Hurricane vs.Bf-110

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

You design a place for another human being, you get a bunch of added on weight as well as changing the shape of the airframe to a less aerodynamic one.

Yes I understand that, I work with aircraft so I have a decent knowledge of how that works.

The two aircraft were designed for two different purposes and used in different roles from one another, hence the difference in design. Therefore it is irrelevant. Just my opinion however.

Had it been designed as a lighter more streamlined single seat aircraft, it might have been comparable to a P-38. Something like the Fw-187 but with 601s instead of Jumos.

I can see where you are coming from, and in that case I can agree with you.

But being how the aircraft was designed, I think it is worthless to compare.

 

[Clay_Allison]

Yes I understand that, I work with aircraft so I have a decent knowledge of how that works.

The two aircraft were designed for two different purposes and used in different roles from one another, hence the difference in design. Therefore it is irrelevant. Just my opinion however.



I can see where you are coming from, and in that case I can agree with you.

But being how the aircraft was designed, I think it is worthless to compare.

To be fair the 110 was designed for a role that should have brought it into dogfighting contact with the Hurricane. It filled a different role (night fighting) but it was supposed to be a long range escort.

It occurred to me as I was reading on the Battle of Britain that had the Germans had any kind of heavy bomber, even one equivalent to the unfairly criticised B-24 Liberator, the British would have beend in deep trouble in the battle of Britain.

 

[delcyros]

To be fair, not every Hurricane Spitfire had 100 oct. fuel and 12 lbs boost during BoB. 100 oct. fuel was aviable in limited quantity, only. The Bf-110C captured and tested by the RAE at BoB was found to be faster than their contemporary Hurricane´s at all altitudes but as Hohun pointed out, the test data is likely a freak event and has to be carefully interpreted.
Limiting dive speed on the 110C was 750 Km/h vs. 700 Km/h for the Bf-109E and ca. 650 Km/h for the Hurricane.
The 110C has a significant cruise speed advantage over the Hurricane and while the climb rate is in within the same range, the Hurricane achieves it´s best climb at a much lower speed and steeper climb angle and thus may be outzoomed by a 110C driver in a climb duel who uses the superior excess speed at equal climb rates.
Remember that the 110C was ordered to fly close escort during BoB! In such a situation, this A/C couldn´t benefit from any of it´s advantages but heavily exposed all it´s weaknesses, most notably the low acceleration, low maneuverability and large target size!
Nevertheless, the 110C was underperforming but not terribly from a statistical perspective. During the august september 1940 period, the 110C Gruppen claimed 213 enemy A/C destroyed (9 of those are night claims) for the loss of 199 Bf-110C to enemy action (+10 losses in non operational flights and 12 in landing accidents). A number of these claims relate to RAF or coastal command bombers and seaplanes but the majority were RAF fighters. Given the typical range of overclaiming You would expect a trade ratio of two Bf-110 for each kill. The close escort orders significantly contributed to the result but nevertheless that´s a reasonable account for an underdog facing 100 oct. Hurricane Spitfire.
Imagine the P-47 would have been ordered to fly close escorts with B-17 formations over Germany in 1943/44!

This is a speed comparison for the BoB -Hurricane with 12 lbs boost 100 oct. fuel and a typical BoB Bf-110C with DB-601A. The Hurricane Bf-110C appear to be equally fast at altitudes below 14.000ft. while at higher altitudes, the -110c has definitely an edge in performance over the 100 oct. Hurricane. Those Hurrianes to run on lower grade fuel and 6.25 lbs overboost will suffer from inferior top speed at all atlitudes. I personally tend to believe that top speed is not as important as acceleration.

 

[slaterat]

delcyros wrote

To be fair, not every Hurricane Spitfire had 100 oct. fuel and 12 lbs boost during BoB. 100 oct. fuel was aviable in limited quantity,

By August 1940 fighter command was running completely on 100 oct fuel. Testing was done in march 1940.

Remember that the 110C was ordered to fly close escort during BoB!

