Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View
- Thread starter drgondog
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wheelsup_cavu
1st Sergeant
I saw that video when Montemayor first posted it and I keep checking his channel for part 2 of this discussion.
Wheels
Wheels
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Always believe Nagumo gets the poor end of the stick.
He just got dealt a lot of poor cards.
He just got dealt a lot of poor cards.
- Thread starter
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drgondog
Major
I was particularly impressed with the decisions that had to be made after the scout reported '10 ships heading SE' or into the wind. Could Nagumo give high probability to a carrier launch - but discounted the extreme danger due to complete lack of results by American pilots on four previous attacks?
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
In "Shattered Sword" they make an excellent point that when Tone's No. 4 plane reported the ten enemy ships:
"The American task force, if it could attack with aircraft, was ideally located to ambush Nagumo's carriers. Indeed, as one historian of the battle has noted, there was no point in any enemy task force being where Amari said it was unless it could attack with aircraft. Third, upon closer examination, the fact that the enemy was steering a course of 150 degrees was ominous in itself. The prevailing winds of the morning had been out of the southeast. Such a course track could well be indicative of an enemy task force launching aircraft."
They go on to point out that it is logical to assume Nagumo knew that the Americans had his approximate location for at least two hours meant that he could also assume a strike by carrier launched aircraft was on the way and would be sizable. The problem is what was to be done about it. Nagumo had nothing in the way of strike aircraft ready to go at the time of the sighting.
Shattered Sword covers this quite well on pages 164 - 166.
As to your question on whether the Japanese were discounting the danger that this sighting meant based on the previous American attacks, you may very well be correct. There was much discussion at certain levels of the IJN regarding American doctrine, equipment and training and none of it was flattering. I think there was a certain element pervasive in the Japanese Navy at the time, that held American training, equipment etc. with more than just a little bit of contempt.
Part of that contempt that morning was probably being borne out by the uncoordinated and almost haphazard attacks that had been thrown at them by the Americans, not realizing that they were just that, haphazard. No B-26 crew had been trained to drop torpedoes, Henderson's boys were green as can be, no coordination between any of the incoming attackers etc. For all they knew, that was the best the U.S. had to throw at them, so perhaps there was a bit of feeling that even if the ten ships included carriers... so what? They may have figured they could deal with whatever TF 16 & 17 could throw at them, come out fine, and then deal a crushing blow on the American ships. Reading what some of the officers had to say leading up to Midway leaves no doubt to me they didn't think the U. S. was very good and that they were so much better than the Americans that the battle and the war was all but won.
I thought it significant that Yamamoto and his team thought they had to come up with a plan to coax the U.S.N. into a battle, never even dreaming that in fact, the U. S. Navy was SPOILING for a fight. Talk about totally misreading your opponent.
I doubt they realized what they were actually up against right up until 10:20 a.m.
"The American task force, if it could attack with aircraft, was ideally located to ambush Nagumo's carriers. Indeed, as one historian of the battle has noted, there was no point in any enemy task force being where Amari said it was unless it could attack with aircraft. Third, upon closer examination, the fact that the enemy was steering a course of 150 degrees was ominous in itself. The prevailing winds of the morning had been out of the southeast. Such a course track could well be indicative of an enemy task force launching aircraft."
They go on to point out that it is logical to assume Nagumo knew that the Americans had his approximate location for at least two hours meant that he could also assume a strike by carrier launched aircraft was on the way and would be sizable. The problem is what was to be done about it. Nagumo had nothing in the way of strike aircraft ready to go at the time of the sighting.
Shattered Sword covers this quite well on pages 164 - 166.
As to your question on whether the Japanese were discounting the danger that this sighting meant based on the previous American attacks, you may very well be correct. There was much discussion at certain levels of the IJN regarding American doctrine, equipment and training and none of it was flattering. I think there was a certain element pervasive in the Japanese Navy at the time, that held American training, equipment etc. with more than just a little bit of contempt.
