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Because Fighter Command was critically short of operational combat pilots. Dowding had also created "class C" squadrons which were effectively non-operational. Of the total number of pilots in Fighter Command about 440 were non-operational. ...
Comparing the RAF number you quoted above to the USN's reputedly relatively well trained 'first team' in Lundstrum: Of 138 total pilots, 88 submitted no claims or a partial claim. 36% of the pilots (including 5 aces with ~5 victories each) accounted for all the claims accumulated by the USN thru the Battle of Midway, so I guess its safe to say, the numbers don't lie. (Although as a cautionary remark to myself when quoting numbers about anything, I say: "Figures sometimes lie and liars sometimes figure." )
Beautiful,magnificent and our national treasure.
Never has any interceptor fighter been so right from the beginning to the end.
Not that I'm biased of course...
While the "C" Class sqns were an emergency measure, it was IMHO a logical solution to the problem of too short OTUs. At the height of the BoB, OTU courses' were of two weeks duration with final training at the "C" Class sqns, ie on fighter sqns resting in north and having some 2/5 of their pilots combat ready in case of surprising LW appearance and 3/5 of pilots non-operational and under training. The "C" Class sqn training was in operation 8.9.-1.12.40, when more OTUs were formed. That according to Norman Franks RAF Fighter Command 1936-1968 p.83.
One can read from J.E.J's Wing Leader who the system worked. After his OTU ended on 28 August 1940 J.E.J. was posted to No 19 Sqn, but because the sqn didn't have time to give him his final training (it had its hands full with the problems of the cannon Spi IBs) he was soon transferred to 616 Sqn . And only an ½ hour after he and 2 other green pilots had met the S/L, J.E.J was sitting in the cockpit of a Spit ready to took off for an hour flight with the S/L after which the S/L gave to J.E.J lot of advices on combat flying and tactics, then began the training in earnest which incl. air to air gunnery training.
I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.
But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.
An extract from the nearby discussion about "Did the LW achieve air superiority over the 8th AF after the Schweinfurt missions? ", comment #26 page 2 :
This explaines well what I put shortly in the Fana's (the magazine) quote up above. In BoB the LW may well have had, overall, a bloody strain on its effectives, but it was a RAF crushing machine nonetheless, as the FC had to keep on defending the vital South-East part of its country. At that stage, the middle of the battle, the LW was furthermore enjoying better pilots losses vs the RAf than the overall figure Juha (hello!) gives. But it is not really the point.
The Lufwaffe changed its strategy, its aim (to central London blitz), and eventually changed it again (night blitz.) And according to the statement above it is this and not the losses, that lead to the loosing of air superiority
The abandon of primary objective did it. Signed it.
This is what should be read in the (coarse) sentence : "the German lost because they failed to acknowledge they [were winning] it."
Even though the very losses were, psychologically more than effectively (LW had lengthy reserves at this pace), part of the decision to indeed abandon primary target before its fullfilment.
I reckon the above quote should be put back into context to become really convincing. A long discussion about what air superiority is, compared to air denial, local air superiority etc., and the military consequences of these.
I'm not sure Midway is a good example, unless you only count the Yorktown fighters. The Enterprise and Hornet were never under attack so their fighters were never in a "target rich environment" of enemy bombers. What percentage of Yorktown fighters claimed kills or were shot down while attempting kills?
There is no doubt what the Midway defenders were doing, they were decimated, they all made 1 pass and then spent the rest of the time trying not to die at the business end of a Zero piloted by some of the best pilots in the world at that time.
I think you need to add the caveat that the bubble-top and griffon-engined (those cowling bumps for the engine are as ugly as a festering boil on the end of your nose) were a noticeable step backwards, beauty-wise.
But the "classic" looking ones are Kate Beckinsales made of metal.
And what a noise! Don't forget the noise. I prefer a Merlin but a Griffon isn't half bad either.
Cheers
Steve
Heresy!!! He speaks heresy! Burn the heretic!!! Well wait, maybe commute the sentence for that Kate Beckinsale comment. That was pretty sweet.
The idea was that the flight leader would get into position to attack the bomber (nobody had considered the possibility of enemy fighters being present) and then all three aircraft would open fire simultaneously with a weight of fire guaranteed to destroy the bomber. This was also the reason why the guns of RAF fighters were originally synchronised at such long range. It only sounds ridiculous with the benefit of hindsight.
It was reckoned that three hundred .303 strikes were needed to bring down an He 111. The chances of even an expert marksman achieving this in the time that was estimated to be available to fire were very slim indeed. Nearly every single round of a two second burst from eight .303 Brownings (which was what was considered possible) would have to hit the target.
Cheers
Steve
Even Keith Park complained about the ineffectiveness of his pilots. Writing about events on 15th September 1940 he stated that he was "far from impressed with the performance of 11 Group." His argument was that with 1,600 potential targets and 300 fighters in the air his pilots should have shot down more than 56.
I'm not a witch! I'm not!
The US government actually banned the British from attempting to recruit ex-USAAF and USN pilots.Speaking of national mythology, I have to admit to being shocked at the small numbers of americans actually involved in the BoB. Wikipedia says it was only 11. Of course American mythology holds that US participation in the Battle saved Britain (especially that of Ben Affleck who was apparently on leave from the USAAF and not afraid to lose his citizenship.)What would Dowding say to that I wonder.
Pinsog, you misread me... I quoted inclusive number for the "USN thru the Battle of Midway" Not USMC or just that battle itself: cumulative from 12/7/41 thru 6/07/42.
3 Luftwaffe pilots are credited with shooting down almost 20% of the British aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe in the North African campaignPS. In FiAF the top 17 shot down 666,5, that is 35% of the total.
3 Luftwaffe pilots are credited with shooting down almost 20% of the British aircraft claimed by the Luftwaffe in the North African campaign
Ooops. Missed that one.
I still wonder, as someone brought up earlier in the thread: You have 300 British fighter pilots and 1600 Germans all flying around in the same airspace and the British only get 56 kills. One wonders what was going on. Were 95% of both sides so incompetent that they just flew around in circles and got shot down?
Hasnt it been proved that aces may not necessarily be the best trained best flyers but the most aggressive?
Actually shooting down an aircraft is not the only way to 'win'.
I am not happy with your comment 'what were the rest doing?' How about being brave? Defending there country...dying maybe?