Only partly true, Luftwaffe fighters were also assigned to fly in front of and above the bomber units. German fighters often held the altitude advantage over RAF intercepting fighters.

Nevertheless, the 110C was underperforming but not terribly from a statistical perspective. During the august september 1940 period, the 110C Gruppen claimed 213 enemy A/C destroyed (9 of those are night claims) for the loss of 199 Bf-110C to enemy action (+10 losses in non operational flights and 12 in landing accidents). A number of these claims relate to RAF or coastal command bombers and seaplanes but the majority were RAF fighters. Given the typical range of overclaiming You would expect a trade ratio of two Bf-110 for each kill

The Luftwaffe overclaimed at a rate of nearly 3 to 1 during the BoB, making 110 kills close to 70 against 200 losses or almost 1:3.

The performance curves you have for the Hurricane at 6.25 lbs are a little on the slow side. Also the switch to 100 oct and 12lbs had no affect above
17,000 ft

I suppose I'm being a little too picky, essentially Delcyros, we probably agree. If the 110s are equal in numbers, and use the right tactics, with very little margin for error, they could pull it off using their very heavy firepower.

Slaterat

 

[delcyros]

By August 1940 fighter command was running completely on 100 oct fuel. Testing was done in march 1940.

That is particularely interesting, slaterat. Do You happen to have a fuel quantity analysis for the timeframe in question?

Only partly true, Luftwaffe fighters were also assigned to fly in front of and above the bomber units. German fighters often held the altitude advantage over RAF intercepting fighters.

Depending on event and situation, I agree. Just wanted to point out that it was a close escort situation and event when 110C Gruppen required to be escorted by Bf-109 Gruppen, not a freie Jagd situation when they were free to apply their tactics on their own.
I am not going to say that the Bf-110C was the better plane but it was a significantly more capable if flown to it´s tactical performance envelope than BoB does imply.

The Luftwaffe overclaimed at a rate of nearly 3 to 1 during the BoB, making 110 kills close to 70 against 200 losses or almost 1:3.

While it is true that the Luftwaffe as a whole overclaimed three to one, one should remmember that this includes bomber claims. Realistically spoken, I used to ignore the bomber claims and concentrate on the fighter claims for the comparison. It appears that at BoB an even two to one claim rate for german and englisch fighter groups can be established, which matches pretty well other events.
(nobody would seriously count bomber claims in the Battle over Germany, don´t?)

The performance curves you have for the Hurricane at 6.25 lbs are a little on the slow side. Also the switch to 100 oct and 12lbs had no affect above
17,000 ft

I happen to use Mike Williams site for the Hurricane performance. While there are some graphs for better performance Hurricanes, they do relate to individual planes in a state pre BoB, meaning no pilot armour, armoured windscreen and bulletproof bulkhead infront of the cockpit. At BoB, these were refitted to all remaining Hurricane I, resulting in the performance of the red graph. I happen to have doublechekced this source with a later, 1943 Hurricane source, which doesn´t show altitude drop but 6.25 12 lbs boost speeds and both do match nicely in within a range of individual performance differences, making me feel that it´s a reasonable extrapolation. But You are basically right, that are only two relevant RAF sources, perhaps I should compile a larger number of test results. Unfortunately, I am limited to these two ones as they do match the BoB condition Hurricane best and I don´t see any point in using fixed pitch prop or lighter airframe tests as those were hardly in use by BoB period.

 

[Kurfürst]

By August 1940 fighter command was running completely on 100 oct fuel. Testing was done in march 1940.

So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.

What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan.

It would appear that most Hurricanes and RAF fighters ran at 87 octane fuel through most of the Battle. BTW, at the start of the Battle it should be noted that three Bf 110 wings, or about 100 aircraft, about half of the 110s, had the improved DB 601N engine, and was running on 100 octane fuel.

