Hungary steps into the breach.

[davebender]

Hungary would get the DB601Aa just like Japan did.

Daimler-Benz DB 601 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
DB601 A-1. Luftwaffe engine.
Up to 1,100 PS (809 kW) at sea-level with 2,400 rpm, up to 1,020 PS (750 kW) at 2,400 rpm and 4.5 km altitude, B4 fuel

DB601 Aa. Export version of DB601A.
Up to 1,175 PS (864 kW) at sea-level with 2,500 rpm, up to 1,100 PS (809 kW) at 2,400 rpm and 3.7 km altitude, B4 fuel

 

[Shortround6]

The Question is WHEN. You keep saying 1936 or 37 for the 601. The sources keep saying that in 1936-37 the engine being licensed or announced to the world was the DB 600 with carburetors and a SINGLE (not variable) speed supercharger. Supercharger may have used a different impeller than the 601 also.

Apparently the Japanese don't get the licence for the 601 until 1939, why would Hungary get the licence for the 601 before DB even has it in Production?

Really big bribes?

 

[davebender]

…..Feb 1937. First DB600 engine completed.
…..Jun 1937. The new factory has 5,813 workers.
…..Nov 1937. 65 x DB600 and 19 x DB601 engines produced.
…..Jul 1938. DB600 production ends. 94 x DB601 engines produced.

A license acquired during 1937 should be for the DB601 (with fuel injection) as the DB600 would be outdated before Manfred-Weiss got the engine into production.

Daimler- Benz wanted to produce the DB601 right from the beginning. RLM insisted on the DB600 for the first year of production. Perhaps someone at RLM didn't trust the new fangled fuel injection system. Just one of many disagreements between Daimler-Benz management and RLM.

 

[Shortround6]

Dave, the fuel injection was not the only difference.

In reality the performance numbers for the DB 600 where only announced to the world at large in Aug of 1937.

And somebodies time line is off. 30 He 111Bs show up in Spain in Feb 1937, the Month YOU claim the first DB600 is completed. I know the Germasn are good but to make 60 engines in the first month, get them the factories making the He 111s, install them and then get the 30 planes all to Spain in one month?????

 

[parsifal]

None of this discussion about grandiose expansions gets past some cold hard historical realities. Chief among them was the level of dependance the Hungarians had on allied credits which risked being stopped should the hungarians be seen to flout their surrender restrictions. effectively, there was no significant Hungarian Air Force from th end of WWI until Munich.

The expansion of the AF from that time was quite fast, but still did not flow in the direction of German armament. The expansion of the AF resulted from agreements with Italian manufacturers, captured ex-Czech equipment and a very small local component (for trainers and liason AC mostly).

The following is a summary of Hungarian expansion

"Hungary' AF expansion began slowly, quietly building an airforce after Munich in the lte 1930s in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade Hungary (and Germany) an air force.

In March, 1939, Hungary joined in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, supplying air support to its ground units. The frontline air force at that time carried out bombing, recon, and patrol missions, but met no aerial opponents. Its strength was as follows:

Fighters 1/I Group (sqdn 1,2,3) 27 CR.32
Bombers 3/II Group (sqdn 3,4,5) 27 Ju-86K-2
LR Recon 1 LR group 9 He170A


By December, 1939, Hungary had been renamed the Royal Hungarian Air Force and had grown into the following:

Fighters 1/I Group (sqdn 1,2) 18+6 CR.32
1/II Group (sqdn 3,4) 18+6 CR.32
2/I Group (sqdn 1,2) 18+6 CR.42
2/II Group (sqdn 3,4) 18+6 CR.42
Bombers 3/I Group (sqdn 1,2,3) 12+3 Ju-86K-2
3/II Group (sqdn 3,4,5) 12+3 Ju-86K-2
4/I Group (sqdn 1,2,3) 12+3 Ju-86K-2
4/II Group (sqdn 3,4,5) 12+3 Ju-86K-2
SR Recon 10 sqdns 34 He46 biplanes
51 WM21 biplanes
LR Recon 1 LR group (sqnd 1,2) 16 He170A
Transport 1 sqdn 5 SM.75 (nationalized from airline)



By April, 1941, the RHAF had upgraded to:

