west but also italy and africa took quite some attention from the Luftwaffe.
How good was the soviet air force? (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter Venomstick121
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Holtzauge
Airman 1st Class
Maybe he does that in the text, but he certainly does have a table which includes the allocation of aircraft to the East as a function of aircraft on all fronts which then must include both Italy and Africa.
And this paper actually supports the case that the Soviet air force was not very effective in that they (the Germans) could handle it with less and less resources. Because it certainly looks like that in Zamansky's figures in the study you linked which actually seems to confirm the gradual drop in Soviet air force effectiveness:
During the period covered in the figure below (page 10 in the study), from the beginning of November 1941 to beginning of February 1944, Germany basically pulls all of its twin engine fighters from the East, and also reduces its theatre allocation of single-engined fighters there from 50 to 20% while at the same time increasing its operation of transports and ground attack aircraft.
This means that the Germans were able to attain air superiority with a progressively reduced number of fighters which would imply a reduced effectiveness of the Soviet air force during this time notwithstanding an increase in Soviet aircraft numbers and technical capabilities.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 932
- Sep 30, 2021
One concern is Germany was used to refit units, often over winter, generally meaning there were more units etc. on strength than were meant for operations in the west. On 30 June 1941 Luftwaffe Mitte only had fighters, on 27 July 1942 it held 460 bombers, on 17 May 1943 it held 1,007 bombers. In June 1943 it held a lot of units preparing to move east and south. Also when it comes to deployments the Luftwaffe needed to guard Germany against what the western allies might do if there were not enough defences. Given the requirements for a successful amphibious assault and the size of ground forces in Britain, the threat from western armies was much less for much of the war, German troops in the west were mostly internal security and training.
The German maritime activity was largely pointed at the west/south, compounded by the need to ship resources from Scandinavia and to Africa, though of course the fleet units in Norway could be considered anti east given their theoretical ability to interdict Arctic convoys. Overall little German maritime activity in the eastern Baltic or Black seas.
As western allied threats increased the occupation of Vichy and Italy surrendered, German forces in those areas went up, furthermore the units tended to be closer to proper strength instead of cadres undergoing training or rebuilding. So there was a major shift of German resources south in 1942/43 to cope with allied operations and the Italian surrender, but by end 1943 the Luftwaffe was not doing much in Italy, though still defending places like Ploesti and Austria.
When it comes to "home army" consider how big the US military was and remained in the continental US 1941 to say end 1944, is that counted as anti Germany or anti Japan or should it be removed from any "against" calculations, like the German home army?
To do the what German forces east/west requires something like a man months calculation for the entire German armed forces, taking into account axis allied, probably overlaid with casualty figures and how about cost of equipment, supplies etc? Since US and British deployments influenced each other how to account for the similar effect of axis allied forces?
Luftwaffe flak was usually allocated to defend itself and economic targets, meaning most of it was in Germany for most of the war. The Luftwaffe went from 7,300 light and 2,538 heavy AA pieces in 1939 to 13,048 light and 4,409 heavy pieces in 1941 and would grow much bigger. Like the RAF and USAAF the Luftwaffe prioritised the best equipment to western Europe and Germany
Luftwaffe units in the east and south tended to have lower serviceable strength given supply issues. The end 1941 report bomber units had half their authorised strength of which half were serviceable. Loss rates as a percentage of sorties remained lower in the east and initially similar in the south, than in the west.
Williamson Murray has June to December 1942 inclusive the Luftwaffe lost 2,388 aircraft in the east and 2,547 elsewhere, only October (324) and November (595) had more losses elsewhere, January to November 1943 inclusive the Luftwaffe lost 3,773 aircraft in the east, 3,936 in the south and 4,225 in the west, the losses in the first 6 months versus the last 5 months remained consistent in the east and south but doubled in the west.
E R Hooton in the book Eagle in Flames notes Luftwaffe strength in the East as 1766 at the end of 1941, 2690 on 30 June 1942, dropping to 2324 on 30 September and 1561 on 31 December 1942 before climbing to 1993 on 31 March 1943 and 2292 in June 1943. In the Mediterranean the Luftwaffe had 752 in March 1942, 743 in September, 843 in December, 921 in March 1943, 1028 in June and 669 in September 1943.