Part of that contempt that morning was probably being borne out by the uncoordinated and almost haphazard attacks that had been thrown at them by the Americans, not realizing that they were just that, haphazard. No B-26 crew had been trained to drop torpedoes, Henderson's boys were green as can be, no coordination between any of the incoming attackers etc. For all they knew, that was the best the U.S. had to throw at them, so perhaps there was a bit of feeling that even if the ten ships included carriers... so what? They may have figured they could deal with whatever TF 16 & 17 could throw at them, come out fine, and then deal a crushing blow on the American ships. Reading what some of the officers had to say leading up to Midway leaves no doubt to me they didn't think the U. S. was very good and that they were so much better than the Americans that the battle and the war was all but won.
I thought it significant that Yamamoto and his team thought they had to come up with a plan to coax the U.S.N. into a battle, never even dreaming that in fact, the U. S. Navy was SPOILING for a fight. Talk about totally misreading your opponent.
I doubt they realized what they were actually up against right up until 10:20 a.m.
The planning for Operation MI had assumed there were not any US ships and certainly not carriers anywhere near early in the battle. The report "10 ships heading into wind" should have triggered a backup plan into operation, but they had never planned for that! Also Nagumo was not flexible and wanted to keep to the original plan when he had justification for caution.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
The Battle of the Coral Sea also is part of the Midway battle.
Shokaku and Zuikaku was planned for Midway but Shokaku was badly damaged and Zuikaku had a weakened air group. Zuikaku could have been at Midway but wasn't.
The outcome of the Coral Sea was certainly proof of American carrier operations and certainly should have rang Japanese alarm bells.
Nagumo walked into a trap and didn't have the luck to get out of it.
But I have loads of issues with Japanese planning and intelligence.
The carriers were the target but didn't know where they were.
The Invasion of Midway was a diversion. But instead became a focus.
Military planning was always over complicated and always depended on the enemy acting as planned.
Japanese didn't have radar and Japanese naval flak was poor.
The Japanese may have thought they were up against 2 carriers. Hornet and Enterprise.
Shokaku and Zuikaku was planned for Midway but Shokaku was badly damaged and Zuikaku had a weakened air group. Zuikaku could have been at Midway but wasn't.
The outcome of the Coral Sea was certainly proof of American carrier operations and certainly should have rang Japanese alarm bells.
Nagumo walked into a trap and didn't have the luck to get out of it.
But I have loads of issues with Japanese planning and intelligence.
The carriers were the target but didn't know where they were.
The Invasion of Midway was a diversion. But instead became a focus.
Military planning was always over complicated and always depended on the enemy acting as planned.
Japanese didn't have radar and Japanese naval flak was poor.
The Japanese may have thought they were up against 2 carriers. Hornet and Enterprise.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
The real irony of the battle, is that not all of the available assets were ised in the battle, as Yamamoto's group was trailing behind the Kidu Butai group.
Yamamato had five battleships, four heavy cruisers two light cruisers and two light carriers - all of which could have added not only additional CAP and strike assets, but the scouting aircraft from Yamamoto's capital ships would have exponentially increased Nagumo's ability to find and/or detect any USN assets.
Yamamato had five battleships, four heavy cruisers two light cruisers and two light carriers - all of which could have added not only additional CAP and strike assets, but the scouting aircraft from Yamamoto's capital ships would have exponentially increased Nagumo's ability to find and/or detect any USN assets.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Were the battleships fast enough to keep up with the carriers?
Shortround6
Major General
Yes, no and maybe. 3 of the Japanese carriers could do over 30kts, The Kaga is credited with 28kts. the two light carriers back with the Battleships were about 28 and 25kts.
of the Japanese battleships available only the 4 rebuilt Kongo class battlecruisers could hit 30kts, The Yamato was good for 27kts and the other battleships were about 1/2 to 3knts slower. actual service speeds may be slower. I believe the Kongo class ships only had eight 5in AA guns each (4 twin mounts) so their AA ability was not great. next step was the 25mm AA guns.
