Intriguing Midway discussion - IJN Point of View

[RCAFson]

Midway was the curiosity until a lot of combat aircraft came from Midway and started firing. Then it has their full attention.

I doubt the IJN knew the USN torpedoes were poor. So any torpedo attack is hair raising.

Armoured decks carry less aircraft so its not a no brainer. Less combat aircraft mean that you need something like 3 Armoured carriers against 2 unarmoured to carry same air power. It's all about the numbers.

But as I pointed out this is not necessarily true. The Implacable class and Taiho carried (or could have) a very similar complement to an Essex class. Early war the RN didn't use large permanent deck parks, as per the USN but when they began to do so, most of the differences in aircraft capacity vanished.

 

[davparlr]

Two more points about the Midway based aircraft attack on the Japanese. First, the battle lasted about 20 minutes, interrupting an equivalent time of flight operations. 30 minutes later, another "failed" Midway attack started with B-17s and SBDs lasting over half an hour, again interrupting Japanese flight operations. For the Japanese, it brings to mind an old saying, "When you are up to your butt in alligators, it hard to remember you job is to drain the swamp."
Second, the penetrating B-26s, which were claimed to be blazingly fast, were the short wing "B" versions. Had these been the 20-30 mph slower long wing versions, most likely all would have been lost without penetration.

 

[VBF-13]

Let's keep in mind that the exalted Kido Butai of Pearl Harbor fame was never tested defensively during that battle. They laid off to the north of Oahu and sent in their airstrikes.

How would that have changed, historically, if the U.S. Carriers that were out to sea on 7 December, happened to come across them during the attack?

How would the IJN's task force handled attacks differently between Pearl Harbor and Midway? The answer is simple: there would not have been any difference...the legendary Kido Butai was not put to the true test until Midway and they fell like a house of cards under pressure.

The Japanese carriers did seem to have glass jaws when hit compared to Illustrious as an example, who took one 1000kg direct hit, 6 500kg direct hits plus a further 500kg near miss, and she then sailed into Grand Harbour under her own steam, she was one tough girl with a crew to match.

Just as with their featherweight but agile and very adept fighter aircraft, their best defense is a good offense? Especially when coupled with the element of surprise, that seems to reflect their thinking...

 

[PAT303]

Just as with their featherweight but agile and very adept fighter aircraft, their best defense is a good offense? Especially when coupled with the element of surprise, that seems to reflect their thinking...

Trouble is Japanese planes had no defence, it's common to hear how Japanese aircraft had longer legs and were very agile in a fight compared to Allied aircraft but everything else was sacrificed to meet that requirement, so no armour, self sealing tanks, effective armament or radio. Gun camera footage of Allied/German aircraft show many of them getting chucks ripped off them but surviving, Japanese aircraft turn into balls of flame or shed wings at the first sign of a decent hit. Offensive tactics only work if your fight on your terms, a smart enemy is not going to let you do that.

 

[The Basket]

If American torpedoes worked from day dot then the war could have been very different.
Sub launched mk 14 were so poor it gave the Japanese 2 free years.
The usual what if scenarios are simple in this case... How does the USN win the war in the Pacific quicker? Get the mk 14 working!

 

[PAT303]

Some sad reading here.

Mark 14 torpedo - Wikipedia

 

[VBF-13]

Trouble is Japanese planes had no defence, it's common to hear how Japanese aircraft had longer legs and were very agile in a fight compared to Allied aircraft but everything else was sacrificed to meet that requirement, so no armour, self sealing tanks, effective armament or radio. Gun camera footage of Allied/German aircraft show many of them getting chucks ripped off them but surviving, Japanese aircraft turn into balls of flame or shed wings at the first sign of a decent hit. Offensive tactics only work if your fight on your terms, a smart enemy is not going to let you do that.

Yes, that's what I'm trying to say, actually. They seemed to think a good offense and surprise could carry the battles. They were right, when it worked. When it didn't work, they were on their heels, bad. At Pearl, it worked; at Midway, it didn't. Their ships turned out as vulnerable as their aircraft.

 

[davparlr]

If I remember correctly, I think I read somewhere, probably in "The First Team", that the F4F did not initially have self sealing tanks and armor until around the battle of Coral Sea. According to "America's Hundred Thousand", the F4F-3 did not have armor or self sealing tanks until late aircraft. So initially the Zero was consistent with the F4F in lack of protection only the Japanese were late in adapting to the need.

 

[VBF-13]

If I remember correctly, I think I read somewhere, probably in "The First Team", that the F4F did not initially have self sealing tanks and armor until around the battle of Coral Sea. According to "America's Hundred Thousand", the F4F-3 did not have armor or self sealing tanks until late aircraft. So initially the Zero was consistent with the F4F in lack of protection only the Japanese were late in adapting to the need.

