Instead of the ME 262...why not THIS...

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Even with the uber jets. Where is all the fuel and pilots going to come from for this renewed onslaught. Germany is still going to go through the grinder. This is not the BOB on an island with a decent Navy. Germany will be on the defensive leaving initative to the allies.

A fighter force is an integral part to any armed force but in itself is not a war winning one(but granted without one you MIGHT lose a war).
 
GrauGeist, I wad reading up on the HeS 30 engine (on wiki) and it seems that the HeS 30 was to be quite an impressive engine. It would have had a similar output than the BMW 003 and Jumo 004 but weighing only half! For some obscure reason Heinkel-Hirth was ordered to stop work on it and start with the design of a next-generation engine, which resulted in the HeS 011.
Yet the HeS 030 development seemed to have gone quite well while the BMW 003 had to be redesigned completely as of early 1943.

But to me the range of the He 280 seems to be an insurmountable obstacle !!

In fact, I don't see much use for a Me 262 as interceptor if the He 280 was accepted. I think it would not have been that difficult to give it a stronger armament. Other than that it could do what the Me 262 could, at least when it comes to air defence.

BigZ, that may be true but I don't see what this adds to the discussion. We are all aware of the lack of fuel and pilots. And we are all aware that the AF itself can not win the war.

This thread is about the Luftwaffe acquiring better fighter aircraft than the ones they historically had. Do you have anything to add on that? 8)

Kris
 
The limited range was indeed a handicap, but again, had the RLM allowed better funding for research and development at that early stage, there's no telling just how far the Germans could have gotten with thier engine's performance.

Having the three Mg151/20 in the nose was a pretty deadly setup, and weighed 94 pounds each (Mk108 = 130 lb., Mk103 = 320 lb.) making it a pretty heavy hitter for the weight. If it were left up to me, I would leave the three 151/20 as they were...but *maybe* replace the center cannon with a Mk108 30 m/m...but that's a huge maybe, because the He280 was designed as a fighter, not a bomber killer. Besides, you could have Minengeschoss rounds for the Mg151/20 if needed.

I think the Me262 was just as valuable, and it's development and deployment was nessecary. This would be the case of "not keeping all of your eggs in one basket", meaning that having two proven performing jets in production would be very similiar to having the Bf109 and Fw190 in production at the same time, each had thier own strengths and complimented each other.

Perhaps by having the He280 on the battle front at an early stage with the Me262 coming online shortly afterwards (we're assuming that the RLM had backed the jet engine manufacturers in this speculation), then by the time 1944 came around, the Me262's intended successor, the Me262 HG series may have actually made it to at least test-flight stage, if not beyond.

It's really hard to work out any one scenario out of the countless possabilites, because there were so many blundered decisions by the German leadership that exploring them all would take us a whole lifetime...
 


The lack of fuel and trained pilots was a direct result of the allied strategic bombing campaign of early 1944. If that can be prevented by interceptors from 1943 on, then their could be enough of both pilots and fuel. The German catastrophy of the second half of 1944 was a direct result of three events coming together. The Normandy invasions putting a second front in play and the Soviet summer offensive of 1944, combinded with the fuel crunch of mid 1944 that occured as a result of the bombing campaign of the spring of 1944.

All these events were intercontected but were prefaced by the allies shooting the Luftwaffe out of the skys before 1944. By this time in the war the allies [USA in particular] had average pilots getting 600-800 flying hours per year compared to the Luftwaffe dropping from 250 hours per year of the early years, to 180 flying hours by 1943.

From what ive read by 1944 with, the loss of fuel , the luftwaffe flying hours fell to ~ 50 per plane per year. So even by 1943 the Luftwaffe is in crises. They needed to build allot more trainer and divert the bulk of their experten to training more pilots well enough AND give them more flying hours. Combined they could well double the numbers of flying hours per pilot per year. But this still puts them behind the allies in training hours and thus pilot quality. To level the playing field they still need some other advantage? Perhaps this is early arrival of the Me-262.
 
the 262 was very satisfactory if only produced in numbers exceeding piston engine s/e's in the staffeln. if you could read the US pilots first combats with the 262 you could see if the LW had had the full arsenal how upsetting this would of been for the US air forces during 1944
 
I think the second part of your post already shows that first part is inaccurate. The lack of trained pilots had NOTHING to do with oil shortages. The shortages set in after April 1944. By then the training of new pilots was already down to unacceptable levels.

