Hs-129 Panzerknacker
- Thread starter davebender
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parsifal
Colonel
I know that we have been told to stay on topic, so I apologize for straying off topic, but I thought this would still be interesting and useful information at least.
With regard to motorization and transport, the situation for the germans and the Russians changed as the war progressed.
For the germans, their motorized component of their army possessed motorized, and occasionally mechanized artillery support. All Stugs and Wespes and the like were in fact mechanized artillery units. . The majority of the artillery component, was however serviced by soft skinned vehicles.
There was not much change in the degree of motorization for the mobile formations as the war progressed. However, increasingly there were fuel shortages that adversely affected the degree of mobility enjoyed by the germans as the war progressed. All too often their formations were caught without fuel, leading to the loos of much equipment and vehicles.
In the case of their unmotorized formations, the Germans began with a partially motorized force. Their leg infantry formations started the war with an average of 800 vehicles and 5500 draft animals per division. However, unlike their motorized formations, they were unable to maintain the level of motorization and could not replace the losses in draft animals either. This meant that by 1943, the average german div had fewer than 200 MT and fewer than 2000 draft animals attached. This badly affected the degree of mobility enjoyed by the infantry. It was no longer possible for the germans to move all their Divisional assets (which was mostly their artillery component) in one march….they had to move divisions by stages….a much slower process. This meant also that they could not withdraw at the last moment as some historians have argued because they simply lacked the mobility to do so. Every time the Soviet hammer blows fell, it invariably meant the loss of much precious equipment. German units as a general rule had to sit their and take their punishment (which was invariably severe)
Soviet Division started the ar in a similar fashion to the germans. Their mechanized formations started the war with mechanized, or motorized artillery components, whilst their Infantry artillery components were generally fully horse drawn. Due to the losses of artillery early on, Soviet infantry formations were re-organized early on. Soviet Infantry formations were fairly lightly equipped in terms of artillery, with the majority of artillery assets centralized into special8ized artillery corps. Gradually as 1942 and 1943 wore on, Soviet Infantry formations received increasingly heavy artillery support withi their own TOEs, and of course were supported by increasingly thick concentrations of supporting artillery corps behind them. Moreover, with the arrival of vast quantities of lend lease trucks, the Soviets increasingly motorized their artillery formations,. The Soviets in 1943-4 received more trucks from the US than the wehrmacht received for the entire war (39-45). These trucks were more heavily constructed than the german types (being built to a military standard) and because there was virtually no logistic support provided for Soviet Infantry units, were nearly all dedicated to the movement and supply of its artillery, AA and AT formations. By 1943, Soviet Gds and in fact most Infantry were about twice as mobile as any comparable German Infantry unit
With regard to motorization and transport, the situation for the germans and the Russians changed as the war progressed.
For the germans, their motorized component of their army possessed motorized, and occasionally mechanized artillery support. All Stugs and Wespes and the like were in fact mechanized artillery units. . The majority of the artillery component, was however serviced by soft skinned vehicles.
There was not much change in the degree of motorization for the mobile formations as the war progressed. However, increasingly there were fuel shortages that adversely affected the degree of mobility enjoyed by the germans as the war progressed. All too often their formations were caught without fuel, leading to the loos of much equipment and vehicles.
In the case of their unmotorized formations, the Germans began with a partially motorized force. Their leg infantry formations started the war with an average of 800 vehicles and 5500 draft animals per division. However, unlike their motorized formations, they were unable to maintain the level of motorization and could not replace the losses in draft animals either. This meant that by 1943, the average german div had fewer than 200 MT and fewer than 2000 draft animals attached. This badly affected the degree of mobility enjoyed by the infantry. It was no longer possible for the germans to move all their Divisional assets (which was mostly their artillery component) in one march….they had to move divisions by stages….a much slower process. This meant also that they could not withdraw at the last moment as some historians have argued because they simply lacked the mobility to do so. Every time the Soviet hammer blows fell, it invariably meant the loss of much precious equipment. German units as a general rule had to sit their and take their punishment (which was invariably severe)
Soviet Division started the ar in a similar fashion to the germans. Their mechanized formations started the war with mechanized, or motorized artillery components, whilst their Infantry artillery components were generally fully horse drawn. Due to the losses of artillery early on, Soviet infantry formations were re-organized early on. Soviet Infantry formations were fairly lightly equipped in terms of artillery, with the majority of artillery assets centralized into special8ized artillery corps. Gradually as 1942 and 1943 wore on, Soviet Infantry formations received increasingly heavy artillery support withi their own TOEs, and of course were supported by increasingly thick concentrations of supporting artillery corps behind them. Moreover, with the arrival of vast quantities of lend lease trucks, the Soviets increasingly motorized their artillery formations,. The Soviets in 1943-4 received more trucks from the US than the wehrmacht received for the entire war (39-45). These trucks were more heavily constructed than the german types (being built to a military standard) and because there was virtually no logistic support provided for Soviet Infantry units, were nearly all dedicated to the movement and supply of its artillery, AA and AT formations. By 1943, Soviet Gds and in fact most Infantry were about twice as mobile as any comparable German Infantry unit
stug3
Staff Sergeant
Hs 129B-3 With 7.5cm cannon
B-2 30mm guns
B-2 30mm guns
Civettone
Tech Sergeant
To answer the original question, the Hs 129 or any other Schlachtflugzeug was given LOW priority. That is reflected in the requirement that it should not require first rate engines or special alloys.
Air superiority had zero to do with it. Why else would they build the Stuka. Besides, hardly any Hs 129s were shot down by enemy aircraft.
Later in the war production was going to be increased, but then cancelled when more fighters were needed.
Kris
Air superiority had zero to do with it. Why else would they build the Stuka. Besides, hardly any Hs 129s were shot down by enemy aircraft.
Later in the war production was going to be increased, but then cancelled when more fighters were needed.
Kris
Shortround6
Major General
I believe (but could be wrong) that one of the two French factories building the engines for the Hs 129 was hit by a bombing raid at some point in the first half 1944 and both factories were over run by allied troops by the end of the summer of 1944. No more engines= no more Hs 129 regardless of desires of the high command.
Civettone
Tech Sergeant
The much improved Hs 129C was supposed to get the Isotta Fraschini Delta engines. That evidently did not work out either 
Kris
Kris
