If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

Kryten said:

The Luftwaffe weren't winning, that was the problem, FC ended the BoB with more aircraft than it started with, pilot training was coming under control, tactics were evolving!

Turning on London was not the "Strategic disaster" in reality as they were failing to destroy FC air fields anyway, poor intelligence had them attacking CC bases and training fields in some cases, I believe only 2 sector stations were out of action for more than a day throughout the entire battle.
The RAF had reserves in the West and North (much to the consternation of the Norwegian based KG) if the situation became really desperate, and had the ability to fall back and keep fighting if needed, at no time did the Luftwaffe really have the RAF on the ropes, In fact it was the Luftwaffe who was suffering unacceptable losses primarily in bomber crew, every aircraft lost over the UK was a pilot lost, many RAF pilots flew the same day they were shot down!

The reality is the Luftwaffe were not equipped to win that battle, if fighter command had entered the battle with the tactics the Luftwaffe learned over Spain it would have been an appalling defeat for the Luftwaffe, luckily for them the old men at the air ministry kept FC flying round in "rows of idiots" far too long, but as in every war, it's the painful lessons that are learnt the fastest!

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from wiki:

"In the late 1930s, Fighter Command expected to face only bombers over Britain, not single-engined fighters. With this in mind, a series of "Fighting Area Tactics" were formulated and rigidly adhered to, involving a series of manœuvres designed to concentrate a squadron's firepower to bring down bombers: with no apparent prospect of escorting fighters to worry about, RAF fighter pilots flew in tight, v-shaped sections ("vics") of three. These restricted squadrons to tight 12 aircraft formations composed of four sections in another tight "V". With this formation, only the squadron leader at the front was free to watch for the enemy; the other pilots had to concentrate on keeping station.[58] RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by sections breaking away in sequence. Fighter Command recognised the weaknesses of this rigid structure early in the battle, but it was felt too risky to change tactics during the battle, because replacement pilots—often with only minimal flying time—could not be readily retrained,[59] and inexperienced RAF pilots needed firm leadership in the air only rigid formations could provide.[60] German pilots dubbed the RAF formations Idiotenreihen ("rows of idiots") because they left squadrons vulnerable to attack.[61][62]"

This describes my understanding of the motivation for the rows idiots for which the Luftwaffe had such contempt. In other worlds, the practice was a measure of the difficulty FC faced when losses of its trained pilots became serious in late summer. Wasn't one of the RAF's lesser lights responsible for this policy that was more effective than appreciated by the LW? Just asking...

stona said:

Because Fighter Command was critically short of operational combat pilots. Dowding had also created "class C" squadrons which were effectively non-operational. Of the total number of pilots in Fighter Command about 440 were non-operational. The raw figures do not tell the whole story and were contradicted by no less a personage than Dowding himself. I posted what he said about this in a post way above and will repeat it here.

The Luftwaffe too had far, far more aircraft than men to fly them in 1945. Aircraft production figures mean nothing if you are not training pilots fast enough or well enough.

The problem pre-dates the battle of Britain. In an unsigned memorandum, usually presumed to be written by Newall of 3rd June 1940 it is stated that between 10th May and 24th June nearly two hundred pilots were lost, "a fifth of our most highly trained fighter pilots." The memorandum continues that "the number of pilots available per squadron is now little more than adequate to man the available aircraft. More serious is the loss of a considerable proportion of trained leaders." While many of the aircraft lost in France had been replaced "there remains a grave deficiency in pilots."

We can assume that Fighter Command had made up the short fall somewhat before the Battle of Britain really got going two months later as it was not until September that Dowding was forced as a "desperate expedient", his words, to introduce the much disliked "stabilisation system" to keep mostly 11 Group squadrons well above the average pilot strength of Fighter Command. 11 Groups average squadron pilot strength was 19, still well short of the official establishment of 26. By mid September other squadrons averaged only about 10 operational pilots.
The stabilisation system was not abandoned until the end of November 1940. It had been introduced as an operational expedient intended to last only until the OTUs could meet the wastage problem so it is reasonable to assume that this finally happened at the end of November 1940.
In August 1940 the OTUs only delivered 260 pilots to replace the 304 killed or wounded according to the Air Historical Branch Narrative of the MoD which obviously did not meet the criteria.