Alfred Price, Luftwaffe aircraft in operational units. More snapshot dates,
Luftflotte 5 tended to be more deployed against the USSR, the Balkans units more against the west. A question is what do the various tabulations count as east, west and south.
Germany and the Second World War Volume V endpiece for 1941 and Volume 5 part 2, endpiece for 1944,
End 1941, East 146 divisions, 4 brigades, 6 regiments plus axis allied 8 divisions, 8 brigades and 3 regiments under German command. North 13 German and 2 allied divisions, (including 5 in central/south Norway), West 27 divisions and 1 brigade (Vichy doing security in that part of France), south east 8 divisions and 1 regiment, Africa 3 German and 7 axis allied divisions, reserves 9 divisions. The above includes security units in the east. All up Germany 216 divisions 5 brigades and 7 regiments, along with under command 17 axis allied divisions, 8 brigades and 3 regiments, a figure that excludes most of the armies of Finland and Italy at least.
German Army strength 4 April 1944, 238 divisions and 28 Brigades, where brigades can mean independent regiments as well as a Brigade in German (not British) terms.
Of these 138 divisions and 24 brigades were in the east. In addition there were 27 axis allied divisions and 1 brigade in the east.
"North" is a problem, it consists of Finland and Norway, so it faced both ways, the 19 Finnish divisions and 9 German divisions were facing east, 10 German divisions and 2 brigades holding Norway, so facing west.
So the anti USSR forces were around 193 divisions and 27 Brigades.
The south east was the anti partisan operations in the Balkans, where there were 19 German divisions and 1 Brigade and 11 axis allied divisions and 14 brigades. Whether you count this as allied or local fighters is up to you, it appears to be a mix of the local fighters with western allied support and the threat of western allied invasion.
The south west front in Italy held 20 German divisions and 1 axis allied division.
The western front held 62 German divisions and 1 brigade.
So I make it the forces the western allies were fighting in Italy and France come to 81 German divisions and 1 brigade, plus 1 axis allied division versus 193 divisions and 27 brigades in the east.
In addition the threat to Norway tied up another 10 divisions and 2 brigades, and the Balkans tied up another 19 German and 11 axis allied divisions, plus 1 German and 11 axis allied brigades.
The German maritime activity was largely pointed at the west/south, compounded by the need to ship resources from Scandinavia and to Africa, though of course the fleet units in Norway could be considered anti east given their theoretical ability to interdict Arctic convoys. Overall little German maritime activity in the eastern Baltic or Black seas.
As western allied threats increased the occupation of Vichy and Italy surrendered, German forces in those areas went up, furthermore the units tended to be closer to proper strength instead of cadres undergoing training or rebuilding. So there was a major shift of German resources south in 1942/43 to cope with allied operations and the Italian surrender, but by end 1943 the Luftwaffe was not doing much in Italy, though still defending places like Ploesti and Austria.
When it comes to "home army" consider how big the US military was and remained in the continental US 1941 to say end 1944, is that counted as anti Germany or anti Japan or should it be removed from any "against" calculations, like the German home army?
To do the what German forces east/west requires something like a man months calculation for the entire German armed forces, taking into account axis allied, probably overlaid with casualty figures and how about cost of equipment, supplies etc? Since US and British deployments influenced each other how to account for the similar effect of axis allied forces?
Luftwaffe flak was usually allocated to defend itself and economic targets, meaning most of it was in Germany for most of the war. The Luftwaffe went from 7,300 light and 2,538 heavy AA pieces in 1939 to 13,048 light and 4,409 heavy pieces in 1941 and would grow much bigger. Like the RAF and USAAF the Luftwaffe prioritised the best equipment to western Europe and Germany
Luftwaffe units in the east and south tended to have lower serviceable strength given supply issues. The end 1941 report bomber units had half their authorised strength of which half were serviceable. Loss rates as a percentage of sorties remained lower in the east and initially similar in the south, than in the west.
Williamson Murray has June to December 1942 inclusive the Luftwaffe lost 2,388 aircraft in the east and 2,547 elsewhere, only October (324) and November (595) had more losses elsewhere, January to November 1943 inclusive the Luftwaffe lost 3,773 aircraft in the east, 3,936 in the south and 4,225 in the west, the losses in the first 6 months versus the last 5 months remained consistent in the east and south but doubled in the west.