 

[KrazyKraut]

As already pointed out it's nonsense to evaluate the 110 (as a fighter) based on the BoB alone. It performed well during 1939 and early 1940 campaigns and held its own over North Africa against Hurricanes (until the arrival of better fighters) and was important again in the Balkans campaign (don't know about Barbarossa).

 

[steelDUST]

What a head-on comparison!

The Bf110 only excelled in firepower vs the mosquito. Though badly mauled as escort fighters during the BoB, it is not without distinction esp in nightfighting in continental europe.
Meanwhile, the DH98 mosquito distinguished itself in almost all aspect of twin-engined fighter performances eventhough many of which had been destroyed in nightfighting by the He219 Uhu.

The mosquito wins in this comparison.

But I think the most ideal twin-engined plane to be clashed head-on aginst the mosquito should be the Fw187 Falke of which the only 3 aircraft produced were much more preferred by a Jagdstaffel in Norway than the Bf110. Unfortunately, RLM and Nazi Germany got very small interest in the 187 project and were relegated to defending the Bremen industrial complex. They were even used by Goebbels as the new state-of-the-art heavy fighter in the 1940s.

 

[Hop]

To be fair, not every Hurricane Spitfire had 100 oct. fuel and 12 lbs boost during BoB.

Fighter Command had switched completely to 100 octane fuel some time before the BoB began.

100 oct. fuel was aviable in limited quantity

British aviation fuel stocks at the start of September 1939 were 153,000 tons of 100 octane, 323,000 tons of other grades.

By February 1940, when the decision to start using 100 octane was made, there were 220,000 tons in stock.

In early November 1940, just after the BoB, British stocks were 500,000 tons of 100 octane, and a similar amount of other grades.

According to Wood and Dempster, between 11 July and 10 October, Fighter Command used 22,000 tons of 100 octane. With a Spitfire or Hurricane using about 85 gallons maximum (no drop tanks at the time) that's 612 lbs of fuel for a full sortie, assuming they landed with empty tanks.

With 2,240 lbs in a British ton, that's enough 100 octane for just over 80,000 sorties (assuming each sortie empties the tanks). According to Hooton, quoting RAF records, Fighter Command flew 50,500 sorties in the period.

I presume the extra fuel was used in ground running, flight testing etc, but it's clear that fuel consumed was easily enough to allow for all flights.

Lastly, the evidence is in the records. Go to Mike Williams site and he has the combat reports from every Spitfire squadron that showed they used 100 octane in combat. (from memory 1 squadron is missing, but I suspect that's one of those that saw little or no fighting).

ALL the evidence shows FC used 100 octane exclusively. I have seen no evidence that suggests otherwise.

So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.

What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan.

Against the evidence from the official records, Kurfurst has a forum posting by an Australian who claimed to have seen documents to that effect in the Australian archives, and was recalling them from memory.

However, the simple explanation of the Australian's recollections is that what he saw was the plans from early 1939, not the actions of 1940.

The key is in the numbers. Note the 16 fighter squadrons and 2 Blenheim squadrons Kurfurst quotes.

From The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain by Gavin Bailey:

RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939

 

[Glider]

So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.

What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan.

It would appear that most Hurricanes and RAF fighters ran at 87 octane fuel through most of the Battle. BTW, at the start of the Battle it should be noted that three Bf 110 wings, or about 100 aircraft, about half of the 110s, had the improved DB 601N engine, and was running on 100 octane fuel.

The attached lisk shows a copy of the instruction dated 7th August authorising the use of 100 octane was authorised for use in all Commands. Note the use of the word Commands, not other fighter units, or other groups in Fighter Coammand but Commands. The only other commands include Bomber Command, Training etc, there were no other Fighter Commands in the UK.

The clear implication being that Fighter Command was already using it. Even if there were was some obscure corner of Fighter Command that wasn't, this allows the use of 100 octane.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100oct-7aug40-allcommands.jpg

Kurfurst
Every time this topic crops up you keep trotting out the theory that only a small proportion of Fighter command used 100 Octane. Is your only source an Australian who was looking at a 1939 report as HOP states, or have you something more substantial to support your claim, if so can I ask what it is?