Bungay is simply quoting, almost word for word, the pamphlet "The Battle of Britain" published by HMSO whilst the war was still continuing. Dowding himself replied to the assertion that "the fighter squadrons of the RAF were indeed stronger at the end of the battle than at the beginning" replying, "whatever the paper return showed, the situation towards the end was extremely critical and most squadrons were fit only for operations against unescorted bombers."
I would expect better from Bungay whose writing I quite like. This is nothing new, the facts have been in the public domain for years. Some wilfully choose to ignore them.

Cheers

Steve

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That's interesting, how was the Luftwaffe faring in comparison, after all losses will have the same effect on both sides and Luftwaffe crew losses were substantial?
and unless we can compare the effects on the Luftwaffe also we don't really see the overall picture?

Oldcrow,

Sailor Malan instigated a change to in line fours due to the obvious shortcomings of this formation, could you argue it's lack of initiative against rigid orders that prolonged the practice?

After all if Malan and Bader could make these changes surely other squadrons could have adapted if they had the will to do so?

The Luftwaffe was sustaining substantial losses too, on top of those sustained in the Battle of France. For some reason the French losses, on both sides seem to get ignored in most histories which tend to concentrate on the Battle of Britain within the British dates.

As for tactics, that is an entirely different topic. Formation flying was high on the agenda of RAF training programmes, precisely because the new pilots were expected to carry out the "Fighting Area Tactics". These tactics were developed for an entirely different scenario to those of the battles the RAF found itself fighting. Why they were retained for so long would be a subject for another thread, but there was hardly time to retrain pilots during the battle.

It's a shame gunnery wasn't as high up the training agenda as formation flying!

Cheers

Steve

Kryten said:

Oldcrow,

Sailor Malan instigated a change to in line fours due to the obvious shortcomings of this formation, could you argue it's lack of initiative against rigid orders that prolonged the practice?

After all if Malan and Bader could make these changes surely other squadrons could have adapted if they had the will to do so?

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I am not sure I understand the question. It seems obvious to me that skilled pilots restricted to engaging an enemy in rigid formations is not a recipe for success or pilot survival in any sustained air battle but then my understanding is also that the numbers of skilled pilots were few and heavily attritted during the BoB and that formation flying was the heart of the RAF training curriculum so it offered an easy if problematic fix.

It's interesting to note that The USAAF for a period prior to December 7, 1941 adopted much of the RAF practices until changes were disseminated to its allies. FEAF training curriculum in the PI evidently emphasized formation flying and three plane elements until late 1941 when word spread that the RAF was promoting the use of two plane elements. Emphasis on formation flight training apparently persisted however.

Formation flying is precision flying (having to keep station with other a/c) so should help in positioning an a/c for shooting.

There may be a world of difference between trying to fly like three aircraft tied together with ribbons (two pilots focusing 99% of their attention on the lead plane) and keeping a loose formation while scanning the sky (all pilots trying to maintain situational awareness).

A bit extreme but pretty peace time flying does not make for effective war time flying and having junior pilots spend too much time slavishly following the more experienced pilots around might not show a good return for hours invested.

Milosh said:

Formation flying is precision flying (having to keep station with other a/c) so should help in positioning an a/c for shooting.

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The idea was that the flight leader would get into position to attack the bomber (nobody had considered the possibility of enemy fighters being present) and then all three aircraft would open fire simultaneously with a weight of fire guaranteed to destroy the bomber. This was also the reason why the guns of RAF fighters were originally synchronised at such long range. It only sounds ridiculous with the benefit of hindsight.
It was reckoned that three hundred .303 strikes were needed to bring down an He 111. The chances of even an expert marksman achieving this in the time that was estimated to be available to fire were very slim indeed. Nearly every single round of a two second burst from eight .303 Brownings (which was what was considered possible) would have to hit the target.

Prior to the Battle of Britain gunnery training was in a poor state. The Inspector General's visit to Sutton Bridge OTU on 3rd May 1940 revealed that training was limited by the serviceability of the four Henley target tugs. A spares shortage limited these to one or two serviceable at any one time. The inspector (Air Chief Marshall Ludlow-Hewitt) also criticised Sutton Bridge's 25 yard firing ranges and noted that at the other Fighter Command OTU at Aston Down (there were only two) a 400 yard range was required to "enable fighter aircraft to fire their fixed guns at various ranges on the ground."

We know that some officers took it upon themselves to re-harmonise their guns. Malan harmonised his at 250 yards. This too was something Dowding resisted. In a memorandum he circulated to Group Commands in October 1939 he said "there is nothing much wrong with the harmonisation of the guns of an 8 gun fighter at the ranges for which this harmonisation has been designed." He also wished to discourage the practice of "close range firing" without specifying what he meant by the term. Another memorandum from the Air Ministry's Air Tactics Directorate supported Dowding's view on harmonisation but not on close range firing.