I hear you, but let's look at the big picture. The Japanese were in this to finish this thing quickly, before the Americans could mobilize. I don't think they were thinking safety like we were as much. If you look at the evolution of the A6M, they were late in these revisions. It was too late, too, to make a difference. The war was lost for them after Midway, and they knew that deep in their hearts. They failed to break our back, and they knew that was it, it was over. They kept on trying, but they knew they were overmatched.

 

[VBF-13]

The reason they were resistant to the armor plating was the weight; the reason they were resistant to the self-sealing tanks was the loss of fuel-capacity in those padded tanks, which was around 20-25%, give or take.

 

[michael rauls]

The reason they were resistant to the armor plating was the weight; the reason they were resistant to the self-sealing tanks was the loss of fuel-capacity in those padded tanks, which was around 20-25%, give or take.

Very interesting. I had always read and therefore assumed that the Japanese resistance to self sealing fuel tanks was due to weight increase alone.

 

[Peter Gunn]

I think the war was lost for the Japanese on December 7, 1941. A sneak attack virtually guaranteed the implacable hatred of the Americans, nothing Japan could do was ever going to bring the U. S. to the negotiating table. Even had the IJN triumphed at Midway all that would have bought them was maybe a year before they were inevitably buried by American production and better equipment.

Unlike the ETO, the outcome of the Pacific war was never really in doubt, once production got rolling the fat lady might as well tune up the pipes.

Not to belittle the sacrifice or the bitter fighting that were hallmarks of the PTO, it's just that Japan (stupidly) took on a juggernaut she couldn't handle no matter what her armed forces managed early on.

 

[VBF-13]

Very interesting. I had always read and therefore assumed that the Japanese resistance to self sealing fuel tanks was due to weight increase alone.

Interesting side note. The tanks wouldn't necessarily explode when they were hit, unless they were hit with a lot, all at once. The tracer-fire would bring down the aircraft with the hit tanks by igniting the combustible vapor trails. I don't have citation for that (...or, more precisely, verification outside of the pilots, themselves, I've had the privilege of sitting with, and listening to).

 

[fliger747]

I believe that the 50 BMG fired some incendiary rounds and that a mix of AP and incendiary were often fired.

Statement subject to memory error...

 

[Shortround6]

It may depend on year, theater and state of supply. The US didn't have any incendiary before the war, at least not in production and we seem to have followed the British. US getting an Incendiary into service at some point in 1941? from then until 1944 mixed belts were common (often 40%AP, 40% Incendiary and 20% tracer although less tracer was used as time went on) The M8 API was introduced in the Spring of 1944 (?) and soon became the preferred round and replaced both the AP and incendiary.

 

[drgondog]

Until the RAF kept rejecting a/c from US based on lack of armor plate and self sealing tanks - NONE of the front line AAF/USN fighters (or bombers) had such tanks on December 7. The AAF did not initiate a Serious program to develop self sealing and external combat tanks until Feb 1942. The 160 gallon tank (for P-38) didn't pass MC tests until summer 1943. The first 'long range' fuel tank for VIII FC was the freaking 200 gallon, un-pressurized, ferry tank in late July 1943 because we were that desperate.

The Japanese design philosophy was not that much different from ours through 1940. Their lack of armor and self sealing tanks was in parallel with our own. Our sense of urgency (IMO) was to acquiesce to the RAF standards to provide funding to Curtiss and Lockheed to upgrade production modifications via BPC rather than low budget AAC/AAF.

 

[Conslaw]

The Japanese strategy of making the zero a light-weight, long-range fighter at the expense of armor and fuel tank protection was a sound one through the conquest part of the war. Despite these deficiencies, zero losses were manageable at least until the Battle of Midway, and in that battle, most of the planes were lost on board the ships rather than in combat.

 

[GrauGeist]

The Japanese also lost a good number of aircraft because they no longer had a place to land.

The Hosho and the Zuiho were too far out of range for any Kido Butai (Carrier Div. 1/2) "orphans".

 

[taly01]

The Hosho and the Zuiho were too far out of range for any Kido Butai (Carrier Div. 1/2) "orphans".

Actually this brings up the dispersion of forces issue, Given that Kido Butai was missing Zuikaku and Shokaku they could/should have replaced them with the other smaller carriers they squandered on the Aleutian operation and elsewhere.

Now then...... say Japan still losses Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu ...but the close by Zuiho, Ryujo and Hosho etc are able to make a strike and service the orphan planes from the BIG4, and sink all 3 US carriers. This would have given Japan a free hand in the Solomons and saved them the huge losses the incurred there.

 

[PAT303]

The Japanese strategy of making the zero a light-weight, long-range fighter at the expense of armor and fuel tank protection was a sound one through the conquest part of the war. Despite these deficiencies, zero losses were manageable at least until the Battle of Midway, and in that battle, most of the planes were lost on board the ships rather than in combat.

It's not the loss of planes that was the problem, it's the loss of the skilled pilots.