Hypothetical Scenario: Java 1942

[davebender]

Everything I have read suggests the 1941 USN was considerably larger then the 1941 IJN. We also had more military shipping in the Pacific plus more army divisions and USAAC units available for immediate deployment.

 

[davebender]

26 July 1941. USA begins a massive military expansion in the Philippines.
4 heavy bomber groups and 5 divisions of long range submarines were to be main offensive components of this military expansion.

Japan attacked during December 1941 to forestall the U.S. military build up. If they don't attack the USA they won't attack at all.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Everything I have read suggests the 1941 USN was considerably larger then the 1941 IJN. We also had more military shipping in the Pacific plus more army divisions and USAAC units available for immediate deployment.

Dave, the thing about those USAAC units, as the debacles in the PI and Java revealed, is that they looked better in their numbers than in their actual quality. The pilots were terribly raw many having only a few hours in type. The units that got to the PI in early '41 were reported to have suffered from a very low quality standard of training according to the more seasoned flyers already there. The FEAF units had to institute a program of training that absorbed much time and resources and detracted from the time spent to prepare for the imminent war. Combat style training only began in the Fall and was curtailed by the lack of 50 cal. ammunition and other operational essentials. The problem with jammed guns which became epidemic was not revealed until actual combat in part because the training regimine was carefully correographed and the HMG weren't used in training. Personnel were sent to the PI and Australia on the long voyage ahead of their aircraft and so became supernumeraries upon arrival instead of pilots in training with grounded time becoming weeks. In the PI I believe it was months. The heavy non-combat related losses in Australia and Java and the terrible early non-combat related attrition of the FEAF in the PI, as well as the losses suffered in combat were the result.

IMO, the rush to build the FEAF not only precipitated the Japanese attack, in some significant ways, it crippled the ability of the US to respond effectively in defense of the PI when the IJ attack occurred.

 

[davebender]

IMO, the rush to build the FEAF not only precipitated the Japanese attack, in some significant ways, it crippled the ability of the US to respond effectively in defense of the PI when the IJ attack occurred.

President FDR more or less admitted as much to his inner circle after the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't have the historical statement in front of me but it was to the effect that if FDR had known how poorly prepared defenses were in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor he would have continued serious diplomatic talks with Japan for a few more months before creating USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East. FEAF was the aerial component of USAFFE.)

 

[oldcrowcv63]

President FDR more or less admitted as much to his inner circle after the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't have the historical statement in front of me but it was to the effect that if FDR had known how poorly prepared defenses were in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor he would have continued serious diplomatic talks with Japan for a few more months before creating USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East. FEAF was the aerial component of USAFFE.)

Very interesting Dave!

 

[davebender]

Normally major nations get what they want as long as they don't demand too much from the little guys. Push too hard against a weaker nation and you get war.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

President FDR more or less admitted as much to his inner circle after the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't have the historical statement in front of me but it was to the effect that if FDR had known how poorly prepared defenses were in the Philippines and at Pearl Harbor he would have continued serious diplomatic talks with Japan for a few more months before creating USAFFE (U.S. Armed Forces Far East. FEAF was the aerial component of USAFFE.)

I find this observation to be very interesting. I wonder, if there wasn't a strategy that took into account the upreparedness of the USA, the forward deployment of its unprepared forces as well as the situation in the PI and neighboring areas of conflict that could have possibly forestalled the Japanese tide and given the allies a very different war to fight. In other words, don't focus on the outcome of any particular battle but of the entire early war campaign. I think there might have been one, but it's a stretch, especially given the short time involved and the political realities of the pre-Pac war countries Australia, Britain and the USA.

Sounds like a new thread. I'll post it later unless someone beats me to it. This retiree has to get back to work.

 

[davebender]

I wonder, if there wasn't a strategy that took into account the upreparedness of the USA, the forward deployment of its unprepared forces as well as the situation in the PI and neighboring areas of conflict that could have possibly forestalled the Japanese tide and given the allies a very different war to fight. In other words, don't focus on the outcome of any particular battle but of the entire early war campaign.

You are thinking way too hard.

Japanese strategy was to dominate China by bribing or coercing local warlords. That strategy worked until 1928 when the KMT booted the pro-Japanese warlord out of Beijing and established a weak national government. China still had plenty of warlords but they acknowledged the KMT as the national government.

Japan invaded China in the vicinity of Shanghai 28 January 1932. The battle raged until 4 March 1932. Before it was over both sides (Japan and KMT China) committed 5 infantry divisions plus a bunch of separate smaller units. Two of the Chinese divisions were German trained and they fought hard. However the remaining Chinese units were typical warlord organizations and couldn't stand up to a professional Japanese army backed by armor and airpower. The U.S. Government took a hard diplomatic stance (which Britain refused to support). Japan eventually backed down and withdrew from the Shanghai area while keeping Manchuria which they had occupied 6 months earlier.

After the Shanghai diplomatic crisis Japan and the USA were barely on speaking terms for the remainder of the 1930s. It probably didn't help that the USA violated the 1923 naval agreement when we fortified Corregidore Island. Moving the USN Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor probably didn't help either.

During 1937 a border clash escalated into full blown war between Japan and KMT China. By the end of 1939 Japan controlled all the Chinese seaports. However KMT China still had a rail line to the French controlled seaport at Hai Phong (Vietnam). As long as this rail line remained open KMT China had a viable supply line to the outside world. Japan couldn't do anything about it unless they wanted to fight France in addition to China.