So why was this you may ask?
Bad management. Nazi leaders were absolutely clueless about the importance of proper training. When the US entered the war, the first thing they did was to start building trainers and training facilities. Only when they knew how many pilots they could train did they look at how many aircraft they would build. Hitler himself was the one who decided how many fighters, bombers and tanks had to be delivered. He often changed his plans and would order production of one of them to be doubled immediately! And under Milch and Speer from the end of 1943 onwards the production of fighter aircraft started to rise exponentially. And yet training facilities was kept the way they were. No increase in training aircraft. No, instead they even brought back many trainer pilots to operational units. Also fighter aircraft for operational training were removed and put back at the front. Nazi leaders saw training schools as a fast way to recuperate pilots and aircraft when needed. In most of the cases they were not returned to the schools afterwards.

Of course after April 1944 the training hours went even more down but by then the game was already over anyway. It takes at least a year to train a recruit into a decent new pilot.
It becomes even more crazy after that. Nazi leaders including Goering himself believed that training was not important but courage and a will to fight were all what was needed. And that is how they 'solved' the training problem. It is these kind of people who lost the war, not the soldiers on the field or in the air...

Kris
 
The Americans were planning on getting into the war a long time before they actually did. I beleive there was a goverment sponsered training program for civilian pilots that started in either 1940 or very early 1941.
Large numbers of Piper, Taylorcraft and Aeronca planes were involved inthis program with a few other small manufacturers trying to design planes to meet the requirements of the program.
 


Kris we are in agreement . I was only taking the original posters point and worked backwards. The basic point is any change in 1944 is too late, change has to happen earlier. I've read that prewar German training programme counted on a fleet of over ~3000 trainer planes and teachers and was said to be able to train 15-20,000 pilots per year based on ~ 250 hours /year basic flying and specialist courses beyond that. This seems to have served them well until the BoB, where it looks like each sides attrition rate left only 1/4 of their veterans left. IE most of the pilots fighting were raw with minimal training.

In general Germans found that if they could maintain 1/4 of their veterans in a unit, they could retrain the force upto acceptable levels given enough time [1/2 year?], but that implied rotation of forces and the on going war of attrition in Russia scuttled this long term plan.

So yes building more trainers instead of bombers could have helped emmensely in this task, but they would also need to divert their experten into more training roles. We should also mention the notion that the Hitler and the Nazi regime was convinced the war would be over in a matter of a year or so, and thus made no preperations for such a long war.
 
Totally !
And also Hitler who was starting to interfere personally with the Luftwaffe or the entire Heer. Also the RLM under Goering was stuck in pre-war thinking. Best example of that is that production hardly increased. They were told that the war was going to be short and Goerings personal reputation was at stake: he could never ask Hitler for more aircraft do to the job he promised Hitler he could do.

Kris
 
I have gotten quite intrigued by the He 280 ...

There have been some discussions about it before on this forum.

From Cool Kitty:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/p-80-v-me-262-a-7274-15.html

and Delcyros in the same thread:
and most interesting of all ... planned improvements for the He 280!

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/advanced-designs-3287-11.html
Kris
 
And from a newsgroup, on the HeS 030 and 011

Steel single-use turbine blades ... genius!
Kris
 
Thanks for the excerpts, Kris.

I don't see whats the fuss about engines having only 25 hours life. The plane could do 20 missions, 1 hour each, with one set of engines and then had the engines replaced. The plane would be more likely destroyed by enemy action before new set of engines would be mounted.
 
A lot of times the "life" of an engine was an 'average' life, not a guaranteed minimum life.

Say you are the one flying the plane in it's 20th hour, do you want engines that "average" 25 hours of life or engines that "average" 100hours
 
In the peace time, or in military low-intensity tasks, 25 hours life of an engine borders with lunacy

Above Germany in 1944, 25 combat hours borders with eternity. At least for 90% if German pilots.
 
45 hours???


Here, I've made it more easy for you to see.
 
Just what part of "A lot of times the "life" of an engine was an 'average' life, not a guaranteed minimum life."

aren't you getting?

you are assuming the 25hr was a guaranteed mininum life and every single Jummo 004 would make to 25 hrs with no problem.

If you can show me reference to this "minimum" life please do so.

Some modern piston engines are rated at 1400-2000hrs between overhauls depending on engine. Some have with inspections, gone hundreds of hours over this time. Others have cracked cylinders, broken pistons and even developed crankcase cracks while hundreds of hours short of making it to the "expected" life of the engine.

British Viper jet engines had two different "life" ratings in the 1950s. one rating a given level of thrust was was "manned use" and was If I remember right, 250 hrs. The other rating was for unmanned use, at a higher thrust rating but the life rating was 50hrs.
According to you all they had to do was run the engine at the higher thrust rating with manned aircraft and change the engine at 40 hrs and the men should have been safe.
 
What's your problem?
Since SET of engines would be replaced after 20 hours by another SET of engines, the 21st mission would be flown with zero-hour engines on board.

Please quote my post(s) that I stated that 25 hrs was guaranteed lifetime of any engine.
 
How many engines would be required to be able to changes engines every 25 hours?
 

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