PS re the widespread use of 100 Octane in the Luftwaffe, can I ask how widespread it was? I note that you asay that at the start of the BOB approx 100 Me110 were using the DB601N. However at the end of January 1941 the number was about 150. An increase of about 50 aircraft over 4 months doesn't seem a huge increase, so I was wondering if the figures were accurate.

 

[Kwiatek]

So far no evidence is that so it remains on the list of wishful Mike Williams claims.

What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan.

It would appear that most Hurricanes and RAF fighters ran at 87 octane fuel through most of the Battle. BTW, at the start of the Battle it should be noted that three Bf 110 wings, or about 100 aircraft, about half of the 110s, had the improved DB 601N engine, and was running on 100 octane fuel.

Did you have maby any detailed info or confitmation about DB 601 N in Bf 110 C-4? I need it to our small Il2 mod project. We dont know really if 110 C-4/B had 601 N and what was their perfomance expecially speed and climb at different alt. If you have any info plz send it to me.
The same about maximum dive speed. I cant find any info about these.

 

[ponsford]

Hi gents:

There's quite a bit of interesting documentation about the Hurricane's performance, 100 octane fuel use during the Battle of France, over Dunkirk and during the Battle of Britain, as well as combat reports and pilot's accounts noting +12 lbs boost, pulling the plug, etc. at these pages:

Hurricane Mk I Performance
Hurricane Mk I Combat Report
Spitfire Mk I versus Me 109 E

 

[Kurfürst]

Fighter Command had switched completely to 100 octane fuel some time before the BoB began.

Thats very nice for fantasy and wishful thinking, however there is no evidence for it. You are welcome to post that evidence.

There's evidence, however, that 100 octane was only supplied to selected fighter stations, and only 16 Sqns of Fighters and 2 Squadrons of Blenheims were concerned.

More later.

 

[Kurfürst]

Did you have maby any detailed info or confitmation about DB 601 N in Bf 110 C-4? I need it to our small Il2 mod project. We dont know really if 110 C-4/B had 601 N and what was their perfomance expecially speed and climb at different alt. If you have any info plz send it to me.

The only information is from Mankau who notes that as of July 3 Gruppen of 110 and one Gruppe of 109 had been refitted with the 601N (see the 601N page on my site).

I don't think I have seen figures for the 110C w. 601N, however as far as speed goes its fairly easy to estimate with a good level of accuracy by comparing the power output of the DB 601A and 601N, and then correcting the figures for higher out for the 110C-2 (chart in other topic on 110). Power requirements for speed are increasing with the cube, while climb is roughly linear.

The same about maximum dive speed. I cant find any info about these.

According a 110C-D datasheet, dive speed limit was 700 km/h.

 

[Kurfürst]

The attached lisk shows a copy of the instruction dated 7th August authorising the use of 100 octane was authorised for use in all Commands. Note the use of the word Commands, not other fighter units, or other groups in Fighter Coammand but Commands. The only other commands include Bomber Command, Training etc, there were no other Fighter Commands in the UK.

The clear implication being that Fighter Command was already using it. Even if there were was some obscure corner of Fighter Command that wasn't, this allows the use of 100 octane.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/100oct-7aug40-allcommands.jpg

Oh yes, and appearantly nothing of this suggestion come to fruitation - at least until October 1940 - see the Appendix for this discussion your are pointing to.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/100octane-annexure-7aug40.jpg

Note that in the 2nd Quarter, April, May and June, before tha Battle when fighter command had much fewer fighters and when much fewer sorties were flown, consumption was 18 100 tons.

They estimate that 93 700 tons will be required for the 3rd and 4th Quarters of 1940, after the revision of 7 August 1940 so that others Commands would use this fuel as well.

That works out on avarage something like 47 000 tons / quarter.