Fighters 1/I Group (sqdn 1,2) 18+6 CR.32
1/II Group (sqdn 3,4) 18+6 CR.42
2/I Group (sqdn 1,2) 18+6 CR.32
2/II Group (sqdn 3,4) 18+6 CR.42
Bombers 3/I Group (sqdn 1,2,3) 27+9 Ju-86K-2
3/II Group (sqdn 4,5) 18+6 Ju-86K-2
4/I Group (sqdn 1,2,3) 27+9 Ca.135b
4/II Group (sqdn 4,5) 18+6 Ju-86K-2
SR Recon 11 sqdns 42+14 He46 biplanes
24+8 WM21 biplanes
LR Recon 1 LR group (sqnd 1,2) 18+6 He170A
Transport 1 sqdn 5 SM.75 (nationalized from airline)



In June, 1941, Hungary sent a field army to Operation Barbarossa. Hungary's Air Force was composed as follows:

Fighters 1/I Group (sqdn 1,2) 18+6 CR.32 (+ field test unit of 9 Re.2000s)
2/II Group (sqdn 3,4) 18+6 CR.42 (in process of changing to Re.2000s)
Bombers 4/I Group (sqdn 1,2,3) 27+9 Ca.135b
4/II Group (sqdn 3,4) 18+6 Ju-86K-2
SR Recon 7 sqdns 24+8 He46 biplanes
18+6 WM21 biplanes
LR Recon 1 LR group (sqnd 1,2) 18+6 He170A

Predictably enough, Operation Barbarossa took a big bite out of these aircraft. They were replace by German aircraft, and Germany began to set up aircraft factories in Hungary to produce components and assemble aircraft.

In October, 1942, Germany gave Hungary 50 Bf109F-4s, which were used to re-equip Re.2000 units. 40 Ju87D-1s, 30 Ju87D-5s, 6 Bf110G-4s, and 160 Me210s (which the Germans were happy to get rid of) were added to the Hungarian Air Group to be used on the Russian Front.

By May, 1943, 50 Bf109G-2s re-equipped 2 squadrons armed with F-4s. By May, 1944, 4 squadrons on the Russian Front and 6 for home defense (against British and American bombers based in Italy) were armed with G-6s. By December, 1944, The Russians were at the door step of Budapest; all 9 remaining squadrons were armed with G-6s. a few surviving squadrons retreated with the Germans and continued to fly G-6s until May, 1945".

Source: World War II Eastern European Minor Power Air Forces

German influence and equpiment provision for the RHAF simply was not a major factor until after 1941. There were good reasons for that, which are being conveniently ignored in this little axis wet dream

 

[Tante Ju]

Chief reason for Hungarian reliement on Italian aircraft was fact that Hungary was politically much closer to Italy than it was to Germany in 1930. Germany and Italy saw each other as rival, and the German refused to sell weapon license to the Hungarian goverment which continously wanted this. Germany wanted the Balkan and esp. Rumania (oil) safe, and Rumania and Hungary had very bad realations. Germans did not want to arm Hungarians and shoot themselves in leg... Italian equipment was bought due to the lack of other possibilities. Until 1937 Hungary was possessing a small secret army and nucleus "air force" but the capacity to build one was there, great goverment founding was made.

It had nothing to do with mythical "Allied" credits that never were or "Allied" (what is "Allied"? there was no such thing either) bad look for buying German weapons... many countries like Yugoslavia bought these without any bad look. Also Hungarian diplomats succeeded lifting Versailles sanctions on armament in 1937, there was agreement of equal armament rights with the small entente.

Wheter DB licence production was possible is different question. German did not want to sell in first place... secondly, themselves did not have it production until about 1938.

 

[davebender]

Which German are you referring to?

RLM stiffed Daimler-Benz during October 1935, cutting DB601 engine funding from 50 million RM to 20 million RM. RLM stiffed Daimler-Benz again during 1937 when they cancelled funding for the DB603 engine. I suspect Daimler-Benz management would be thrilled to establish an engine factory in 1937 Hungary. The Hungarian Government is likely to be more cooperative and reliable then the German Government. Maybe Daimler-Benz will even move the corporate HQ to Budapest just to escape RLM oversight.

 

[parsifal]

Chief reason for Hungarian reliement on Italian aircraft was fact that Hungary was politically much closer to Italy than it was to Germany in 1930. Germany and Italy saw each other as rival, and the German refused to sell weapon license to the Hungarian goverment which continously wanted this.

