Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

[davparlr]

It's not the loss of planes that was the problem, it's the loss of the skilled pilots.

The loss of aircrews at Midway was not a crippling blow to Japan. They lost 121 aircrew members, not all pilots, out of a possible 2000 carrier qualed crew members available at the outbreak of the war (per Shattered Sword). It was the later battles in the south pacific that decimated the majority of highly trained and capable aircrews. However, the loss of maintenance personnel was indeed a blow.

 

[pinsog]

All of it was a problem for Japan. The 4 carriers at Midway were all carrying several fewer planes than they were capable of because losses had not been replaced. Their pilot and aircrew losses weren't large but they were irreplaceable veteran pilots and crew. They lost 4 carriers as well and while japan built more carriers they still could not keep up with the US. It's called attrition, every single plane, pilot or ship Japan lost was one more they couldn't replace while the US juggernaut could while not even considering Japan to be the main enemy.

Midway was a big US victory, but it didn't matter. Guadalcanal was a US victory, but it didn't matter. At the beginning of 1943 the first of the new Essex class carriers began sliding into the sea, filled with much better performing Hellcats and Avengers. P38's were beginning to fill up Army airfields in Australia and moving out into the Pacific. B24's, B25's and B26's filtered out as well, bombing Japanese airfields at long range. American pilots were being trained by the 10's of thousands. Even all of this really doesn't matter. If we had not sunk a single Japanese carrier the entire war, on August 6, 1945, a single B29 with probably a large fighter escort would fly out and drop a nuke right over the middle of a huge Japanese fleet bustling with carriers and aircraft and POOF! the bar has been reset.

 

[Conslaw]

The carriers committed to the Aleutians operation were core to the operation. The Japanese thought occupying the Aleutians would be more essential to occupying Midway. The Japanese thought the Aleutians could be a stepping stone to bombing Japan. I suspect that even if Japan had made no moves to the Aleutians, it would not have been the source of a major thrust by the Americans. Operations there were just too difficult. I suppose the natural question then is, could the two operations have been done at different times? In my view, if Japan would have invaded the Aleutians first, the US Navy carriers probably wouldn't have intervened immediately. Would it have been practical as a follow-on from the Midway invasion, maybe a week or two later? I don't know.

 

[pinsog]

If they sunk the 3 US carriers they wouldn't have had too much to worry about except for what we could ferry through Canada up to Alaska

 

[GrauGeist]

If they sunk the 3 US carriers they wouldn't have had too much to worry about except for what we could ferry through Canada up to Alaska

The USN still had the Ranger (CV-4), Saratoga (CV-3) and others like Long Island (AVG-1/CVE-1) and Copahee (AVG-11/CVE-12).
Plus the Essex (CV-9), Yorktown - originally Bon Homme Richard (CV-10), Lexington - originally Cabot (CV-16), Interpid (CV-11) and Bunker Hill (CV-17) coming into service in the first part of 1943.

 

[pinsog]

I'm thinking Saratoga is the only one of those really capable of taking on the Japanese head to head. Which really makes it a 1 vs the entire Japanese Navy. The other ships start coming in I think around March 1943 which gives the Japanese about 9 months to do what they want.

 

[GrauGeist]

As of 8 December 1941, the Saratoga's air groups consisted of:
(VF-3) 7 F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A
(VB-3) 21 SBD-3
(VS-3) 22 SBD-3
(VT-3) 12 TBD-1

And the Ranger's air groups consisted of:
(VF-5) 18 F4F-3 and 1 F4F-3A
(VF-41) 17 F4F-3 and 2 SNJ-3
(VS-41) 8 SB2U-1 and 2 SB2U-2
(VS-42) 9 SB2U-1 and 6 SB2U-2
(VT-4) 3 TBD-1

So I'm not sure why the Saratoga would be considered more capable than the Ranger.

 

[Shortround6]

I haven't bothered to look it up but it might have something to do with the amount of Aviation fuel on board, the size of the ordnance magazines for the aircraft and the extra 5 or knots wind over the deck the Saratoga could provide to get heavily laden aircraft into the air.
I could be wrong. I would also note that a number of the Japanese carriers could not make 30kts let alone 32-33kts and they were judged as capable.

 

[GrauGeist]

Going from memory, the Ranger's speed had been limited by the Washington Treaty, but she could make just over 29 knots.
But then again, the Kaga was only good for 28 knots.

 

[Shortround6]

Not sure if she was limited by the treaty itself or if 28-29 kts was all they could get out of it with the weight of engines used which had to fit in the treaty limited weight. She was a very tricky juggling act to get over 70 planes on an under 15,000 ton carrier

 

[pinsog]

As of 8 December 1941, the Saratoga's air groups consisted of:
(VF-3) 7 F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A
(VB-3) 21 SBD-3
(VS-3) 22 SBD-3
(VT-3) 12 TBD-1

And the Ranger's air groups consisted of:
(VF-5) 18 F4F-3 and 1 F4F-3A
(VF-41) 17 F4F-3 and 2 SNJ-3
(VS-41) 8 SB2U-1 and 2 SB2U-2
(VS-42) 9 SB2U-1 and 6 SB2U-2
(VT-4) 3 TBD-1

So I'm not sure why the Saratoga would be considered more capable than the Ranger.

That's a pretty small airgroup for Saratoga. On July 7, 1942 she carried 90 aircraft, 37 wildcats, 37 SBD's and 16 Avengers. That's not a ferry mission, that was her load for fighting

 

[R Leonard]

As of 8 December 1941, the Saratoga's air groups consisted of:
(VF-3) 7 F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A
(VB-3) 21 SBD-3
(VS-3) 22 SBD-3
(VT-3) 12 TBD-1

And the Ranger's air groups consisted of:
(VF-5) 18 F4F-3 and 1 F4F-3A
(VF-41) 17 F4F-3 and 2 SNJ-3
(VS-41) 8 SB2U-1 and 2 SB2U-2
(VS-42) 9 SB2U-1 and 6 SB2U-2
(VT-4) 3 TBD-1

So I'm not sure why the Saratoga would be considered more capable than the Ranger.

And Saratoga was in the yard for maintenance. While the VB & VS squadrons were up to strength and the VT was near so (12 vice 15), VF-3 was sorely under-strength due to its on-going transition from the F2A to the F4F.

Ranger's squadrons don't look hefty in numbers, either. First of all, when deployed the VF's rotated, one was ashore and the other deployed aboard. And the VS squadrons? Not just under-strength, but SB2U's? You are kidding, right? Not even real dive bombers . . . SB2Us, -1s, -2s, and, yes, the Marine Corps -3s, could only glide bomb, a long sad story that impacted Midway. Jeez, the SBC biplanes over in the Hornet VB & VS rons could at least actually dive bomb.

Ranger's VT-4 was officially established on 10 Jan 1942 while the ship was a Grassy Bay, Bermuda, with a total of six TBDs aboard, under command of LT Wallace Andrew Sherrill, USN. Among those assigned to the new squadron were: John S Warfel, LTJG, USNR AV(N); George Daniel Martin Cunha, ENS, USN; Willard Wilson Ball, AOM3c (NAP), USN; George Washington Bolt, AMM1c (NAP), USN; Paul Eugene Dickson, AMM1c (NAP), USN; Robert William Labyak, AOM1c (NAP), USN; Merlin John Stockwell, AMM1c (NAP), USN; and George Washington Thomas, AM1c (NAP), USN . Can't specifically date when Warfel and Cunha came aboard, but all the NAPs reported aboard on 17 Dec 1941. Sherrill was already aboard as XO in VS-41. One might presume the oft repeated torpedo storage/handling problem had been resolved. The original aircraft complement was an average of 8 TBD's up through the end of July 1942. By the end of August 1942, VT-4's complement was up to 18 TBF-1, but the squadron's complement eventually settled down to an average of 10 TBFs. What you are looking at on 8 December 1941 for Ranger are the initial deliveries.

Off hand, I'd say VF-3's chances of getting 9 F4Fs from whatever source were better than VS-41 or VS-42 getting full complements of SBD's. Let's see, by about 15 February 1942 VF-3 had all 18 of its F4F-3 complement. Truthfully though, at the time VF-3 was aboard Lexington while VF-2 was dumping off its F2As for F4Fs. VF-3 and VF-2 would be trading off airplanes and pilots back and forth right up to Lexington's departure for Coral Sea . . . everyone, yours truly excepted, seemed surprised when the Lexington wreck was found and what fighters of which they took pictures were clearly in VF-3 livery, not VF-2. At the same time Ranger's VS-41 and 42 were still operating the venerable SB2Us; as were Wasp's VS-71 and 72, for that matter.

 

[R Leonard]

Between 7 December 1941 and late 1942, the USN had a steep learning curve against Japan, who at the time, was numerically superior and had several years of combat experience on the US Navy.

Most of the vaunted combat experience acquired by IJNAF units/personnel was in ground based units, not carrier units . . . and against the Chinese AF of the late 1930's . . . quite a challenge I am sure

The USN CAP early on, comprised of the F4F and SBD with inexperienced pilots against veteran pilots that had greater numbers - add to that, instances where IJA participated with IJN elements against the USN, too.

The business of SBDs as anti-VT CAP was not doctrine. It was a one-off deal pushed as a pet theory of then CAPT Frederick Sherman on Lexington. Turned out to be a pretty stupid idea that not only caused losses of SBDs, but simultaneously deprived the strike groups of about 25% of their striking capability. The results of this one time use quickly extinguish any further such attempts.

 

[R Leonard]

Perhaps you can enlighten me on how well the USN performed at Pearl Harbor, then, which happened to be primarily a USN facility?
If memory serves me right, it was several USAAC elements that got airborn to challenge IJN aircraft.
Where were the Navy's F4F and F2A fighters? I don't seem to recall any getting up to challenge the Japanse...

As has been pointed out, the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor, including in the air, belonged to the US Army. And just what clouds of USN F4Fs and F2As would you expect to rise up an smite the Japanese? Enterprise and Lexington were at sea and Saratoga in the yard on the west coast. Exactly what was available in terms of naval fighters? Looks something like this:
Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor

Lexington Air Group - VF-2 - 3 F2A‑3 (in maintenance status)​

Saratoga Air Group - VF-3 - 1 F4F‑3 (in maintenance status)​

Marine Corps Air Station, Ewa

VMF‑211 Rear Echelon - 10 F4F‑3 (these are the ones that did not make the trip to Wake, mostly for maintenance reasons which is why VF-6 aboard Enterprise had to give some of it's planes to the VMF-211 Forward Echelon)​

I believe most of the VMF-211 fighters were destroyed on the ground, two survived the attack.

The USAAF had 138 fighters of various types (not counting a smattering of 14 P-26's) of which 54 were out of commission for maintenance. A total of 46 of those 138 fighters were destroyed, either on the ground (most of them) or in the air, leaving 92 on-hand after the attack, of which but 43 were operational.

Seems the preponderance of available fighter aircraft was in the hands of the USAAF

 

[R Leonard]

The Dauntless dive bombers missed their target and got lost. A IJN destroyer had been despatched from the fleet to chase a USN sub. This was then used as a guide by the dive bombers to the fleet carriers. .

I'd suggest that is a way, way overly simplistic description and, for certain, the EAG SBDs flying up the Arashi's track were not lost.

 

[GrauGeist]

I was pointing out the USN's reported strengths for the Saratoga and the Ranger as of the day of decleration of war against the Empire of Japan.
This was in rebuttal to the prospect of the loss of the three USN carriers at the battle of Midway.

As it happens historically, the USS Ranger was a force in the MTO during Operation Torch and shortly after, in the North Sea, accounting for a number of Axis shipping.

So in the "what if" realm, had the USN lost the Hornet, Yorktown and Enterprise at Midway, there were still two fleet carriers that would be up to the challenge to hold the line in the Pacific until early 1943.

 

[pinsog]

I see Ranger could transport 75 P40's when used as a ferry, I can't seem to find what size airgroup she could handle in battle. The Saratoga was a big ship and could operate 100 aircraft in battle if she chose. I believe it was The First Team that said they thought about using her as a fighter carrier only and that they thought she could operate up to 200 Wildcats! But they decided that was putting too many eggs in one basket if something happened to her.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Ranger was close to a Lexington class carrier...she could carry a max. of 86 aircraft.

Not sure why people are surprised that the Ranger was so large...perhaps spending most of her time in the Atlantic and out of the PTO spotlight has relegated her to the back-burner of history?

 

[Kevin J]

The Ranger was close to a Lexington class carrier...she could carry a max. of 86 aircraft.

Not sure why people are surprised that the Ranger was so large...perhaps spending most of her time in the Atlantic and out of the PTO spotlight has relegated her to the back-burner of history?

I always assumed that like USS Wasp(CV-7) that she was deficient in armour and was therefore relegated to theatres where enemy opposition was weakest. I could be wrong here. USS Wasp was even worse than the Ranger, IIRC the armour planned for it was never installed, so its not surprising that she was sunk.

 

[VBF-13]

It's not the loss of planes that was the problem, it's the loss of the skilled pilots.

Yes, that too. And, I'll assure you, most, if not all, here, agree with it, and that it had a big bearing on the final outcome. The Japanese knew it, though. They knew, they didn't knock off those American carriers, they were facing that kind of war of attrition, all around, making victory only the more elusive for them.