Carriers do a lot of high speed steaming to launch and recover planes, could the Battleships keep even somewhat close without burning up too much fuel?
Also, due to the Doolittle Raid, two [Japanese] carriers were diverted to the Alaskan island invasion to prevent them from being used as bomber bases and could not be used in the Midway operations.
Doolittle Raid - Wikipedia
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Operation AL employed a dedicated task force that was deployed in concert with Operation MI. Admiral Kakuta's force included the carriers Ryujo and Junyo.
pinehilljoe
Senior Airman
- 674
- May 1, 2016
Shattered Sword is a good revisionist book.
In his book, Fuchida states the carriers were caught with their decks full of aircraft. See the photo of Soryu, no aircraft on the deck of the holed ship.
Stock Photo - Battle of Midway, June 3-7, 1942. Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu (Flying Dragon), abandoned and burning after attacks by dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Enterprise. World
In his book, Fuchida states the carriers were caught with their decks full of aircraft. See the photo of Soryu, no aircraft on the deck of the holed ship.
Stock Photo - Battle of Midway, June 3-7, 1942. Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu (Flying Dragon), abandoned and burning after attacks by dive bombers from USS Yorktown and Enterprise. World
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
All four carriers had their hangar decks full of aircraft being prepped for a strike.
The main deck of all four carriers was kept clear, per IJN battle doctrine, to recover and launch CAP elements.
Here's a photo of the Soryu taking evasive maneuvers during the battle - look to the stern and you'll see an A6M waiting to launch from an otherwise empty main deck.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Ryūjō was not a fleet carrier. This is where Koga's Zero came from.
When it came to Japanese planning, you can never make it too complicated.
When it came to Japanese planning, you can never make it too complicated.
sdmodeller
Recruit
- 4
- Oct 21, 2016
You cannot overestimate the operational problems Nagumo had. He came from a dichotomous culture that did not question authority, yet a navy that had fistfights between high ranking officers. He was hamstrung by specific orders by Yamamoto, an inflexible operations plan that absolutely refused to have the Americans behave in any way not predicted, and no intelligence to help until he had already begun shifting to armaments. Finally, the doctrine of the Japanese navy was a mash of very modern and very obsolete. Finally early Japanese carrier design left them with all the worst characteristics possible. Finally damage control as part of training for every sailor was non-existent and was an institutional failure. When he heard about the ships he ordered a re-rearming to follow doctrine but in reality never had the time to get a strike on deck. He could not run to open the distance- he would lose face and be called cowardly, he could not doctrinally launch a mixed strike , he would also lose most of the Midway strike in ditchings, and he could not wait. Obviously with a different fleet doctrine, most American commanders would have sent off the strike armed with whatever they had, even if it were depth charges as they still would blow up in a fire. Nagumo could not.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
The Dauntless dive bombers missed their target and got lost. A IJN destroyer had been despatched from the fleet to chase a USN sub. This was then used as a guide by the dive bombers to the fleet carriers.
The uncoordinated attacks meant that the Zeros were chasing torpedo bombers on the deck. The Dauntlesses had open target. Luck is as much about war as anything and the Americans got plenty and Nagumo got dealt rags.
My favourite bad luck story is about the Coral Sea is that a Japanese strike force missed finding the carriers and so jettisoned the bombs to make it back home only then to find the USN carriers! Talk about ifs and buts. Also the Japanese sent a powerful strike force against a carrier sighting but it was a tanker and a destroyer. It was bad news for the 2 ships who got the chop but it wasn't carriers.
The USN also got a faulty sighting of Fleet carriers but found Shoho instead and this light carrier got absolutely plastered.
A point of the Coral Sea is that the air attack on Lexington and Yorktown was very much against the Lexington and Yorktown got a less powerful strike. Had both ships got equal measures then both ships could have been lost or badly damaged and so Yorktown may have been too damaged for Midway.