It is worth remembering that during the Battle of Britain (in British terms) the seventeen top scoring aces shot down 221 aircraft. That's about 1/5 of the total German aircraft destroyed. What were all the rest doing?
Only 900 of the 2000+ who flew in the battle made a claim between July and November 1940. Only 15% were credited with a "whole" aircraft. In the same period the 160 or so men who became aces shot down almost all the Luftwaffe aircraft lost to fighters.

The training problems did not go away, even after the battle.

Dowding's successor ,Air Marshall Sholto Douglas, wrote in late 1941 that he was "very concerned about the standards of air gunnery in Squadrons and anxious that more gunnery training should be given to pilots prior to joining their Squadrons."
He noted that pilots at OTUs only fired their guns two or three times a week and raised the familiar problem of a lack of target towing aircraft. He finished saying that it was "imperative" that standards be improved.

Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.

I'm sorry if none of this fits with the glorious myth of the Battle of Britain. Unfortunately we don't learn anything useful from myths, for that we need to take a cold, hard, look at the facts.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

It is worth remembering that during the Battle of Britain (in British terms) the seventeen top scoring aces shot down 221 aircraft. That's about 1/5 of the total German aircraft destroyed. What were all the rest doing?
Only 900 of the 2000+ who flew in the battle made a claim between July and November 1940. Only 15% were credited with a "whole" aircraft. In the same period the 160 or so men who became aces shot down almost all the Luftwaffe aircraft lost to fighters.

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Wow!

stona said:

Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.

I'm sorry if none of this fits with the glorious myth of the Battle of Britain. Unfortunately we don't learn anything useful from myths, for that we need to take a cold, hard, look at the facts.

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How does that compare with the later 8th AF experience with in 1943? ~250-300 B-17s vs ~400 LW fighters? My numbers are probably way off but must be within a factor of ~10. Seems like the numbers of victories claimed aren't too different if you consider the possible victims of ~3-400 fighters in a target rich environment to be about 60 a/c as an average? Could the number of fighters be the real limiting factor (Late entry: Probably not, see post below)? Was Park being overly optimistic in his assessment?

I still think the BoB was a glorious victory if perhaps an inelegant one. As a wiser person than I once said, "You don't want to know what goes into making the sausage, just enjoy the taste of the result."

Reminds me a bit of the battle of Midway. Looks like a glorious victory until you put it under the microscope and the warts appear in abundance. yet the myths persist because, in fairness, those involved were feeling their way blindly and don't have the hindsight of 60 years perspective or the relatively accurate numbers we can exploit to the detriment of some of their reputations. The sight of a hurricane or a spitfire unfailingly evokes some deep emotions if only because of the uncertainty present in the men and women who fought the battle for us all.

Comparing the RAF number you quoted above to the USN's reputedly relatively well trained 'first team' in Lundstrum: Of 138 total pilots, 88 submitted no claims or a partial claim. 36% of the pilots (including 5 aces with ~5 victories each) accounted for all the claims accumulated by the USN thru the Battle of Midway, so I guess its safe to say, the numbers don't lie. (Although as a cautionary remark to myself when quoting numbers about anything, I say: "Figures sometimes lie and liars sometimes figure." )

I think the Battle of Britain was an important victory too. Glorious, well maybe.
I'm not challenging the result of the battle or its importance. I have a very great admiration for the men who fought the battle from the half trained rookie in the cockpit, or in front of his radar screen up to Park and Dowding. None of these men were perfect, nor did they always make the correct decisions. Luckily for all of us they were more often right than wrong, which is a lot more difficult than it sounds.

It's the mythologising which irritates me. Look at a well respected, if populist, historian like Bungay quoting virtually verbatim from a war time pamphlet without including Dowding's rebuttal. It's that kind of "sloppy" history which prolongs the life of the myth when the real story is far better, more exciting, and reveals the battle to have been a close run thing littered with errors and failings on both sides.
Just like most campaigns then

Veering off I found a list of the six approved methods of attack in the "fighting Area Tactics" system.