I agree with most of this, except what evidence is there that "Hungary wanted this" I cant find any sucgh evidence. on the contrary they were forced economically into the german camp.

Germany wanted the Balkan and esp. Rumania (oil) safe, and Rumania and Hungary had very bad realations. Germans did not want to arm Hungarians and shoot themselves in leg... Italian equipment was bought due to the lack of other possibilities. Until 1937 Hungary was possessing a small secret army and nucleus "air force" but the capacity to build one was there, great goverment founding was made.

I agre with the first statement about capability. But "Great Government founding???". hardly. they were forced into rearmament by the far right elements of the government, that ultimately led Hungary on a crash course to oblivion.

It had nothing to do with mythical "Allied" credits that never were or "Allied" (what is "Allied"? there was no such thing either) bad look for buying German weapons... many countries like Yugoslavia bought these without any bad look. Also Hungarian diplomats succeeded lifting Versailles sanctions on armament in 1937, there was agreement of equal armament rights with the small entente.

Ther is nothing mythical about it. The source for the following is Notel, R. International Credit and Finance in The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975: Volume II: Interwar Policy, the War and Reconstruction, Edited by Kaser, M. C. and E. A. Radice Oxford Clarendon Press, 1986.

"The Hungarian economy remained susceptible to escalating inflation and was largely disorganized until March 1924 when the League of Nations agreed to the Financial Reconstruction Plan. This plan remained in force until the Munich crisis, and provided credits to the Hungarian economy. Chief crediter nations were Britain and France. Under this plan the League would lend Hungary a sum of about 250 million gold crowns from 1924 in an attempt to help stabilize Hungarian currency and help balance the budget. The budget was finally balanced in 1924/25 followed by a stabilizing of the economy. On 1st January 1927, the government introduced a new currency, the pengő, which equaled 12,500 paper crowns.

During the Great Depression, despite having been greatly reduced in size following the war, Hungary, due to its agricultural efficiency, still exported more wheat than any other State in Europe at the time . The economy did well from the 1924/25 financial year until 1929/30. When the Great Depression hit in 1929 there was a collapse of world wheat prices putting Hungary, heavily depended on wheat export, into a budget deficit. From July 1930- July 1934 the boletta system was put into place, providing price support and tax relief for farms in an attempt to manage the economic crisis caused by the decline in wheat prices. The National Council for Industry was also established to help regulate the industrial sector of the economy.

Between May 1 and July 13, 1931 the Hungarian National Bank paid out 200 million pengős in gold and foreign exchange. This additional foreign exhange was mainly provided by the banking crediter nations France, Britain and the US. At the same time Hungary's foreign debt reached 4,300 million pengos with interests costing 300 million pengos a year. With the gold and foreign exchange reserves virtually depleted, the gold cover of the pengos fell from 40% to 20%. By the summer of 1931 the National Bank no longer maintained enough foreign exchange to continue making interest payments. The government suspended the redemption of bonds and ended the payment of interest in foreign exchange on long-term foreign debts. In response to the economic crisis Hungary faced, foreign creditor nations France and Britiain agreed to temporarily suspend debt payments.

The deflation policies first enacted in 1929 and 1930 meant to assist the government in rebalancing the budget were finally achieved in 1936/37. On July 7, 1937, The Times reported that Hungary had reached an agreement to pay interest on long-term non-State debts, which had been suspended since 1931 with over 65 loans falling under the terms of this new debt offer. The resumption of payments came after signs of a recovering economy. The revival of the economy was due largely to the controls set on inflation and a bilateral trade agreement signed with Germany in 1934. The agreement gave Hungary a secure market for its wheat exports along with prices which made selling to Germany more advantageous to Hungary than selling the wheat on the world market. The League did not object to this arangement, but it set the pattern for the gradual drift of Hungary into the German camp.