However we do know that in the 3rd Quarter - which covers the most active period of the Battle - only 22 000 tons were issued (which is not the same as consumed), only about that was estimated to be the requirement for the 'Commands', and if fact only very slightly more than in April, May and June, when Fighter Command had about half the number of fighters it did have in the Battle of Britain, and was flying incomparably fewer sorties - given that there was no heavy combat in France until May, and even that was limited to Hurricanes in France.

The peak of activity was over Dunkerque, and Fighter Command flew something in the order of 1000 sorties in the duration of a week or so, a number Fighter Command flew on a daily basis during the Battle of Britain...

From which it logically follows that the number of Sqns using/aircraft flying sorties with 100 octane was not much different during the Battle as it was in April, May and June 1940. And, as the evidence reveals, even in May 1940 (when FC had about half as many fighters as it did in August), 100 octane was only supplied to selected units (or to be more precise, selected fighter stations, as fuel was supplied to airfields, and not units which often changed their base) - take note of the expression: 'the units concerned had now been stocked with 100 octane fuel.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/18may40-100octane.jpg

With a good likelyhood, these were those 16 Fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons that were originally planned for 100 octane by September 1940, ie. 1/4 of Fighter command.

PS re the widespread use of 100 Octane in the Luftwaffe, can I ask how widespread it was? I note that you asay that at the start of the BOB approx 100 Me110 were using the DB601N. However at the end of January 1941 the number was about 150. An increase of about 50 aircraft over 4 months doesn't seem a huge increase, so I was wondering if the figures were accurate.

Decision was made in the 2nd half of 1940 that SE fighters would enjoy priority for DB 601N engines - before that 110s had priority - namely the Bf 109E-x/N and the Bf 109F-1 and F-2, as the F was just coming into production in July 1940.

You may want to check the number of E/Ns and Fs (at this time, all Fs were fitted with 601N) in March 1941 when the 109F came into service: Single engine fighters - 29.03.41

 

[Kurfürst]

Go to Mike Williams site and he has the combat reports from every Spitfire squadron that showed they used 100 octane in combat. (from memory 1 squadron is missing, but I suspect that's one of those that saw little or no fighting).

Oh surely, but then there of course is a courious circumstance that there is never more than about four Spitfire Squadrons reporting using 100 octane in Combat in a month, and coincidentally when they report that happening, they were somehow always stationed at the same fighter stations - Hornchurch, CATTERICK, KENLEY or NORTH WEALD for example. But thats only a couple of fighter stations, on which usualy two to four Squadrons were stationed at a time.

The answer to that mystery is very simple, it was selected fighter Stations, and not Squadrons that were supplied with the precious 100 octane fuel, and Fighter Squadrons kept rotating off and into combat.

So, when say Squadron X reported the use of 100 octane on say 10th August, and then was re-deployed to the North say on 14th of August, the aircraft remained as they were and only the crew travelled North; they were replaced by the crew of say Y Squadron, using the very same planes left behind by X Squadrons, they reported a few day later using 100 octane fuel, too. But then of course, such reports from Squadron X would 'suddenly' disappear.

ALL the evidence shows FC used 100 octane exclusively. I have seen no evidence that suggests otherwise.

That's wonderful, I though none existed so far, but surely if they do you can easily post a few, right?

Against the evidence from the official records, Kurfurst has a forum posting by an Australian who claimed to have seen documents to that effect in the Australian archives, and was recalling them from memory.

I have never seen him stating he was 'recalling it from memory', so I guess its again something you made up, as you have in the past making up everything imaginable to dismiss the information he dug up, although you never actually dare to make you accusation face to face, implying that he was just making it up but appearantly he just saw the same paper Gavin Bailey has found at AVIA 10/282 and referred to in his study.

Some shot of which, having been presented with the reference by Bailey, allowed Neil to make a trip to the PRO in October and present a couple of pages from the hundreds to further his point - but none of those pages actually suppurt the 100% use, the theory they are pushing forward for a long time, before having any evidence to it. Knowing the fanatic attitude of both Neil and Mike to this agenda, it can only mean that there's nothing to support their claims in these set of documents, or worse, there is something amongst that utterly disproves it, and hence why only a couple of pages from selected reports are posted on their site. Its probably the second case.