Fighter Attack No.1 (From Above Cloud) {3 aircraft Section vs single enemy}

Fighter Attack No.2 (From Directly Below) {3 aircraft Section vs single enemy}

Fighter Attack No.3 (From Dead Astern) Approach Pursuit or Approach Turning

Fighter Attack No.4 (From Directly Below) {A variation of No.2, attacking multiple aircraft}

Fighter Attack No.5 (From Dead Astern) {For attacking a large enemy formation}

Fighter Attack No.6 (From Dead Astern) {Attack conducted with entire squadron}

So I was incorrect to say that they all involved a simultaneous attack by an entire flight, though some do.

Cheers

Steve

Speaking of national mythology, I have to admit to being shocked at the small numbers of americans actually involved in the BoB. Wikipedia says it was only 11. Of course American mythology holds that US participation in the Battle saved Britain (especially that of Ben Affleck who was apparently on leave from the USAAF and not afraid to lose his citizenship.) What would Dowding say to that I wonder.

according to wiki:

"The first Eagle Squadron, (No. 71 Squadron), was formed in September 1940 as part of the RAF's buildup during the Battle of Britain,[1] and became operational for defensive duties on 5 February 1941. Eventually, a total of three Eagle Squadrons formed and were numbered 71, 121, and 133, respectively.[1] Of the thousands that volunteered, 244 Americans served with the three Eagle Squadrons; 16 Britons also served as squadron and flight commanders."

In other words except for 11 unpatriotic americans willing to sacrifice their citizenship for the sake of Great Britain's survival, americans played essentially no role.

Bummer.

Hasnt it been proved that aces may not necessarily be the best trained best flyers but the most aggressive?

Actually shooting down an aircraft is not the only way to 'win'.

I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?

Any volunteer was welcome Mal.
If it was only 11 Americans then that is better than no Americans to fight for Britains survival.
The BoB is one of those cultural landmarks that I hope is never forgotten.
Cheers
John

stona said:

...It is worth remembering that during the Battle of Britain (in British terms) the seventeen top scoring aces shot down 221 aircraft. That's about 1/5 of the total German aircraft destroyed. What were all the rest doing?
Only 900 of the 2000+ who flew in the battle made a claim between July and November 1940. Only 15% were credited with a "whole" aircraft. In the same period the 160 or so men who became aces shot down almost all the Luftwaffe aircraft lost to fighters....

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Hello Steve
I cannot see anything remarkable in that. It was a common phenomenon. In FiAF, which had fairly good gunnery training, the 10 top aces shot down 489,5 out of some 1900 accepted kills, more or like RAF's confirmed and probables during the Winter and Continuation Wars. You can easily calculate how many kills were achieved by the top ten or 17 LW aces.

Juha

PS. In FiAF the top 17 shot down 666,5, that is 35% of the total.

The Basket said:

I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?

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Please don't interpret the comment as being disrespectful to them. That was not my intention. They were doing all those things.
The problem, from the point of view of the efficiency of Fighter Command is that they were not shooting down Luftwaffe aircraft. The vast majority were doing their best in a very difficult situation, it's just a fact that they were not very effective. This was not their fault and I've touched on some of the reasons for this above. It's one of the many reasons why the true story of the battle is even more remarkable than the myth. The few were in fact a lot fewer than most imagine.
Cheers
Steve

Juha said:

Hello Steve
I cannot see anything remarkable in that. It was a common phenomenon. In FiAF, which had fairly good gunnery training, the 10 top aces shot down 489,5 out of some 1900 accepted kills, more or like RAF's confirmed and probables during the Winter and Continuation Wars. You can easily calculate how many kills were achieved by the top ten or 17 LW aces.

Juha

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It's not particularly remarkable. I suspect that similar figures applied to most air forces in WW2. It's a reflection of the training, particularly in air to air gunnery, that was given and the difficulty of hitting anything with the gun sights available for most of the war.

The poor quality of the RAF's fighter pilots' gunnery remained a concern throughout the war. I don't have information on how other air forces assessed theirs.

Cheers
Steve

Readie said:

Any volunteer was welcome Mal.
If it was only 11 Americans then that is better than no Americans to fight for Britains survival.
The BoB is one of those cultural landmarks that I hope is never forgotten.
Cheers
John

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And I thought, like Beetlejiuce, you'd only appear if I said "Spitfire" three times. Once was all it took!

oldcrowcv63 said:

And I thought, like Beetlejiuce, you'd only appear if I said "Spitfire" three times. Once was all it took!

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Even you thinking 'Spitfire' is enough Mal

How's this! taken at my last visit to Virginia beach's Military aviation museum: