Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

I always assumed that like USS Wasp(CV-7) that she was deficient in armour and was therefore relegated to theatres where enemy opposition was weakest. I could be wrong here. USS Wasp was even worse than the Ranger, IIRC the armour planned for it was never installed, so its not surprising that she was sunk.
Wasp was always front line. The Atlantic Fleet service was higher priority than the Pacificat at the time. She was sunk by what is arguably one of the finest Submarine Torpedo attacks in history. With one 6 torpedo spread, 3 hit Wasp and sunk her; 1 hit the DD O'Brien and sunk her; 1 hit North Carolina, keeping her out of service for 3 months.
 
Last edited:
In addition to trying out SBDs as anti-torpedo plane fighters, prewar doctrine included experiments with SBDs with smoke generators, meant to fly in front of the TBDs, masking their approach. It might have worked in that respect, but it also kept the torpedo plane pilots from being able to line up on their targets. AFAIK this tactic was never used operationally.
 
Wasp was always front line. The Atlantic Fleet service was higher priority than the Pacificat at the time. She was sunk by what is arguably one of the finest Submarine Torpedo attacks in history. With one 6 torpedo spread, 3 hit Wasp and sunk her; 1 hit the DD O'Brien and sunk her; 1 hit North Carolina, keeping her out of service for 3 months.
If you examine all the USN carrier losses during the war, they were for the most part lost to torpedo attacks, not aerial attacks.
The USN had a comprehensive damage control policy that employed all hands in a well drilled procedure unlike most other navies.
There are several instances where US Carriers took considerable damage and the ship was thought to be lost, but damage control recovered the ship. The Yorktown is one such example, where she was thought to be lost (the IJN confirmed her loss) but she was recovered only to be lost (again) at Midway.
 
I was always under the assumption (yeah, I know) that Ranger was not considered fit for front line service by 1942, as a delivery/training ship yes but per Shattered Sword the IJN accounted for her in their calculations as a front line unit while the USN did not.

Perhaps Mr. Leonard can set me straight on whether that's correct or not.
 
If you examine all the USN carrier losses during the war, they were for the most part lost to torpedo attacks, not aerial attacks.
The USN had a comprehensive damage control policy that employed all hands in a well drilled procedure unlike most other navies.
There are several instances where US Carriers took considerable damage and the ship was thought to be lost, but damage control recovered the ship. The Yorktown is one such example, where she was thought to be lost (the IJN confirmed her loss) but she was recovered only to be lost (again) at Midway.

The US Navy damage control ability was astounding. This is especially evident in the case of the kamikaze hits on the Franklin and the Bunker Hill. I was also amazed to see this web page which lists all of the American aircraft carriers hit by kamikazes. For a while in the Okinawa campaign, Japan was removing US ships from service faster than they could be replaced, but these ships weren't usually sunk.
 
Not unlike Lexington and Saratoga, which only had two, centerlined, and those notoriously slow, the amidships elevators on Ranger were slightly starboard of the centerline and were faster. There was, of course, Ranger's centerlined, albeit smaller, elevator aft. The lesson from Lexington and Saratoga was three elevators were better than two and faster operation was needed
 
Always believe Nagumo gets the poor end of the stick.
He just got dealt a lot of poor cards.
Nagumo would have benefited from more carriers. Zuikaku was left behind in Japan to replenish her CAG, demonstrating the downside of the IJN's slow pilot and aircraft replacement.

What about Zuiho (commissioned Dec 1940), Junyo (commissioned May 1942) and Ryujo? Imagine these three along with Zuikaku at Midway.
 
Last edited:
Why did the IJN require its aircraft be struck below and re-armed inside the hangars? What's the greater risk of swapping bombs for torpedoes while the aircraft were on the flight deck? Surely the faster aircraft are rearmed and launched the better?

The RN did both. Here's the FAA arming Swordfish on the flight deck. Surely if in a rush with a strike group already ranged on the fight deck this is the better move?

cd9ac2e8b76f00161502c962c60b0f62--hms-illustrious-fairey-swordfish.jpg


And I have to assume the IJN didn't require that the Zeros' magazines be replenished below deck?
 
Last edited:
It's a riot to think that Imperial Japan contemplated invading Australia or even India. I remember reading a German General talking about the Kriegsmarine saying it's impossible to talk to them cos they only think in continents.

The IJA were too busy fighting a war to bother with such patent nonsense. Maybe then the Midway campaign was a way to win without the IJA and the IJN gets all the credit.

From my view, the IJN had a lead and blew it. Had they had all 4 carriers for the Guadalcanal campaign then that could be have been decisive.
 
It's a riot to think that Imperial Japan contemplated invading Australia or even India. I remember reading a German General talking about the Kriegsmarine saying it's impossible to talk to them cos they only think in continents.

The IJA were too busy fighting a war to bother with such patent nonsense. Maybe then the Midway campaign was a way to win without the IJA and the IJN gets all the credit.

From my view, the IJN had a lead and blew it. Had they had all 4 carriers for the Guadalcanal campaign then that could be have been decisive.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back