The trade treaty Gyula Gombos signed with Germany in 1934 was an important factor in stimulating the economy, but it also became a critical factor in deciding the fate of Hungary for the remainder of the decade and during the war. Though the agreement did give Hungary a favorable price for sales of her wheat, the money earned remained in an account in Germany and forced Hungary to purchase German industrial goods..." (my note: so much for Hungary wanting to purchase german goods....a better way of describing it is that they were blackmailed into such purchases....held to ransom by the abovementioned treaty) " By 1938 the terms of trade agreement provided Germany with economic domination over Hungary, along with most other countries in the region, and left Hungary inextricably tied to Germany for the remainder of the interwar period and leading into World War II; Hungary, because of her unbreakable ties to Germany, ultimately joined the war on the side of the Axis powers."

 

[Shortround6]

I suspect Daimler-Benz management would be thrilled to establish an engine factory in 1937 Hungary.

Why? Daimler-Benz management was interested in making money. The Hungarians don't have a lot to spare. They certainly weren't ordering any other type of aircraft in large numbers. setting up a factory to make a couple dozen engines a month (actually in 1937 the Hungarian market was more like a couple dozen engines per year) is not really profitable. The German government may not have been paying for new factories but they were ordering a fair number of engines.

The Hungarian Government is likely to be more cooperative and reliable then the German Government.

Reliable maybe, a viable market??? According to Parisfal's post and list the Hungarians had in Dec 1939 ( two years minimum after you hypothetical deal) 278 operational aircraft, not including trainers. These were of 7 different types and used a variety of engines. Even if they had bought ONE DB powered fighter for each fighter they did buy that is 96 fighters in two years. Even allowing for 50% extra spare engines that is not exactly a big sale or big market. Let's say, just to show how ridiculous this is, that the Hungarians sign the deal late in 1937, they get the factory going in just about 1 year (Dec 1938) they need to average about 13 engines a month to supply all their fighters including the 50% spares by Dec of 1939. Such a facility would make no difference in the course of WW II.

As far as DB or the German government looking for export orders goes one only has to look at the reports from the Paris Exhibition of 1938 (November) where the French are displaying a Hispano with a THREE speed supercharger, a 24 cylinder 2000hp Hispano is announced. The British are displaying a Hercules and the Merlin X with two speed supercharger and announcing power rating for the Merlin III and Merlin XX using 100 octane fuel. Daimler Benz is displaying a DB 600 with carburetors, a full year after the DB 601 goes into production. While the He 100 which set the speed record is listed as having a DB 601 no details are released at the show.

Maybe Daimler-Benz will even move the corporate HQ to Budapest just to escape RLM oversight.

Man, you must be smoking some really good stuff

Just what percentage of Daimler-Benz's business is the aircraft engine division? Between the truck division, the cars, and the marine engines and other divisions I may be skipping over DB could probably give a hoot about what the RLM does or doesn't do.

 

[davebender]

Daimler-Benz management was interested in making money. The Hungarians don't have a lot to spare.

RLM wasn't sparing much either. Funding for the DB601 engine program was cut to 20 million RM. Funding for the DB603 engine program was eliminated. If Hungary offers 10 million RM for a small DB601 engine factory that might look attractive to Daimler-Benz management during 1937.

Some of the investment capital might come from other nations desiring to purchase He-112B aircraft. Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, Finland etc. don't have a lot of money but a million RM from each could add up to half or more of engine factory construction cost.

 

[Shortround6]

Face it, the idea doesn't work.

Why should Hungary or a number of those other countries finance an engine factory for some rather short runs or small purchases which would only make their aircraft more expensive?

Some of those countries were only buying a couple of dozen aircraft. Why should they help finance an engine factory in another country that they will get no benefit from? And will delay the delivery of the aircraft that they want.

You still need to get around the fact that the DB 601 was a military engine and was not to be exported except to certain nations in order to preserve it's military secrets. First good look the British and French got at the DB 601 Fuel injection and supercharger drive was in crashed/captured examples after the war started. The DB 601 HAD NEVER been on the open market.

 

[davebender]

DB601Aa version was specifically for export.

 

[Shortround6]

And exported when??

The three countries to receive 109s before Sept of 1939 were Spain, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. The last two started receiving planes in the spring of 1939. Spain collected a few 109E left overs. This is hardly "open market" and is just about 1 1/2 to 2 years too late for your proposed idea to bear any fruit in 1940.

Fuel injected DB 601s were used at the Zurich meet in 1937 and in the Nov 11, 1937 speed record of 610.95kph. Both the Zurich flights ( 109 and DO-17) and the speed record flight had the Germans giving the false information that planes had DB 600 engines.