E R Hooton in the book Eagle in Flames notes Luftwaffe strength in the East as 1766 at the end of 1941, 2690 on 30 June 1942, dropping to 2324 on 30 September and 1561 on 31 December 1942 before climbing to 1993 on 31 March 1943 and 2292 in June 1943. In the Mediterranean the Luftwaffe had 752 in March 1942, 743 in September, 843 in December, 921 in March 1943, 1028 in June and 669 in September 1943.
Alfred Price, Luftwaffe aircraft in operational units. More snapshot dates,
| Date | A | East | West | South | Norway | Balkans | Misc | Total |
30-Jun-41 | Unit | 1,2,4 | 3,Mitte | FK X | 5 | n/a | LR Recon | |
30-Jun-41 | Aircraft | 3,094 | 747 | 535 | 316 | 0 | 91 | 4,783 |
27-Jul-42 | Unit | 1,4,Ost | 3,Mitte | 2 | 5 | n/a | n/a | |
27-Jul-42 | Aircraft | 2,799 | 1,558 | 927 | 396 | 0 | 0 | 5,680 |
17-May-43 | Unit | 1,4,6 | 3,Mitte | 2 | 5 | Sud Ost | n/a | |
17-May-43 | Aircraft | 2,368 | 2,910 | 1,105 | 373 | 163 | 0 | 6,919 |
22-May-44 | Unit | 1,4,6 | 3,Reich | 2 | 5 | Sud Ost | Transports | |
22-May-44 | Aircraft | 2,392 | 3,532 | 348 | 294 | 353 | 434 | 7,353 |
Luftflotte 5 tended to be more deployed against the USSR, the Balkans units more against the west. A question is what do the various tabulations count as east, west and south.
Germany and the Second World War Volume V endpiece for 1941 and Volume 5 part 2, endpiece for 1944,
End 1941, East 146 divisions, 4 brigades, 6 regiments plus axis allied 8 divisions, 8 brigades and 3 regiments under German command. North 13 German and 2 allied divisions, (including 5 in central/south Norway), West 27 divisions and 1 brigade (Vichy doing security in that part of France), south east 8 divisions and 1 regiment, Africa 3 German and 7 axis allied divisions, reserves 9 divisions. The above includes security units in the east. All up Germany 216 divisions 5 brigades and 7 regiments, along with under command 17 axis allied divisions, 8 brigades and 3 regiments, a figure that excludes most of the armies of Finland and Italy at least.
German Army strength 4 April 1944, 238 divisions and 28 Brigades, where brigades can mean independent regiments as well as a Brigade in German (not British) terms.
Of these 138 divisions and 24 brigades were in the east. In addition there were 27 axis allied divisions and 1 brigade in the east.
"North" is a problem, it consists of Finland and Norway, so it faced both ways, the 19 Finnish divisions and 9 German divisions were facing east, 10 German divisions and 2 brigades holding Norway, so facing west.
So the anti USSR forces were around 193 divisions and 27 Brigades.
The south east was the anti partisan operations in the Balkans, where there were 19 German divisions and 1 Brigade and 11 axis allied divisions and 14 brigades. Whether you count this as allied or local fighters is up to you, it appears to be a mix of the local fighters with western allied support and the threat of western allied invasion.
The south west front in Italy held 20 German divisions and 1 axis allied division.
The western front held 62 German divisions and 1 brigade.
So I make it the forces the western allies were fighting in Italy and France come to 81 German divisions and 1 brigade, plus 1 axis allied division versus 193 divisions and 27 brigades in the east.
In addition the threat to Norway tied up another 10 divisions and 2 brigades, and the Balkans tied up another 19 German and 11 axis allied divisions, plus 1 German and 11 axis allied brigades.
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Just a small comment here.
LL had little impact at the beginning, indeed - in terms of the volume delivered.
But already at that earlier stage (in 1941) it allowed the Soviets to plan their supply and industrial strategy accordingly.
Just as an example. My Soviet economy is a so-called "command economy". If I know that the USA has the capacity and the will to supply me with 100,000 tons of canned meat next year, I can order my factories to work on the cans not for meat but for ammunition and my collective farms to focus on the corn instead of meat. If I know that there will be "free" aviation gasoline, I can order my over-stretched petroleum industry to focus on other types of fuel, etc.