And you, Neil and Mike was implying he was just making it up, all these years. Now, all that remains to be done is to get a copy of AVIA 10/282 and publish it in its entirety, rather than the cherry picking and the wishful misinterpretation Mike does with it, as usual.

Here's what this gentleman found out in the National Archieves of Australia, and posted on the subject on another discussion board:

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

I came across it when I was in fact researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives. It's from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was quite an interesting paper actually, even though i found it to be a very dry subject. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. I believe that McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

 

[Glider]

Oh yes, and appearantly nothing of this suggestion come to fruitation - at least until October 1940 - see the Appendix for this discussion your are pointing to.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/100octane-annexure-7aug40.jpg

Note that in the 2nd Quarter, April, May and June, before tha Battle when fighter command had much fewer fighters and when much fewer sorties were flown, consumption was 18 100 tons.

Correct, they used 18,100 tons in the second quarter

They estimate that 93 700 tons will be required for the 3rd and 4th Quarters of 1940, after the revision of 7 August 1940 so that others Commands would use this fuel as well.

That works out on avarage something like 47 000 tons / quarter.

Correct

However we do know that in the 3rd Quarter - which covers the most active period of the Battle - only 22 000 tons were issued (which is not the same as consumed),

Correct, Issued is not the same as consumed. Your assumption is based on the false premise that every ton consumed in the second quarter, was issued. You don't know what was Issued in the second quarter. It is certain that more was issued in the first and second quarter than was consumed resulting in a reserve. See the notes below.

What isn't in doubt is that all commands were given the OK to use 100 octane after the 7th August 1940.

The evidence trail is very clear
12 December 1939
Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants. Note that it specifically mentions that Supplies in Bulk should be available before it is issued to the relevent stations.
There you are, the phrase you love to misquote Relevent Stations. What you always leave out of your quote is the specific mention of 'Non Operational Stations'. The meaning is clear, Relevent Stations are those with Spitfire Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Non Operational Stations will not be stocked with 100 Octane until later.

18th May 1940
The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft and that the Units involved had been so equipped. Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start, in May 1940 this had been made available.
The Board even passed on that the Air Ministry had been impressed with how well this had been undertaken.

7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.

Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.

With a good likelyhood, these were those 16 Fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons that were originally planned for 100 octane by September 1940, ie. 1/4 of Fighter command.

You have nothing to back it up.

Decision was made in the 2nd half of 1940 that SE fighters would enjoy priority for DB 601N engines - before that 110s had priority - namely the Bf 109E-x/N and the Bf 109F-1 and F-2, as the F was just coming into production in July 1940.

You may want to check the number of E/Ns and Fs (at this time, all Fs were fitted with 601N) in March 1941 when the 109F came into service: Single engine fighters - 29.03.41

Thanks for this I will look at it.

 

[Glider]

I have had a look at the site and its very interesting, many thanks for it. I was surprised to see how large a drop there was in servicable fighters and ready pilots between June and December 1940.

from 856 Operational 109's and 906 pilots
down to 586 operational aircraft and 711 ready pilots

Considering that November and December were quiet periods where the strength would have built up and with new production introduced the OOB. The Luftwaffe must have been on their knees by the end of October.

 

[Hop]

Is your only source an Australian who was looking at a 1939 report as HOP states, or have you something more substantial to support your claim, if so can I ask what it is?

As you can see, he doesn't have anything substantial, just a lot of leaps of faith using documentation that says the opposite of what he claims.

Note that in the 2nd Quarter, April, May and June, before tha Battle when fighter command had much fewer fighters and when much fewer sorties were flown, consumption was 18 100 tons.

