If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

[Readie]

Beautiful,magnificent and our national treasure.
Never has any interceptor fighter been so right from the beginning to the end.
Not that I'm biased of course...

 

[Juha]

Because Fighter Command was critically short of operational combat pilots. Dowding had also created "class C" squadrons which were effectively non-operational. Of the total number of pilots in Fighter Command about 440 were non-operational. ...

While the "C" Class sqns were an emergency measure, it was IMHO a logical solution to the problem of too short OTUs. At the height of the BoB, OTU courses' were of two weeks duration with final training at the "C" Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. The "C" Class sqn training was in operation 8.9.-1.12.40, when more OTUs were formed. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968 p.83.

One can read from J.E.J's Wing Leader who the system worked. After his OTU ended on 28 August 1940 J.E.J. was posted to No 19 Sqn, but because the sqn didn't have time to give him his final training (it had its hands full with the problems of the cannon Spi IBs) he was soon transferred to 616 Sqn . And only an ½ hour after he and 2 other green pilots had met the S/L, J.E.J was sitting in the cockpit of a Spit ready to took off for an hour flight with the S/L after which the S/L gave to J.E.J lot of advices on combat flying and tactics, then began the training in earnest which incl. air to air gunnery training.

 

[pinsog]

Comparing the RAF number you quoted above to the USN's reputedly relatively well trained 'first team' in Lundstrum: Of 138 total pilots, 88 submitted no claims or a partial claim. 36% of the pilots (including 5 aces with ~5 victories each) accounted for all the claims accumulated by the USN thru the Battle of Midway, so I guess its safe to say, the numbers don't lie. (Although as a cautionary remark to myself when quoting numbers about anything, I say: "Figures sometimes lie and liars sometimes figure." )

I'm not sure Midway is a good example, unless you only count the Yorktown fighters. The Enterprise and Hornet were never under attack so their fighters were never in a "target rich environment" of enemy bombers. What percentage of Yorktown fighters claimed kills or were shot down while attempting kills?

There is no doubt what the Midway defenders were doing, they were decimated, they all made 1 pass and then spent the rest of the time trying not to die at the business end of a Zero piloted by some of the best pilots in the world at that time.

 

[silence]

Beautiful,magnificent and our national treasure.
Never has any interceptor fighter been so right from the beginning to the end.
Not that I'm biased of course...

I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.

But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.

 

[stona]

While the "C" Class sqns were an emergency measure, it was IMHO a logical solution to the problem of too short OTUs. At the height of the BoB, OTU courses' were of two weeks duration with final training at the "C" Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. The "C" Class sqn training was in operation 8.9.-1.12.40, when more OTUs were formed. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968 p.83.

One can read from J.E.J's Wing Leader who the system worked. After his OTU ended on 28 August 1940 J.E.J. was posted to No 19 Sqn, but because the sqn didn't have time to give him his final training (it had its hands full with the problems of the cannon Spi IBs) he was soon transferred to 616 Sqn . And only an ½ hour after he and 2 other green pilots had met the S/L, J.E.J was sitting in the cockpit of a Spit ready to took off for an hour flight with the S/L after which the S/L gave to J.E.J lot of advices on combat flying and tactics, then began the training in earnest which incl. air to air gunnery training.

That's right. The reason that the "stabilisation" system was so unpopular with the squadrons wasn't so much the creation of the class C squadrons but the system for reinforcing the squadrons at the sharp end, principally 11 Group. It was impossible for entire squadrons to rotate in and out of 11 Group because the squadrons in quieter areas were either very under strength (in personnel) or were Class C and unfit for 11 Group operations. This meant that squadrons were stripped of their more experienced pilots who were sent to make up for wastage in front line squadrons.
This annoyed the squadrons who lost their senior pilots on the one hand and the squadrons at the front who did not get rotated out.
It is no accident that as soon as the rate of losses reduced in November and the OTUs were able to provide enough replacement pilots the system was abandoned' It always was, in Dowding's words a "desperate expedient."
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.