Zuikaku and Shokaku were both penciled in for Midway but there unavailability didn't seem to change the plans much. Which you think it would! Losing 2 carriers and about 180 planes is a chuffing big spanner in anyone's works.
The uncoordinated attacks meant that the Zeros were chasing torpedo bombers on the deck. The Dauntlesses had open target. Luck is as much about war as anything and the Americans got plenty and Nagumo got dealt rags.
My favourite bad luck story is about the Coral Sea is that a Japanese strike force missed finding the carriers and so jettisoned the bombs to make it back home only then to find the USN carriers! Talk about ifs and buts. Also the Japanese sent a powerful strike force against a carrier sighting but it was a tanker and a destroyer. It was bad news for the 2 ships who got the chop but it wasn't carriers.
The USN also got a faulty sighting of Fleet carriers but found Shoho instead and this light carrier got absolutely plastered.
A point of the Coral Sea is that the air attack on Lexington and Yorktown was very much against the Lexington and Yorktown got a less powerful strike. Had both ships got equal measures then both ships could have been lost or badly damaged and so Yorktown may have been too damaged for Midway.
Zuikaku and Shokaku were both penciled in for Midway but there unavailability didn't seem to change the plans much. Which you think it would! Losing 2 carriers and about 180 planes is a chuffing big spanner in anyone's works.
The Basket
Senior Master Sergeant
- 3,712
- Jun 27, 2007
Nagumo comes across as a very safe by the book kinda guy. Which has its place.
The Americans were reading Japanese codes before Midway so it's not like this was going to go well.
Thing is that it's supposed to be a surprise but not only do the Americans know, they are lining up combat aircraft to attack you. Which means they are waiting for you.
Should have rang alarm bells. Also Midway was a diversion but all these aircraft are attacking you which makes Midway a priority target plus the carriers are somewhere plus the invasion force! Lots to go!
But IJN certainly turned around if things were going south and Nagumo could have gone west to get out of range of Midways bombers. There is a tradition in most navies to be aggressive. The Nelson touch.
in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time, in order to encourage the others.
Captain Leach was said to be under court martial for not forcing combat in the HMS Prince of Wales against the Bismarck after Hood blew up. Absolute nuts. Although a court martial would have probably saved his life.
The Americans were reading Japanese codes before Midway so it's not like this was going to go well.
Thing is that it's supposed to be a surprise but not only do the Americans know, they are lining up combat aircraft to attack you. Which means they are waiting for you.
Should have rang alarm bells. Also Midway was a diversion but all these aircraft are attacking you which makes Midway a priority target plus the carriers are somewhere plus the invasion force! Lots to go!
But IJN certainly turned around if things were going south and Nagumo could have gone west to get out of range of Midways bombers. There is a tradition in most navies to be aggressive. The Nelson touch.
in this country, it is good to kill an admiral from time to time, in order to encourage the others.
Captain Leach was said to be under court martial for not forcing combat in the HMS Prince of Wales against the Bismarck after Hood blew up. Absolute nuts. Although a court martial would have probably saved his life.
That's interesting, Bismarck Captain Ernst Lindemann was fixing to finish off the Prince of Wales but Admiral Günther Lütjens "obeyed operational orders to shun any avoidable engagement with enemy forces that were not protecting a convoy,[70] firmly rejecting the request, and instead ordered Bismarck and Prinz Eugen to head for the North Atlantic.[71] "
Conslaw
Senior Airman
Yamato and his admirals supposedly played many rounds of wargames to simulate potential Midway battles. Their basic assumptions were flawed in a very elemental way the Japanese should have caught. The US did not have to fight a naval battle at Midway if the odds were against them. Losing the garrison at Midway would have been less detrimental than losing its carriers. If the US fleet was preserved, Midway could be retaken almost at will. The Japanese would have had a difficult time just taking Midway with the men and material committed. If successful the Japanese Garrison would face starvation very quickly. In other words the US Navy had every reason to avoid the type of decicive battle that Yamato NEEDED to buy time to fortify the navy and the empire.