However we do know that in the 3rd Quarter - which covers the most active period of the Battle - only 22 000 tons were issued (which is not the same as consumed), only about that was estimated to be the requirement for the 'Commands', and if fact only very slightly more than in April, May and June, when Fighter Command had about half the number of fighters it did have in the Battle of Britain, and was flying incomparably fewer sorties - given that there was no heavy combat in France until May, and even that was limited to Hurricanes in France.

This is one of those leaps of faith.

There's a fairly obvious reason for high consumption in the second quarter that Kurfurst, in his quest to find evidence to support his faith, overlooks.

We know that RAF Hurricane squadrons based in France were using 100 octane, because Mike has the combat reports. See for example 1 squadron's Paul Richley. 1 squadron were based at Vassingcourt.

What happened to the RAF airfields in France in the second quarter of 1940? They were overrun by the Germans.

What happened to the fuel at those airfields? With tanks, artillery, trucks and equipment all left behind, what's the chance soldiers at Dunkirk had their pockets full of aviation fuel?

The truth is that any fuel the RAF had sent to France was lost in the second quarter, so trying to equate sorties to fuel consumption is futile.

100 octane was only supplied to selected units (or to be more precise, selected fighter stations, as fuel was supplied to airfields, and not units which often changed their base) - take note of the expression: 'the units concerned had now been stocked with 100 octane fuel.

OK, only you do understand ALL FC airfields had switched over to 100 octane, don't you?

From the 7th December 1939 memo:

The operational stations at which the fuel will be required in the first instance are:

It goes on to list operational stations. Then:

All non-operational Stations in the Fighter Command will also have to hold certain quantities of this fuel for visiting aircraft. Non-operational Stations and Stations which have no Hurricane or Spitfire aircraft at the moment are:

On the 9th:

It is proposed, therefore, that storage space
for 100 octane fuel at stations shall be made available
by the consumption of the D.T.D. 230 fuel already in stock.
When a tank in the installation becomes empty, it is to be
re-filled with 100 octane fuel. This process is to be repeated
until all the accommodation allotted to 100 octane fuel at
a station has been filled. When this has been done, the
use of this fuel in aeroplanes for which it is approved
should commence.

So all lower grades of fuel were to be removed from operational stations, and replaced with 100 octane.

How much clearer can it be?

Oh surely, but then there of course is a courious circumstance that there is never more than about four Spitfire Squadrons reporting using 100 octane in Combat in a month, and coincidentally when they report that happening, they were somehow always stationed at the same fighter stations - Hornchurch, CATTERICK, KENLEY or NORTH WEALD for example. But thats only a couple of fighter stations, on which usualy two to four Squadrons were stationed at a time.

The answer to that mystery is very simple, it was selected fighter Stations, and not Squadrons that were supplied with the precious 100 octane fuel, and Fighter Squadrons kept rotating off and into combat.

Only we've seen the list of operational, and non operational, airfields that were to be supplied with 100 octane. Even the ones that weren't on the list in 1939, eg Westhampnett, are listed in Mike's combat reports.

Nope, you are lying, the Australian was taking notes and was sharing and you keep dismissing these, calling him just making up but appearantly he just saw the same paper Gavin Bailey has found at AVIA 10/282 and referred to in his study.

Yeah?

Why are his facts so badly out, then? Why, after more than 4 years, has he yet to post anything to back his claims up?

Let's look at some of the "facts":

The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba.

We know the stocks as at 3rd September were 153,000 tons from Gavin Bailey. So we are expected to believe 150,000 tons arrived in the 3 months before war broke out? An average of 50,000 tons a month?

Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

We know for a fact that 100 octane allowed boost pressure to increase from 6.25 to 12 lbs, not 9.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Right. Only look at the documents we've seen from the second quarter.

Stock at 31st March 1940 - 220,000 tons
Due in by the end of the year - 383,000 tons

With a Spitfire using at most a quarter of a ton per sortie, and the RAF's peak fighter sortie rate of 5,000 a week, that's a maximum of about 1,250 tons a week, or about 63,000 tons in an entire year. That means stock was enough for over 3 years, and the next 9 months were expected to see another 5+ years supply come in.