But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.

And what a noise! Don't forget the noise. I prefer a Merlin but a Griffon isn't half bad either.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Juha]

An extract from the nearby discussion about "Did the LW achieve air superiority over the 8th AF after the Schweinfurt missions? ", comment #26 page 2 :



This explaines well what I put shortly in the Fana's (the magazine) quote up above. In BoB the LW may well have had, overall, a bloody strain on its effectives, but it was a RAF crushing machine nonetheless, as the FC had to keep on defending the vital South-East part of its country. At that stage, the middle of the battle, the LW was furthermore enjoying better pilots losses vs the RAf than the overall figure Juha (hello!) gives. But it is not really the point.
The Lufwaffe changed its strategy, its aim (to central London blitz), and eventually changed it again (night blitz.) And according to the statement above it is this and not the losses, that lead to the loosing of air superiority
The abandon of primary objective did it. Signed it.
This is what should be read in the (coarse) sentence : "the German lost because they failed to acknowledge they [were winning] it."

Even though the very losses were, psychologically more than effectively (LW had lengthy reserves at this pace), part of the decision to indeed abandon primary target before its fullfilment.

I reckon the above quote should be put back into context to become really convincing. A long discussion about what air superiority is, compared to air denial, local air superiority etc., and the military consequences of these.

Hello again l'OS
IMHO the turning against London was a complicated question, Kesselring supported it, because he was thinking that it would help to achieve the main aim, the destruction of FC by forcing the elusive FC come up and fight and so would help his 109 pilots to get grip to British fighters which had to defend their capital (he would also get more units under his command). On the other hand Sperrle was against the shift, because he thought that it was too early, he would have continued the pounding of the RAF bases (the shift also would meant that he would lose some of his units to kesselring

Juha

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I'm not sure Midway is a good example, unless you only count the Yorktown fighters. The Enterprise and Hornet were never under attack so their fighters were never in a "target rich environment" of enemy bombers. What percentage of Yorktown fighters claimed kills or were shot down while attempting kills?

There is no doubt what the Midway defenders were doing, they were decimated, they all made 1 pass and then spent the rest of the time trying not to die at the business end of a Zero piloted by some of the best pilots in the world at that time.

Pinsog, you misread me... I quoted inclusive number for the "USN thru the Battle of Midway" Not USMC or just that battle itself: cumulative from 12/7/41 thru 6/07/42.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.

But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.

Heresy!!! He speaks heresy! Burn the heretic!!! Well wait, maybe commute the sentence for that Kate Beckinsale comment. That was pretty sweet.

 

[silence]

And what a noise! Don't forget the noise. I prefer a Merlin but a Griffon isn't half bad either.
Cheers
Steve

Yes! Like a beautiful woman who can sing.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Apologies for distracting from the excellent and interesting discussion. But no discussion of the BoB should be had without at least one photo each of the Spitfire and Hurricane. I'll leave the 109 for someone else to post...

 

[silence]

Heresy!!! He speaks heresy! Burn the heretic!!! Well wait, maybe commute the sentence for that Kate Beckinsale comment. That was pretty sweet.

I'm not a witch! I'm not!

 

[Milosh]

The idea was that the flight leader would get into position to attack the bomber (nobody had considered the possibility of enemy fighters being present) and then all three aircraft would open fire simultaneously with a weight of fire guaranteed to destroy the bomber. This was also the reason why the guns of RAF fighters were originally synchronised at such long range. It only sounds ridiculous with the benefit of hindsight.
It was reckoned that three hundred .303 strikes were needed to bring down an He 111. The chances of even an expert marksman achieving this in the time that was estimated to be available to fire were very slim indeed. Nearly every single round of a two second burst from eight .303 Brownings (which was what was considered possible) would have to hit the target.

Cheers

Steve

I meant later when the pilot would be in his own combat, not part of a V. The subtle changes in stick and throttle in keeping formation in the V would stand him in good sted in making the fine changes to acquire a firing solution.

Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.

Well 20mm cannons would have helped with the number of shoot downs.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I'm not a witch! I'm not!

Do you float? Can a bridge be built out of you?

(we really gotta get back on topic.... )

 

[redcoat]

Speaking of national mythology, I have to admit to being shocked at the small numbers of americans actually involved in the BoB. Wikipedia says it was only 11. Of course American mythology holds that US participation in the Battle saved Britain (especially that of Ben Affleck who was apparently on leave from the USAAF and not afraid to lose his citizenship.) What would Dowding say to that I wonder.

The US government actually banned the British from attempting to recruit ex-USAAF and USN pilots.

 

[pinsog]

Pinsog, you misread me... I quoted inclusive number for the "USN thru the Battle of Midway" Not USMC or just that battle itself: cumulative from 12/7/41 thru 6/07/42.

Ooops. Missed that one.

I still wonder, as someone brought up earlier in the thread: You have 300 British fighter pilots and 1600 Germans all flying around in the same airspace and the British only get 56 kills. One wonders what was going on. Were 95% of both sides so incompetent that they just flew around in circles and got shot down?

We aren't talking about long range fighter sweeps where you may not see the enemy at all, we are talking about FC saying "Hey guys, BIG groups of Germans will be at this place in 10 minutes, could everyone show up and shoot them down". They weren't particularly tough bombers, nor were they well defended. It looks to me like everyone would show up and most of one side would get shot down, but it just didn't happen that way.

 

[redcoat]

PS. In FiAF the top 17 shot down 666,5, that is 35% of the total.

3 Luftwaffe pilots are credited with shooting down almost 20% of the British aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe in the North African campaign

 

[pinsog]

3 Luftwaffe pilots are credited with shooting down almost 20% of the British aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe in the North African campaign

Reminds me of "Professional Wrestling" in the 1970's. There were like 3 stars and the other 50 guys were just there to get beat up every week.

Also reminds me of some of the group/gang fights I've seen on video where there are like 3 or 4 guys fighting while the rest of them are running their mouths or maybe pushing and shoving but never getting in and slugging it out.

 

[Milosh]

Ooops. Missed that one.

I still wonder, as someone brought up earlier in the thread: You have 300 British fighter pilots and 1600 Germans all flying around in the same airspace and the British only get 56 kills. One wonders what was going on. Were 95% of both sides so incompetent that they just flew around in circles and got shot down?

There wasn't 1900 a/c in the same airspace at the same time.

Daily history by the hour, List of Website Contents

 

[OldSkeptic]

Hasnt it been proved that aces may not necessarily be the best trained best flyers but the most aggressive?

Actually shooting down an aircraft is not the only way to 'win'.

I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?

Bungey (and others) go into this quite a lot. Studies of all air warfare show that most kills are made by a small number of pilots (in Bungey's terms the 'hunter killers'). Then you have a large group of people that can survive in the battle field, but don't contribute much, then there is the cannon fodder (the victims). Naturally newbies make up most of the cannon fodder.

Good eyesight, good shooting skills and the ability to manoeuvre the aircraft as a gun platform were the main key skills, as well as situational awareness.
Deflection shooting skills were a real asset and it is no surprise when you look at all the aces you find nearly all of them had good shooting skills before they learned to fly.

Good aerobatic and formation flying skills were probably a liability for a fighter pilot, the British Vic formation was hopeless.
You needed to keep the plane moving around all the time in a high risk area, to avoid being bounced and to be able to see more. Stanford Tuck said he used to deliberately fly very roughly and he was a superb pilot.
The German formation was excellent and is the standard everyone uses today.

Dowding's A/B/C squadron idea was also a response to whole squadrons of inexperienced pilots being slaughtered when they were moved into 11 Group. Ones that had no experience of combat at all.
In other words they were all cannon fodder.

Same thing happened to the only German one of 109s that got moved into the Battle that was inexperienced (unfortunately for the British virtually all the German ones were very experienced).