Britain solved the Hai Phong problem when they stabbed France in the back at Mers el Kebir. France could no longer use her navy. To make matters worse a substantial amount of war material which France had purchased in the USA was diverted to Britain. France no longer had the ability to reinforce IndoChina and apparently no longer had any diplomatic friends. That left France no choice but to accept Japanese military bases in Vietnam and permanent closure of the rail line to China.

Japan miscalculated. The USA apparently had no problem with Britain stabbing France in the back but they weren't going to tolerate Japan doing the same thing. Especially when the Japanese action was also a death blow to China. Relations between Japan and the USA went from cool to frigid. Japan refused to leave IndoChina so the USA made plans to base heavy bombers and long range submarines in the Philippines. A big stick to add clout to American diplomacy. Japan would have been smart to back down but apparently there weren't many smart politicians in 1941 Japan.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Seems odd to revive an old thread, but I noticed the 71st anniversary is today. Found a lecture on youtube I think you all might enjoy. I'll post a few pictures as well.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LQcdWS7ce0

Rear Admiral Karel Doorman

HNLMS De Ruyter- Doormans Flagship

HNLMS Java

HMS Exeter

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

A few more pictures.

USS Houston

HMAS Perth

HNLMS Kortenaer- same class as HNLMS Witte de With, another Netherlands destroyer

HMS Electra- same class as HMS Encounter

HMS Jupiter

USS Alden: Same Clemson-class Destroyers as USS John D. Edwards, John D. Ford, and Paul Jones

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Should be last batch of pictures for tonight. Right now it's all concerning ABDA. I'd like to include some photos on the Japanese side, but that will have to wait until tomorrow. If I have time tommorrow and Friday, I will include photos of the Second Battle of the Java Sea, DesDivs 58s flight through the Bali Strait, and the Battle of Sunda Strait.

One of few pictures I could find of the battle, looks like HMS Exeter, might not be from the 27th if given the comments from the forum.

A little overview map I found, gives context to locations.

I believe that's all of the pictures for now. While I enjoy posting contemporary paintings to visualize, I unfortunately couldn't find any for Java Sea. I'll update with pictures of the Japanese perspective, along with everything else. I'm heading up for a weekend to Vermont, and the place I'm staying at does not have internet, so I may finish up next week.

 

[Bernhart]

My great uncle died on one of the dutch ships, actually listed as missing in action

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

My great uncle died on one of the dutch ships, actually listed as missing in action

Sorry to hear about that Bernhart. to your uncle.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Here you guys go. Not many pictures as I'd like, but I got a late start.

Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi- Commander of Eastern Covering Group

HIJMS Nachi- Takagis flagship(I believe), same Myōkō-class as Haguro

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Feel a little bad for not updating until now, but I hope to make it up.

HIJMS Naka, same Sendai-Class light cruiser as Jintsu

HIJMS Yudachi- same Shiratsuyu-class destroyer as Samidare ,Murasame, Harusame, Yamakaze, Kawakaze

HIJMS Asagumo- same Asashio-class destroyer as Minegumo

HIJMS Yukikaze- same Kagerō-class destroyer as Hatsukaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze,

HIJMS Sazanami- same clase of Fubuki-class destroyer as Ushio.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

I'm really behind with the updates, but as promised, here is Sunda Strait.

Overview of Sunda Strait

HMAS Perth- colored photo from Untitled Document

Captain Hector Waller of HMAS Perth, artist is Joshua Smith

Another picture of USS Houston at Darwin in February 1942, from Untitled Document

Captain Albert Rooks of Houston, from the Navy's Department website.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Rear Admiral Takeo Kurita, commanding the 7th Cruiser Division.

HIJMS Mogami, same class of ships as Mikuma, part of the 7th Division.

HIJMS Natori, flagship of Rear Admiral Kenzaburo Hara, screening the Japanese 16th Armys transports with the 5th and 11th Destroyer Divisions.

A track chart of the battle.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

A few more pictures before I move onto the Bali Strait

A contemporary painting of Sunda Strait, looks like the Houston. Could not find out who the artist was.

Another painting of the Houston, again could not find who the artist was.

Painting of HMAS Perth by Dennis Adams

A memorial to the men of Perth and Houston, from Rockingham memorial Park in Australia if Wikipedia is accurate.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

This section will be a bit more lean than the others, since Bali Strait amounted to nothing more than two Destroyer Divisions exchanging shots for a short period. I'm a little confused as to why a lot of sources place the four DDs as DesDiv58. According to Winslows "The Fleet the Gods Forgot", Paul Jones and John D. Ford were a part of DesDiv59, while Alden and John D. Edwards were part of DesDiv57. I can only assume that there is an error in the research, or they were formed into DesDiv58 due to losses.

A quick summary of the action in Bali Strait. Order of Battle - Java Aftermath - 1 March 1942

A more detailed report, from US Naval Intelligence. The Java Sea Campaign

A track chart of Bali Strait, taken from the link above.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Last set of pictures, coinciding with the last major naval battle of the Java campaign.

Another picture of HMS Exeter, last remaining heavyweight near Java.

HMS Encounter, Prewar

USS Pope