And we are expected to believe they were worried about lack of supply?

Doesn't.Make.Sense.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place.

Right, so in May the position is so bad they have to halt the conversion of Fighter Command, and yet at the beginning of August the position is so good they can convert the whole of the RAF?

Doesn't.Make.Sense. Especially when you see they didn't have to "discover" new supplies, they had them on order.

And the other reason I don't believe what he posted was a quote of an official document? The language isn't right. There is no way an official report from 1940 has language like "Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis."

 

[Kurfürst]

The Luftwaffe must have been on their knees by the end of October.

Certainly a just as wishful claim as the one that all RAF fighters were using 100 octane fuel in the BoB.

Looking at the strenght reports, on 28.09.40 (a day after some very heavy combat and losses btw) the LW day fighters reported 920 fighters on strenght and 917 pilots.

They reported practically the same number, 889 aircraft on strenght, 7 September 1940 (without II/LG 2, which could mean about 20-30 aircraft missing)

During October they reported 104 fighters lost to enemy action, against 184 lost to enemy action in September, indicating just how crippled Fighter Command have become, right?

Anyway, are we to believe that after loosing 184 fighters to enemy action September, and yet strenght was even slightly increasing, the strenght was supposedly declining in October, when much less fighters were lost...?

On 28 December 1940 they reported 829 fighters and 915 pilots. The number of fighter pilots remained unchanged compared to September, in fact many were back to Germany and on leave, while the units were prepearing to receive the new 109Fs. This explains the low servicibility numbers for the end of December, that is effected by some units reporting 0 servicable aircraft, ie.

Stab/JG51, I./JG51, II./JG51, III./JG51 curiously reporting 0 Bf 109Es ready for operation out of the 46 present, while II./JG54, that was almost on full strenght with 35 aircraft reported again with 0 mission capable aircraft. Which is more than just odd. Not one, not half of them, none.

Obviously these units were in the process of rest and refit, and units were busy creating their own operational training units, to which they transferred to old aircraft, and awaiting the new 109Fs.

Of course, there's a tad bit more of a problem with the theory that the Germans were running out fighters, and that is that they weren't. During the entire Battle of Britain, July to October, they lost 663 single engined fighters on and outside of operations (502 of these were attributed to enemy action).

At the same time, their factories delivered 884 new ones, adding to the sizable reserves they also had before the Battle.

Surely the Jagdwaffe was not its knees (except for those pilots which were hunting with Göring as a reward and taking aim on a stag), quite the contrary, they had on arm behind their back. They pulled it out in the spring:

On the 29 March 1941, they were reporting 1104 aircraft present, with much of the frontline strenght now consisting of the new 109Fs, with much of the Emils retired, and the last batches of them running out of the production line, and 1204 pilots.

The only ones on their knees and praying for their lives in December were British citizens, in their bomb raid shelters.

What isn't in doubt is that all commands were given the OK to use 100 octane after the 7th August 1940.

What isn't at doubt that originally only 16+2 Squadrons were meant to receive 100 octane fuel. What is at doubt how many actually received it in the end.

What isn't at doubt that on 18 May 1940 the wording of the historical documents leaves no doubt that only some units were concerned with being supplied with 100 octane fuel.

What isn't at doubt that on 7th August 1940 they decided that they want to convert aircraft from other Commands, and that would require nearly 50,000 tons of fuel per quarter.

What isn't at doubt that they supplied 18 000 tons of 100 octane fuel in Q2 of 1940 to far fewer aircraft engaged far less heavily in Combat than in the Q3 1940 when they supplied practically the same amount at 22 000 tons.

What is at doubt is the exact reason as to why the plans of 7th August 1940 were not carried out in the end, not that wheter they were carried out or not - as we know from the lack of fuel issues is that it simply wasn't.

What is at doubt are the wishful claims of a few nationalist who claim that each and every fighter of Fighter Command was running on 100 octane fuel, and having nothing to offer for the validity of their claim so far.